Whether principle of forum non conveniens is applicable to civil proceeding filed in India?

During the course of arguments, Mr. Sai Deepak also invokes the principle of forum non conveniens. In his submission, as the defendant, i.e. his client, was based in Hyderabad, and had filed OS 867/2019 prior, in point of time, to the filing of the present suit by the plaintiffs, applying the principle of forum non conveniens, the present suit ought to have been filed in Hyderabad.

43. This submission, of Mr. Sai Deepak, merits rejection, straightaway, as it stands covered by the decision, of a Division Bench of this Court, authored by Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. (as he then was) in Horlicks Ltd. v. Heinz India (Pvt.) Ltd. MANU/DE/2721/2009 : (2009) 164 DLT 539 (DB) which, after an incisive study of the evaluation of the forum non conveniens doctrine, with all its inflexions, held, authoritatively, that the principle had no application to domestic suits. Paras 78, 86, 88 and 90 of the decision merit reproduction, in extenso, thus:

"78. The aforesaid exposition thus shows that principles while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot ipso facto be applied to a civil proceeding governed by the said Code. Not only that, the principle of forum non conveniens emerged as a principle of admiralty law applicable primarily to foreign forums. It finds no place in a domestic forum in India. The plaintiff is always the dominus litis and so long as the Court has jurisdiction to try a suit, a party cannot be non-suited. A suit has to be governed by the provisions of the said Code. In this context, we may refer to the observations made in Abdul Gafur v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/SC/3415/2008 : (2008) 10 SCC 97, where the Supreme Court held that since Section 9 of the said Code provides that a civil Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred, the civil Courts have inherent jurisdiction unless a part of that jurisdiction is carved out. Thus, the law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one's choice, at one's peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute. It was further observed that a plaint can only be rejected in terms of Order 7 Rule 11 of the said Code and similarly a plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil Court can be examined.

90. We thus hold that the principle of forum non conveniens has no application to domestic forums in India which are governed by the said Code."

(Emphasis supplied).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

I.As. 2594, 2595, 2596, 4274 and 5209/2020 in CS (COMM.) 611/2019

Decided On: 15.07.2020

FMC Corporation  Vs. NATCO Pharma Limited

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Whether divorce can be obtained from foreign court if marriage is performed as per Hindu marriage Act?

 A perusal of the divorce petition filed by the defendant
indicates that the defendant has invoked the Article 3(1) of the
Council Regulation (EC) No.2201/2003 of 27th November 2003 and
has applied for divorce on the ground that the marriage has broken
down irretrievably and also on the ground that the plaintiff herein
has alleged to have behaved in such a way that the defendant
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the plaintiff. Under the
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, no decree of divorce can
be granted on the ground that marriage has been broken down
irretrievably. This Court while granting ad-interim relief on 30th June
2014 in favour of the plaintiff in this notice of motion has recorded
various reasons and has prima facie observed that the parties
having been married in Mumbai under the provisions of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, that law governs the marriage of the party.

49. This Court also considered that the reliefs have been
sought by the defendant in the Family Court, UK against the plaintiff
not under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, either on the
question of jurisdiction or on the question of grounds for dissolution
but under the English Personal law, one that does not govern the
marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant. Considering these facts,
this Court after recording the detailed reasons, had granted adinterim
injunction in terms of prayer clause (b) of the notice of motion
thereby restraining the defendant from proceeding the divorce
proceedings filed by the defendant against the plaintiff which are
before the Family Court at Manchester, UK. Though by the said
order dated 30th June 2014, this Court had granted liberty to the
defendant to apply for modification, variation or recalling of the said
order by filing an affidavit, the defendant filed a Notion of Motion
bearing No.1774 of 2018 for setting aside the ad-interim order dated
30th June 2014 only on 4th July, 2018. The said ad-interim order
passed by this Court is already in force since 30th June, 2014. The
said notice of motion has been withdrawn by the defendant.
50. Admittedly there are no criminal proceedings filed by the
plaintiff against the defendant and the defendant had no
apprehension if the defendant attends the proceedings filed by the
plaintiff against the defendant in the Family Court, Thane. On the
other hand, if the plaintiff is asked to defend the proceedings filed by
the defendant before the Family Court, Manchester, UK, the
defendant who has always obstructed the entry of the plaintiff in UK,
the plaintiff even otherwise would not be able to defend the
proceedings and that would also without financial assistance of the

defendant.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
NOTICE OF MOTION NO.28 OF 2015
IN
SUIT NO.880 OF 2014

Arunima Naveen Takiar,Vs  Naveen Takiar,

CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 29TH JANUARY, 2019

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Whether concept of forum convenience is applicable to wardship jurisdiction of court?

 We must remind ourselves of the settled legal position that the concept of forum convenience has no place in wardship jurisdiction. Further, the efficacy of the principle of comity of courts as applicable to India in respect of child custody matters has been succinctly delineated in several decisions of this Court. ...

66. The invocation of first strike principle as a decisive factor, in our opinion, would undermine and whittle down the wholesome principle of the duty of the Court having jurisdiction to consider the best interests and welfare of the child, which is of paramount importance. If the Court is convinced in that regard, the fact that there is already an order passed by a foreign Court in existence may not be so significant as it must yield to the welfare of the child. That is only one of the factors to be taken into consideration. The interests and welfare of the child are of paramount consideration. The principle of comity of courts as observed in Dhanwanti Joshi case [MANU/SC/0810/1998 : 1998(1) SCC 112], in relation to non-convention countries is that the

Court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. While considering that aspect, the Court may reckon the fact that the child was abducted from his or her country of habitual residence but the Court's overriding consideration must be the child's welfare.

4. In view of above, principle of comity of courts or principle of forum convenience alone cannot determine the threshold bar of jurisdiction. Paramount consideration is the best interest of child. The same cannot be subject-matter of final determination in proceedings Under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2291 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3090 of 2018)

Decided On: 20.02.2018

Jasmeet Kaur Vs. Navtej Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 584

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Whether court will follow principle of welfare of child for deciding custody dispute even if there is order of foreign court?

 The Appellant has assailed the aforesaid order inter alia on the ground that in the present scenario, the paramount interests and welfare of the daughter, Nethra, who is presently over seven years of age, is to remain in custody of her mother, especially because she suffers from a cardiac disorder and that she would face immense physical and psychological harm if repatriated to the custody of the father in England in light of the alleged physical, verbal and mental abuse meted out by him. The Appellant has also contended that the UK Court does not have intimate contact with Nethra merely because she has acquired the citizenship of the UK in December, 2012. The daughter has her deep roots in India as she was born here in Delhi and has retained her Indian citizenship. She has been schooling here for the past 12 (twelve) months and has spent equal time in both the countries out of her first six years. Further, Nethra has her grandparents, family and relatives here in India, unlike in the UK where she lived in a nuclear family of the three (father, mother and herself) with no extended family and friends. Thus, it is the Indian Courts which have the intimate contact with the minor and including the jurisdiction to decide the matter in issue. Furthermore, the Respondent No. 2 did not initiate any action for initial six months even after knowing that the Appellant was unwilling to return along with her daughter and until he was slapped with a notice regarding complaint filed by the Appellant before the Women Cell at Delhi in December 2015, relating to violence inflicted by him. As a counter blast to that notice the Respondent No. 2 rushed to the UK Court and then filed writ petition in the Delhi High Court to pressurize the Appellant to withdraw the allegations regarding violence inflicted by him.

 We must remind ourselves of the settled legal position that the concept of forum convenience has no place in wardship jurisdiction. Further, the efficacy of the principle of comity of courts as applicable to India in respect of child custody matters has been succinctly delineated in several decisions of this Court. We may usefully refer to the decision in the case of Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde MANU/SC/0810/1998 : (1998) 1 SCC 112. In Paragraphs 28 to 30, 32 and 33 of the reported decision, the Court observed thus:

28. The leading case in this behalf is the one rendered by the Privy Council in 1951, in McKee v. McKee. In that case, the parties, who were American citizens, were married in USA in 1933 and lived there till December 1946. But they had separated in December 1940. On 17-12-1941, a decree of divorce was passed in USA and custody of the child was given to the father and later varied in favour of the mother. At that stage, the father took away the child to Canada. In habeas corpus proceedings by the mother, though initially the decisions of lower courts went against her, the Supreme Court of Canada gave her custody but the said Court held that the father could not have the question of custody retried in Canada once the question was adjudicated in favour of the mother in the USA earlier. On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Simonds held that in proceedings relating to custody before the Canadian Court, the welfare and happiness of the infant was of paramount consideration and the order of a foreign court in USA as to his custody can be given due weight in the circumstances of the case, but such an order of a foreign court was only one of the facts which must be taken into consideration. It was further held that it was the duty of the Canadian Court to form an independent judgment on the merits of the matter in regard to the welfare of the child. The order of the foreign court in US would yield to the welfare of the child. "Comity of courts demanded not its enforcement, but its grave consideration". This case arising from Canada which lays down the law for Canada and U.K. has been consistently followed in latter cases. This view was reiterated by the House of Lords in J v. C. This is the law also in USA (see 24 American Jurisprudence, para 1001) and Australia. (See Khamis v, Khamis)

 In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the Hague Convention of 1980 on "Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction". As of today, about 45 countries are parties to this Convention. India is not yet a signatory. Under the Convention, any child below 16 years who had been "wrongfully" removed or retained in another contracting State, could be returned back to the country from which the child had been removed, by application to. a central authority. Under Article 16 of the Convention, if in the process, the issue goes before a court, the Convention prohibits the court from going into the merits of the welfare of the child. Article 12 requires the child to be sent back, but if a period of more than one year has lapsed from the date of removal to the date of commencement of the proceedings before the court, the child would still be returned unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Article 12 is subject to Article 13 and a return could be refused if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. In England, these aspects are covered by the Child Abduction and Custody Act, 1985.

33. So far as non-Convention countries are concerned, or where the removal related to a period before adopting the Convention, the law is that the court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration as stated in McKee v. McKee unless the Court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare, as explained in L. As recently as 1996-1997, it has been held in P (A minor) (Child Abduction: Non-Convention Country), by Ward, L.J. [1996 Current Law Year Book, pp. 165-166] that in deciding whether to order the return of a child who has been-abducted from his or her country of habitual residence--which was not a party to the Hague Convention, 1980,-the courts' overriding consideration must be the child's welfare. There is no need for the Judge to attempt to apply the provisions of Article 13 of the Convention by ordering the child's return unless a grave risk of harm was established. See also A (A minor) (Abduction: Non-Convention Country) [Re, The Times 3-7-97 by Ward, L.J. (CA) (quoted in Current Law, August 1997, p. 13]. This answers the contention relating to removal of the child from USA.

The Court has noted that India is not yet a signatory to the Hague Convention of 1980 on "Civil Aspects of international Child Abduction". As regards the non-convention countries, the law is that the Court in the country to which the child has been removed must consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and reckon the order of the foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into consideration, unless the Court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare. In exercise of summary jurisdiction, the Court must be satisfied and of the opinion that the proceeding instituted before it was in close proximity and filed promptly after the child was removed from his/her native state and brought within its territorial jurisdiction, the child has not gained roots here and further that it will be in the child's welfare to return to his native state because of the difference in language spoken or social customs and contacts to which he/she has been accustomed or such other tangible reasons. In such a case the Court need not resort to an elaborate inquiry into the merits of the paramount welfare of the child but leave that inquiry to the foreign Court by directing return of the child. Be it noted that in exceptional cases the Court can still refuse to issue direction to return the child to the native state and more particularly inspite of a pre-existing order of the foreign Court in that behalf, if it is satisfied that the child's return may expose him to a grave risk of harm. This means that the Courts in India, within whose jurisdiction the minor has been brought must "ordinarily consider the question on merits, bearing in mind the welfare of the child as of paramount importance whilst reckoning the pre-existing order of the foreign Court if any as only one of the factors and not get fixated therewith. In either situation-be it a summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry-the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. Thus, while examining the issue the Courts in India are free to decline the relief of return of the child brought within its jurisdiction, if it is satisfied that the child is now settled in its new environment or if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. We are in respectful agreement with the aforementioned exposition.

We once again reiterate that the exposition in the case of Dhanwanti Joshi (supra) is a good law and has been quoted with approval by a three-judge bench of this Court in V. Ravi Chandran (supra). We approve the view taken in Dhanwanti Joshi (supra), inter alia in paragraph 33 that so far as non-convention countries are concerned, the law is that the Court in the country to which the child is removed while considering the question must bear in mind the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. The summary jurisdiction to return the child be exercised in cases where the child had been removed from its native land and removed to another country where, may be, his native language is not spoken, or the child gets divorced from the social customs and contacts to which he has been accustomed, or if its education in his native land is interrupted and the child is being subjected to a foreign system of education,-for these are all acts which could psychologically disturb the child. Again the summary jurisdiction be exercised only if the court to which the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly. The overriding consideration must be the interests and welfare of the child.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 972 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5751 of 2016)

Decided On: 03.07.2017

 Nithya Anand Raghavan Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

Citation:(2017) 8 SCC 454

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Whether court within whose jurisdiction part of cause of action has arisen should entertain writ petition?

A reference in this
regard is made to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Haribox
Swalram and others [(2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 786]. Their
Lordships have observed that each and every fact pleaded in the
writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those
facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have nexus
or relevance with the lis or dispute involved in the case. Facts
which does not have bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the
case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned.
That apart even if it is assumed for the time being
that small part of cause of action has fallen within the
jurisdiction of this Court also in view of the express agreement
between the parties, that would be of no help to the petitioners. A
reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court
rendered in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
another [(2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 254] the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 30 as under :
“30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself
may not be considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In
appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.4217 of 2015

M/s Bhagwati Coke Industries Pvt. Ltd.

V
 The Central Coalfields Ltd., 

CORAM:  DR. JUSTICE RAVI RANJAN

Date: 27-07-2016.
Citation: AIR 2017 Patna 56

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Whether doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable for transfer of Case?

We have considered the above suggestions. In this respect, we
may also refer to the doctrine of forum non conveniens which can be
applied in matrimonial proceedings for advancing interest of justice.
Under the said doctrine, the court exercises its inherent jurisdiction to
stay proceedings at a forum which is considered not to be convenient
and there is any other forum which is considered to be more
convenient for the interest of all the parties at the ends of justice. In
Modi Entertainment Network and anr. v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte.
Ltd.(2003)4 SCC 341
 this Court observed:
“19. In  Spiliada Maritime Corpn. V. Cansulex Ltd. (1986)3 All ER 843 case the House of Lords laid down
the following principle:
“The fundamental principle
applicable to both the stay of English
proceedings on the ground that some
other forum was the appropriate
forum and also the grant of leave to
serve proceedings out of the
jurisdiction was that the court would
choose that forum in which the case
could be tried more suitably for the
interest of all the parties and for the
ends of justice.”
The criteria to determine which was a more appropriate forum,
for the purpose of ordering stay of the suit, the court would look
for that forum with which the action had the most real and
substantial connection in terms of convenience or expense,
availability of witnesses, the law governing the relevant
transaction and the places where the parties resided or carried
on business. If the court concluded that there was no other
available forum which was more appropriate than the English
court, it would normally refuse a stay. If, however, the court
concluded that there was another forum which was prima facie
more appropriate, the court would normally grant a stay unless
there were circumstances militating against a stay. It was
noted that as the dispute concerning the contract in which the
proper law was English law, it meant that England was the
appropriate forum in which the case could be more suitably
tried.”
Though these observations have been made in the context of
granting anti suit injunction, the principle can be followed in
regulating the exercise of jurisdiction of the court where proceedings
are instituted. In a civil proceeding, the plaintiff is the dominus litis
but if more than one court has jurisdiction, court can determine which
is the convenient forum and lay down conditions in the interest of
justice subject to which its jurisdiction may be availed.Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and anr. (2004) 6 SCC 254 para 30
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
 TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1912 OF 2014
KRISHNA VENI NAGAM 
V
HARISH NAGAM 
Dated:MARCH 9, 2017.
Citation:(2017)4 SCC150,2017(4) MHLJ764

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When doctrine of Forum non conveniens is applicable?

Forum non conveniens

4. To clarify the position with regard to forum non conveniens, a slight

digression would be in order. Black‘s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines

the phrase ―forum non conveniens‖ as follows:-

―Term refers to discretionary power of court to decline

jurisdiction when convenience of parties and of justice would

be better served if action were brought and tried in another

forum. Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash.2d 577, 555

P.2d 997, 999, 1000.‖

And further as:-

―The doctrine is patterned upon the right of the court in the

exercise of its powers to refuse the imposition upon its

jurisdiction of the trial of cases even though the venue is

properly laid if it appears that for the convenience of litigants

and witnesses and in the interest of justice the action should be

instituted in another forum where the action might have been

brought. Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., D.C. Minn., 79

F. Supp. 821, 824. The doctrine presupposes at least two

forums in which the defendant is amenable to process and

furnishes criteria for choice between such forums. Wilson v.

Seas Shipping Co., D.C.N.Y., 77 F.Supp. 423,424. …….‖

―The rule is an equitable one embracing the discretionary

power of a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction which it has

over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the

action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.

Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 155 P.2d 42,

44……‖

(underlining added)

The principle was stated by Lord Kinnear in Sim v. Robinow: (1892) 19 K.

665 thus:

―The general rule was stated by the late Lord President in

Clements v. Macaulay 4 Macph. 593, in the following terms:

'In cases in which jurisdiction is competently founded, a court

has no discretion whether it shall exercise its jurisdiction or

not, but is bound to award the justice which a suitor comes to

ask. Judex tenetur impertiri judicium suum {a judge must

exercise jurisdiction in every case in which he is seized of it}

and the plea under consideration must not be stretched so as to

interfere with the general principle of jurisprudence.' And

Therefore the plea can never be sustained unless the court is

satisfied that there is some other tribunal, having competent

jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for

the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice... In all

these cases there was one indispensable element present when

the court gave effect to the plea of forum non conveniens,

namely, that the court was satisfied that there was another

court in which the action ought to be tried as being more

convenient for all the parties, and more suitable for the ends of

justice."

(underlining added)

5. In Mayar (H.K.) Ltd v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune

Express: (2006) 3 SCC 100, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the

explanation of the ambit of the principle of forum non conveniens for

issuing an order of stay as given by the House of Lords in Spiliada

Maritime Corpn. V. Cansulex Ltd: (1986) All ER 843 which was to the

following effect:

―(1) The fundamental principle applicable to both the stay of

English proceedings on the ground that some other forum was

the appropriate forum and also the grant of leave to serve

proceedings out of the jurisdiction was that the court would

choose that forum in which the case could be tried more

suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of

justice…

(2) In the case of an application for a stay of English

proceedings the burden of proof lay on the defendant to show

that the court should exercise its discretion to grant a stay.

Moreover, the defendant was required to show not merely that

England was not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial

but that there was another available forum which was clearly

or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum. In

considering whether there was another forum which was more

appropriate the court would look for that forum with which the

action had the most real and substantial connection e.g. in

terms of convenience or expense, availability of witnesses, the

law governing the relevant transaction, and the places where

the parties resided or carried on business. If the court

concluded that there was no other available forum which was

more appropriate than the English Court it would normally

refuse a stay. If, however, the court concluded that there was

another forum which was prima facie more appropriate the

court would normally grant a stay unless there were

circumstances militating against a stay e.g. if the plaintiff

would not obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction….‖

6. In a more recent decision of the House of Lords [Tehrani v. Secy of

State for the Home Department: [2006] UKHL 47] it was observed:-

―The doctrine of forum non conveniens is a good example of a

reason, established by judicial authority, why a court should

not exercise a jurisdiction that (in the strict sense) it possesses.

Issues of forum non conveniens do not arise unless there are

competing courts each of which has jurisdiction (in the strict

sense) to deal with the subject matter of the dispute. It seems

to me plain that if one of the two competing courts lacks

jurisdiction (in the strict sense) a plea of forum non conveniens

could never be a bar to the exercise by the other court of its

jurisdiction.‖

(underlining added)

7. Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can only be invoked

where the court deciding not to exercise jurisdiction, has jurisdiction to

decide the case. The U.S. Supreme Court also held in Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Gilbert: 330 U.S. 501 that "[I]ndeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens

can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue".

8. In this very decision (viz. Gulf Oil Corp.) the doctrine is stated as

follows:

―The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court

may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even where

jurisdiction is authorised by the letter of a general venue

statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality

and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may

be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy. But

the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice

but perhaps justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff

sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing

the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at

some inconvenience to himself.‖

9. From the above discussion, it is clear that the doctrine of forum non

conveniens can only be invoked where the court deciding not to exercise 

jurisdiction, has jurisdiction in the strict sense, but comes to the conclusion

that some other court, which also has jurisdiction, would be the more

convenient forum. It must also be kept in mind that the doctrine of forum

non conveniens is essentially a common law doctrine originating from

admiralty cases having trans-national implications. It is clear that the

doctrine of forum non conveniens is only available when a Court has the

jurisdiction but the respondent is able to establish the existence of another

competent court.

THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Judgment delivered on: 21.07.2016

 FAO (OS) 9/2015 and CM No. 326/2015

MCDONALD’S INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED 

versus

VIKRAM BAKSHI & ORS 

CORAM:-

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

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