Bombay HC: Whether third party has locus standi to plead on behalf of the real owner that it is he (real owner), who was to be benefited by the Benami transaction?

 It is, therefore, necessary to understand whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that the appellant was holding property Benami. The appellant's husband is not party to the suit and, therefore, he has not claimed himself to be the real owner of the property. To my mind and in terms of Section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act, the question, whether the property held Benami was for the benefit of real owner, can only be answered when the real owner either files a suit or raises a defence on this count. It is so because the intention behind the Benami transaction is known to the person in whose name the property has been purchased or the person who has purchased the property in the name of other. A third party has no locus to plead on behalf of the real owner that it is he (real owner), who was to be benefited by the Benami transaction, unless third party otherwise proves. {Para 12}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 616/2007

Decided On: 26.04.2024

Badrunisa Vs. Sabdar Khan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anil L. Pansare, J.

Citation: 2024:BHC-NAG:4870, MANU/MH/2715/2024.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Kerala HC: Police Cannot Attach Bank Account Under S.107 BNSS Without Magistrate's Approval

 IRAC Analysis of Kerala High Court Judgment (Crl.M.C.No.3740/2025, Order dated 02.06.2025)

With Emphasis on the Concept of "Proceeds of Crime"

Issue

·       Whether the police, during the investigation of a criminal case, can freeze the bank account of a third-party company (Headstar Global Pvt. Ltd.) under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), or whether such freezing requires a specific procedure under Section 107 of BNSS, especially when the funds involved may constitute "proceeds of crime".

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DelhI HC: Passport & Personal Identification Details Cannot Be Disclosed Under RTI Act to third party as it is invasion of Privacy

 Further, the observations of learned Single Judge in the aforesaid batch of writ petitions are contrary to the judgment of another learned Single Judge in Suhas Chakma v. Central Information Commission, W.P.(C) 9118/2009 decided on 2nd January, 2010 as well as a Division Bench's judgment in Harish Kumar v. Provost Marshal-Cum-Appellate Authority, LPA 253/2012 decided on 30th March, 2012. In Suhas Chakma (supra) another learned Single Judge has held as under:

"5. The Court is of the considered view that information which involves the rights of privacy of a third party in terms of Section 8(1)(j) RTI Act cannot be ordered to be disclosed without notice to such third party. The authority cannot simply come to conclusion, that too, on a concession or on the agreement of parties before it, that public interest overrides the privacy rights of such third party without notice to and hearing such third party." {Para 12}

13. The relevant portion of the Division Bench in Harish Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow:-

9. What we find in the present case is that the PIO had not refused the information. All that the PIO required the appellant to do was, to follow third party procedure. No error can be found in the said reasoning of the PIO. Under Section 11 of the Act, the PIO if called upon to disclose any information relating to or supplied by a third party and which is to be treated as confidential, is required to give a notice to such third party and is to give an opportunity to such third party to object to such disclosure and to take a decision only thereafter.

10. There can be no dispute that the information sought by the appellant was relating to a third party and supplied by a third party. We may highlight that the appellant also wanted to know the caste as disclosed by his father-in-law in his service record. The PIO was thus absolutely right in, response to the application for information of the appellant, calling upon the appellant to follow the third party procedure under Section 11. Reliance by the PIO on Section 8 (1) (j) which exempts from disclosure of personal information and the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest and which would cause unwanted invasion of the privacy of the individual was also apposite. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P.(C) 5836/2018

Decided On: 28.01.2025

Rakesh Kumar Vs. Central Public Information Officer and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sachin Datta, J.

Citation: 2025DHC 618: MANU/DE/0639/2025.

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Whether insurance Company can refuse to pay compensation to third party if certificate of Insurance was wrongly issued?

If a question of fraud or misrepresentation arises by and between the insurer and the insured, the third party claimant is not concerned therewith. A vehicle is required to be compulsorily insured in terms of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Keeping in view the aforementioned provisions, we are of the opinion that the learned tribunal has committed an error in going into the issue raised by the respondent No. 1. In our opinion, if according to the respondent No. 1, the contract of insurance did not come into force on 18-2-1992 and the certificate of insurance was wrongly granted either by reason of any mistake or fraud committed by either of the parties or by its officers, the remedy of the respondent No. 1 may be to initiate a separate proceeding for realisation of the amount so paid by it from the owner of the vehicle, but keeping in view the letter and spirit of the Motor Vehicles Act, we are of the opinion that a third party claimant should not suffer therefore.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

Misc. Appeal No. 7 of 1995

Decided On: 31.07.1996

V. Ravi Vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and S.K. Tiwari, JJ.

Author: S.B. Sinha, J.

Citation: MANU/WB/0032/1997, 1998ACJ598, AIR1997CAL242.

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Whether high court can entertain criminal revision at the instance of third party?

So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court has suo moto power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. The State (Delhi Administration),   MANU/SC/0176/1975 : 1976CriLJ1721 . {Para 6}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1682, 1683, 1684 and 1685 of 1996

Decided On: 18.09.2003

K. Pandurangan and Ors. Vs. S.S.R. Velusamy and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Santosh Hegde and B.P. Singh, JJ.

Author: N. Santosh Hegde, J.

Citation: (2003) 8 SCC 625,MANU/SC/0736/2003.

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Whether third-party flat purchasers in a redevelopment project from developer can claim specific performance of contract from Co-operative society?

The Society is the owner of the property and has

entered into an agreement with the developers, i.e. Vaidehi,

for redevelopment of its property. The redevelopment

envisages construction of the Society’s building to

accommodate its members and also construction of

building/s of flats/premises to be sold to outsiders. The

agreement authorizes or entitles the developers to

construct such building/s and sell flats/premises therein to

outsiders. Such authority or entitlement is to the

developers’ account and in their own right and as an

independent contractor. If in exercise of such authority or

entitlement, a building is constructed by the developers, it

cannot be said that such building is caused to be

constructed by the Society within the meaning of Section

2(c) of the MOFA. {Para 88}

89. Any other interpretation would lead to anomalous

consequences, which could never have been contemplated

by MOFA. The owners of lands entering into agreements

for sale or development agreements with

promoters/developers would be held as being subject to all

liabilities of a promoter, such as liability of disclosure of

plans and specifications, outgoings etc. under Section 3 of

the MOFA, entering into agreements in accordance with

Section 4, giving possession of flats and suffering the

consequences of Section 8, forming co-operative societies

of flat purchasers under Section 10 and so on. This would

be plainly inconceivable.

90. Prima facie, thus, there is no case to treat the

Society, who is merely in the position of an owner vis-avis

the third party purchasers, as a ‘promoter’ within

the meaning of MOFA and foist the obligations of a

promoter on the Society in relation to the purchasers.

91. Besides what is discussed above, there are many

other difficulties in the way of many of these third party

purchasers. In the first place, it now transpires from the

various proceedings that their vendor, Vaidehi, has

proceeded to allot an area far in excess of its entitlement,

which was merely 2,53,500 sq.ft. FSI to start with and

thereafter restricted to 57050 sq.ft. (i.e. after the Rustomjee

Agreement). In fact, what Vaidehi appears to have dealt

with is an area far in excess of even the total FSI (at the rate

of 2.4) available on the entire land. Secondly, the individual

transactions are evidenced only in a few cases by registered

agreements with Vaidehi. Many transactions are contained

in unregistered agreements or even allotment letters which

are not even stamped. Many of these transactions appear to

be simply financial arrangements. Each individual case of a

third party purchaser would thus be subject to different

considerations based on the entitlement of Vaidehi at the

relevant point of time and the nature and incidents of the

individual transaction. But we are dealing here with the

rights of the individual purchasers vis-a-vis the Society

and Rustomjee claimed through Vaidehi and not their

rights qua Vaidehi. All these purchasers certainly have

independent rights to claim damages against Vaidehi,

peculiar to their individual cases, but they have prima

facie no right to claim anything from the Society and

Rustomjee, much less specific performance of their

individual agreements. In the premises, the individual

features of their respective cases, as noted above, have no

relevance to our discussion in this group of Motions and

need not be discussed any further. Even the best placed

amongst them have no leg to stand on as against the Society

or Rustomjee.

92. That brings us to sum up the result of the above

discussion on the prima facie case on merits of individual

stakeholders. Prima facie, it is clear that Vaidehi has

committed breaches of the Society Development

Agreement and that the termination of the Agreement by

the Society was legal and proper. Vaidehi has not made out

any case of its readiness and willingness to perform its

obligations under the Society Development Agreement.

Vaidehi is not entitled to specific performance of the

Society Development Agreement or restrain the

development of the suit property by the Society or

Rustomjee. The Rustomjee Agreement and its confirmation

by the Society by the Confirmation and Supplementary

Agreements as well as further Agreement dated 29 January,

2011 between the Society and Rustomjee are valid and

proper. Members of the Society opposing the development

through Rustomjee are not entitled to any interim relief

either on the basis of the aforesaid agreements being in

breach of the Society Development Agreement or on the

basis of breach of bye-laws or contravention of the State

Government circular dated 3 January, 2009 or on account

of the alleged non-performance of the offer letter by

MHADA or the booklet or directives of MHADA or indeed

on account of any alleged FSI violation or usurpation. The

decisions of the Society in connection with the present

dispute are prima facie taken bona fide and none of the

challenges of the members opposing redevelopment are

prima facie sustainable. None of the third party purchasers,

who claim through Vaidehi under their respective

agreements for sale/allotment letters, have any case for

specific performance of their respective agreements against

the society or Rustomjee. None of these purchasers has

any enforceable right under MOFA against the Society

or Rustomjee.

93. Even the considerations of balance of

convenience and irreparable injury clearly weigh in

favour of the Society and its members, who support the

redevelopment project. The fundamental basis or rather

the very raison d’etre of the entire redevelopment

project is the need for housing of 480 members of the

Society. These members have already surrendered their

tenements to enable the Society to carry out the

redevelopment project first through Vaidehi and later

through Rustomjee, as noted above. Since 2006, these

members have been living in temporary alternative

accommodations. The buildings on the suit property

occupied by these members have since been demolished

and a rehab building for their permanent alternative

accommodation is under construction. The

development of the free sale component is inextricably

linked to the construction of the rehabilitation

component. The cost of the construction of the

rehabilitation component has to be necessarily funded

from and out of the development and sale of the free sale

component. Any relief granted to either of the

stakeholders, namely, Vaidehi or the members opposing

the redevelopment project or the third party purchasers,

who claim through Vaidehi, will necessarily impact the

construction of the rehabilitation component adversely

and jeopardize the members’ right to their permanent

alternative accommodation. The members cannot be

asked to wait indefinitely for years for getting something

which they are legally entitled to and which legal

entitlement is not even questioned by any other

stakeholders.

(Emphasis added)

11. We are in respectful agreement with all these findings on law.

We emphatically reaffirm Vaidehi Akash.

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 1776 OF 2023

Deepak Prabhakar Thakoor & Ors Vs Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) & Ors

CORAM: G.S. Patel & Kamal Khata, JJ.

DATED: 12th October 2023

ORDER (per GS Patel J):-

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Whether the husband can seek production of call details of third party to prove adultery of his wife?

 In the case at hand, tower details of the petitioner is permitted

 to be taken and produced. It is for

the first time, the petitioner comes into the picture merely

on an allegation of illicit relationship. He is a third party to

these proceedings. Third party’s privacy cannot be

permitted to be violated on the specious plea of the

husband that he wants to prove illicit relationship between

the petitioner and the wife. It is trite that right to privacy

is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the

citizens of the Country under Article 21 of the Constitution

of India. It is a right to be ‘let alone’. A citizen has a right

to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage

and other incidental relationships. Informational privacy

also forms an integral part of right to privacy. Therefore,

the order which directs tower details of the petitioner to be

placed before the Court in a proceeding, which he is not

even a party, undoubtedly violates informational privacy.

{Para 11}

12. The acceptance of the order by the wife, by not

challenging it as of now, would have no bearing on the

right of the petitioner to seek quashment of the said order

insofar as, it concerns him, as he is a third party. Wife,

who is anyway party to the proceedings, has instituted

divorce case, her acceptance or otherwise, cannot bind the

petitioner. There is no warrant to permit tower details of

the petitioner to be summoned or brought before the

concerned Court to aid the plea of the husband who has

not even filed any case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

WRIT PETITION No.13165 OF 2019 

MR VISHWAS SHETTY Vs MRS. PREETHI K RAO W/O. VIKRAM SAMANTH.

BEFORE

 MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

DATED:  30TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2022

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Whether Municipal Corporation can lease out open space vested in it in layout to third party?

 Considering the provisions applicable to the present matter, keeping in view observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we find that the Corporation does not have unfettered rights relating to open space. The Corporation has to use it for the purpose for which the space is left open. {Para 12}

13. In this regard, the petitioners have rightly pointed out the Circular issued by the Government of Maharashtra having Writ Petition No.4208/1998 No.TPB4396/114/C.No.89/96/NV.11, dated 10th June 1996. The Circular refers to misuse being done of such 10% open spaces handed over to public institutions. The Circular records that, to such open spaces, the first right is of the plot holders of the layout, because the plot holders have indirectly to the extent of their plots paid price to the owner of the plot even for the open space which was required to be left by the owner. It is stated that, even if from the open space 10% would be constructed for "Balak Mandir, Club Hall" etc., still such use should be made by the Corporation or jointly by the plot holders of the layout. The Circular requires forming of Co-operative Society/ Federation of plot holders of the lay-out. The proposal should be received from the Co-operative Society/ Federation of the plot holders and should be for common use. If Society/ Federation has not been formed, Registered Undertaking can be taken from plot holders to use the open space for the purposes specified. Such structure can be only for purposes of recreation. As per the directions issued by the State Government, the remaining space has to be left open permanently for the common use of the plot holders as a playground or garden or space for recreation. The Circular contains directions that it would be permissible for the Corporation to give such 10% open space to the Co-operative Society/ Federation of the plot holders on rent on such terms and Writ Petition No.4208/1998 conditions as mentioned in the Circular.

14. The above circular was issued on 10.6.1996, which was before the respondent Corporation passed resolution dated 30.3.1998 to give away the land to the respondent Club. There is no material to show that the Corporation made any efforts as were directed under the above Circular dated 10.6.1996.

15. This Court has, in the matter of "R.S. Pool Table & others Vs. The Aurangabad Municipal Corporation & ors."

(Writ Petition No.4335 of 2012), decided on 8th July 2014, held that, even where Corporation has to lease its land, it would be necessary to follow transparent procedure inviting tenders by issuing advertisement. In this matter, the Corporation cannot justify its action of simply receiving an application from a Club hardly two years old, managed by one of its Corporator and leasing out property, in violation of the Circular dated 10.6.1996, which had been recently issued at that time. In fact the Circular issued by State was specifically to curb leasing outs to such public institutions. Neither the Circular was resorted to nor any transparent procedure was followed for leasing out the land. In fact, as per direction Clause 'B' of the Circular, the only course open for the Corporation was to either lease out the open space to the Society/ Federation or develop the same itself.

Writ Petition No.4208/1998

16. For such reasons, the allocation of the open space made by the Corporation in favour of respondent No.3 and the impugned agreement dated 7.9.1998 is quashed and set aside.

Looking to the averments of the respondent No.3 that the petitioner No.1 was misusing the open space to park his vehicles etc., we record that it would be responsibility of the Municipal Corporation to ensure that the open space is kept open and for common use of the plot holders of the lay-out. The Corporation would be at liberty to take necessary steps as per the Circular referred and to ensure that open space is used strictly for the purpose for which it is left open under the bye-laws and shall take action against violation, if any.

Bombay High Court

Punjabrao Srihari Wadje And Anr vs Municipal Corpn. Aurangabad Thr. ... on 29 February, 2016

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Whether court can entertain third party's intervention application in disposed off suit?

  Here, the plaintiff sued and had the decree. Thus, he is

entitled to the decretal amount. When he wanted to withdraw

that amount, somebody else objects. That somebody maybe his

brother or his erstwhile agent. However strong that person's

right to recovery maybe, he cannot file an intervention

application in an already disposed of matter and stay the

execution of the decree or nullify the decree without proper

judicial recourse. {Para 36}

37. After all is said and done, here comes the palliative. If

Subhash has an enforceable claim against either Rajesh or

Sudarshan, the above suit does not defeat his rights. Much less

do these observations affect Subhash’s supposed rights.

38. Under these circumstances, I express my inability to

entertain this application despite diligent efforts made by Shri

Savant, the applicant’s counsel. I, therefore, dismiss it.

39. Shri Savant, at this juncture, wants this Court to

restrain the respondent-plaintiff from withdrawing the decretal

amount for at least eight weeks, so the applicant could explore

his remedial options. The Respondent's counsel, of course,

strongly opposes this plea.

As the intervention application in a disposed of suit has

been summarily rejected, I see no justification for the Court to

grant such relief as the applicant sought. The request stands

rejected.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 11624 OF 2021

IN

SUIT NO. 2700 OF 2011

RAJESH SAICHAND SHARMA Vs SUDERSHAN GANGARAM RAJULA 

CORAM : DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J.

DATE : 11th JUNE, 2021.

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Leading Supreme Court on obtaining information from courts under RTI, Confidential Information and Data Protection

In order to consider the contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. Prashant Bhushan, let us briefly refer to the various categories of information held by the High Court, which are broadly as under:

(a) information held by the High Court relating to the parties to the litigation/proceedings - pleadings, documents and other materials and memo of grounds raised by the parties;

(b) orders and judgments passed by the High Court, notes of proceedings, etc.;

(c) In exercise of power of superintendence over the other courts and tribunals, information received in the records submitted/called for by those courts and tribunals like subordinate judiciary, various tribunals like Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal and other tribunals;

(d) information on the administrative side of the High Court viz. appointments, transfers and postings of the judicial officers, staff members of the High Court and the district judiciary, disciplinary action taken against the judicial officers and the staff members and such other information relating to the administrative work.

(e) Correspondence by the High Court with the Supreme Court, Government and with the district judiciary, etc.;

and

(f) information on the administrative side as to the decision taken by the collegium of the High Court in making recommendations of the Judges to be appointed to the High Court; information as to the assets of the sitting Judges held by the Chief Justice of the High Court.

25. Information under the categories (a), (b) and (c) and other information on the judicial side can be accessed/certified copies of documents and orders could be obtained by the parties to the proceedings in terms of the High Court Rules and the parties to the proceedings are entitled to the same. So far as the third parties are concerned, as of right, they are not entitled to access the information/obtain the certified copies of documents, orders and other proceedings. As per Rules framed by the High Court, a third party can obtain the certified copies of the documents, orders or judgments or can have access to the information only by filing an application/affidavit and by stating the reason for which the information/copies of documents or orders are required. Insofar as on the administrative side i.e. categories (d), (e) and (f), one can have access to the information or copies of the documents could be obtained under the Rules framed by the various High Courts or under the Rules framed by the High Court under the RTI Act. Insofar as the disclosure of information as to the assets of the Judges held by the Chief Justice of the High Court, the same is now covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench reported in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal MANU/SC/1561/2019 : 2019 (16) SCALE 40.

27. Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 requires a third party applicant seeking copies of documents in any civil or criminal proceedings to file an application/affidavit stating the reasons for which those documents are required. As such, the High Court Rules do not obstruct a third party from obtaining copies of documents in any court proceedings or any document on the judicial side. It is not as if the information is denied or refused to the applicant. All that is required to be done is to apply for the certified copies with application/affidavit stating the reasons for seeking the information. The reason insisting upon the third party for stating the grounds for obtaining certified copies is to satisfy the court that the information is sought for bona fide reasons or to effectuate public interest. The information is held by the High Court as a trustee for the litigants in order to adjudicate upon the matter and administer justice. The same cannot be permitted by the third party to have access to such personal information of the parties or information given by the Government in the proceedings. Lest, there would be misuse of process of court and the information and it would reach unmanageable levels. If the High Court Rules framed Under Article 225 provide a mechanism for invoking the said right in a particular manner, the said mechanism should be preserved and followed. The said mechanism cannot be abandoned or discontinued merely because the general law - RTI Act has been enacted.

28. As discussed earlier, the object of the RTI Act itself recognizes the need to protect the institutional interest and also to make optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information. The procedure to obtain certified copies under the High Court Rules is not cumbersome and the procedure is very simple - filing of an application/affidavit along with the requisite court fee stating the reasons for seeking the information. The information held by the High Court on the judicial side are the "personal information" of the litigants like title cases and family court matters, etc. Under the guise of seeking information under the RTI Act, the process of the court is not to be abused and information not to be misused.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1966-1967 of 2020 

Decided On: 04.03.2020

Chief Information Commissioner Vs.  High Court of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi, A.S. Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author:R. Banumathi, J.

Citation:(2020) 4 SCC 702

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Delhi HC: Court may issue interim orders against the third parties to arbitration only in exceptional circumstances

 Undoubtedly, section 9 provides that the court shall have the same powers for making interim orders under section 9 as a civil court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it, and the powers of a civil court in this regard are very wide. The civil courts as and when required, and deemed appropriate in the facts and circumstances of a particular case have been making interim orders in respect of third parties, such as: interim injunction restraining third party-banks from honouring bank guarantees; attaching defendant's monies/property in hands of third party trustee, debtor, agent etc; restraining third party-subsequent transferee/person claiming rights in suit property from disposing of the same, and the like. As a corollary, the power of the court to issue interim orders under section 9 cannot be confined only to the parties to arbitration agreement. However, a significant parameter inherent in section 9, for exercise of this power against a non-signatory to arbitration agreement, is that the purpose of section 9 is to aid arbitration between the parties thereto, and the interim orders there under have to be with regard to subject matter of arbitration/in connection with the arbitral proceedings. In this context, it is relevant to draw a distinction between orders granting interim relief against a party to the arbitration agreement which incidentally affects a third party, on one hand, and orders granting relief directed against a third party, on the other. While the former is ordinarily acceptable as being within the scope of section 9, the power with respect to the latter should be exercised sparingly. For instance, an order appointing a third party as a receiver or guardian of a minor/person of unsound mind is not an order against the third party, or detrimental to its rights as such. Rather, it is a relief granted to the petitioner in support of the arbitral proceedings and affects the party to the arbitration agreement. Similarly, when a subsequent transferee, or a person claiming title under a party to arbitration is ordered to maintain status quo, or not to dispose of property which is subject matter of arbitration, it is again ancillary to arbitral proceedings in as much, as, it is for protection of the subject matter of arbitration that the order is passed. An injunction, or order of attachment with respect to the properties belonging to/monies owed to a party to arbitration, but in hands of a third party for/on behalf of the said party, is effectively a relief against the said party, which incidentally affects the third party. Pertinently, it is expressly provided in the C.P.C., that attachment before judgment shall not affect the prior existing rights of third parties in the property of the defendant sought to be attached. Injunction against a third party bank from honouring a bank guarantee is consequential to interim relief of restraining a party from encashing the same against the petitioner. To sum up, the court may issue interim orders against the third parties to arbitration only in exceptional circumstances which are such that denial thereof might frustrate the petitioner's rights in arbitration; defeat the very object of arbitration between the parties thereto; render the arbitration proceedings infructuous; lead to gross injustice; and/or, leave the petitioner remediless, depending on facts of each case."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

O.M.P. (I) (COMM) No. 35/2020 and I.A. 3251/2020

Decided On: 10.06.2020

Blue Coast Infrastructure Development Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  Blue Coast Hotels Ltd. and Ors.

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What is distinction between power of court and arbitrator to grant interim relief to party to arbitration against third party?

Reading of Section 9 of the Act as well as the judgments in Value Advisory (supra) and Gatx India (supra) makes it clear that the scope of power of a Court under Section 9 of the Act is not limited to parties to an Arbitration Agreement and the Court can issue interim directions even against a third party. The distinction between the powers under Section 9 of the Act and Section 17 of the Act has a clear rationale. An Arbitrator is a creature of the contract between the parties and therefore cannot venture outside the contract to issue directions to parties who are non-parties to the Arbitration Agreement. This limitation is not applicable to a Court exercising power under Section 9 of the Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

O.M.P. (I) (COMM) No. 35/2020 and I.A. 3251/2020

Decided On: 10.06.2020

Blue Coast Infrastructure Development Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  Blue Coast Hotels Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jyoti Singh, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1259/2020

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Whether the court can permit a stranger to the transaction to give a bank guarantee?

It is clear that the object of directing the petitioner to furnish the bank guarantee vide order dated 25.11.2019 was to secure the payment which the respondent was directed to deposit in the escrow account. The bank guarantee now furnished by the petitioner with the assistance of Arcelor Mittal, in my opinion, satisfies the said purpose and secures the respondent for its dues. Mere technical arguments are being raised to try and wriggle out of the directions passed by the court on 25.11.2019 by the respondent.

17. The second argument strongly urged was that the respondent does not wish to deal with a stranger Arcelor Mittal. It was strongly claimed that at the time of encashment of the bank guarantee if such a situation arises, the said Arcelor Mittal may turn around and start proceedings against the respondent. It is pleaded that the respondent is not interested in the Arcelor Mittal and this court cannot force the respondent to deal with the said company.

18. The plea is misplaced. A bank guarantee is a contract between the bankers and the beneficiaries. The respondent for the purpose of the bank guarantee has to deal with the guarantor, namely, the bankers and not the party at the instance the bank guarantee has been given.

19. In my opinion, there is no merit in the plea raised by the respondent. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

OMP (I) (COMM.) 218/2019

Decided On: 03.06.2020

 Bhubaneshwar Expressways Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  National Highways Authority of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jayant Nath, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1145/2020

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What remedy is available against consent decree to an aggrieved third party?

Still there could be one more situation, where the third party who was not the party to suit or the party to the compromise but had an interest in the subject matter of the compromise, is aggrieved by the decree passed by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties to the suit. So what remedy would be available to him? It cannot be gainsaid that the decree based on the compromise between the parties under Order XXIII, Rule 3, if remains unchallenged would be a "consent decree" binding to the parties to suit. However, when the person aggrieved is third party who was neither a party to the suit nor a party to the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed by the Court in the suit, would not be bound by such decree. Such a decree could not be said to be a "consent decree" qua such third party, and therefore, neither the bar contained in Section 96(3) nor the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII would be application to him. Such an aggrieved party, with the leave of the Court can always file an appeal under Section 96(1) against the decree passed by the Court on the basis of the compromise, and can contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not have been recorded by the Court in view of Rule 1A(2) of Order XLIII of CPC. When the third party is vitally and adversely affected by the decree passed by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties to the suit on the subject matter or otherwise of the suit, he can certainly, with the leave of the appellate Court, prefer an appeal and can contest such a decree passed under Order XXIII, Rule 3. One of the grounds to contest the decree could be that such a compromise should or should not have been recorded by the Court.

31. At this juncture, the word "party" used in Sub-rule (1) and the word "appellant" used in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII assume importance. The Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1A relates to the order passed against the 'party' to the suit, and the appeal filed by 'such party', whereas the Sub-Rule (2) of the said Rule 1A relates to the appeal filed by the 'appellant'. Such appellant may or may not be a party to the suit. The Sub-rule (2) is not confined to the appeal filed by the "party" to the suit. Hence, the third party, in the appeal against the decree passed in the suit under Rule 3 of Order XXIII can also contest such decree on the ground that such a compromise should not have been recorded.

32. In the opinion of the Court, such an aggrieved third party would also have an option to file an application for Review of the order recording the compromise or for Review of the decree based on the compromise between the parties to the suit, under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of CPC, if the conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. It has been held by the Supreme Court in case of Board of Control for Cricket, India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club, reported in MANU/SC/0019/2005 : AIR 2005 SC 592, that an application for Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence, or when there exists an error apparent on the face of record but also if the same is necessary on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. The words "sufficient reason" in Order XLVII, Rule 1 are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or by an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking he doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit", which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no one. Therefore, it any person considers himself aggrieved by the order or decree passed under Order XXIII, Rule 3 may for sufficient reason apply for review of such decree or order under Order XLVII, Rule 1, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. When an application for review is granted, the Court may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit, as contemplated in Rule 8 of Order XLVII of CPC.

 If the aggrieved party was not the party to the suit, the remedy available to him to challenge the decree passed by the Court on the basis of compromise between the parties to the suit (consent decree), would be to file an appeal under Section 96(1) of CPC, with the leave of the appellate Court, or to file a review application before the Court, which passed the decree, as may be permissible under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/Appeal from Order No. 33 of 2017,

Decided On: 28.08.2019

 Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) Vs.  Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj 

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Whether third party can file application for adding them as party in abated proceeding?

From the bare reading of the said provision, it clearly transpires that when the sole plaintiff (sole appellant in the instant case) dies and the right to sue survives, the Court on an application made in that behalf shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made the party and proceed with the suit (appeal in the instant case), however, within the time limit, no application is made, the suit (appeal) would abate. The Supreme Court in the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh & Ors. v. Annabai Devram Kini & Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0722/2003 : (2003) 10 SCC 691 has also held inter alia that the abatement of the suit for failure to move an application for bringing the legal heirs on record within the prescribed period of limitation is automatic and a specific order dismissing the suit/appeal as abated is not called for. In the instant case also, the sole appellant Kantaben having expired, and her legal heirs having not made any application within the prescribed time limit for substituting them in place of the original appellant/petitioner, the Special Civil Application and the First Appeal had stood abated by the operation of law of limitation. Hence, the question that falls for consideration before this Court is, as to whether the third party applicants could file the application in the abated proceedings for joining the legal heirs of the deceased Kantaben as the respondent Nos. 1/1 to 1/3 in Civil Application No. 10253 of 2014 filed in Special Civil Application No. 5411 of 2008 and in Civil Application No. 10254 of 2015 in First Appeal No. 1589 of 2011.

15. It is pertinent to note that neither the legal heirs of the deceased appellant/petitioner Kantaben nor the respondents in the First Appeal and the Special Civil Application have filed any application for substituting the legal heirs of the deceased Kantaben in the First Appeal or Special Civil Application. The applications have been filed by the third party applicants for joining the legal heirs of the said deceased Kantaben in the applications filed by them for impleading/transposing them as the appellants/petitioners in the First Appeal and Special Civil Application. The applicants having still not been joined or impleaded either in the First Appeal or Special Civil Application, they could not be said to have any locus standi to file application for bringing the legal heirs of the deceased Kantaben on record of the proceedings which have already stood abated. None of the parties have filed any application for setting aside of the abatement also. As stated herein above, the said First Appeal and the Special Civil Application having already stood abated, such applications at the instance of the third party applicants in the abated proceedings would not be maintainable either under Order I Rule 10 or under Order XXII Rule 3 or under Order XXII Rule 10 of CPC. The alternative submission of Sr. Advocate Mr. Mehta to permit the applicants to prosecute the First Appeal and the Special Civil Application also could not be accepted. The applications filed by the third party applicants for joining them as the appellants/petitioners could be heard and decided in the pending proceedings and not in the proceedings, which have already stood abated. They may take recourse to other remedy as may be permissible under the law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

Civil Application (for Bringing Heirs) No. 9970 of 2017 in Civil Application No. 10253 of 2014 in Special Civil Application No. 5411 of 2008, 

Decided On: 05.09.2017

Mahendrasinh Jorubha Zala  Vs. Kantaben Shrikrishna Agrawal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 748 Guj

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Under which circumstances separate suit for possession will be barred if third party is dispossessed in execution of decree?

The next limb of the argument based on Rule 99 to Rule 101 of Order 21 C.P.C., is that in a situation contemplated by Order 21, Rule 99, C.P.C., the procedure laid down therein has to be necessarily followed and it is not open to the person dispossessed to file a separate suit in view of the bar contained in Rule 101. In other words, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that after the amendment of Order 21, Rule 101 by the C.P.C. Amendment Act, 1976, the resort to suit is altogether barred and the application under Order 21, Rule 99 and the appeal under Rule 103 are the exclusive remedies available. We find it difficult to accept this contention. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the bar against filing of a separate suit would apply only if there was an application under Rule 99 but not otherwise. The third party aggrieved by dispossession in execution of a decree, may make an application to the Court complaining such dispossession. If he makes such an application, all questions including questions relating to right, title and possession in the properties shall be decided in that application as if it were a full-fledged suit for title and possession and no separate suit would lie for this purpose. However, an appeal lies under Rule 103 as if the order passed on such application is decree. We are unable to visualise the provisions of Rules 99 to 101 even after amendment as laying down an exhaustive Code on the remedies of the third parties dispossessed in execution of a decree for possession. The remedy under Order 21, Rule 99, C.P.C. is no doubt one of the remedies available to the person dispossessed. But, we are unable to construe Order 21, Rule 99 as placing a bar on bringing an independent suit for possession, without filing an application under the said Rule. Such a bar, in our view does not arise even by necessary implication.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Civil Revision Application No. 73 of 2001

Decided On: 13.09.2002

Sushila Sadanand Borkar  Vs. Maria Exaltacao Vaz

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

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Whether executing court can decide the issue that decree was obtained by fraud in obstructionist notice at the instance of third party?

 On plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, as amended after 1976, it is not open to contend, that the question relating to decree obtained by fraud cannot be gone Into by the Executing Court at the instance of the third party who is neither a judgment debtor nor claiming through the judgment debtor. Rule 101, as it presently stands, clearly bars a separate suit; and. Instead, postulates that all questions arising between the parties shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application filed under Rule 97 or Rule 99. There is no dispute that the present proceedings are arising out of the obstructionist notice taken out by the petitioner under Rule 97 to remove obstruction. Therefore, in such proceedings the issue regarding the decree having been obtained by fraud can surely be adjudicated by the Executing Court at the instance of a stranger to the decree.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3838 of 1989

Decided On: 05.03.2001

 Ahmed Abdul Aziz Bengali  Vs.  Mohammed Hanif M. Mulla and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2001 ( 3 ) ALLMR 720

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Whether tenant can be permitted to produce documents at appellate stage if document is between landlord and third party?

 It cannot be denied that the documents sought to be produced by the tenants are material and if substantiated, would have a material effect on the case of the landlords of their bona fide need of the suit premises. If, in fact, the landlord has entered into negotiations with M/s. Godrej Boyce Co. Ltd. for selling or use by them of the property, the need cannot be said to be genuine. Similarly, a change in the construction plan may show that the alleged need of the landlord for the construction may not be genuine. The third document proposes to demolish the case of availability of the funds for construction with the landlord. Two of the documents came into existence after the passing of the decree by the trial court. Similarly, the correspondence entered into by the landlord with a third party could not have been within the knowledge of the tenant and therefore, the tenants' statement that the documents could not have been produced before the trial court, in spite of the exercise of due diligence, was highly probable. In such circumstances, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the first appellate court permitting additional evidence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1210 of 2005 

Decided On: 14.02.2005

ADIL Jamshed Frenchman Vs  Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.C. Lahoti, C.J., G.P. Mathur and P.P. Naolekar, JJ.

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Whether family court can try dispute raised by third party to Marriage?

 Having taken note of this aspect of the matter, the factual matrix in the present case would disclose that the respondent herein is not the person who claims a declaration about his own marriage. The very contention that is put forth in the proceedings before the Family Court is that the appellant herein, Smti Nitikona Banarjee, is not the legally wedded wife of his (plaintiff's) brother, Lakshman Banerjee. If that be the position, the parties to the proceedings are not parties to the marriage.

9. Be that as it may. The question that would arise is as to whether in such circumstance the case would fall under Section 7(b) of the Act. In that regard, though in Section 7(b) of the Act the expression "parties to a marriage" does not occur, keeping in view the nature of relief that is provided before the Family Court, it would be only between the parties to a marriage to seek for such declaration for their benefit against the person who claims or contends not to be a party to the marriage. If that aspect of the matter is kept in view, a third party questioning the marriage of any other party would not be entitled to maintain proceedings before the Family Court. In any event, if such a party has any grievance, the remedy is available before the ordinary civil court by filing a suit therein.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI

Mat. App. 29/2016

Decided On: 01.11.2018

Nitikona Banarjee Vs.  Ram Prasad Banerjee

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna, C.J. and Arup Kumar Goswami, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 (NOC) 452 Gau

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Whether adopted person can obtain details about his adoption through power of attorney?

 Sub-regulation (6) of Regulation 44 undoubtedly seeks

to achieve an important purpose of not parting with

confidential and sensitive information in relation to an

adopted child to third party. The purpose for framing said

sub-regulation, therefore, can easily be appreciated.

However, when the adopted person himself or herself

appoints an attorney to act for and on his / her behalf, such

power of attorney ceases to be a third party and would

therefore not be hit by the limitation contained in subregulation

(6) of Regulation 44. A person who is appointed

as attorney acts for and on behalf of the person so

appointing him and therefore, cannot be considered to be a

third party for the purpose of Regulation 44(6). Subject to

certain safeguards, therefore, we propose to direct the

concerned respondents and in particular SARA to provide

necessary documents and further information as may be

available with it to Ms. Anjali Pawar as a duly constituted

attorney of the petitioner for such purpose.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 13670 OF 2018

Beena (Leena) Makhijani Muller Vs  The Commissioner,

Department of Women & Child

Development, Maharashtra

CORAM : AKIL KURESHI &

S.J. KATHAWALLA, JJ.

DATE : OCTOBER 9, 2019.

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