Having given our thoughtful consideration to the contention
advanced at the hands of learned counsel for the respondents, we
are of the view, that the decision rendered by this Court in the
P.P. Unnikrishnan case (supra) is clear and emphatic. The same does
not leave any room for making any choice. It is apparent, that the
official arrest of Neeraj Kumar in terms of the provisions of the
‘Code’, referred to hereinabove, would extend during the period
from 28.06.1999 to 30.06.1999. The above period of apprehension can
legitimately be considered as, having been made “while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties”. The
factual position expressed by the appellants is, that Neeraj Kumar
was not detained for the period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999. His
detention during the above period, if true, in our considered view,
would certainly not emerge from the action of the accused while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official
duties. If it emerges from evidence adduced before the trial
Court, that Neeraj Kumar was actually detained during the period
from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, the said detention cannot be taken
to have been made by the accused while acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of their official duties. More so, because it is
not the case of the appellants, that they had kept Neeraj Kumar in
jail during the period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999. If they had
not detained him during the above period, it is not open to anyone
to assume the position, that the detention of Neeraj Kumar, during
the above period, was while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of their official duties. Therefore, in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case, based on the legal position
declared by this Court in the P.P. Unnikrishnan case (supra), we
are of the considered view, that sanction for prosecution of the
accused in relation to the detention of Neeraj Kumar for the period
from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, would not be required, before a
Court of competent jurisdiction, takes cognizance with reference tothe alleged arrest of Neeraj Kumar. We therefore hereby, endorse
advanced at the hands of learned counsel for the respondents, we
are of the view, that the decision rendered by this Court in the
P.P. Unnikrishnan case (supra) is clear and emphatic. The same does
not leave any room for making any choice. It is apparent, that the
official arrest of Neeraj Kumar in terms of the provisions of the
‘Code’, referred to hereinabove, would extend during the period
from 28.06.1999 to 30.06.1999. The above period of apprehension can
legitimately be considered as, having been made “while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties”. The
factual position expressed by the appellants is, that Neeraj Kumar
was not detained for the period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999. His
detention during the above period, if true, in our considered view,
would certainly not emerge from the action of the accused while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official
duties. If it emerges from evidence adduced before the trial
Court, that Neeraj Kumar was actually detained during the period
from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, the said detention cannot be taken
to have been made by the accused while acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of their official duties. More so, because it is
not the case of the appellants, that they had kept Neeraj Kumar in
jail during the period from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999. If they had
not detained him during the above period, it is not open to anyone
to assume the position, that the detention of Neeraj Kumar, during
the above period, was while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of their official duties. Therefore, in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case, based on the legal position
declared by this Court in the P.P. Unnikrishnan case (supra), we
are of the considered view, that sanction for prosecution of the
accused in relation to the detention of Neeraj Kumar for the period
from 24.06.1999 to 28.06.1999, would not be required, before a
Court of competent jurisdiction, takes cognizance with reference tothe alleged arrest of Neeraj Kumar. We therefore hereby, endorse
the conclusions drawn by the High Court, to the above effect.
“REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.565 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.3406 of 2008)
SURINDERJIT SINGH MAND & ANR. .
V
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.
Citation: 2016(3) ALLMR(JOURNAL) 82,(2016) 8 SCC722
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.565 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.3406 of 2008)
SURINDERJIT SINGH MAND & ANR. .
V
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.
Citation: 2016(3) ALLMR(JOURNAL) 82,(2016) 8 SCC722
