Supreme Court direction for seizure of cash or other assets and withdrawal of prosecution of election offences

DIRECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

18. Keeping in view the above, i.e, the discussion made above, reference to case laws, the detailed affidavits of the parties, and the submission of the learned amici, this Court issues the following directions:

a. When a seizure of cash or other assets takes place, the authority affecting the seizure, must, within 24 hours, report the same to the District Magistrate/Additional District Magistrate/Court having competent jurisdiction along with written reasons disclosing the prima facie nexus between the cash or other asset seized and the suspected electoral offence.

b. When FIRs are registered, the Investigation Officer (IO) entrusted with the investigation thereof shall make every possible endeavour to complete investigations thereinto, within a year, from the date of registration. If this timeline is exceeded, reasons therefor shall be recorded and communicated to the Election Commission of India;

c. The investigating officer shall submit a quarterly status report regarding the investigation to the EC through the Nodal Officer, after due approval of the Senior Superintendent of Police/the Deputy Commissioner of Police of the concerned district;

d. When Static Surveillance Teams (SST) during checks find money in excess of Rs. 10 lacs, information about the same shall be forwarded to the income tax authorities.

e. All endeavours ought to be made for expeditious disposal of cases against candidates/sitting MPs/MLAs keeping in view the recurrent nature of elections. For this purpose, it is directed that the High Courts may, by following respective procedures, designate courts for the purposes of prompt hearing and disposal of such cases.

f. For withdrawal of cases against candidates in a particular election cycle, the approval of the concerned High Court is mandatory in view of K. Ajith (supra) and Ashwani Kumar Upadhyay (supra).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. ... of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3549 of 2016)

Decided On: 17.08.2026

The State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. Prathik Parasrampuria

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 868, MANU/SC/0895/2026

Print Page

Bombay HC: The High court should not entertain writ petition challenging rejection of nomination paper by returning officer in election dispute

Division Bench decision of this Court in Vinod Pandurang Bharsakade Vs. Returning Officer, Akot and Anr. reported in MANU/MH/1064/2002 : 2003(4) Mh. L.J. 359. It was contended that any grievance that the petitioners may have, in relation to the orders rejecting their nominations, ought to be raised after the elections are over by raising appropriate election dispute.{Para 2}

68. For the reasons aforesaid, while agreeing with the view in Vinod Pandurang Bharsakade (supra), we answer the fundamental question as formulated in paragraph 27 in the negative. As a sequel thereto, we answer the questions referred by the Division Bench in the manner as follows:-

(i) Allowing a challenge in a writ petition to rejection of nomination form to contest an election and granting the relief claimed by setting aside such order of rejection is definitely not a step to sub-serve the progress of election and/or facilitate its completion in the sense enunciated in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and explained in Ashok Kumar (supra) though it may not always amount to intervention, obstruction or protraction of the election;

(ii) Article 243-O(b) of the Constitution of India is a bar for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Returning Officer rejecting nomination paper and such provision would clearly be attracted whenever a writ petition is presented before a Court for its consideration; and

(iii) The law laid down in Vinod Pandurang Bharsakade (supra) represents the correct view of law; consequently, we hold that the decision in Smt. Mayaraju Ghavghave (supra) and Sudhakar s/o. Vitthal Misal (supra) do not lay down the correct law;

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (ST.) Nos. 26 and 28 of 2021

Decided On: 13.01.2021

Karmaveer Tulshiram Autade and Ors. Vs. The State Election Commission, Mumbai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta, C.J., A.S. Gadkari and G.S. Kulkarni, JJ.

Citations: AIR 2021 BOMBAY 90, AIRONLINE 2021 BOM 6, MANU/MH/0033/2021

Print Page

Bombay HC: What basic principles should the court follow while deciding election dispute?

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Election Commission of India, through Secretary, Appellant v. Ashok Kumar & others, respondents, reported in MANU/SC/0540/2000 : AIR2000SC2979 , has in paragraphs 32 and 33 held as under:

"For convenience sake we would now generally sum up our conclusions by partly restating what the two Constitution Benches have already said and then adding by clarifying what follows therefrom in view of the analysis made by us hereinabove.

1) If an election, (the term 'election' being widely interpreted so as to include all steps and entire proceeding commencing from the date of notification of election till the date of declaration of result) is to be called in question and which questioning may have the effect of interrupting, obstructing or protracting the election proceeding in any manner, the invoking of judicial remedy has to be postponed till after the completing of proceedings in elections.

2) Any decision sought and rendered will not amount to "calling in question an election" if it subserves the progress of the election and facilitates the completion of the election. Anything done towards completing or in furtherance of the election proceedings cannot be described as questioning the election.

3) Subject to the above, the action taken or orders issued by Election Commission are open to the judicial review on the well settled parameters which enable judicial review of decisions of statutory bodies such as on a case of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power being made out or the statutory body being shown to have acted in breach of law.

4) Without interrupting, obstructing or delaying the progress of the election proceedings, judicial intervention is available if assistance of the Court has been sought for merely to correct or smoothen the progress of the election proceeding, to remove the obstacles therein, or to preserve a vital piece of evidence if the same would be lost or destroyed or rendered irretrievable by the time the results are declared and stage is set for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court.

5) The Court must be very circumspect and act with caution while entertaining any election dispute though not hit by the bar of Article 329(b) but brought to it during the pendency of election proceedings. The Court must guard against any attempt at retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling of the election proceedings. Care has to be taken to see that there is no attempt to utilise the Court's indulgence by filing a petition outwardly innocuous but essentially a subterfuge or pretext for achieving an ulterior or hidden end. Needless to say that in the very nature of the things the shall not act except on a clear and strong case for its intervention having been made out by raising the pleas with particulars and precision and supporting the same by necessary material.

These conclusions, however, should not be construed as a summary of our judgment. These have to be read along with the earlier part of our judgment wherein the conclusions have been elaborately stated with reasons."

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the election is called in question and when such questioning may have the effect of interrupting, obstructing or protracting the election proceeding in any manner, the invoking of judicial remedy has to be postponed till after the completing of proceedings of election. Needless to say that the petitioner has an alternate remedy of filing an election petition challenging the said elections.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 3980 of 2001

Decided On: 03.12.2001

Rekhabai Vs. State Election Commission and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.M. Kanade, J.

Citation: 2002(2) ALL MR 742, MANU/MH/0884/2001.

Print Page

Whether court can pass any order which has the effect of postponing of the election?

 Besides, as indicated by us in the order dated March 30,1982, the view which we took was that though the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition and issuing a rule therein since, the writ petition apparently contained a challenge to several provisions of Election laws, it was not justified in passing any order which would have the effect of postponing the elections which were then imminent.

Supreme Court of India

Lakshmi Charan Sen And Ors Etc vs A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman And Ors. Etc on 8 May, 1985

Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 1233, 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 493

Author: Y Chandrachud

Bench: Chandrachud, Y.V. ((Cj)

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Whether court can condone delay in filing of election petition?

Section 69 of the Act is the mechanism provided by the State Legislature as contemplated Under Article 243ZK(2) of the Constitution of India. Once the mechanism provided under the Statute provides for a time Schedule for preferring an election petition, in the absence of a provision in the Statute for enlarging the time under any given circumstances, no court, whether the High Court Under Article 226 or this Court Under Article 32, 136 or 142 of the Constitution can extend the period in election matters. In the matter of limitation in election cases, the Court has to adopt strict interpretation of the provisions. This Court in Smita Subhash Sawant v. Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0966/2015 : (2015) 12 SCC 169, though in a different context, has held at paragraph 33 that "In the absence of any provision made in the Act for condoning the delay in filing the election petition, the Chief Judge had no power to condone the delay in filing the election petition beyond the period of limitation prescribed in law".

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4001 of 2018 

Decided On: 19.04.2018

Reji Thomas  Vs.   The State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kurian Joseph, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Navin Sinha, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 16 SCC 778

Print Page

What are parameters for deciding application for rejection of plaint and application for striking off pleading?

The rejection of plaint follows the procedure on admitting plaint or even before admitting the same, if the court on presentation of the plaint is of the view that the same does not fulfill the statutory and institutional requirements referred to in Clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. The power bestowed in the court in terms of Rule 11 may also be exercised by the court on a formal application moved by the Defendant after being served with the summons to appear before the Court. Be that as it may, the application Under Order VII Rule 11 deserves consideration at the threshold.

12. On the other hand, the application for striking out pleadings in terms of Order VI Rule 16 may be resorted to by the Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) at any stage of the proceedings, as is predicated in the said provision. The pleading(s) can be struck off by the Court on grounds specified in Clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 16.

13. Indeed, if the Defendant moves two separate applications at the same time, as in this case, it would be open to the court in a given case to consider both the applications together or independent of each other. If the court decides to hear the application Under Order VII Rule 11 in the first instance, the court would be obliged to consider the plaint as filed as a whole. But if the court decides to proceed with the application Under Order VI Rule 16 for striking out the pleadings before consideration of the application Under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint, on allowing the former application after striking out the relevant pleadings then the court must consider the remainder pleadings of the plaint in reference to the postulates of Order VII Rule 11, for determining whether the plaint (after striking out pleadings) deserves to be rejected in limine.

14. In the present case, the High Court has presumably adopted the latter course. It first proceeded to examine the application for striking out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition being frivolous and vexatious and also because the same did not disclose any cause of action. And having accepted that prayer, it proceeded to reject the election petition on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action. However, we find that the High Court has muddled the analysis of the pleadings. It merely focused on the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. It is one thing to strike out the stated pleadings being frivolous and vexatious but then it does not follow that the rest of the pleadings which would still remain, were not sufficient to proceed with the trial or disclose any cause of action, whatsoever, for rejecting the plaint as a whole in limine or to hold that it did not warrant a trial. No such finding can be discerned from the judgment under appeal. Be that as it may, the High Court committed manifest error in striking out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition, being frivolous and vexatious by considering the factual matrix noted therein as untenable on merit. For striking out the pleadings or for that matter, rejecting the plaint (election petition), the High Court is not expected to decide the merits of the controversy referred to in the election petition. We shall elaborate on this aspect a little later.

 To put it differently, the approach of the High Court in considering the two applications is, in our opinion, manifestly erroneous, if not perverse. For, it has ventured into the arena of analysis of the matter on merit. That is a prohibited area at this stage. Since the conclusion reached by the High Court that the pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 of the election petition are frivolous and vexatious is untenable, it would necessarily follow that the election petition, as filed, will have to be examined as a whole without subtracting any portion therefrom. If so read, it is not possible to take a view that the same does not disclose any cause of action at all. On this finding, the application preferred by Respondent No. 1 for rejection of election petition in limine Under Order VII Rule 11, cannot be countenanced and must also fail.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 9466-9468 of 2016

Decided On: 21.03.2018

Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju Vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.M. Khanwilkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 14 SCC 1

Print Page

Whether court can permit examination of party to suit at subsequent stage?

Learned counsel for the sole respondent, on the other hand, has
opposed the prayer and has placed reliance of the Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows :
“Party to appear before other witnesses - Where a party himself
wishes to appear as a witness, he shall so appear before any other
witness on his behalf has been examined, unless the Court, for
reasons to be recorded, permits him to appear as his on witness at a
later stage.”
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the sole respondent that
since two witnesses have already been examined in presence of the election
petitioner, the election petitioner himself cannot examine as a witness now. It is
submitted that if the election petitioner desired to be examined at a later stage, he
should have filed the application for the same on the same date, but he did not
seek the permission of the Court for his examination at a later stage and allowed
the other witnesses to be examined in his presence. Alternatively, it is submitted
by the learned counsel for the sole respondent that in any event, the election
petitioner should be examined after the examination of all the witnesses.
Having heard the learned counsels for both the parties, I am of the
considered view that the Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is
not an absolute bar for examination of party to a suit at a later stage. There is
always a discretion of the Court to allow the party to be examined at the later
stage. Even Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act only states that the
procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of the suits
shall be followed by the High Court while trying an election petition, as nearly as
may be. There is no requirement of strict adherence to the provisions of CPC,
while trying an election petition.
In view of the aforesaid discussions, it is directed that the election
petitioner shall be examined in the case as witness on the next date. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
 E.P No. 11 of 2015

Krishna Nand Tripathi.
 V
Alok Chaurasiya .
CORAM :  MR. JUSTICE H. C. MISHRA

 Dated:19.8.2016.
Citation: AIR 2017 Jharkhand 22

Print Page

Whether courts can interfere in Election process?

The main question arises for consideration is whether the Writ Petitions filed under the guise of Public Interest Litigation are maintainable in view of the bar in Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India, before culmination of the Election process. Article 329 of the Constitution of India takes away the jurisdiction of the Courts in certain matters relating to Election, which are governed by Part XV of the Constitution. Clause (b) of Article 329 excludes the jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain any matter relating to Election. The question as to whether the word "Election" in Article 329(b) of the Constitution would embrace the whole procedure of Election or whether it is not confined to the final result, came up for consideration before the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.P. Ponnuswami's case. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India and held that the word "Election" in the said provision would include the entire process of Election commencing with the issue of notification and terminating with the declaration of election of a candidate and that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of any of the facts forming any part of that process would be barred.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

W.P. Nos. 18159, 18196 of 2016 and W.M.P. No. 15940 of 2016

Decided On: 18.05.2016

Satta Panchayat Iyakkam (SPI) and Ors.
Vs.
 The Chief Election Commissioner, Election Commission of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:K. Kalyanasundaram and D. Krishnakumar, JJ.

Print Page

How to calculate limitation for filing election petition?

Election petition

Limitation starts from the date on which list specifying necessary details

for declaring results is prepared by returning officer and is available for

inspection and not from the date on which the result is notified.

If rules providing manner of declaration of result of election are not

framed then the provision has to be read in such manner that it is favourable to

returned candidate and not in the manner which may benefit the person

challenging the election

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6848 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6244/2015)

Decided On: 04.09.2015

Smita Subhash Sawant
Vs.
 Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin and Ors.

Coram:Jasti Chelameswar and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2016 SC 1409

Print Page

When disqualification to contest municipal election is removed?

 In view of the aforesaid position of law the disqualification
of the petitioner was removed by virtue of Section 12 of the Probation of
Offenders Act and such removal operated from 25.06.2007.   It cannot
therefore, be said that the petitioner was disqualified under Section 10 of
the Maharashtra Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, on the date of his
election i.e. on 16.04.2012 as a Member of the Municipal Corporation
from Prabhag No.21­B.  The trial Court has committed an error of law in
setting aside the election petition of the petitioner on such ground.  The
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   trial   Court   cannot,   therefore,   be
sustained.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO.782 OF 2015
Karimuddin @ Karimlala Kazi,

V 
 Deepak s/o Shankarlal Jaiswal,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM:  R.K. DESHPANDE, J.
DATE:          26th   AUGUST, 2015.
Citation:2016(5) ALLMR 119

Print Page

Whether court can permit a party to seek a roving enquiry in election petition?

 During the trial of an election petition, it is not permissible for the court to permit a party to seek a roving enquiry. The party must plead the material fact and adduce evidence to substantiate the same so that the court may proceed to adjudicate upon that issue. Before the court permits the recounting, the following conditions must be satisfied:

(i) The Court must be satisfied that a prima facie case is established;

(ii) The material facts and full particulars have been pleaded stating the irregularities in counting of votes;

(iii) A roving and fishing inquiry should not be directed by way of an order to recount the votes;

(iv) An opportunity should be given to file objection;

and

(v) Secrecy of the ballot requires to be guarded.

Reportable

Supreme Court of India

Kalyan Singh Chouhan vs C.P.Joshi on 24 January, 2011

Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan

Citation:(2011)11SCC 786

Print Page

What is difference between trial of election petition and trial of civil suit?

 In Kailash v. Nanhku & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2441, this Court held that the trial of an election petition is entirely different from the trial of a civil suit, as in a civil suit trial commences on framing the issues while trial of an election petition encompasses all proceedings commencing from the filing of the election petition up to the date of decision. Therefore, the procedure provided for the trial of civil suits under CPC is not applicable in its entirety to the trial of the election petition. For the purpose of the election petition, the word `trial' includes the entire proceedings commencing from the time of filing the election petition till the pronouncement of the judgment. The applicability of the procedure in Election Tribunal is circumscribed  by two riders : firstly, the procedure prescribed in CPC is applicable only "as nearly as may be", and secondly, the CPC would give way to any provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder. Therefore, the procedure prescribed in CPC applies to election trial with flexibility and only as guidelines.
Reportable

Supreme Court of India

Kalyan Singh Chouhan vs C.P.Joshi on 24 January, 2011

Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan

Citation:(2011)11SCC 786

Print Page

Whether defect in nomination form of election can be cured at scrutiny stage?

The next question is whether the attestation can be compelled by the persons concerned at the scrutiny stage. It must be accepted that no attempt was made at the presentation stage to satisfy the Returning Officer about the identity of these persons but evidence was led to show that this was attempted at the scrutiny stage. The Returning Officer denies this, but even if the identities could have been proved to his satisfaction at that stage it would have been too late because the attestation and the satisfaction must exist at the presentation stage and a total omission of such an essential feature cannot be subsequently validated any more than the omission of a candidate to sign at all could have been. Section 36 is mandatory and enjoins the Returning Officer to refuse any nomination when there has been " any failure to comply with any of the provisions ofsection 33............... The only jurisdiction the Return- ing Officer has at the scrutiny stage is to see, whether the nominations are in order and to hear and decide objections. He cannot at that stage remedy essential defects or permit them to be remedied. It is true he is not to reject any nomination paper on the ground of any technical defect which is not of a substantial character but he cannot remedy the defect. He must leave it as it is. If it is technical and unsubstantial it will not matter. If it is not, it cannot be set right.

Supreme Court of India

Rattan Anmol Singh And Another vs Atma Ram And Others on 21 May, 1954

Equivalent citations: 1954 AIR 510, 1955 SCR 481

BENCH:
BOSE, VIVIAN
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA

Print Page

When Improper acceptance of nomination be said to have materially affected result of election?

  Representation of the  People  Act,  1951-S.100(1)(d)-
Improper acceptance  of nomination-When  could it be said to
materially affect the result of election?
The appellant, the respondent and four other candidates
contested the  election to  a legislative  assembly  from  a
constituency  reserved  for  Scheduled  Castes.  While  the
respondent was declared elected,  the appellant secured the
next highest  number of  votes and  the  difference  in  the
number of  votes secured by them was only 373. The appellant
challenged the election of the respondent on the ground that
the result  of the  election had been materially effected by
the  improper  acceptance  of  the  nomination of  a  third
candidate who  had secured 6710 votes. The Election Tribunal
arrived at  the finding  that the  candidate in question was
not a member of the Scheduled Castes and hence is nomination
had been  improperly accepted, but nevertheless, refused to
set aside  the election of the respondent on the ground that
the result  of the  election had not been shown to have been
materially affected  as a  result of the improper acceptance
of the nomination.
     Allowing the appeal,
^
     HELD: Under  s. 100(1)(d) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, the election of a returned candidate shall
be declared  to be  void if the High Court is of the opinion
that the  result of  the election,  in so far as it concerns
the returned  candidate, has been materially affected by the
improper acceptance  of any  nomination and  the  burden  of
establishing the  same is  on the  person  impeaching  the
election.  Where   the candidate   whose   nomination  was
improperly accepted  has secured  a larger  number of  votes
than the  difference between  the number of votes secured by
the successful candidate and the candidate securing the next
highest number of votes,  there is  a possibility  that  a
sufficient number  of votes  actually cast for the candidate
whose nomination  was improperly  accepted might  have been
cast for  the candidate  who secured  the highest  number of
votes next  to the  successful candidate  so as to upset the
result of  the election.  In such a situation, the answer to
the question  whether the  result of  the election  could be
said to  have been  materially affected  must depend  on the
facts, circumstances  and reasonable  probabilities  of  the
case. If  the number of votes secured by the candidate whose
nomination was improperly  accepted  is  disproportionately
large as compared with the difference
967
between the  votes secured  by the  successful candidate and
the candidate  securing the next highest number of votes and
if the votes secured  by the candidate whose nomination was
improperly accepted  bears a  fairly high  proportion to the
votes secured  by the  successful candidate,  the reasonable
probability is that the  result of  the election  has been
materially affected  and one may venture to hold the fact as
proved. [968 F-G; 969 D-F]
     Under the Evidence Act,  a fact  is said to be proved
when after  considering the  matters before  it,  the  Court
either believes  it to exist or  considers its existence so
probable that  a prudent  man ought, under the circumstances
of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
exists. If having regard to the facts and circumstances of a
case, the  reasonable probability  is all  one way,  a court
must not lay down an impossible standard of proof and hold a
fact as not proved. [969 G-H]
     In the instant case, the candidate whose nomination was
improperly accepted had obtained 6710 votes, that is, almost
20-times the  difference between the number of votes secured
by the successful candidate  and the candidate securing the
next highest  number of  votes. Further, the number of votes
secured by  the candidate  whose nomination  was  improperly
accepted bore  a fairly  high proportion  to the  number  of
votes secured  by the  successful candidate-it was a little
over one-third.  In such  a  situation the  result  of  the
election may  safely be  said to have been affected.

Supreme Court of India

Chhedi Ram vs Jhilmit Ram & Others on 5 December, 1983

Equivalent citations: 1984 AIR 146, 1984 SCR (1) 966,

1984 SCC  (2) 281,

BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

Print Page

Whether election of person who has contested election on false caste certificate can be terminated?

We have perused sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the 2000 Act and we find that it applies to admission to reserved seat in an educational institution and to appointment to a reserved post in the Government, local authorities, Government Corporations, Government aided institutions or co-operative societies and will not be attracted to the facts of the case. Instead, the consequences as provided in sub- section (4) of Section 10 of the 2000 Act will follow. Sub-Section (4) of Section 10 reads : "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a person shall be disqualified for being a member of any statutory body if he has contested the election for local authority, co-operative society or any statutory body on the seat reserved for any of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes or Special Backward Category by procuring a false caste certificate as belonging to such caste, tribe or class on such false caste certificate being cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee, and any benefits obtained by such person shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue and the election of such person shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively."

The consequence is that the election of a person who has contested on a seat reserved for the aforementioned categories on false caste certificate as belonging to such caste, tribe or class "shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively". The deeming provision in sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the 2000 Act is a statutory fiction which has to be given effect to and the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation has given effect to the deeming provision and has thus acted in accordance with law.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Kalpana Dilip Bahirat Vs. Pune Municipal Corp. & Ors.

[Civil Appeal No. 4805 of 2013 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19296 of 2013]

Dated:7 June 2013

Print Page

Landmark Judgments on Election Law

http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/Judgements/LandmarkJudgementsVOLI.pdf

Print Page

Basic principles when court can allow production of document

The court, therefore, is clearly empowered and it shall be lawful for it to order the production, by any party to the suit, such documents in his possession or power relate to any matter in question in the suit provided the court shall think right that the production of the documents are necessary to decide the matter in question. The court also has been given power to deal with the documents when produced in such manner as shall appear just. Therefore, the power to order production of documents is coupled with discretion to examine the expediency, justness and the relevancy of the documents to the matter in question. These are relevant considerations which the court shall have to advert to and weigh before deciding to summoning the documents in possession of the party to the election petition. At the same time the election petition - proceedings being of quasi-criminal nature the allegations in the petition must be pleaded clearly and with full particulars, especially the grounds of corrupt practices cannot be permitted to be tried on the basis of deficient pleadings or by filing applications for production of record to fish out grounds as material which is not part of the pleadings. In any case secrecy of the ballot boxes cannot be tinkered unless an iron-cast case is made out in the election petition. 

Supreme Court of India

Basanagouda vs Dr. S. B. Amarkhed And Ors on 31 March, 1992

Equivalent citations: 1992 AIR 1163, 1992 SCR (2) 397

Bench: Ramaswamy, K.

        

CITATION:
 1992 AIR 1163    1992 SCR  (2) 397
 1992 SCC  (2) 612   JT 1992 (2) 484
 1992 SCALE  (1)770

Print Page