Supreme Court: What are pre-requisite for proving recovery of article from accused and identification of recovered article?

It is an admitted case as evident from record

that the solitary circumstance relied upon by the

prosecution to connect the accused-respondent with

the crime was the recovery of the umbrella made in

furtherance of his disclosure statement recorded by

the Investigating Officer under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act. The High Court held that the said

umbrella was concealed by the accused-respondent

in an attempt to destroy evidence of the crime, and

accordingly, affirmed his conviction for the offence

punishable under Section 201 of the IPC. However,

the sentence awarded by the trial Court for the said

offence was reduced from rigorous imprisonment for

seven years to rigorous imprisonment for three years,

along with fine and default stipulation. {Para 26}

27. The factum of recovery of the umbrella, recorded

vide seizure memo (Ex. 1), was sought to be proved

through the evidence of the Investigating Officer,

Abhishek Bodo (PW-19) Hereinafter, referred 

to as “Investigating Officer”. Upon a perusal of the

testimony of the said witness (PW-19), we find that

the very arrest of the accused-respondent in the

present case is shrouded in a cloud of doubt.

28. Insofar as the recovery of the umbrella is

concerned, the Investigating Officer proved the

disclosure statement of the accused-respondent as

Ex. 19. Pursuant to the said disclosure statement, a

black-coloured umbrella was purportedly recovered

by the Investigating Officer on 14th June, 2017, upon

being pointed out by the accused-respondent. Thus,

there is a significant gap of approximately 14 days

between the date of the incident and the recovery of

the umbrella.

29. It also emerges from the evidence that the

Investigating Officer deposed that he summoned the

family members of the deceased to the police station

and got the umbrella identified by them. It is further

apparent from the evidence on record that the

umbrella did not bear any specific or distinctive

features so as to be conclusively linked to the

deceased.

30. The identification procedure conducted by the

Investigating Officer, i.e., by simply calling the family

members of the deceased to the police station and

asking them to identify the umbrella as belonging to

the deceased, is in clear contravention of the

established procedure for identification of articles.

Ordinarily, the recovered article ought to have been

sealed, and the test identification proceedings should

have been conducted in the presence of a Magistrate

so as to make the procedure of identification

unimpeachable.

31. The Investigating Officer’s evidence referred to

supra does not specify compliance with either of the

aforesaid requirements, both of which are absolutely

necessary to hold that the seizure of an umbrella was

proved by cogent and reliable evidence.

32. Thus, we are of the firm opinion that neither

was the recovery of the umbrella proved as per law

nor does the identification thereof inspire confidence

so as to link the same either to the accusedrespondent

or to the crime. Furthermore, the

significant gap of 14 days in effecting the recovery

creates a doubt on the sanctity of the procedure of

recovery.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 8846 of 2025)

THE STATE OF ASSAM  Vs  MOINUL HAQUE @ MONU 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: APRIL 16, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 386.

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Supreme Court explains pre-requisite for proving recovery panchnama as per S 27 of Evidence Act

 77. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to have been made by the Appellant herein which ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

78. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the Appellant-Accused while in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that he would lead to the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence, the site of burial of the dead body, clothes, etc. then the first thing that the investigating officer should have done was to call for two independent witnesses at the police station itself. Once the two independent witnesses would arrive at the police station thereafter in their presence the Accused should be asked to make an appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to pointing out the place where he is said to have hidden the weapon of offence, etc. When the Accused while in custody makes such statement before the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact statement or rather the exact words uttered by the Accused should be incorporated in the first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the police station in the presence of the independent witnesses so as to lend credence that a particular statement was made by the Accused expressing his willingness on his own free will and volition to point out the place where the weapon of offence or any other Article used in the commission of the offence had been hidden. Once the first part of the panchnama is completed thereafter the police party along with the Accused and the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) would proceed to the particular place as may be led by the Accused. If from that particular place anything like the weapon of offence or bloodstained clothes or any other Article is discovered then that part of the entire process would form the second part of the panchnama. This is how the law expects the investigating officer to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral evidence of the investigating officer then it is clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter.

21.A cautious appraisal of the above extract from the evidence of the Investigating Officer(PW-27) would reveal that he did not depose the exact words as narrated by the Accused Thammaraya(A-2) and Accused Basappa(A-3) in their disclosure statements. In fact, he even did not care to exhibit the disclosure statements of which he was the scribe in his deposition. He also did not depose in clear words that the Accused persons had led him to the place mentioned in the disclosure statements and got the articles recovered. No connection between the Accused and the particular articles recovered is visible from the testimony of the Investigating Officer(PW-27). The Investigating Officer(PW-27) also failed to exhibit the recovery memorandums. There is no indication in the deposition of the Investigating Officer(PW-27) that he sealed the recovery articles or got the same subjected to test identification at the hands of the relatives of the deceased Shrishail. 

4. Therefore, this material omission on part of the Investigating Officer(PW-27) in not conducting a Test Identification Parade(TIP) of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2013 

Decided On: 22.01.2025

Thammaraya and Ors. Vs. The State of Karnataka 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath, , Sanjay Karol,  and Sandeep Mehta, , JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0110/2025.

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Whether court can convict accused based on his disclosure statement if recovery from him is not unimpeachable?

  The short question that falls for our consideration thus is whether the conviction of the Appellant on the strength of the purported disclosure statement (Ex. PD) and the recovery memo (Ex. PD/2), in the absence of any corroborative evidence, can sustain? { Para 15}

16. We have implored ourselves with abounding pronouncements of this Court on this point. It may be true that at times the Court can convict an accused exclusively on the basis of his disclosure statement and the resultant recovery of inculpatory material. However, in order to sustain the guilt of such accused, the recovery should be unimpeachable and not be shrouded with elements of doubt. Vijay Thakur vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) 14 SCC 609 We may hasten to add that circumstances such as (i) the period of interval between the malfeasance and the disclosure; (ii) commonality of the recovered object and its availability in the market; (iii) nature of the object and its relevance to the crime; (iv) ease of transferability of the object; (v) the testimony and trustworthiness of the attesting witness before the Court and/or other like factors, are weighty considerations that aid in gauging the intrinsic evidentiary value and credibility of the recovery. (See: Tulsiram Kanu vs. The State, AIR 1954 SC 1; Pancho vs. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC 165. ; State of Rajasthan vs. Talevar & Anr., (2011) 11 SCC 666 and Bharama Parasram Kudhachkar vs. State of Karnataka, (2014) 14 SCC 431)

17. Incontrovertibly, where the prosecution fails to inspire confidence in the manner and/or contents of the recovery with regard to its nexus to the alleged offence, the Court ought to stretch the benefit of doubt to the accused. 

19. Unmindful of these age­old parameters, we find that the Prosecution in the present case has miserably failed to bring home the guilt of the Appellant and Courts below have been unwittingly swayed by irrelevant considerations, such as the rise in the incidents of dacoity. In its desire to hold a heavy hand over such derelictions, the Trial Court and the High Court have hastened to shift the burden on the Appellant to elucidate how he bechanced to be in possession of the incriminating articles, without primarily scrutinizing the credibility and admissibility of the recovery as well as its linkage to the misconduct. We say so for the following reasons:

Firstly, the High Court and the Trial Court failed to take into consideration that the testimony of ASI Rajinder Kumar (PW­14) exhibited no substantial effort made by the police for conducting the search of the residence of the Appellant in the presence of local witnesses. The only independent witness to the recovery was Raldu (PW­8) who was admittedly a companion of the Complainant.
Secondly, the Complainant (PW­4) as well as Raldu (PW­8), have unambiguously refuted that neither the passbook, nor the ‘red cloth’ was recovered from the possession of the Appellant, as claimed in his disclosure statement.
Thirdly, while the Complainant (PW­4) negated his signatures on the recovery memo (EX. PD/2), on the other hand, Raldu (PW­8) also neither enumerated the recovery memo (Ex. PD/2) in the catalogue of exhibited documents, nor did that he affirm to having his endorsement.
Fourthly, the recovered articles are common place objects such as money which can be easily transferred from one hand to another and the ‘red cloth’ with ‘Kamla’ embossed on it, as has been acceded by the Investigating Officer, Rajinder Kumar (PW­14), can also be easily available in market.
Fifthly, the recovery took place nearly a month after the commission of the alleged offence. We find it incredulous, that the Appellant during the entire time period kept both the red cloth and the passbook in his custody, along with the money he allegedly robbed off the Complainant.
Sixthly and finally, there is no other evidence on record which even remotely points towards the iniquity of the Appellant.

Supreme Court

CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA N.V. RAMANA JUSTICE SURYA KANT JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI

Bijender @ Mandar Vs. State of Haryana

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2438 OF 2010

8th November 2021

Author: Surya Kant, J.

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 632

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How to prove Email sent by accused in Criminal prosecution?

Electronic Mails

62. We will now turn to the electronic mails which the prosecution has relied on. It has sought to prove this evidence by relying on the testimonies of PW 132, the expert from the West Bengal Electronics Ltd. (Webel), PW 118, the wireless operator and the I.O. According to these witnesses, Akib Ali disclosed his e-mail identities and passwords in their presence in the computer room at Bhabani Bhawan (the C.I.D. headquarters). They claim to have downloaded these e-mails from Akib Ali's e-mail account. The e-mails were then printed in their presence. All these printed e-mails have been signed by the aforesaid witnesses. It has been noted on these e-mails that Akib Ali refused to endorse the printed copies of the mails. Under Section 88A of the Evidence Act the Court may presume that an electronic message, forwarded by the originator through an electronic mail server to the addressee to whom the message purports to be addressed corresponds with the message as fed in the computer for transmission. However, the Court cannot draw any presumption about the person who sent the message. The term 'originator' has been defined in the Information and Technology Act, 2000 under Section 2(za) as a person who sends, generates, stores or transmits any electronic message; or causes any electronic message to be sent, generated, stored or transmitted to any other person but does not include an intermediary. Thus on analysing Section 88A of the Evidence Act and the relevant provisions of the Information and Technology Act, it is apparent that the Court may presume the veracity of the message fed into the computer for transmission by the originator through his mail server to an addressee, that is, the person who is intended by the originator to receive the electronic record and does not include any intermediary. However, this is a rebuttable presumption. Besides, no presumption can be drawn about the person who has sent such a message. Therefore, even if we accept the fact that these e-mails have been downloaded as stated by the Webel expert or sent by using the e-mail address of Akib Ali, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that Akib Ali was in fact the originator of these e-mails. The disclosure, if any, made by Akib Ali of the e-mail address and password would have to be made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. PWs 118 and 132 have both stated that Akib Ali has disclosed his e-mail identities and passwords in their presence. They have signed the seizure list under which the emails accessed from these accounts and printed have been seized. Therefore, in our opinion, these e-mails are admissible in evidence.

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Whether disclosure statement of accused U/S 27 of evidence Act can be relied on if it does not bear signature of accused?

So far as the conscious possession of the weapon Ex. M/O/4 is concerned, the disclosure statement, Ex. P-9 inspires no confidence. Firstly because none of the two panch witnesses, Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh, ASI, have been examined at the trial and secondly because the disclosure statement does not bear the signatures or the thumb impression of the appellant. Even, the recovery memo of the revolver and the cartridges, Ex. P-9/A, which is also attested by Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh, ASI does not bear either the signatures or the thumb impression of the accused. The absence of the signatures or the thumb impression of an accused on the disclosure statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act detracts materially from the authenticity and the reliability of the disclosure statement. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 472 of 1985

Decided On: 20.04.1995

Jaskaran Singh Vs.  The State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. A.S. Anand and M.K. Mukherjee, JJ.

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Whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is a necessary condition of Section 27 of Evidence Act?

There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the Police Officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz., the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the Police Officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section 27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the Police Officer chooses not to take the informant- accused to the spot, it will have no bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence.1

Supreme Court of India

State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) vs Navjot Sandhu@ Afsan Guru on 4 August, 2005

Bench: P. Venkatarama Reddi, P.P. Naolekar

Citation;AIR 2005 sc 3820

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