Showing posts with label examination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label examination. Show all posts

Saturday, 11 June 2016

Whether anticipatory bail can be granted for offence of malpractices in examinations?


 Challenge is given under section 7 and it was argued vehemently
that section 7, which is non-bailable, cannot be invoked. Under section 7,
the phrase 'use of any other unfair means' takes care of all mal-practices
or the misdeeds done when the examination is conducted. Though the
punishment is upto 6 months, the offence is made non-bailable because of
the nature and gravity of the offence. At the time of conducting
examination, the degree of sanctity required is very high and, therefore, it
is made non-bailable. The word 'examination' is defined under section
2(b) of the Act. It is as under:
“2(b). “Examination” means any examination held or proposed to be
held by any University or the Board and includes such other
examination held or proposed to be held by such other authority as
may be specified in this behalf, from time to time, by the State
Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
 The section is clear that if at all the examination is conducted by the
University or Board, then, it is covered under the examination as defined
under the Act. Besides this, when an examination is conducted by any

other authority than the university and the Board, then, the State
Government may issue notification in the official gazette specifying the
authority and the examination. I cannot accept the submission of the
learned Public Prosecutor that the “Collector” himself is to be considered
as a authority. On plain reading of the section, the legislature did not
intend to give standing authority to the Collector in respect of conducting
examination. “The other authority as may be specified' means that the
State Government has option to issue notification in the official gazette
about the said authority and once such authority is specified in the official
gazette, then, the examination conducted by the said authority, comes
within the sweep of the word 'examination' as defined under section 2(b) of
the Act and then only section 7 of the Act can be attracted. In the absence
of such notification, if the examination is conducted by any authority, then
that examination is valid and legal, however, the said Act cannot be made
applicable to that examination. However, to bring that examination within
the ambit of section 2(b) of the Act, the State Government needs to issue
notification in the official gazette specifying the authority. In the absence
of such notification, the examination cannot be an examination under 2(b)
of the Act and, therefore, if the mal practices have taken place during such
examination, cannot be said as offence as under section 7 of the Act.
Thus, notification issued by the State Government enables to bring the
acts, misdeeds, malpractices committed within the ambit of section 7 of

the Act. I am in agreement with the learned Prosecutor that the word 'may'
is not to be read as the word 'shall'. The choice is given to the State
Government to issue notification, specifying the authority. If the State
Government does not want to specify the authority, then, if any malpractice
takes place, at the time of conducting of any examination, in the absence
of such notification, those malpractices cannot be said as offences under
section 7 of the Act. Therefore, to that extent, for the interpretation of
section 7, I am with the learned Counsel for the applicants-accused.
However, the prosecution has not restricted the charges only to section 7
of the said Act but has also charged the applicants/accused under
sections 420, 464, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code which are nonbailable.
The manner in which the offence is committed, the custodial
interrogation of the applicants-accused is necessary. The absconding real
candidate is also to be traced. As it is a case of cheating, fraud and
forgery, I am not inclined to grant pre-arrest bail to the applicants/accused.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO.1851 OF 2015
Gajanan Ramrao Lande

Vs.
The State of Maharashtra

 CORAM: MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.
 DATE: MARCH 21, 2016
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)2168
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Saturday, 14 May 2016

Whether appearing in two examinations simultaneously for same year amounts to using unfair means in examination?

Before us, Mr. Pradeep Kant, learned senior counsel for the appellant has made a neat legal argument. He submits that though the impugned judgment proceeds on the basis that appearing in two examinations simultaneously for the same year is violation of the Regulations of the Board, this reason given by the High Court is clearly unsustainable inasmuch as no such Regulation is shown by the Board which prohibited any such candidate to appear in two examinations in the same year. The learned senior counsel further argued that the impugned order passed by the respondents for confiscating his Certificate of Intermediate exam was, otherwise also, contrary to the principles of natural justice inasmuch as no show cause notice and opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant before passing such an order, which was passed belatedly after a period of nine years from the passing of the said examination by the appellant.
7. We are of the opinion that both the submissions of the learned senior counsel are valid in law and have to prevail. The High Court has been influenced by the argument of the respondents that simultaneous appearance in two examinations by the appellant in the same year was 'contrary to the Regulations'. However, no such Regulation has been mentioned either by the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench. Curiously, no such Regulation has been pointed out even by the respondents. On our specific query to the learned counsel for the respondents to this effect, he expressed his inability to show any such Regulation or any other rule or provision contained in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or Supplementary Regulations of 1976 framed under the aforesaid Act or in any other governing Regulations. Therefore, the entire foundation of the impugned judgment of the High Court is erroneous.
8. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant's intermediate examination and result thereof was not in question before the U.P. Board. No illegality in the admission in that class has been pointed out by the respondents. The alleged charge of simultaneously appearing in two examinations, one of the U.P. Board and other of the Sanskrit Board, was with respect to Class X and equivalent examination which did not relate to admission in intermediate course. The only provision for canceling the said admission is contained in Regulation (1) of Chapter VI-B. It details the procedure for passing the order of punishment canceling intermediate results and, inter alia, prescribes that a committee consisting of three different members is to be constituted and entrusted with the responsibility of looking into and disposing of cases relating to unfair means and award appropriate penalty as specified in the Regulations itself. However, there is no allegation of any unfair means adopted by the appellant in the instant case and, therefore, that Regulation has no applicability. Even otherwise, no such committee was constituted. Therefore, having taken admission in Intermediate on the basis of past certificate issued by a separate Board, which was recognised, and not on the basis of the result of Class X of the U.P. Board, the appellant derived no advantage from his examination of the U.P. Board while seeking admission in Intermediate course. Thus, from any angle the matter is to be looked into, the impugned orders dated April 20, 2011 and May 10, 2011 passed by the respondents are null and void, apart from the fact that they are in violation of the principles of natural justice.
Supreme Court of India
Kuldeep Kumar Pathak vs State Of Up And Ors on 5 January, 2016
Bench: A.K. Sikri, Rohinton Fali Nariman
NON-REPORTABLE

                       
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11   OF 2016
                  (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2964 OF 2015)
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC521
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Monday, 13 October 2014

Whether district court can be exempted to provide information in RTI if said information relates to confidentiality of any examination or selection process conducted by office of District Judge for appointment of ministerial staff?

 During the hearing, the Respondent submitted that they have the record but
claimed that as per Rule 7(iii) of Delhi District Courts (Right to Information) Rules,
2008, PIO may not provide the information to the applicant if the information relates
to the confidentiality of any examination or selection process conducted by the
office of the District Judge for the appointment of ministerial staff. He also added
that nearly 62,000 candidates appeared for the exam and it will pose huge burden
on them if copies were provided to each and every candidate.
In the present case the exemption taken by the PIO for denying the
information sought by the appellant is Rule 7 (iii) of Delhi District Courts (Right to
Information) Rules, 2008 which states as under :
 Exemption from disclosure of information: The Public Information Officer or
the Assistant Public Information Officer may not provide the information to the
applicant on the following grounds:…. (iii) The information relates to the
confidentiality of any examination or selection process conducted by the office of
the District Judge for the appointment of ministerial staff.
5. The Commission had in CIC/SG/A/2010/002021/9247 and in
CIC/SG/A/2010/003545/1147 with regard to Validity of exemptions contained in
District Court Rules visàvis
RTI Act had observed as follows:
“Sections 8 and 9 of the RTI Act lay down the grounds on the basis of which
information may be denied by the PIO. The District Court Rules have been made
by the High Court of Delhi (the “Delhi HC”) in exercise of its powers under
Section 28(1) of the RTI Act and notified in the New Delhi Gazette on May 6,
2009. Rules framed by a competent authority under Section 28(1) of the RTI Act
cannot go beyond the exemptions provided in Section 8 and 9 of the RTI Act. The
Supreme Court of India as well as various High Courts have categorically held
that subordinate legislations or rules cannot go beyond the letter of the delegating
legislation.
In Addl. District Magistrate (Rev.) Delhi Admn. v Shri Siri Ram AIR 2000 SC
2143, the Supreme Court of India held:
“It is well recognized principle of interpretation of a statute that conferment of rule
making power by an Act does not enable the rule making authority to make rule
which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent
therewith or repugnant thereto.”
The RTI Act was enacted with the spirit of ensuring transparency and access to
information giving citizens the right to information. Hence, as observed by the Delhi

HC in CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. S.C. Agarwal WP (C) No. 188/2009, the
RTI Act is premised on disclosure being the norm, and refusal, the exception.
According to the RTI Act, information may be exempted from disclosure in
accordance with Section 8 and 9 only and no other exemptions can be claimed
while rejecting a demand for disclosure.
The Delhi HC in Bhagat Singh v. CIC WP(C) No. 3114/2007 has held that
exemptions in the RTI should be strictly construed. It explained:
“Access to information, under Section 3 of the Act, is the rule and exemptions
under Section 8, the exception. Section 8 being a restriction on this fundamental
right, must therefore is to be strictly construed. It should not be interpreted in
manner as to shadow the very right itself.”
6. Hon’ble Information Commissioner Shri Shailesh Gandhi in
CIC/SG/A/2010/003545/11147 while dealing with Rule 7 made under Delhi District
Court Rules, 2008 had observed that:
“It must be noted that no public body is permitted under the RTI Act to take upon
itself the role of the legislature and import new exemptions hitherto not provided.
The District Court Rules made by the competent authority under the RTI Act
appears to bring in exemptions not provided for in the RTI Act and transgress the
exemptions envisaged by the Parliament under Sections 8 and 9 of the RTI Act.
Since the right to information is a fundamental right of the citizens, any move
which constricts it should be avoided. Even Parliament is very wary of the
restrictions it can place on the fundamental right of the citizen and hence

competent authorities would be well advised to ensure that they do not create any
exemptions which the lawmakers did not provide.”
CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

CIC/AD/A/2013/001720SA
Appellant : Vipin Kumar
Respondent : Tis Hazari Court

Date of decision : 22.8.2014
Information Commissioner : Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu
(Madabhushi Sridhar)

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Thursday, 12 December 2013

Whether accused will be entitled to be acquitted if informant is not examined?


Non-examination of the informant is once again stressed by the appellants in defence. The informant is, as claimed by the appellants, a member of Sawarna Liberation Front, and was the accused in the carnage known as Miyanpur Narsanghar. Non examination of S.I. Ram Japit Kumar also weakens the prosecution’s case, because according to the counsel for appellants he was entrusted with the preliminary investigation, but neither the case diary was brought in, nor was he examined.
15. The learned senior counsel for the State Mr. Rai on the other hand submitted that the above submission is completely misconceived, and reiterated the findings of the Apex Court in para 35 of Krishna Mochi v. State (supra) viz. that an F.I.R is not a substantial piece of evidence, and non-examination of the informant would not entitle the appellants to an order of acquittal on this ground alone. The case should be examined on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. 1

Supreme Court of India
Vyas Ram @ Vyas Kahar & Ors. vs State Of Bihar on 20 September, 2013
Author: H Gokhale
REPORTABLE
Citation; 2013 (4) Crimes 304 (SC)
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