Supreme Court Directions for eviction of unauthorized occupants over Gram Panchayat land

We find no merit in this appeal. The Appellants herein were trespassers who illegally encroached on to the Gram Panchayat land by using muscle power/money power and in collusion with the officials and even with the Gram Panchayat. We are of the opinion that such kind of blatant illegalities must not be condoned. Even if the Appellants have built houses on the land in question they must be ordered to remove their constructions, and possession of the land in question must be handed back to the Gram Panchayat. Regularizing such illegalities must not be permitted because it is Gram Sabha land which must be kept for the common use of villagers of the village. The letter dated 26.9.2007 of the Government of Punjab permitting regularization of possession of these unauthorized occupants is not valid. We are of the opinion that such letters are wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. In our opinion such illegalities cannot be regularized. We cannot allow the common interest of the villagers to suffer merely because the unauthorized occupation has subsisted for many years. {Para 13}

22. Before parting with this case we give directions to all the State Governments in the country that they should prepare schemes for eviction of illegal/unauthorized occupants of Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat/Poramboke/Shamlat land and these must be restored to the Gram Sabha/Gram Panchayat for the common use of villagers of the village. For this purpose the Chief Secretaries of all State Governments/Union Territories in India are directed to do the needful, taking the help of other senior officers of the Governments. The said scheme should provide for the speedy eviction of such illegal occupant, after giving him a show cause notice and a brief hearing. Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge expenditure in making constructions thereon or political connections must not be treated as a justification for condoning this illegal act or for regularizing the illegal possession. Regularization should only be permitted in exceptional cases e.g. where lease has been granted under some Government notification to landless labourers or members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, or where there is already a school, dispensary or other public utility on the land.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1132/2011 

Decided On: 28.01.2011

 Jagpal Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra, JJ.

Author: Markandey Katju, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0078/2011

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Whether Gram panchayat can give no objection for regularization of encroachment done over Gairan land by passing resolution?

  The petitioner is admittedly an encroacher

upon government “E” Class land, which is Gairan land.

It is the contention of Mr. Awachar, learned counsel for

the petitioner that the petitioner is a land less person,

who has encroached upon this land since the year 1991

and therefore, the petitioner is entitled for allotment of

the land encroached by him through its regularization.

He also submits that there is a Gram Panchayat

Resolution dated 30.06.1998, which gives no objection

for permanent allotment of government land to the

petitioner. {Para 2}

3. Mr. Patil, learned AGP for respondent Nos.1,

3 and 4 submits that under Section 22A of the

Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for short "the

Code of 1966"), no regularization for any private

purpose is permissible, as it could amount to diversion

of the Gairan land against the express provisions of law.

He also submits that even by the criteria laid down in

the case of Jagpal Singh (supra), the petitioner is not

entitled for any kind of regularization.

4. So far as Gram Panchayat resolution is

concerned, we must say that there was no business for

the Gram Panchayat to have passed a resolution, giving

its no objection for regularization of the encroachment

upon the government land, especially in view of the

provisions made under sub-Section (6) of Section 22A

of the Code of 1966. These provisions indicate that

powers of diversion, grant, lease of Gairan land under

Section 22A of the Code of 1966 shall be vested in the

State Government. Therefore, passing of any unwarrented

resolution in respect of the land, of which

Gram Panchayat is not the owner or the land which is

not vested in the Gram Panchayat, only amounts to

meddling with the affairs of the State Government, for

which purpose, appropriate action, if thought it

necessary, would have to be taken by the State

Government.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.2581 OF 2021

Ramdas s/o. Sambhaji Ghewande Vs. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary,

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Whether petitioner can seek regularization of his encroachment over Gairan Land?

  It would be clear from the above provisions

of law that except for public purpose, the Gairan land

cannot be diverted or granted or leased out for any

other use. In the present case, the petitioner is seeking

allotment of the land on lease to him for private

purpose, which is not permissible under above referred

provisions of law. {Para 6}

7. In present case, admittedly, the

petitioner is not there on the land by virtue of some

Government Notification in his favour. Admittedly, the

petitioner is seeking regularization of his encroachment

for only private purpose. Therefore, as per the law laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the

petitioner is not entitled for regularization of his

encroachment by allotting the land on lease to him.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.2581 OF 2021

Ramdas s/o. Sambhaji Ghewande Vs. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary,

CORAM : SUNIL B. SHUKRE AND

ANIL S. KILOR, JJ .

DATE : 26th JULY, 2021.

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Madras HC: Officers Can't Promote Encroachers By Allotting Alternative Lands In Absence Of Statutory Provision

 Learned Additional Advocate General could not refer to any provision of law, which mandates the State Government to allot a land to the encroachers. However, he prayed that till alternative lands are allotted, the encroachments may not be removed.

 {Para 4}

5. The encroachments are on the water-bodies. The allotment ofalternative lands to the encroachers, would only promote the tendency to encroach on the Government land and the water-bodies. For years, the Officers remained silent spectators and failed to take any action in reference to the encroachments on the water-bodies. Therefore, there is a total failure on the part of the Officers concerned to remove the encroachments on the waterbodies and even on catchment-areas. The encroachment of the water-bodies would lead to shrinkage of the water-bodies, destroying them to the maximum and creating acute water scarcity. At times, in the absence of storage facilities to store the water during rainy season, it causes floods.

6. In view of the above, learned Additional Advocate General could not clarify as to why the Officers are promoting the encroachers by allotting alternative lands else-where. It may be a Government policy or decision. However, in the absence of any statutory provision, it would lead to promoting encroachment of the lands on the water-bodies and the same cannot be endorsed.

THE  CHIEF JUSTICE and D.BHARATHA CHAKRAVARTHY, J

(The Order of the Court was made by The Honourable Chief Justice)

Dated: 23.03.2022

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What is the nature of proof required in suits for declaration of title against the Government?

 This brings the Court to the question of the onus of the Plaintiffs of proving their ownership of the suit property. It is well-settled that in cases of government land, there is a greater responsibility of Courts in ascertaining title of third parties. In fact, the plaintiff in such cases must establish his clear right, title and nature of possession in the property, superior to that of the Government authority and there is a presumption in favour of the Government. In such cases, the Supreme Court has clearly observed that it is not sufficient to show possession or adverse possession merely by some stray revenue entries or records. This position was elaborated upon by the Supreme Court in R. Hanumaiah and Ors. v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and Ors., (2010) SCC 203:

“Nature of proof required in suits for declaration of title against the Government {Para 30}

15. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual. The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession have to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963 which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire state and it is not always possible for the government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the government. Any loss of government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements.

16. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted. A court should necessarily seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a decree declaring title against the government : whether the plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established his adverse possession to the knowledge of the government for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his possession into title.

Incidental to that question, the court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in the revenue records or municipal records, for more than thirty years, and what is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in possession - authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or implied (following a title).

17. Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the government. To claim adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should be ignored. As noticed above, many a time it is possible for a private citizen to get his name entered as the occupant of government land, with the help of collusive government servants. Only entries based on appropriate documents like grants, title deeds etc. or based upon actual verification of physical possession by an authority authorized to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the government. Be that as it may.”

31. Thus, the Plaintiffs had a heavy onus to establish the following:

(i) That they had acquired the suit property through legally recognized documents such as registered sale deed, allotment from governmental authorities, etc. However, no such documents were produced by the Plaintiffs.

(ii) That the Plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property which falls in Khasra No.48/7 – this ought to have been established by positive evidence and not by an inference.

(iii) That the Plaintiffs had to rely on documents proved in accordance with law, even to establish possession – however, in this case, only some spattering revenue records which were marked and not even exhibited, were relied upon by the Plaintiffs.

32. The plaint in the present case is bereft of any pleadings as to how ownership/title was acquired by the Plaintiffs to the land in question. It is relevant to note that even paragraph 2 of the plaint shows the manner in which the Plaintiffs state that the suit property is not acquired by the Land Acquisition Collector and was not handed over to the DDA. This reflects the

state of mind of the Plaintiffs who seem to have themselves had an apprehension that the suit property may be falling in the acquired portion of the land.

36. In view of the above settled legal position, that mere sporadic or stray entries in the revenue records cannot confer title, and the facts mentioned above, this Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that there is any substantial question of law which deserves to be adjudicated upon in the present second appeal. In fact, from the evidence which has emerged from the record, it is clear that apart from some mention in khasra girdawaris, there are no other concrete documents which have been filed by the Plaintiff to discharge the heavy onus that is placed on him.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 RSA 64/2020

NATHU RAM  Vs D.D.A & ANR

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Whether a public body can dispossess a party if the court rejects his application for interim relief after hearing both parties?

  In the present case also, similar to the decision in Prabhagiya Van Adhikai (supra), the manner in which the possession of Plaintiff/his family members is shown in some khasra girdawaris, that too as agriculturists and cultivators, for some sporadic periods but not continuously, does raise doubts as to whether they were in continuous possession or not. Therefore, the mere mention in some years of khasra girdawari showing possession, cannot by itself confer ownership and title in respect of such precious land. {Para 24}

25. In so far as the Trial Court’s finding stating that DDA cannot dispossess the Plaintiffs without due process of law, is concerned, this is clearly an erroneous approach inasmuch as even if the Plaintiffs are stated to be in settled possession, it is not necessary for the DDA to file a suit to take possession from them. The DDA can, as a Defendant, establish before the Court that the Plaintiffs are in possession of a government land and the same can result in dismissal of the suit. Due process of law, as is settled in several judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, does not always require initiation of action by the owner/ Government. Dismissal of a suit by a competent Court of law after affording proper opportunity to the parties, is also a recognized mode of following the due process of law. On this issue, the observations of the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRs, (2012) 5 SCC 370, are as under:

“81. Due process of law means nobody ought to be condemned unheard. The due process of law means a person in settled possession will not be dispossessed except by due process of law. Due process means an opportunity for the Defendant to file pleadings including written statement and documents before the Court of law. It does not mean the whole trial. Due process of law is satisfied the moment rights of the parties are adjudicated by a competent Court.

82. The High Court of Delhi in a case Thomas Cook (India) Limited v. Hotel Imperial, 2006 (88) DRJ 545 : (AIR 2007) (NOC) 169) held as under:

"28. The expressions 'due process of law', 'due course of law' and 'recourse to law' have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed 'forcibly' by the true owner taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the same thing - ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly, 'due process of law' or 'due course of law', here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner.

Now, this 'due process' or 'due course' condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence.”

26. This position was reiterated by this Court in Bal Bhagwan v. Delhi Development Authority [CM (M) 416/2019, decided on 18th December, 2020] holding that the ‘due process’ condition would be sufficiently met if a person in settled possession is dispossessed by the dismissal of an application for interim injunction, as long as the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon and opportunity is given to them to present their case. On the question of ‘due process’, this Court has observed as under:

“The issue as to what constitutes ‘due process’ is thus settled beyond any doubt. The Plaintiff, who is claiming possession, can be dispossessed in the suit for injunction filed by him. Due process does not always mean that the owner has to file the suit to prove his title. So long as a Court of law has examined the documents and has given a fair hearing to the parties concerned, the compliance of due process has taken place. Moreover, due process of law also does not mean the final adjudication after trial. It merely means an opportunity being given to present the case before the Court of law and the rights of the parties being adjudicated. It does not mean the whole trial, as per Maria Margarida (supra).

62. The main question to be determined is whether the Plaintiff, who is in settled possession, can be dispossessed in an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. The answer is a clear yes.”

27. A special leave petition against this decision in Bal Bhagwan (supra) was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19th April, 2021, in SLP(C) No. 4247 / 2021 titled Bal Bhagwan v. DDA.

28. Recently in Mehvish Adil & Ors v. Delhi Wakf Board & Ors., [CRP 223/2019, decided on 15th December, 2021] this Court has observed in respect of Waqf land, which is also in the nature of a public land, as under:

“33. As held in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRs, (2012) 5 SCC 370, ‘due process’ need not always mean a process initiated by the owner it can be any judicial proceedings where the respective contentions of the parties are adjudicated in a free and fair manner and with proper opportunity being afforded to the parties. The observations of the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida (supra) are as under:

35. Thus, it is the settled legal position that ‘due process’ need not mean only an active process initiated by the owner of the property. It can even mean rejection of relief in a proceeding initiated by the occupants/encroachers or persons in possession.”

29. In view of this legal position, the requirement of adhering to due process of law has been satisfied in the present case and the Plaintiffs are not being dispossessed contrary to law.

40.  As government authorities continue to defend against suits filed by such occupants, the public is deprived of the use and enjoyment of the said land which has been acquired for public purposes. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Trial Courts, to consider the maintainability of such suits at the initial stage in a manner that they deem appropriate, so as to ensure that such long delays do not take place, especially in respect of government land.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 RSA 64/2020

NATHU RAM  Vs D.D.A & ANR

CORAM:

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Date of decision: 01st February, 2022

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Whether plaintiff can get title on government land by adverse possession if he pays penalty in encroachment case?

The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession."

(Emphasis laid)

11. Ext. 3, rent receipt, shows that the father of the plaintiffs paid penalty in Encroachment Case No. 1/82. This Court in the case of Abu Bakkar Habib (MANU/OR/0020/2017 : AIR 2017 Ori 36) held that when penalty is paid, the plaintiff admits the title of the State. The possession is not hostile to the real owner and amount to a denial of title to the property claimed.

12. The plaintiffs have failed to prove the date of entry into the suit land. Their father paid the penalty. The element of hostile animus is absent. The findings of the courts below with regard to acquisition of title by the plaintiffs are perverse. The substantial question of law has been answered accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA

S.A. No. 7 of 1997

Decided On: 25.01.2019

State of Orissa  Vs.  Jaladhar Sha and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Akshaya Kumar Rath, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Orissa 48

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Whether it is permissible to convert occupancy class II land to class I land?

One of the conditions is that the transferee would continue to occupy the land as Occupant Class-II. The said GR having been issued by the State Government can be modified or varied only by the State Government and the officers exercising the powers under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code are required to follow the said GR and not tinker with the terms and conditions mentioned in the said GR. In the instant case, as can be seen, the Secy. & OSD in spite of the mandate of the said GR dated 08/09/1983 has in breach and violation of the said GR directed conversion of the land from Occupancy Class II to Occupancy Class I which was impermissible. Hence it would have to be held that the order passed by the Secy. & OSD to the said extent is illegal as having been passed without jurisdiction and therefore the said condition though in favour of the Petitioner herein would be of no avail.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 6747 of 2016

Decided On: 10.01.2017

 Niketan Land and Estate Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.M. Savant, J.
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR 222

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Whether lessee of Nazul land can execute sale deed in respect of said land?

The High Court’s order dated 03.11.2009 whereby
the respondent was substituted in place of the
original lessee on its application under Order 22
Rule 10 of CPC for the reason of execution of sale
deed dated 14.10.1998 by the original lessee in
favour of the respondent by entering into compromise
between them in Suit No. 601 of 1984 is also bad in
law. The sale of the property in question to give
effect to the compromise decree in aforesaid suit is
void ab initio in law for the reason that the
original lessee, in the absence of renewal of lease
in his favour himself had no right, title or
interest, at the time of execution of sale deed, in
respect of the property in question. It is well
settled position of law that the person having no
right, title or interest in the property cannot
transfer the same by way of sale deed. Thus, in the
instant case, the sale of the property in question by
the original lessee in favour of the respondent is
not a valid assignment of his right in respect of the
same. For the aforesaid reasons, the sale deed is not
binding on the DDA. The High Court has failed to
appreciate this important factual and legal aspect of
the case.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3783 OF 2016

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 
V
M/S ANANT RAJ AGENCIES PVT. LTD. 
Dated:12th April, 2016
Citation:(2016) 11SCC406

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What is procedure for transfer and conversion of Occupancy Class II government land?

 The writ jurisdiction of this Court is invoked against the order
dated 24/02/2010 passed by the Respondent No.2 i.e. the Collector, Nashik by

which order the application filed by the predecessor of the Petitioner for grant
of permission to transfer the land and for its conversion from agricultural to
non­agricultural came to be allowed on the terms and conditions mentioned
therein.  The terms and conditions mentioned in the impugned order entail the
payment of unearned income to the State Government, as also the condition
that the land in question would continue to remain as Occupancy Class II land.
The Petitioner is principally aggrieved by the aforesaid condition mentioned in
the impugned order.
 In the instant case it would have to be borne in mind that the land in
question was allotted to the father of the original owner Namdeo Bankar on a
new and impartible tenure i.e. Class II.  The father of the said Nameo Bankar
had also executed a Kabuliyat wherein he had given an undertaking that the
allottee and his successor were bound by the terms and conditions of the
allotment and that if he commits a breach, he is liable to be evicted.  Hence the
instant case is not a case where the renewal of lease was sought but is the case
where   the   original   allottee   had   sought   permission   to   transfer   and   for
conversion of the agricultural land to non­agricultural.   In so far as the said
aspect is  concerned,  the  GR  dated  08/09/1983 regulates  the  transfer  and
conversion of agricultural lands belonging to Class II.  The said GR therefore
supplements the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code in so far as the transfer and
conversion of the land belonging to agricultural Class II is concerned. Hence

the instant case can be distinguished on facts from the case before the Division
Bench.
24 It would also have to be noted that the Petitioner and original
Owner by their conduct are now estopped from contending that the said GR
dated 08/09/1983 has no application.   It is required to be noted that the
Petitioner/original Owner has applied for conversion in the year 1989 as per
the then extant policy.  The original owner and the Petitioner had prosecuted
the proceedings before the authorities and this Court also as regards quantum
of the unearned income payable under the said GR for transfer and conversion
of  the land. The original  owner and the  Petitioner  have also shown  their
willingness to pay the unearned income and in fact have now deposited the
said unearned income with the Collector, Nashik.   It was also contended on
behalf of the Petitioner in the said Writ Petition No.5740 of 2007 that the GR
dated   08/09/1983   has   been   fully   implemented,   meaning   thereby   that   the
applicability of the said GR was accepted. The aforesaid facts therefore act as
an estoppel against the Petitioner and the original owner from contending that
the said GR dated 08/09/1983 would have no application.  The conduct of the
Petitioner amounts to approbation and reprobation i.e. on one hand apply
under the said GR for transfer and conversion whereas on the other hand
contend that it is not liable to pay unearned income as premium which is
contemplated by the said GR. It also cannot be lost sight of that the tenor of

the above Petition is only as regards the challenge to the condition appearing
in  the  impugned order dated 24/02/2010 passed by the  Collector, Nashik
wherein it is stated that the transferee would continue to occupy the land as a
Class II Occupant.   The Petitioner or the original Owner therefore never did
once question the applicability of the said GR dated 08/09/1983 and therefore
the submissions advanced on the basis of the judgment of the Division Bench
cannot be countenanced in the facts of the instant case.   The judgment in
Mohinder Singh Gill's  case (supra) would also have no application having
regard to the facts of the instant case.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.6747 OF 2016 
M/s. Niketan Land and Estate Pvt. Ltd.
v
State of Maharashtra  
CORAM : R. M. SAVANT, J.

Pronounced on : 10th January 2017

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Whether court should take security from plaintiff prior to grant of status quo in case of removal of encroachment?

This Court has carefully gone through the provisions

of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code like sections 50 to 53. The

provision of section 50 (5) shows that order made by Collector

can be challenged by filing appeal before the appellate authority.

Admittedly, this recourse was not used. The provision of section

50 (6) shows that only when the decision given under these

provisions becomes final, the suit can be filed to establish the

rights in Civil Court and that too, within six months from the date

when the decision of the revenue authority becomes final. It can

be said that in the present matters, there is no right as such to

the plaintiffs to continue the possession, but by making some

contentions, they have remained on the space due to the orders

made by the Courts below. The Trial Court has rightly held that

the provision of section 50 is applicable in such cases. The

record is produced to show that the Collector has delegated the

powers to Tahsildar, both in respect of agricultural lands and non

agricultural lands. Thus, there is no illegality in the notices given

against the plaintiffs and there are further aforesaid

circumstances. In view of the facts and circumstances, this Court

has no hesitation to observe that the Courts below did not take

proper care, they did not take even the security from the

plaintiffs for getting order like statusquo and due to that the

Government could not take the steps like widening of the road in

respect of that portion.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY

APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD

 SECOND APPEAL NO. 255 OF 2016

RAJENDRA POPAT WAGHMARE AND OTHERS

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH THE DISTRICT

COLLECTOR

CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE, J.

DATED : 31st March, 2016.

Citation: 2016 (4) MHLJ 475

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Whether court should direct government to regularize encroachment on public land?

We are fortified in our above view on this subject by the

decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Holeyappa & others
Vs. State of Karnataka represented by its Secretary & others
[ILR 2005 KARNATAKA 5437]. The observations made by the
Karnataka High Court in the said Judgment, the relevant portion of
which is quoted below, are apt in the present scenario:-
“.....................................................................................
...........No writ lies for issuing directions to the
Government or the officials of the Government to
compel them to act contrary to the statutory provisions.
Respondents are directed to ensure that if any standing
crop was there, it is harvested and the proceeds given
to such persons who had raised the crop and to ensure
that hence forth the land is retained as a gomal land,
that no unauthorised encroachments are allowed on the
land and land is preserved for the common utility of the
community of the village. It is hereby directed that the
respondents are bound to maintain the land as gomal
land. #Over a period of time, no doubt the number of
cattle might have got reduced but villagers still remain
agricultural based and farmers continue to depend on
cattle. Areas available for grazing of cattle, greenery,
have got reduced over all on account of vast extents of
lands becoming urbanised and rapid urbanization has
not spared villages either. Non agricultural activities
have proliferated and the demand for land has
increased day by day. Vast extents of land which has
been earmarked for such community purposes like
gomal land have become the prime target of the
greedy. Local politicians eye on it for their personal
gains, set up people to grab such lands; applications are
made by syndicates in benami and what not. Available
lands are grabbed by the powerful and greedy persons
and the like at the cost of community even when there
is absolute need for maintaining such lands as gomal
lands and to ensure that they sub-serve the common
interest of the community. Without any application of
mind or thought and at the behest of greedy political
bosses, bureaucrats threw to winds the relevant

statutory provisions, subvert the provisions and virtually
sell away Government lands in the guise of granting of
lands. To further compound the situation such persons
even seek aid of the Court praying for issue of
directions to the respondents to legitimise their illegal
activities and directions and mandamus are issued by
this Court. More often than not such directions come in
handy for conniving and fraud intent officials to put a
seal of legitimacy for their arbitrary and illegal actions.
…..”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Criminal Application [APL] No. 516 of 2015

Bhaskar son of Bhagwant Dikkar, V State of Maharashtra,

 CORAM : A.B. CHAUDHARI AND
P.N. DESHMUKH, JJ.

 Date : 14th August, 2015.
Citation; 2016 ALLMR(CRI)1077

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Whether lessee from govt is covered by definition of occupant-Class-I or not is a question of fact to be examined by appropriate authority on case to case basis.

According to the Petitioners insofar as Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928 is concerned, Section 56 thereof provided that subject to personal law, the rights of occupant shall be permanent and transferable and on his death shall pass by inheritance, bequest or survivorship, as the case may be. According to the Petitioners they were enjoying the lands in question as Bhumiswami. It was argued that, that right was protected by the subsequent legislation of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (Section 152) or for that matter, MLRC(Sections 336, 337). Indeed, if the holder of the land possessed permanent and transferable right in the property, he would fall within the definition of "occupant-Class-I" within the meaning of Section 29 of the MLRC. Whether he is covered by definition of occupant-Class-I or not is a question of fact to be examined by the 

appropriate authority on case to case basis.

Bombay High Court

Smt. Jaikumari Amarbahadursingh vs The State Of Maharashtra, Through on 30 September, 2008

Bench: A.M. Khanwilkar, R. C. Chavan

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Smt. Jaikumari Amarbahadursingh. Vs State of Maharashtra

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar and R.C. Chavan, JJ.1

Decided on;30.09.20081

Property - Lease - Petition filed for direction to concern authority for renewal of lease - Petitioner asserted that land in question is ‘Nazul’ land - Lease condition provided for right to transfer or alienate and inheritance - Lease condition postulates that on expiry of lease period Authority will renew lease for further period on same terms and conditions - Claim of petitioners rejected - Court directed petitioners to file proceedings before appropriate authority asking for relief as may be permissible in law

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