Showing posts with label final decree proceeding. Show all posts
Showing posts with label final decree proceeding. Show all posts

Sunday, 24 February 2019

Whether preliminary decree for partition can be executed after delay of thirty years?

Only question raised in the present appeal is with respect to the limitation for execution of preliminary decree for partition. In the instant case, the application for execution of the decree was filed after thirty years of the preliminary decree. That too in the shape for the appointment of an court Commissioner so as to carry out the preliminary decree which has been passed on 23.11.1959. The application for the execution of the decree was filed on 3.10.1989 i.e. after thirty years.

4. In our opinion a preliminary decree for partition crystallizes the rights of parties for seeking partition to the extent declared, the equities remain to be worked out in final decree proceedings. Till partition is carried out and final decree is passed, there is no question of any limitation running against right to claim partition as per preliminary decree. Even when application is filed seeking appointment of Commissioner, no limitation is prescribed for this purpose, as such, it would not be barred by limitation, lis continues till preliminary decree culminates in to final decree.

5. The matter is no more res integra. The Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in In Bhusan Chandra Mondal v. Chhabimoni Dasi, [MANU/WB/0079/1948: AIR 1948 CALCUTTA 363] considered the question when a preliminary decree was passed in a suit for partition in courts, the court consider the applicability of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (in short 'the old Act') the court has laid down thus:

(6) Article 181 is the residuary Article relating to applications. In a mortgage suit it has been held that the application for a final decree has to be made within 3 years by reason of Article 181, Limitation Act. But those decisions are not helpful because Order 34 Rule 4 Code of Civil Procedure expressly requires the mortgagee to make an application for a final decree, either for foreclosure or for sale. In a suit for partition and/or accounts a party need not make an application for making the decree final. After the preliminary decree is in such a suit has been passed it is the usual practice for the Plaintiff to make an application for the appointment of the Commissioner but there were no legal bar in the court appointing the commissioner suo motu and asking the Plaintiff to deposit the commissioner's fee in Court. If he does not deposit the fees any other party to the suit can do so and take upon himself the carriage of the proceedings if the Plaintiff and none of the other parties make the deposit the fact that the court would not be able to dismiss the suit is, however, another matter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4187 of 2008

Decided On: 27.04.2017

 Venu Vs.  Ponnusamy Reddiar (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 15 SCC 254
Print Page

Sunday, 15 July 2018

Whether abatement of final decree proceeding is set aside if court has permitted prayer for bringing legal heirs on record?

In my considered opinion, having regard to the fact that the present proceedings are, though not the execution proceedings in a strict sense of the term, even then, they are the Final Decree proceedings, in which the shares of the parties in a Partition Suit are determined and partitioned. In such situation, when during the pendency of that proceeding, husband of the Petitioner has expired, then, as held by the Apex Court in the above-said Judgment, the Trial Court should not have adopted such a technical approach of insisting on the application for setting aside the abatement. The very fact that the Applicant was seeking her impleadment in the proceedings as legal heir of her husband, indirectly, represents that she was also requesting for setting aside the abatement, if any has occurred, against her husband. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court, by adopting the technical approach of insisting on separate application for setting aside the abatement, needs to be set aside; considering the legal position enunciated above, the nature of litigation itself and the fact that such application was filed in the Final Decree proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 57 of 2016

Decided On: 28.02.2018

 Anuradha Vasantrao Ghorpade Vs. Sayajirao Tatyasaheb Ghorpade and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.
Citation: 2018(3) MHLJ 687
Print Page

Sunday, 7 January 2018

When application of final decree will be barred by limitation?

The only contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant before this Court is that the Application filed by the plaintiff for grant of final decree itself is barred by limitation. Though the preliminary decree was passed on 23.10.2003, the Application was filed only on 1.6.2009, which is barred by limitation. As specified under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, three years period is given for filing an application for final decree. Whereas final decree application has been filed only on 1.6.2009 beyond three years, which is barred by Limitation. Hence, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the application for a final decree itself is barred by limitation, passing of final decree cannot be sustained. According to the learned counsel the right to apply for final decree proceedings arose immediately after the period of two months which was granted by the trial Court for the defendant to pay the amount, which has expired on 23.12.2003 itself and plaintiff ought to have applied for a final decree within a period of three years i.e. on or before 23.12.2006. Whereas, this application has been filed only on 1.6.2009 which is clearly barred by limitation.

It is well settled that Application for final decree is governed by the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act, in which an Application for final decree is to be filed within three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. If the right to apply for final decree had accrued to the plaintiff on default being committed by the defendant for payment of the decreetal amount. An Application for final decree ought to have taken out within a period of three years as specified under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In this case, Application for final decree itself has been filed on 01.06.2009, i.e. Beyond the period of limitation of three years. Right to apply for final decree accrued to the plaintiff in this case is on the expiry of the two months time granted to the defendant for payment of decretal amount, by the trial Court in the preliminary decree dated 23.10.2003. Therefore, right to file Application for final decree accrued in the month of December 2003 itself and the Application for final decree ought to have been taken out within three years i.e., on or before 23.12.2006. Whereas in this case, the Application for final decree as could be seen from the lower Court records, was filed on 01.06.2009, much beyond the period of limitation, without filing an application to condone the delay.

7. Further, in the Application for final decree, there was no explanation whatsoever pleaded, for the delay in filing such application and no evidence whatsoever has been led to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the Application within the period of limitation. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

A.S. No. 809 of 2010 and M.P. No. 1 of 2010

Decided On: 10.04.2017

 L.K. Raju Vs. S.N. Samiappan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N. Sathish Kumar, J.
Citation: AIR 2017 (NOC) 903 MAD
Print Page

Tuesday, 8 November 2016

Whether court can appoint fresh commission for partition of suit property after completion of final decree proceeding?

 In the teeth of the aforesaid background wherein the final decree has been confirmed right upto the Apex Court and where the orders passed on the earlier applications invoking section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the respondent No. 1 and said Mrs. Anita Khetan had become final, the question which begs an answer is whether the subsequent applications filed invoking section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were maintainable. The answer has to be an emphatic 'no'. The trial Court in entertaining the said applications has totally glossed over the earlier round of litigation between the parties, which insofar as final decree proceedings are concerned, ended with the special leave petition filed by the respondent No. 1 being dismissed and insofar as application invoking section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure had finally culminated in view of no further challenges to the orders passed in the earlier applications filed by the respondent No. 1 and said Mrs. Anita Khetani. What the trial Court has done by the impugned order is to reopen the final decree proceedings by ordering a fresh Commission for partitioning of the property in question. The same, in my view, cannot be countenanced in the background of the facts as narrated above.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
W. P. No. 987 of 2011
Decided On: 13.07.2011
 Premlata s/o. Ramlal Shahu and another
Vs.
Chandrakant s/o. Gayaprasad Shahu and another
Coram:
R.M. Savant, J.

Print Page

Tuesday, 12 July 2016

Whether transferee pendente lite can seek partition in final decree proceeding?

Countering the said document, learned Counsel for Defendants 9 and 10, relied on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of 'Khemchand Shankar Choudhary and Another v. Vishnu Hari Patil and Others' reported in MANU/SC/0168/1982 : 1983 [1] SCC 18, where dealing with the purchaser pendente lite, locus standi to claim equitable partition before the Collector in Final Decree Proceedings under section 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was held as under:
"Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act no doubt lays down that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in an immovable property which is the subject matter of a suit from any of the parties to the suit will be bound in so far as that interest is concerned by the proceedings in the suit. Such a transferee is a representative in interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly recognises the right of a transferee to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and to be heard before any order is made. It may be that if he does not apply to be impleaded, he may suffer by default on account of any order passed in the proceedings. But if he applies to be impleaded as a party and to be heard, he has got to be so impleaded and heard. He can also prefer an appeal against an order made in the said proceedings but with the leave of the appellate court where he is not already brought on record. The position of a person on whom any interest has devolved on account of a transfer during the pendency of any suit or a proceeding is somewhat similar to the position of an heir or a legatee of a party who dies during the pendency of a suit or a proceeding, or an official receiver who takes over the assets of such a party on his insolvency. An heir or a legatee or an official receiver or a transferee can participate in the execution proceedings even though their names may not have been shown in the decree, preliminary or final. If they apply to the court to be impleaded as parties they cannot be turned out. The Collector who has to effect partition of an estate under section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt to divide it in accordance with the decree sent to him. But if a party to such a decree dies leaving some heirs about whose interest there is no dispute should he fold up his hands and return the papers to the civil court? He need not do so. He may proceed to allot the share of the deceased party to his heirs. Similarly he may, when there is no dispute, allot the shares of a deceased party in favour of his legatees. In the case of insolvency of a party, the official receiver may be allotted the share of the insolvent. In the case of transferees pendente lite also, if there is no dispute, the Collector may proceed to make allotment of properties in an equitable manner instead of rejecting their claim for such equitable partition on the ground that they have no locus standi. A transferee from a party of a property which is the subject matter of partition can exercise all the rights of the transferor. There is no dispute that a party can ask for an equitable partition. A transferee from him, therefore, can also do so. Such a construction of section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure advances the cause of justice. Otherwise in every case where a party dies, or where a party is adjudicated as an insolvent or where he transfers some interest in the suit property pendente lite the matter has got to be referred back to the civil court even though there may be no dispute about the succession, devolution or transfer of interest. In any such case where there is no dispute if the Collector makes an equitable partition taking into consideration the interests of all concerned including those on whom any interest in the subject matter has devolved, he would neither be violating the decree nor transgressing any law. His action would not be ultra vires. On the other hand, it would be in conformity with the intention of the Legislature which has placed the work of partition of lands subject to payment of assessment to the Government in his hands to be carried out 'in accordance with the law (if any) for the time being in force relating to the partition or the separate possession of shares."

68. Therefore, a transferee pendente lite steps into the shoes of the transferor who is a party to the suit. He acquires all the rights of the transferor. The pendency of the suit would not come in the way of his acquiring such right, if the transferor has any such right. If the transferor has no right, he acquires none. This is a matter which is finally adjudicated in the suit. The judgment and decree passed in the suit is equally binding on him, as his transferee, whether he is impleaded as a party to the suit or not. Transferee from a party of property which is subject matter of partition can exercise all the rights of the transferor. Such transferee is representative in interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly recognises the right of a transferee to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and to be heard before any order is made. It may be that if he does not apply to be impleaded, he may suffer by default on account of any order passed in the proceedings. The position of a person on whom any interest has devolved on account of a transfer during the pendency of any suit or a proceeding is somewhat similar to the position of an heir or a legatee of a party who dies during the pendency of a suit or a proceeding, or an official receiver who takes over the assets of such a party on his insolvency. When a party to a decree dies, leaving some heirs, in the final decree proceedings, shares may be allotted to such heirs. Similarly, in the case of transferee pendente lite, if there is no dispute, final decree Court can proceed to make allotment of the properties in an equitable manner  instead of rejecting their claim for such equitable partition on the ground that they have no locus standi. A transferee from a party of a property which is the subject matter of partition can exercise all the rights of the transferor. There is no dispute that a party can ask for an equitable partition. A transferee from him, therefore, can also seek for an equitable partition, even if the transfer is during the pendency of the suit. Such a construction of section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure advances the cause of justice.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R.F.A. No. 960/2003
Decided On: 31.01.2015
 Syed Basheer Malik and Ors.
Vs.
 Jameela Begum and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:N. Kumar and B. Veerappa, JJ.
Citation:AIR 2016(NOC)395 KAR
Print Page

Sunday, 3 July 2016

Whether preliminary decree for partition can be executed?

 The final decree proceedings were taken after the passing of the preliminary decree. We are not much concerned regarding the division of the revenue yielding estate and other moveable property. It is an admitted position that a Commissioner was appointed by the Court for effecting the partition of the house. It appears that the Commissioner on giving opportunities to the contesting parties, finalised a Scheme for partition. The report of the Commissioner was put before the Court. Objections were raised to that report by the contesting parties. The Court ultimately passed an order overruling the objections raised by the present petitioner. It is an admitted position prevailing even to-day that the Court has not yet passed the final decree. In spite of this, the advocate appearing for the plaintiff-decree-holder in the trial Court, presented a Regular Darkhast before the Court. The illegality has crept in right from the inception of this Darkhast and it pains tremendously to point out that an advocate has contributed substantially to the final outcome. During the course of this Special Darkhast, the warrant of possession came to be issued by the Court directing the bailiff to put the decree-holder in possession of the ground floor of the house, though in fact there was no decree to that effect. The Court not only issued the warrant, but on the pt her hand granted police help to the decree-holder, so that the possession could be effectively delivered to the decree-holder. With the help of police, the bailiff put the decree-holder in possession of the property and a record was accordingly submitted to the court.
Thus, the whole process of putting the decree-holder in possession of the property is vitiated. In my opinion, the execution application could not be filed before the Court, nor could the Court issue a warrant, nor could the Bailiff execute that warrant, nor could any police aid be granted by the Court. Thus, the process being vitiated, there is no justification for the decree-holder remaining and continuing in possession of the property. I would set aside the order passed by the trial Court and direct the Court to put the judgment-debtor (present petitioner) in possession of the property which he lost due to illegal action. 
Bombay High Court

Vishwasrao vs Ushabai And Anr. on 11 February, 1987
Equivalent citations: AIR 1988 Bom 392, 1987 (1) BomCR 707
Bench: S Ratnaparkhi
Print Page

Sunday, 27 July 2014

Whether any limitation is provided for initiation of final decree proceeding?


As found earlier, no executable final decree has been drawn working out the rights of the parties dividing the properties in terms of the shares declared in the preliminary decree. The preliminary decree had only declared the shares of the parties and properties were liable to the partitioned in accordance with those shares by a Commissioner to be appointed in this behalf. Admittedly, no Commissioner was appointed and no final decree had been passed relating to all.
Recently, albeit on a different factual backdrop, this Court in Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad and ors. (2007) 2 SCC 355 opined:
9. A final decree proceeding may be initiated at any point of time. No limitation is provided therefor. However, what can be executed is a final decree, and not a preliminary decree, unless and until final decree is a part of the preliminary decree.
For the reasons aforementioned, Articles 136 and 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will have no application. 

Supreme Court of India
Bikoba Deora Gaikwad & Ors vs Hirabai Marutirao Ghorgare & Ors on 27 May, 2008
Citation;2009(1)MhLj582, (2008)5MLJ1388(SC), 2008(4)MPHT518(SC), 2009MPLJ275(SC), 2008 105 RD336, RLW2008(2)SC1780, 2008(8)SCALE692, (2008)8SCC198

Bench: S.B. Sinha, Lokeshwar Singh Panta
 REPORTABLE
Print Page

Friday, 17 January 2014

When court can entertain execution application for executing interim mandatory Injunction?


Equivalent Citation: ILR 2010 KARNATAKA 923, 2009(5)KCCR3446
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
C.R.P. No. 237/2009
Decided On: 06.11.2009
 Shri Somashekar D. Patil S/o Mr. D.S. Patil
Vs.
Shri D.S. Patil S/o Sri Shivanagouda Patil and Shri Manjunath D. Patil S/o D.S. Patil
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.S. Bopanna, J.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 20, Rule 18--Final decree proceedings--Suit for partition filed and preliminary decree obtained--Interim mandatory injunction sought by plaintiff to remove an unauthorized person--Allowed--Execution filed--Petition for obstruction file--Dismissed--In the meanwhile preliminary decree passed--The execution was allowed against the Civil Revision Petition filed--Whether Execution Court has Jurisdiction to entertain the Court--The order of interim mandatory injunction gets merged with the decree.

Held: Therefore, what can be deduced is that in all suits of the nature where passing of only one decree is provided under the Code, the suit would come to an end on the passing of the decree. In that circumstance, all interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of the suit would merge with the decree and would not have independent existence so as to seek for execution since the decree in itself would become executable. However, the suits in which the passing of two decrees namely, preliminarily and final is provided for under the Code, even if the preliminary decree is passed, in law, the suit does not conclude until the final decree which is executable is passed, though the right of the party gets decided or determined by the preliminary decree. One such exception would be if interlocutory order has a bearing on the passing of the final decree in terms of Order 20, Rule 18(2) and Order 26, Rule 14 of the Code. In such event, it would remain in force even after the passing of the preliminary decree and until the suit concludes by way of final decree.

As such, the interlocutory order in the instant case cannot be held to have merged in the preliminary decree and the executing Court would be justified in proceeding with the matter. The impugned order therefore does not call for interference. i) The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. ii) The petitioner is however granted time till 15.11.2009 to voluntarily vacate and report to the executing Court failing which the delivery warrant shall be executed.


Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.



Print Page

Friday, 31 May 2013

Whether preliminary decree for partition can be executed?

The final decree proceedings were taken after the passing of the preliminary decree. We are not much concerned regarding the division of the revenue yielding estate and other moveable property. It is an admitted position that a Commissioner was appointed by the Court for effecting the partition of the house. It appears that the Commissioner on giving opportunities to the contesting parties, finalised a Scheme for partition. The report of the Commissioner was put before the Court. Objections were raised to that report by the contesting parties. The Court ultimately passed an order overruling the objections raised by the present petitioner. It is an admitted position prevailing even to-day that the Court has not yet passed the final decree. In spite of this, the advocate appearing for the plaintiff-decree-holder in the trial Court, presented a Regular Darkhast before the Court. The illegality has crept in right from the inception of this Darkhast and it pains tremendously to point out that an advocate has contributed substantially to the final outcome. During the course of this Special Darkhast, the warrant of possession came to be issued by the Court directing the bailiff to put the decree-holder in possession of the ground floor of the house, though in fact there was no decree to that effect. The Court not only issued the warrant, but on the pt her hand granted police help to the decree-holder, so that the possession could be effectively delivered to the decree-holder. With the help of police, the bailiff put the decree-holder in possession of the property and a record was accordingly submitted to the court.



Bombay High Court
Vishwasrao vs Ushabai And Anr. on 11 February, 1987
Equivalent citations: AIR 1988 Bom 392, 
1987 (1) BomCR 707
Bench: S Ratnaparkhi


Print Page