When contract between private party and govt will not be opposed to public policy?

Further the High Court has rightly observed that another benefit derived by the appellant-trust from the said development agreement is immediate and reciprocal sanction for the development of the said land with permission for the commercial usage of the same, presuming that there would be no acquisition.

This Court is of the view that the High Court has rightly held that the impugned clause in the development agreement is neither void nor opposed to the public policy. The High Court has held thus:

“42.When the parties entered into agreement, they were fully aware of the nature of transaction, conditions and respective obligations. There was no objection raised at any point of time while entering into such agreement and even thereafter when petitioners and such other persons who based upon the said agreement got the benefit out of the same. We cannot read the clauses in isolation. We have to read the whole agreement in question. It is very clear even from the provisions of the Contract Act that the consideration of any such agreement was permissible and not unlawful and/or not prohibited by law and was not to defeat the provisions of any law or is fraudulent and/or is immoral or opposed to public policy.

43.The submissions, that such contract and especially the clause is void, in view of provisions contained under Section 23/25 of the Indian Contract Act being opposed to public policy; violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner; violative of the right of property of petitioner/society; because of unequal bargain power; being forbidden by law and further in view of Section 25 of the Contract Act, as the agreement to transfer is without consideration and the same was not registered, have no force.” In view of the findings and reasons recorded by the High Court in the Central Inland Water Transport Corpn Ltd & Anr case (supra) upon which the reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-trust is of no relevance to the fact situation.

Further, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the appellant- trust has accepted and acted upon the said development agreement like other beneficiaries who are either the societies or other similar persons who are benefited by the approved scheme of the NIT. It is noteworthy that the appellant-trust has accepted all the terms and conditions of the development agreement without any objection while executing the same. The impugned clause of the said development agreement provides for the transfer of land in favour of NIT which is earmarked in the layout for the public utility purpose. The same is in terms of the approved development plan by Maharashtra Government and as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966 contained in its Chapter-V i.e., Sections 59-112 and Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948.

The findings recorded on the relevant contentious issues by the High Court in the impugned judgment with cogent and valid reasons are legal and justifiable. Therefore, we do not find any valid reason, whatsoever, to interfere with the said impugned judgment and order as the same, in our opinion, is a well-considered and reasoned decision. The same does not suffer from erroneous reasoning or error in law which requires interference by this Court.

Supreme Court of India

Narayanrao Jagobaji Gawande ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 4 February, 2016

Bench: V. Gopala Gowda, Amitava Roy

Non-REPORTABLE
 CIVIL APPEAL NO.870 OF 2016

(Arising out of SLP(C) No.25972 of 2009)

Citation;(2016) 4 SCC 443

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Whether govt is liable to pay compensation for negligence of doctors of govt hospital causing blindness to Baby?

It is settled law that the hospital is vicariously liable for
the acts of its doctors vide Savita Garg vs. National Heart
Institute, (2004) 8 SCC 56, also followed in Balram Prasad’s
case (supra). Similarly in Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa v. State
of Maharashtra, (1996) 2 SCC 634 this court unequivocally held
that the state would be vicariously liable for the damages which
may become payable on account of negligence of its doctors or
other employees. By the same measure, it is not possible to
absolve Respondent No. 1, the State of Tamil Nadu, which
establishes and administers such hospitals through its
Department of Health, from its liability.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No. 8065 OF 2009

V. KRISHNAKUMAR .V STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 

Citation;(2015) 9 SCC388,2016(2) MHLJ 555 SC

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When doctrine of promissory estoppel is not binding on govt?

 In M/s Motilal Padampt Sugar Mills Company supra, this
Court, on an exhaustive survey of the law pertaining to the doctrine
of promissory estoppel held that the same was an equitable doctrine
that would yield when equity so required. While propounding that
the same had been evolved to avoid injustice where it is
demonstrated that a party acting on the words or conduct of
another, amounting to clear and unequivocal promise and intended
to create legal relations or effect legal relationships to arise in the
future had altered his position, then the promise would be binding
on the promisor and he would not be permitted to renege therefrom
unless it would be inequitable to compel him to do so. While
extending this doctrine to the Government as well, it was
enunciated that if it can be shown that having regard to the facts as
had subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the
Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise
the equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against
the Government. Their Lordships held that the doctrine of the
promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on
the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be
held bound by the promise made by it. That aside overriding public
interest against enforcement of the doctrine qua the Government, it
would be still competent for it to depart from the promise on giving
reasonable notice which need not be a formal one, affording the
promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position was
underlined. We consider it inessential to dilate on the other
decisions cited on behalf of the respondents on this theme as these
are in essence in reiteration of the above proposition.
 {REPORTABLE}
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 3962 of 2011

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.  Vs. SHRI HANUMAN INDUSTRIES & ANR.

Citation: 2015VI AD (S.C.) 644, (2015)4MLJ470(SC), 2015(6)SCALE185, (2015)6SCC600
Amitava Roy, J.

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Whether contractor can get damages for breach of contract even if cancellation of agreement by govt was not wrongful?

There can be no dispute that in order to succeed in its claim to damages the plaintiff must establish that the cancellation of the agreement before the expiry of the period fixed was wrongful. Clause 13 of the agreement undoubtedly empowered the defendant to terminate the agency in case of appreciable shortfall in the guaranteed annual sale of products worth Rs. 5 lakhs in terms of Clause 12 The last mentioned term would not apply inter alia if T.P.I. failed to maintain the quality of its products leading to the buyers such as K.D.H.P. refusing to place orders with T.P I.

Supreme Court of India

The Firm Styled G.L. Kilikar vs The State Of Kerala on 26 April, 1971

Equivalent citations: AIR 1971 SC 1196, (1971) 3 SCC 751, 1971 III UJ 704 SC

Bench: G Mitter, K Hegde, P J Reddy

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Whether transfer of judicial officer is within province of High court or govt?

This is, of course, as it should be. The High Court is in the day to day control of courts and knows the capacity for work of individuals and the requirements of a particular station or Court. The High Court is better suited to make transfers than a Minister. For however well-meaning a Minister may be he can never possess the same intimate knowledge of the working of the judiciary as a whole and of individual Judges, as the High Court. He must depend on his department for information. The Chief Justice and his colleagues know these matters and deal with them personally. There is less chance of being influenced by secretaries who may withhold some vital information if they are interested themselves. It is also well-known that all stations are not similar in climate and education, medical and other facilities. Some are good stations and some are not so good. There is less chance of success for a person seeking advantage for himself if the Chief Justice and his colleagues, with personal information, deal with the matter, than when a Minister deals with it on notes and information supplied by a secretary. The reason of the rule and the sense of the matter combine to suggest the narrow meaning accepted by us. The policy displayed by the Constitution has been in this direction as has been explained in earlier cases of this Court. The High Court was thus right in its conclusion that the powers of the Governor cease after he has appointed or promoted a person to be a district Judge and assigned him to a post in cadre. Thereafter, transfer of incumbents is a matter within the control of District Courts including the control of persons presiding there as explained in the cited case.

Supreme Court of India

State Of Assam vs Ranga Mahammad And Ors on 21 September, 1966

Equivalent citations: 1967 AIR 903, 1967 SCR (1) 454

Author: Hidayatullah

Bench: Rao, K. Subba (Cj), Hidayatullah, M., Sikri, S.M., Shelat, J.M., Mitter, G.K.

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