It can thus be seen that the Division Bench of the Commission has observed that the word 'investigation' as used in section 8(1)(h) should be construed rather broadly and should include all inquiries, verification of records, assessments and so on which may be ordered in specific cases and for all such cases, the inquiry or investigation should be taken as completed only after the competent authority makes a "prima facie", determination about the presence or absence of guilt on receipt of the investigation/enquiry report from the investigation/enquiry officer. It is clear that the competent authority/disciplinary authority can form a "prima facie", opinion on conclusion of the preliminary enquiry or the fact finding enquiry. The conclusion/finding, which the competent authority would reach on completion of the regular enquiry cannot be said to be "prima facie" opinion. It has to be a final opinion.
18. Thus, the two judgments of the Commission cited on behalf of the petitioner cannot come to the aid of the petitioner in this case. However, at the same time, I do not propose to record any final or binding opinion or conclusion as to whether 'investigation' within the meaning of Section 8(1) (h) of the Act would include only an investigation by police or a similar agency in the matter of prosecution of an offence or whether it would also include the investigation by the disciplinary authority in a matter of initiation of disciplinary authority. I proceed on the assumption that the 'investigation' as used in Section 8(1)(h) of the Act, would include 'investigation', by the disciplinary authority before the initiation of the disciplinary enquiry. However, any such investigation would stand 'concluded', once the chargesheet is served on the delinquent employee. It is not possible to accept that investigation in such a case would continue till the conclusion of the departmental inquiry. Thus, the said contention raised on behalf of the petitioner has to be rejected. In the present case, admittedly, the two chargesheets have been served on the first respondent and thus the investigation, if any, stands concluded. Thus, it is not possible to accept that the information if furnished would impede the process of any such investigation.
19. The Commission, in my considered view, is right in holding that the public authority or the PIO cannot just stay content, while refusing to supply the information, by claiming that the information if supplied would impede the process of investigation and/or for that matter the apprehension or prosecution of any offender. It is necessary for the public authority to demonstrate with some semblance as to how the furnishing of information would impede the process of investigation.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
Writ Petition No. 338 of 2019
Decided On: 25.06.2019
The State Public Information Officer, The Deputy Director of Vigilance Vs. Vinesh V. Arlekar and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C.V. Bhadang, J.
Citation: AIR 2020 Bom 27
