Showing posts with label discreet inquiry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label discreet inquiry. Show all posts

Tuesday, 31 January 2017

Whether probationary judicial officer can be removed from service on ground he was found under influence of alcohol in Academy?

Without prejudice to the contention that this is a
case of discharge simpliciter and during the probationary period,
there is a reference made to a discreet inquiry. The discreet
inquiry   revealed   that   the   petitioner   was   found   under   the
influence of alcohol while residing as a trainee Judge at the
Academy.   There   was   a   complaint   or   a   confidential   report
received from the Joint Director of the said Academy bringing to
the notice of the Registrar General of this Court this incident.
The incident is stated to have occurred twice, on 29­1­2012 and
5­2­2012. There was a discreet inquiry with the colleagues and
the staff and thereafter this report was forwarded. This report
was considered by the Administrative Committee of Judges on
15­-2­-2012.   Thereafter,   at   a   further   meeting   held   on

20-­3-­2012, a decision was taken to discharge the petitioner from
judicial service. That decision was communicated to the Law and
Judiciary Department of the State of Maharashtra, whereupon
the impugned order was served on the petitioner.
None of the decisions citied by Mr. Arjunwadkar lay
down   any   absolute   principle.   None   of   the   decisions   of   the
Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   hold   that   merely   because   some
preliminary   or   discreet   inquiry   is   held   while   judging   for
assessing   the   performance   and   in   an   overall   manner   of   a
probationer, that the foundation of the order ultimately passed
of discharging him from service is a misconduct. It is always
open  for  the  authorities   while  assessing  and  considering  the
performance in an overall manner to take note of some event
and incident. Merely because they take note of it or called for a
report about the same from the superior of the person like the
petitioner, does not mean that they desire to hold a full­fledged
inquiry   or   there   is   a   decision   to   terminate   the   services   on
account of some misconduct. The decisions also refer to cases
where  inquiries  were commenced under  the relevant  Service
Rules but they were not taken to their logical conclusion and
end.   During   the   pendency   of   the   same,   a   probationer   was
discharged   for   unsatisfactory   performance.   Thus,   the   law

enables assessment of the performance and conduct of a Judicial
Officer. All the more if an overall assessment reveals that the
probationer is unsuitable for continuation in service any further,
then, an order of discharge simpliciter can be passed. Precisely,
such is the nature of the impugned order. The order does not
refer to any misconduct. There is no need to go behind it or the
allegations that the petitioner makes in the affidavit in rejoinder.
We   do   not   think   that   the   record   indicates,   even   from   the
information   generated   by   the   petitioner   under   the   Right   to
Information Act, that the foundation or basis for the impugned
order is the petitioner's alleged misconduct or misbehaviour at
the Academy. His performance is assessed in an overall manner
for finding out whether he is suitable to be continued in service.
He was appointed on 28­-12-­2011. A periodical assessment of his
performance could have always been undertaken and the Rules
permit this course of action. Therefore, during the probationary
period,   in   March   2012,   the   petitioner's   performance   was
assessed and an occasion for the same could be some complaint
or incident which had occurred during the course of the training

at the Academy. That by itself and without anything more does
not   mean   that   the   petitioner   has   been   terminated   for   some
misconduct and which required an inquiry to precede the same.
There   was   no   need   for   an   inquiry,   much   less   a   full­fledged
Departmental one. That was not necessitated at all. This was a
case of assessment of the performance of a Judicial Officer who
is a probationer and finding him unsuitable for continuation in
service   any   further   discharging   him   from   service.   It   is   a
termination simpliciter.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
WRIT PETITION NO.2733 OF 2013
Gurunath Dinkar Mane,

­ V
 State of Maharashtra
    

           CORAM: S.C. DHARMADHIKARI &
                   B.P. COLABAWALLA, JJ.
   
        DATE   : SEPTEMBER 23, 2016
Citation: 2016(6) ALLMR 545
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Tuesday, 13 January 2015

When Judicial officer can be compulsorily retired in public interest?

When even verbal repeated complaints are
received against a judicial officer or on enquiries,
discreet or otherwise, the general impression
created in the minds of those making inquiries or
the Full Court is that concerned judicial officer
does not carry good reputation, such discreet
inquiry and or verbal repeated complaints would
constitute material on the basis of which ACR
indicating that the integrity of the officer is
doubtful can be recorded. While undertaking
judicial review, the Court in an appropriate case
may still quash the decision of the Full Court on
administrative side if it is found that there is no
basis or material on which the ACR of the judicial
officer was recorded, but while undertaking this
exercise of judicial review and trying to find out
whether there is any material on record or not, it
is the duty of the Court to keep in mind the nature
of function being discharged by the judicial officer,
the delicate nature of the exercise to be performed
by the High Court on administrative side while
recording the ACR and the mechanism/system
adopted in recording such ACR.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE
WRIT PETITION NO. 302 OF 2013
Smt.Shraddha Vinod Deo. ..
V/s.
The State of Maharashtra and another. 
CORAM : NARESH H. PATIL AND
B.P.COLABAWALLA, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 8th October 2014.
Citation;2015(1) MHLJ 62


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