New NA Permission Regime in Maharashtra: What the 2025 MLRC Amendment and 10 February 2026 GR Mean for Landowners?

 

Maharashtra has implemented a major reform in how agricultural land is converted to non‑agricultural (NA) use in areas covered by development or regional plans. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2025 (Mah. Act LVII of 2025), together with the Government Resolution (GR) dated 10 February 2026 issued by the Revenue and Forest Department, removes the old system of separate NA permission and annual NA tax, and replaces it with a simplified, single‑window, one‑time premium model.

This article explains the key changes in accessible language for landowners, developers, advocates and judges.

Earlier System: Dual Permissions and Dual Taxation

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Whether trespasser can claim that the land belongs to him based on the imposition of Non-agricultural tax and penalty on him?

 From the above it is clearly discernible that the N.A.

order does not give any entitlement of right or title to the plaintiffs in the suit open space. Needless to state that the open space belongs to one Dyanesh Kamlakar Samant as per the revenue record. Therefore it is beyond any reasonable doubt that the Plaintiffs are ranked encroachers in respect of the suit structures as well as the suit open space. The N.A. assessment order itself states that an application was made by Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 along with two others seeking to levy assessment in respect of the structures and the open space used by both for commercial purpose. The provision of section 45 of the MLRC

Act clearly envisage that it pertains to penalty for so using the land without permission of the Collector. The contents of the N.A. order levied penalty to the extent of ten times of the fine of the annual commercial assessment for the use of the structures and the open space. To construe that the N.A. order puts the Plaintiffs in settled possession and confers title on the Plaintiffs in respect of the open space is a fallacy and an erroneous proposition of law adopted by the Plaintiffs in their submissions. Such a position cannot be countenanced by the Court which requires to look at documentary evidence of title or existence of the names of the Plaintiffs in the primary revenue record pertaining to the suit land. In absence of any documentary evidence of title, the Plaintiffs' case of settled position and having right, title and interest conferred on the Plaintiffs by the N.A. order dated 26.01.2005 stands rejected.{Para 12}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

APPEAL FROM ORDER (ST) NO.4532 OF 2021

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO.4533 OF 2021

Ramesh R. Pandey Vs Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 

CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : MAY 18, 2021

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How to prove that collector has granted deemed permission for non agricultural use of land?

Whosoever is desirous of getting conversion of agricultural land to use it for non-agricultural purpose, has to apply to the Collector for permission in accordance with the form prescribed. In terms of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Code, the Collector on receipt of such application has to give an acknowledgment within a period of seven days. In terms of sub-section (3), if the Collector fails to inform the applicant to his decision within ninety days from the date of acknowledgment of the application, the permission applied for is deemed to be have been granted subject to any condition prescribed in the rules made by the State Government in respect of such use.

7. We find that the production of acknowledgment granted in terms of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Code about receipt of application, is very crucial. The deeming fiction is conditional and it would not operate unless the acknowledgment evidencing the date of receipt of the application tendered, is produced or otherwise such date is proved. The burden is upon the person who wanted to claim benefit of it, to prove that the condition is satisfied. In the absence of such acknowledgment being produced on record to the satisfaction of the Court, it is not possible to record the finding that the application was not decided within a period of ninety days from the date of it's receipt. The petitioner has failed to discharge burden of establishing that the application was given on 01/03/2006. The condition is not satisfied and, therefore, it cannot be held that either the permission is deemed to have been granted or that the rejection of the application was not within a period of ninety days.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1422 of 2007

Decided On: 29.03.2019

 Rajendra  Vs.State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Deshpande and S.M. Modak, JJ.

Citation : 2019 (5)MhLJ 348

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Whether it is mandatory to record lis pendens in revenue record?

We do not find that there is any error in the said decision and rather the said decision taken by the State Government, as contained in the impugned circular, is in conformity with the provision of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, since section 148 of the Code sets out the particulars which should be included in the record of rights and it do not stipulate any other particulars to be included, except in accordance with the decision by the State Government, which it can prescribe by the rules. It is the State Government which has made it clear that the pendency of any proceedings or suit before any court or any other quasi judicial authority, does not amount to any kind of right in praesenti and a right of litigant comes into existence only on final adjudication by the concerned Court where the lis is pending. Since the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code itself do not provide for inclusion of a lis pendens in the record of right and the State Government had rather reflected its decision not to include the same in the record of right in the backdrop of the fact that the revenue records are mere reflections of the rights claimed by a person in respect of any immovable property and being reported to the revenue authority and such entries are subject to adjudication of title rights by Court of competent jurisdiction, the said decision of the State Government cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious specifically when section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act protects the properties which are involved in any lis and the principle recognized in the said section put restrictions on the rights of the parties to a suit or proceeding to transfer the property, which is the subject matter of the said litigation. In any case, the object of Section 52 is not to make such transfers made in violation of the said provision to be void ab initio, but are only voidable at the instance of the party who has been prejudiced. The State amendment to section 52 further protects the interest of the land holders in the State and whenever the notices of pending suits or proceedings referred to in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is given under section 18 of the Registration Act, the Land Revenue Code makes it imperative for the Officer recording such a registration to forward an intimation to the talathi of the village. The avowed purpose of such an intimation is to keep the Talathi of a village or tahsildar of a taluka updated about the dealings in respect of a piece of land, in respect of which he is duty bound to maintain the revenue record. In such circumstances, the decision of the State Government not to effect entries of lis pendens in the record of rights is perfectly in tune and spirit with the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and we do not find that the said decision calls for an interference by exercising our writ jurisdiction. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 7040 of 2013 and Writ Petition No. 8042 of 2014

Decided On: 17.07.2018

Pramod Moreshwar Tattu Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Baramati and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.C. Dharmadhikari and Bharati H. Dangre, JJ.

Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 785

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Whether court can register civil suit if delay condonation application is not allowed?

The word "institute" as per Black's Law Dictionary means "to begin or start; commence." Thus, the bar under Section 143(5) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code to file an appeal or revision under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code would apply only if the civil suit has been "instituted" under Section 143(4) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code which means that if the civil suit is filed. In the present case, the civil suit having been filed after the period of limitation, the application praying for condonation of delay was filed. It is established practice that until the delay is condoned, the civil suit is not registered and the civil Court cannot look into the civil suit. In these facts, it cannot be said that the civil suit was "instituted" by the respondent no.5 and his wife as per Section 143(5) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Consequentially, the bar created by Section 143(4) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code for filing of the appeal or revision to challenge the decision of the Tahsildar will not apply. In these facts, it cannot be said that the civil suit was instituted as per Section 143(4) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

10. Shri Mirza, the learned advocate for the petitioners submits that the application filed by the respondent no.5 and his wife under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a part and parcel of the civil suit and therefore, it has to be treated that the civil suit was instituted as contemplated by Section 143(4) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The submission as made on behalf of the petitioners is misconceived and contrary to the established principles of law. The application praying for condonation of delay can never be part and parcel of the civil suit and the civil suit is not registered until and unless the delay is condoned. It is the settled law that Court gets its jurisdiction to entertain and decide the proceedings before it, only after the delay is condoned and till that time the Court does not get the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 2977/2012

Decided On: 17.11.2014

 Nago Hari Zangte Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Z.A. Haq, J.

Citation: 2015(5) ALLMR 279

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Whether it is permissible to convert occupancy class II land to class I land?

One of the conditions is that the transferee would continue to occupy the land as Occupant Class-II. The said GR having been issued by the State Government can be modified or varied only by the State Government and the officers exercising the powers under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code are required to follow the said GR and not tinker with the terms and conditions mentioned in the said GR. In the instant case, as can be seen, the Secy. & OSD in spite of the mandate of the said GR dated 08/09/1983 has in breach and violation of the said GR directed conversion of the land from Occupancy Class II to Occupancy Class I which was impermissible. Hence it would have to be held that the order passed by the Secy. & OSD to the said extent is illegal as having been passed without jurisdiction and therefore the said condition though in favour of the Petitioner herein would be of no avail.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 6747 of 2016

Decided On: 10.01.2017

 Niketan Land and Estate Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.M. Savant, J.
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR 222

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Whether court should take security from plaintiff prior to grant of status quo in case of removal of encroachment?

This Court has carefully gone through the provisions

of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code like sections 50 to 53. The

provision of section 50 (5) shows that order made by Collector

can be challenged by filing appeal before the appellate authority.

Admittedly, this recourse was not used. The provision of section

50 (6) shows that only when the decision given under these

provisions becomes final, the suit can be filed to establish the

rights in Civil Court and that too, within six months from the date

when the decision of the revenue authority becomes final. It can

be said that in the present matters, there is no right as such to

the plaintiffs to continue the possession, but by making some

contentions, they have remained on the space due to the orders

made by the Courts below. The Trial Court has rightly held that

the provision of section 50 is applicable in such cases. The

record is produced to show that the Collector has delegated the

powers to Tahsildar, both in respect of agricultural lands and non

agricultural lands. Thus, there is no illegality in the notices given

against the plaintiffs and there are further aforesaid

circumstances. In view of the facts and circumstances, this Court

has no hesitation to observe that the Courts below did not take

proper care, they did not take even the security from the

plaintiffs for getting order like statusquo and due to that the

Government could not take the steps like widening of the road in

respect of that portion.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY

APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD

 SECOND APPEAL NO. 255 OF 2016

RAJENDRA POPAT WAGHMARE AND OTHERS

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH THE DISTRICT

COLLECTOR

CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE, J.

DATED : 31st March, 2016.

Citation: 2016 (4) MHLJ 475

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Whether Civil suit can be registered even if application for condonation of delay is not decided?

Thus, the decision of the Tahsildar can be challenged by filing the 
civil   suit   and   if   the   civil   suit   is   “instituted”   under   Section   143(5)   of   the 
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code challenging the Tahsildar's decision, then the 
decision of the Tahsildar cannot be challenged in appeal or revision under the 
provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.  The word “institute” as per 
Black's Law Dictionary means “to begin or start; commence.”     Thus, the bar 
under Section 143(5) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code to file an appeal 
or revision under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code would 
apply   only   if   the   civil   suit   has   been   “instituted”   under   Section   143(4)   of   the 

Maharashtra Land Revenue Code which means that if the civil suit is filed.   In 
the present case, the civil suit having been filed after the period of limitation, the 
application praying for condonation of delay was filed.   It is established practice 
that until the delay is condoned, the civil suit is not registered and the civil Court 
cannot look into the civil suit.   In these facts, it cannot be said that the civil suit 
was “instituted” by the respondent no.5 and his wife as per Section 143(5) of the 
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.  Consequentially, the bar created by Section 
143(4) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code for filing of the appeal or revision 
to challenge the decision of the Tahsildar will not apply.  In these facts, it cannot 
be said that the civil suit was instituted as per Section 143(4) of the Maharashtra 
Land Revenue Code, 1966. 
Shri Mirza, the learned advocate for the petitioners submits that the 
application   filed   by  the   respondent  no.5   and   his  wife  under  Section  5   of  the 
Limitation Act is a part and parcel of the civil suit and therefore, it has to be 
treated that the civil suit was instituted as contemplated by Section 143(4) of the 
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.   The submission as made on behalf of the 

petitioners   is  misconceived   and   contrary   to   the   established   principles   of  law. 
The application praying for condonation of delay can never be part and parcel of 
the   civil   suit   and   the   civil   suit   is  not   registered   until   and   unless   the   delay   is 
condoned.   It is the settled law that Court gets its jurisdiction to entertain and 
decide the proceedings before it, only after the delay is condoned and till that 
time the Court does not get the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. 


 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.2977/2012

Shri Nago Hari Zangte,  Vs State of Maharashtra, 

   
CORAM  :  Z.A. HAQ, J.
DATE  :     17.11.2014
Citation; 2015(3) MHLJ 381 Bom

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Whether civil court can issue direction for making or deleting entries in records of rights?

It is true that the prayer made in plaint is not properly worded. Instead of seeking a declaration of his title, the respondent No. 1 had prayed for deletion of the names of the appellant and other respondents from the record of rights in respect of the suit lands and to enter his name therein. It is neither the function nor the jurisdiction of civil court to issue direction for making or deleting entries in the records of rights. That is the function assigned to the revenue authorities under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Court. The proper relief which respondent No. 1 could have prayed for was declaration of his title to the suit lands on the basis of the will executed by deceased Mugu Balu Teli. Once he obtains such a declaration from the court, the revenue authority will have to make or correct the entries accordingly in the record of rights in respect of the suit lands. Although, therefore, the appeal is being dismisses, the order and decree passed by the courts below will have to be suitably modified.

Bombay High Court

Narayan Mugu Teli, Since Deceased ... vs Ramchandra Mugu Teli And Ors. on 9 December, 2003

Bench: J Patil

Citation;2004 (3) ALL MR 880

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Whether civil court can give direction to revenue authority to delete or insert name of person in revenue record?

Insofar as the relief directing the survey authorities of
Village Nagorcem-Palolem to delete the name of Damaciano
Fernandes from the Index of survey record in Form No. I & XIV of
survey No. 248/34 of Village Nagorcem-Palolem and to insert the
name of the plaintiff in its place, is concerned, it is well settled
that such a direction cannot be given by the Civil Court in view of
express bar under Section 106 of the Land Revenue Code, 1968,
(the Code, for short) which provides that no suit shall lie against
the Government or any officer of the Government in respect of a
claim to have an entry made in any record or register as
maintained under this Chapter or to have any such entry omitted
or amended. Such function is assigned to revenue authorities
under the Code. In the case of “Narayan Mugu Teli (since
deceased) Vs. Ramchandra Mugu Teli” [2004 (3) ALL MR
880], it has been held that it is neither the function of Civil Court
to issue direction for making or deleting entries in the record of
rights and that this function is assigned to the revenue authorities
under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. It is further observed
that the proper relief which could be prayed for was declaration
of the title to suit land and once such a declaration is obtained
from the Court, the revenue authority will have to make or
correct the entries accordingly in the record of rights in respect
of the suit land. The provisions of the Code are almost similar to
the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. In the case of “Anandi
Bhicaro Veluskar and others Vs. Kustanand Vithu Veluskar
and others” [2006 (6) Bom. C.R. 384], this Court relied upon
the judgment in the case of “Narayan Mugu Teli” (supra) and
held that the Appellate Court could not have directed insertion of
the names of the plaintiffs in the survey records. Again in the case
of “Narendra Voikunt Raikar Vs. Amaral Pereira” [2007 (3)
Mh. L.J. 252], a similar view has been taken. The Land Revenue
Code provides for the procedure for correction of the land
records.
Therefore, the trial Court could not have directed the
Survey Authorities/Talathi to delete the name of “Damaciano
Fernandes” and insert the name of the plaintiff in the index in
Form No. I and XIV of Survey No. 248/34.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
SECOND APPEAL NO. 100 of 2004
Shri Damaciano Fernandes,

versus
St. Anthony's Chapel,

CORAM :- U. V. BAKRE, J.

Pronounced on : 13th June, 2014.
Citation; 2015(2)ALLMR576

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Whether Civil Court can direct Collector to grant temporary leases or permanent leases to lessee of govt land?

As to the second Substantial Question of
Law, I find that grant of temporary or permanent

lease is clearly regulated by the provisions of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra
Land Revenue (Disposal of Govt. Lands) Rules, 1971.
These provisions are self-contained code by
themselves. Merely because the Revenue Officer did
not decide the applications filed by the
respondent-plaintiff for grant of temporary or
permanent leases, as the case may be, the
respondent-Plaintiff could not have approached the
Civil Court to ask for a direction, since he could
have easily approached the authorities provided
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue
Code, or the High Court having extraordinary writ
jurisdiction. The jurisdictions of the Civil Court
cannot be widened to enable it to issue directions
to the Govt. to grant temporary or permanent
leases. That is purely a governmental function
governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code and the Rules thereunder. Civil Court

could not have directed that the Collector should
grant temporary leases or permanent leases to the
respondent-plaintiff even on the ground that others
were granted. Therefore, in my opinion, the Civil
Court could not have issued a direction to grant
permanent or temporary leases, which had already
expired by efflux of time and the period of leases
did not exist at the time when the judgment was
delivered by the Civil Court. That being so,
second Substantial Question of Law will have to be
answered in negative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 345 of 1997
With
Second Appeal No. 346 of 1997
[A] Second Appeal No. 344 of 1997 

State of Maharashtra, Vs Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal,

CORAM : A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
Date : 13th March, 2014.
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR282

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