Supreme Court: What are pre-requisite for proving recovery of article from accused and identification of recovered article?

It is an admitted case as evident from record

that the solitary circumstance relied upon by the

prosecution to connect the accused-respondent with

the crime was the recovery of the umbrella made in

furtherance of his disclosure statement recorded by

the Investigating Officer under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act. The High Court held that the said

umbrella was concealed by the accused-respondent

in an attempt to destroy evidence of the crime, and

accordingly, affirmed his conviction for the offence

punishable under Section 201 of the IPC. However,

the sentence awarded by the trial Court for the said

offence was reduced from rigorous imprisonment for

seven years to rigorous imprisonment for three years,

along with fine and default stipulation. {Para 26}

27. The factum of recovery of the umbrella, recorded

vide seizure memo (Ex. 1), was sought to be proved

through the evidence of the Investigating Officer,

Abhishek Bodo (PW-19) Hereinafter, referred 

to as “Investigating Officer”. Upon a perusal of the

testimony of the said witness (PW-19), we find that

the very arrest of the accused-respondent in the

present case is shrouded in a cloud of doubt.

28. Insofar as the recovery of the umbrella is

concerned, the Investigating Officer proved the

disclosure statement of the accused-respondent as

Ex. 19. Pursuant to the said disclosure statement, a

black-coloured umbrella was purportedly recovered

by the Investigating Officer on 14th June, 2017, upon

being pointed out by the accused-respondent. Thus,

there is a significant gap of approximately 14 days

between the date of the incident and the recovery of

the umbrella.

29. It also emerges from the evidence that the

Investigating Officer deposed that he summoned the

family members of the deceased to the police station

and got the umbrella identified by them. It is further

apparent from the evidence on record that the

umbrella did not bear any specific or distinctive

features so as to be conclusively linked to the

deceased.

30. The identification procedure conducted by the

Investigating Officer, i.e., by simply calling the family

members of the deceased to the police station and

asking them to identify the umbrella as belonging to

the deceased, is in clear contravention of the

established procedure for identification of articles.

Ordinarily, the recovered article ought to have been

sealed, and the test identification proceedings should

have been conducted in the presence of a Magistrate

so as to make the procedure of identification

unimpeachable.

31. The Investigating Officer’s evidence referred to

supra does not specify compliance with either of the

aforesaid requirements, both of which are absolutely

necessary to hold that the seizure of an umbrella was

proved by cogent and reliable evidence.

32. Thus, we are of the firm opinion that neither

was the recovery of the umbrella proved as per law

nor does the identification thereof inspire confidence

so as to link the same either to the accusedrespondent

or to the crime. Furthermore, the

significant gap of 14 days in effecting the recovery

creates a doubt on the sanctity of the procedure of

recovery.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 8846 of 2025)

THE STATE OF ASSAM  Vs  MOINUL HAQUE @ MONU 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: APRIL 16, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 386.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Magistrate Doesn't Require Prior Sanction To Direct FIR Registration Under S.156(3) CrPC

 Part IV

Our Conclusions

164. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, our conclusions are summarised as follows:

V. The statutory framework under the Code of Criminal Procedure (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), provides a comprehensive and layered mechanism to set the criminal law in motion. The duty of the police to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence is mandatory, as settled in Lalita Kumari (supra).

VI. In cases of non-registration of FIR, the Code of Criminal Procedure/BNSS provide efficacious remedies. An aggrieved person may approach the Superintendent of Police Under Section 154(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure or corresponding Section 173(4) of BNSS and thereafter invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 175 of BNSS) or proceed by way of a complaint Under Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 223 of BNSS). These remedies constitute a complete statutory architecture.

VII. The availability of such remedies, coupled with the supervisory jurisdiction of constitutional Courts Under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution demonstrates that no legislative vacuum exists warranting the intervention sought. The appropriate course lies in ensuring faithful and even-handed enforcement of existing law.

VIII. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure or corresponding Section 175 of BNSS is of wide amplitude and includes supervisory oversight over the investigation at appropriate stages. This power is intended to ensure that the investigation is conducted in a fair, impartial, and lawful manner, and may be exercised simultaneously during the stage of investigation, where the material on record discloses any deficiency, inaction, or taint in the investigative process.

IX. The requirement of prior sanction Under Sections 196 and 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Sections 217 and 218 of BNSS) operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not extend to the pre-cognizance stage of registration of FIR or investigation Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 175(3) of BNSS). An order directing investigation Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure does not amount to taking cognizance within the meaning of Section 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 210 of BNSS).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 943 of 2021, 

Decided On: 29.04.2026

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0419/2026,

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Bombay HC : Sessions Court Cannot Take Cognisance Of Offences Under Drugs & Cosmetics Act Without Committal of case By Magistrate

 In regard to the action of the learned Special Judge of taking cognizance of the offence directly, there appears substance in the submission of Mr. Bhasin. {Para 40}

41. Section 32 of the Drugs Act, 1940 provides for cognizance of offences. Sub-Section (2) of Section 32 provides that, save as otherwise provided in that Act, no court inferior to that of a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV. Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contains an interdict against the Court of Sessions taking cognizance of any offence as Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code, except as otherwise expressly provided by that Code or by any other law for the time being force.

Evidently, though sub-Section (2) of Section 32 begins with an inbuilt saving clause in the form of expression, “save as otherwise provided in this Act” yet, there is no provision in the Drugs Act 1940 which expressly provides for the Court of Session taking the cognizance of the offence punishable under the said Act directly. Nor Section 32(2) contains the usual expression, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973”, employed by the legislature where the Court of Session is empowered to take cognizance of the offences under the special enactments, without the case having been committed to it by a Magistrate.

42. What sub-Section (2) of Section 32 essentially provides is that, the trial of an offence under Chapter IV of the Drugs Act 1940 shall be before a Court not inferior to that of the Court of Session. The necessary corollary flowing from Section 4 of the Code, is that the rest of the provisions in the Code in regard to taking of the cognizance of the offence, inclusive of the interdict contained in Section 193 of the Code against the Court of Session taking cognizance of the offence directly, are clearly attracted.

43. Mr. Singh, the learned Special Counsel for the Respondent, attempted to wriggle out of the situation by canvassing a submission that the Administrator of the U.T. of Damand and Diu And Dadra and Nagar Haveli, has published Notification to designate the “Principal District Judge”, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli at Silvassa as Special Court and empowered him to try the case under the Drugs Act, 1940 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for the area of UT of Daman And Diu And Dadra And Nagar Haveli. The said Notification, according to Mr. Singh, constitutes the saving envisaged by the expression, “save as otherwise provided” contained in sub-Section (2) of Section 32.

44. I find it difficult to accede to the aforesaid submission. I have perused the said Notification dated 17th June 2010. It is issued under Section 36AB(1) of the Drugs Act 1940 which came to be inserted by Act No. 26 of 2008, to provide for designation of one or more Special Courts for trial of offence relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs and punishable under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13, sub-Section (3) of Section 22, clauses (a) and (c) of Section 27, Section 28, Section 28A, Section 28B and clause (b) of sub- Section (1) of Section 30 and other offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs.

45. In the case at hand, the complaint is lodged for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 27(d) of the Drugs Act, 1940. Secondly, the said Notification even if the submission on behalf of the Respondent is taken at par, would not empower the Court of Session to directly take the cognizance of the offence as there is no provision in the Drugs Act, 1940 which provides for taking of cognizance of offence by the Court of Session directly.

46. A useful reference in this context can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India V/s. Ashok Kumar sharma and Ors. (2021) 12 SCC 674, wherein the Supreme Court expounded the law, as under :

“49. Section 32 of the Act undoubtedly provides for taking

cognizance of the offence by the court only at the instance of the

four categories mentioned therein. They are: (a) Inspector under the Act; (b) Any Gazetted Officer empowered by the Central or the State Government; (c) Aggrieved person; and (d) Voluntary Association. It is clear that the Legislature has not included the Police Officer as a person who can move the court. Before the matter reaches the court, under Section 190 of the CrPC, ordinarily starting with the lodging of the first information report leading to the registration of the first information report, investigation is carried out culminating in a report under Section 173. The Police Report, in fact, is the Report submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC to the court. Under Section 190 of the CrPC, the court may take cognizance on the basis of the police report. Such a procedure is alien to Section 32 of the Act. In other words, it is not open to the Police Officer to submit a report under Section 173 of the CrPC in regard to an offence under Chapter IV of the Act under Section 32. In regard to offences contemplated under Section 32(3), the Police Officer may have power as per the concerned provisions. Being a special enactment, the manner of dealing with the offences under the Act, would be governed by the provisions of the Act. It is to be noted that Section 32 declares that no court inferior to the Court of Sessions shall try offence punishable under Chapter IV. We have noticed that under Section 193 of the CrPC, no Court of Sessions can take cognizance of any offence as a Court of Original Jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the CrPC. This is, undoubtedly, subject to the law providing expressly that that Court of Sessions may take cognizance of any offence as the Court of Original Jurisdiction. There is no provision in the Act which expressly authorises the special court which is the Court of Sessions to take cognizance of the offence under Chapter IV. This means that the provisions of Chapters XV and XVI of the CrPC must be followed in regard to even offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act. Starting with Section 200 of the Act dealing with taking of cognizance by a Magistrate on a complaint, including examination of the witnesses produced by the complainant, the dismissal of an unworthy complaint under Section 203 and following the procedure under Section 202 in the case of postponement of issue of process are all steps to be followed. It is true that when the complaint under Section 32 is filed either by the Inspector or by the Authorised Gazetted Officer being public servants under Section 200, the Magistrate is exempted from examining the complainant and witnesses.”

(emphasis supplied)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.2777 OF 2024

M/s. C.B.Healthcare and Ors. Vs  Union of India 

CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 24 MARCH 2026

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, the high court or Session court should not release the accused on bail only on the ground that offence is triable by JMFC?

 At this stage, we may note that one of the grounds that weighed with the High Court was that the offences against Respondent No. 1 were triable by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked the fact that the offences now alleged against Respondent No. 1 include offences Under Section 409 Indian Penal Code and Section 467 Indian Penal Code also. Significantly, the punishment for offences under these provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term up to ten years. Similarly, some of the other offences for which Respondent No. 1 has been hauled up for entail a possible sentence of imprisonment over three years. {Para 12}

13. Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, a Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass a sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for life. A Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to a Chief Judicial Magistrate.

14. In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions Under Section 209 Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that Under Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2026 

Decided On: 17.02.2026

Rakesh Mittal Vs. Ajay Pal Gupta and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 161, MANU/SC/0164/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, Magistrate Can Commit the case to Sessions court during Course Of Trial even if it is not exclusively triable by Session Court?

At this stage, we may note that one of the grounds that weighed with the High Court was that the offences against Respondent No. 1 were triable by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked the fact that the offences now alleged against Respondent No. 1 include offences Under Section 409 Indian Penal Code and Section 467 Indian Penal Code also. Significantly, the punishment for offences under these provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term up to ten years. Similarly, some of the other offences for which Respondent No. 1 has been hauled up for entail a possible sentence of imprisonment over three years. {Para 12}

13. Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, a Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass a sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for life. A Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to a Chief Judicial Magistrate.

14. In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions Under Section 209 Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that Under Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2026 

Decided On: 17.02.2026

Rakesh Mittal Vs. Ajay Pal Gupta and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 161, MANU/SC/0164/2026

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Supreme Court: Magistrate can monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation U/S 156 of CRPC

 If such an application Under Section 156(3) is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a case where, according to the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was made. The Magistrate can also under the same provision monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2011

Decided On: 20.03.2020

 M. Subramaniam  Vs.  S. Janaki 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Magistrate can recommend change of the investigating officer under investigation U/S 156 of CRPC so that a proper investigation is done in the matter

 This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is not being done, then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. If such an application Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure is made and the Magistrate is, prima facie, satisfied, he can direct the FIR to be registered, or if it has already been registered, he can direct proper investigation to be done which includes in his discretion, if he deems it necessary, recommending change of the investigating officer, so that a proper investigation is done in the matter. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2011

Decided On: 20.03.2020

 M. Subramaniam  Vs.  S. Janaki 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Important provisions of BNSS regarding information to police, investigation U/S 175 of BNSS, and cognizance of offence by Magistrate

 173. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given orally or by electronic communication to an officer in charge of a police station, and if given—

(i) orally, it shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it;

(ii) by electronic communication, it shall be taken on record by him on being signed within three days by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may by rules prescribe in this behalf:

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Supreme Court: Magistrate cannot direct Police to include accused in charge sheet, instead issue summons to person proposed to be added.

 Having considered the matter, we find some technical merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Court has the power to differ from the Final Form submitted by the Police and take cognizance of a crime and also against persons who may not have been sent up for trial by the Police after investigation. In such circumstances, the Court is then required to issue summons instead of directing for inclusion of the name of the person in the charge-sheet. Thus, ultimately, the result is the same, that is, the person concerned is arrayed as an accused upon taking cognizance after application of mind by the Court and accordingly, summons are issued. Thus, the order which in essence is of summons as an accused, cannot be faulted. {Para 3}

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).3649/2025

GOPAL PRADHAN  Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS. 

Date : 17-03-2025 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

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Non-Examination Of Magistrate Who Conducted Test Identification Parade Strikes Severe Blow On Prosecution And Cause Of Justice; Orissa HC Sets Aside Conviction

Above all, the prosecution has not offered any explanation as to why the Magistrate, who conducted T.I. parade was not examined to prove the report, inasmuch as many things the defence could have brought out by way of cross-examination of the Magistrate regarding the irregularities or procedural infirmities, if any, made during conduct of the T.I. parade. Recently, in the case of Umesh Chandra and others -Vrs.-State of Uttarakhand reported in MANU/SC/1412/2021 : (2021) 17 Supreme Court Cases 616, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed concern about non-examination of Magistrates to prove the sanctity of T.I. parade and observed as follows:

"10. But more important than that, the test identification parade being a part of the investigation, has to be proved by the prosecution as having been held in accordance with law. The onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the T.I parade was held in accordance with law. It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid T.I parade having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises. If the prosecution has failed to establish that a T.I parade was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove. In the present case, a Magistrate is stated to have conducted the T.I parade. The Magistrate has not been examined. No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined."

Thus, it is undisputed that the Public Prosecutor has a duty to examine the Magistrate who conducts the T.I. parade so that the legal sanctity of the T.I. parade report can be ascertained during the trial. Non-examination of the Magistrate strikes a severe blow not only to the prosecution case but also to the cause of justice as irregularities, if any, committed in such T.I. parade cannot be canvassed and discussed by the trial Court in his absence from the witness box. In the present case, no plausible explanation has been offered as to why the Magistrate was not examined in the Court to prove the T.I. parade report. In the case in hand, the prosecution has proved the T.I. parade report through P.W.4, the informant who has stated that he had signed the T.I. parade report and accordingly, the report was marked as Ext.2 and the signature of P.W.4 was marked as Ext.2/1. Mere marking of the T.I. parade report is not enough inasmuch as the person who conducted the T.I. parade could only highlight what precautions he took, what procedure he followed during such T.I. parade. Lapses, if any, on his part during the proceedings of the T.I. parade which strikes at the root of the identification evidence, can be brought out by the defence counsel in the cross-examination. If the Magistrate is dead or his attendance could not be procured during trial for any reason, the trial Court has to specifically mention the same in the order-sheet and thereafter the prosecution can adduce cogent evidence to prove such T.I. parade report. Identification proceedings are not conducted for the pleasure of the prosecution. It has got a valuable purpose even though the identification test does not constitute substantive evidence.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRLA Nos. 21 of 2012, 504 of 2012 and 719 of 2012

Decided On: 04.04.2024

Baikuntha Bhoi and Ors. Vs. State of Odisha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.K. Sahoo, J.

Citation: MANU/OR/0369/2024.

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To what extent the Session Judge or Magistrate can permit accused to put his defence at pre-cognizance stage as per S 223 of BNSS?

 The transition from the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) ushers in significant procedural shifts. Among the most impactful is the mandatory pre-cognizance hearing under Section 223 BNSS. This provision, a substantive departure from the CrPC's silent pre-cognizance stage, aims to embed natural justice at the very inception of criminal proceedings. However, the efficacy and fairness of this new 'filter' mechanism hinge critically on robust appellate oversight by Session Courts.

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Supreme Court: Magistrate's Order U/S. 156(3) CrPC For registration of FIR is Not Vitiated Merely Because Complainant Didn't Avail Remedy Under S.154(3)

In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant

had directly moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of

the CrPC without exhausting his statutory remedies, the

Magistrate could have avoided taking action on the said

application and could have refused to direct for the

registration of the FIR. However, as entertaining an

application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural

irregularity and since the Magistrate in a given

circumstance is otherwise empowered to pass such an

order, the action of the Magistrate may not be illegal or

without jurisdiction. {Para 32}

33. To sum up, the Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain

an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless

the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies

provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate

is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct

the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the

application/complaint discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, we are of the opinion that the order so

passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction

and would not stand vitiated on this count.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.18084 OF 2024

ANURAG BHATNAGAR & ANR. Vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. 

 Author: PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Citation:  2025 INSC 895.

Dated: JULY 25, 2025

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Talengana HC: Whether Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence punishable under Pocso Act?

 As the statutory positions in the Cr.P.C. and the POCSO Act are not mutually exclusive, it shall be construed that the Special Court in the stand of Court of Sessions may receive a case on committal from the Magistrate. Meaning thereby the jurisdictional Magistrate is empowered to receive police report or complaint as set down under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. even in regard to the offences under POCSO Act and after taking cognizance, the same may be committed to the Special Court.{Para 13}

14. Concomitantly, the Special Court is also empowered under Section 33(1) of the POCSO Act to take cognizance of the offence. In that way, the Special Court without any committal procedure can directly receive complaint and while doing so the Special Court sets in the position of Magistrate and would process the complaint by applying relevant procedure.

15. For the aforesaid, it shall be understood that the legislature at its wisdom had provided direct reach to the special Court in addition to the indirect committal procedure to extend the needed relief employing either of the forums. Thus, the jurisdictional Magistrate and the Special Court are correspondingly empowered to take cognizance of an offence under POCSO Act upon the complaint. Consequently, it shall be held that, returning of the private complaint by the Special Court and the Magistrate is improper and against the provisions of law.

19. In this position, it has to be concluded that even for the offence under the POCSO Act the Magistrate is not barred to take cognizance and by the enabling provision, the Special Court is also empowered to take cognizance of the offence under the POCSO Act either upon the police report or on complaint within its territorial jurisdiction. 

Talengana High Court

 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.290 OF 2023

Dated: Date: 18.08.2023.

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Kerala HC: Police Cannot Attach Bank Account Under S.107 BNSS Without Magistrate's Approval

 IRAC Analysis of Kerala High Court Judgment (Crl.M.C.No.3740/2025, Order dated 02.06.2025)

With Emphasis on the Concept of "Proceeds of Crime"

Issue

·       Whether the police, during the investigation of a criminal case, can freeze the bank account of a third-party company (Headstar Global Pvt. Ltd.) under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), or whether such freezing requires a specific procedure under Section 107 of BNSS, especially when the funds involved may constitute "proceeds of crime".

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Kerala HC: As per S.349 of BNSS, Magistrate Can Direct Any Person To Provide Voice Sample For Purpose Of Investigation

Similarly, no legal requirement can be read into the declaration of law made in Ritesh Sinha (supra), or for that matter Section 349 of the B.N.S.S, that the accused person should have been in custody at the time when an order for voice sample has to be made. While Ritesh Sinha (supra) uses the language 'any person', Section 349 B.N.S.S. would separately deal with 'any person', by suffixing with the expression 'including an accused person'. Similarly, the language in the first proviso to Section 349 is that the person should have been arrested at some time in connection with the investigation, which requirement is amply satisfied in the given facts. If this Court has to go by Ritesh Sinha (supra), there is no such requirement that the person should have been in the custody at the time when the order for voice sample is made. The requirement in Ritesh Sinha (supra) is that such an order has to be passed 'for the purpose of investigation of a crime'. Under Section 349, the criteria is the satisfaction of the Magistrate that it is expedient to direct any person to provide his voice sample, again, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under B.N.S.S. Therefore, the thrust is upon the question whether the voice sample is required for the purpose of investigation in a crime.

8. In the instant facts, this Court notice that the crime in question was registered pursuant to a trap. If, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the phenolphthalein test has turned negative, that is all the more a reason for the Investigating Agency to produce whatever evidence possible in support of the prosecution case. If, as claimed by the Investigating Officer, there exists a voice clip containing the voice of the petitioner, wherein, he had allegedly demanded bribe, the same would constitute an important evidence in the armoury of the prosecution. Such an attempt cannot be shut down, since it has to be conceded that it is fully within the realm and prerogative of the Investigating Officer to search, explore and furnish all and whatever legal evidence possible in support of the prosecution case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl. MC No. 9284 of 2024

Decided On: 14.11.2024

Sunil Rajan K Vs. Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Jayachandran, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/5069/2024.

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What is difference between Confession and extra judicial confession and It's value?

 Understanding Confession

A confession is "the direct admission of matter or facts of the cases either in the form of a written or oral statement". According to Sir James Stephen, it is defined as "an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed a crime". Essentially, a confession is a statement made by an accused person that suggests or admits their guilt in relation to a criminal offense.

Types of Confessions

Confessions are broadly categorized into two main types: judicial confessions and extra-judicial confessions.

Judicial Confession

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Constitutional Compliance Checklist for Magistrate Courts and Session Courts when Accused is Brought before them for Remand

MANDATORY CONSTITUTIONAL VERIFICATION CHECKLIST

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (Before Considering Remand)

1. Article 22(1) Compliance Verification

- [ ] Verify if grounds of arrest were communicated to the accused

  - [ ] Check if grounds were provided in writing (not just orally)

  - [ ] Confirm grounds were provided "forthwith" (immediately) after arrest

  - [ ] Ensure grounds were communicated in language understood by accused

- [ ] Examine the arrest memo and related documents

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Illegal Arrest and Violation of Personal Liberty: Bombay High Court Orders Compensation and Inquiry, Upholding Individual Rights Against Arbitrary Police Actions"

 Thus, it is clearly evident that the police failed to comply with the provisions of the Cr. PC as well as the directions of the Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar (Supra), rendering the petitioner's arrest illegal. We find in the peculiar facts, that not only the police but even the learned Magistrate before whom the matter appeared had without any application of mind granted one day's police custody of the petitioner. It is the duty of every Magistrate, when an accused is produced before him/her, to ensure that the provisions of law have been duly complied with and whether police custody in those given facts, is warranted. We are afraid, that even the learned Magistrate failed in his duty to consider whether the arrest of the petitioner was justified having regard to the nature of allegations and Sections with which the petitioner was charged. The Magistrate failed to comply with the directions issued by the Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar (Supra). As per the direction, even the Magistrate concerned, shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court, for authorising detention without recording reasons. All that the Magistrate in his order dated 29th January 2020 granting one day's Police Custody Remand has observed, 'Perused remand application, FIR and case diary. The names of accused are reflected in FIR. The investigation is in progress. I am satisfied for the reasons mentioned in remand appln that presence of accused are required for further progress in investigation. Hence, all the accused are remanded to police custody till 30.01.2020.' Magistrates are not mute spectators, but are Courts of first instance, before whom the accused are produced. It is there bounden duty to uphold the law and protect the liberty of an individual from arbitrary arrest. In the present case, the petitioner had paid all his dues including the compounding charges and as such the petitioner's arrest was unwarranted and as such arbitrary. The aforesaid action of the police, resulted in mental agony to the petitioner since he was required to stay in police custody for one day despite having paid all dues of Adani Electricity including compounding charges. {Para 21}

22. In view of the aforesaid, we pass the following order:-

ORDER

(i) We direct the State Government to pay compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand) to the petitioner, within 6 weeks from today;

(ii) We direct the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, to appoint an Officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police, to conduct a departmental inquiry with respect to the arrest of the petitioner by the police officers of the R.C.F. Police Station, Chembur, Mumbai. The petitioner to be heard in the inquiry so conducted. The inquiry to be completed within 8 weeks from the date of receipt of this order;

(iii) The compensation so paid, to be recovered, after a full- fledged inquiry, from the salary of the person/persons found responsible for the illegal detention of the petitioner;

(iv) A copy of this order be sent to the learned Magistrate who granted police custody of the petitioner.

23. The Petition is allowed and is accordingly disposed of. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.

24. Petition to be listed on 19th December 2024, for recording compliance of clauses (i) to (iii) of para 22 of the aforesaid Judgment and Order.

25. A copy of this Judgment and Order be placed before the Administrative Committee of this Court headed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for taking appropriate steps against the Magistrate, having regard to para 11.8. of the judgment of the Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar (Supra).

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3898 of 2023

Decided On: 01.10.2024

Alex Vs. The State of Maharashtra's and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Revati Mohite Dere and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ.

Author: Revati Mohite Dere, J.

Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:39450-DB,MANU/MH/6240/2024.

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Supreme Court: What precautions the Magistrate should take before ordering investigation U/S 156(3) of CRPC{S 175 of BNSS}?

 Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure {S 175 of BNSS} which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word 'may'. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed Under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored. {Para 24}

25. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure{S 175 of BNSS}. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

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Supreme Court: Magistrate Cannot Direct Police To Include Accused In Charge Sheet; Instead may Issue Summons To Person Proposed To Be Added

The Court has the power to differ from the Final Form submitted by the Police and take cognizance of a crime and also against persons who may not have been sent up for trial by the Police after investigation. In such circumstances,the Court is then required to issue summons instead of directing for inclusion of the name of the person in the charge-sheet. Thus, ultimately, the result is the same, that is, the person concerned is arrayed as an accused upon taking cognizance after application ofmind by the Court and accordingly, summons are issued. Thus, the order which in essence is of summons as an accused, cannot be faulted. (Para 3)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).3649/2025; 

GOPAL PRADHAN  Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH; J., PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA; J.

Dated: 17-03-2025.

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