Showing posts with label govt contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label govt contract. Show all posts

Wednesday, 13 July 2016

Whether contractor can compel authority to award contract in his favour by offering better price after opening of sealed tenders?

In the light of the above contentions and from a perusal of the material on record, it is evident that respondents No. 1 to 4 had opened the sealed tenders in the presence of all the bidders, including the petitioner. The offer of respondent No. 5 was found to be most competitive. It was accordingly recommended for acceptance by the Central Purchase Committee of respondents No. 1 to 4. A letter of Intent was issued to respondent No. 5 as on 25.6.2015. It is noticed that the said respondent has, on receipt of the LOI, volunteered to offer a further discount of Rs. 200/KL over and above the discount of Rs. 850/KL, which was finalized by acceptance, apart from offering 30 days' credit facility and other value additions as seen from column 8 of the LOI.
On the other hand, the petitioner is found to have made more than one revised offer, after the opening of sealed tenders. This would render the sanctity and competitiveness of the closed bidding system meaningless. The petitioner's offer of a discount @ Rs. 1100/KL and other benefits ought to have been made in the first instance. The insistence that the respondents should accommodate the petitioner notwithstanding the process of acceptance of a tender of respondent No. 5, as the petitioner is now ready to better the offer of respondent No. 5 - is not tenable and may indeed result in an unfair trade practice, exposing respondents No. 1 to 4 to legal action.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
Writ Petition No. 27719 of 2015 (GM-RES)
Decided On: 05.01.2016
Indian Oil Corporation Limited 
Vs.
 Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Anand Byrareddy, J.
Citation: AIR 2016 (NOC)398
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Saturday, 4 June 2016

How doctrine of "level playing field" is applicable in govt contract?

When Article 19(1)(g) confers fundamental right to carry on business to a company, it is entitled to invoke the said doctrine of "level playing field". We may clarify that this doctrine is, however, 2 (2007) 8 SCC 1 VRD 28 of 31 WP2753.13.doc subject to public interest. In the world of globalisation, competition is an important factor to be kept in mind. The doctrine of "level playing field" is an important doctrine which is embodied in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This is because the said doctrine provides space within which equally placed competitors are allowed to bid so as to subserve the larger public interest. "Globalisation", in essence, is liberalisation of trade. Today India has dismantled licence raj. The economic reforms introduced after 1992 have brought in the concept of "globalisation". Decisions or acts which result in unequal and discriminatory treatment, would violate the doctrine of "level playing field" embodied in Article 19(1)(g). Time has come, therefore, to say that Article 14 which refers to the principle of "equality" should not be read as a stand alone item but it should be read in conjunction withArticle 21 which embodies several aspects of life. There is one more aspect which needs to be mentioned in the matter of implementation of the aforestated doctrine of "level playing field". According to Lord Goldsmith, commitment to the "rule of law" is the heart of parliamentary democracy. One of the important elements of the "rule of law" is legal certainty. Article 14 applies to government policies and if the policy or act of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of "reasonableness", then such an act or decision would be unconstitutional."
Bombay High Court
Central Railways Caterers' ... vs Union Of India & 4 Ors on 8 January, 2016
Bench: S.C. Dharmadhikari

Read full judgment here: click here
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Wednesday, 18 May 2016

When contract between private party and govt will not be opposed to public policy?

Further the High Court has rightly observed that another benefit derived by the appellant-trust from the said development agreement is immediate and reciprocal sanction for the development of the said land with permission for the commercial usage of the same, presuming that there would be no acquisition.
This Court is of the view that the High Court has rightly held that the impugned clause in the development agreement is neither void nor opposed to the public policy. The High Court has held thus:
“42.When the parties entered into agreement, they were fully aware of the nature of transaction, conditions and respective obligations. There was no objection raised at any point of time while entering into such agreement and even thereafter when petitioners and such other persons who based upon the said agreement got the benefit out of the same. We cannot read the clauses in isolation. We have to read the whole agreement in question. It is very clear even from the provisions of the Contract Act that the consideration of any such agreement was permissible and not unlawful and/or not prohibited by law and was not to defeat the provisions of any law or is fraudulent and/or is immoral or opposed to public policy.
43.The submissions, that such contract and especially the clause is void, in view of provisions contained under Section 23/25 of the Indian Contract Act being opposed to public policy; violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner; violative of the right of property of petitioner/society; because of unequal bargain power; being forbidden by law and further in view of Section 25 of the Contract Act, as the agreement to transfer is without consideration and the same was not registered, have no force.” In view of the findings and reasons recorded by the High Court in the Central Inland Water Transport Corpn Ltd & Anr case (supra) upon which the reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-trust is of no relevance to the fact situation.
Further, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the appellant- trust has accepted and acted upon the said development agreement like other beneficiaries who are either the societies or other similar persons who are benefited by the approved scheme of the NIT. It is noteworthy that the appellant-trust has accepted all the terms and conditions of the development agreement without any objection while executing the same. The impugned clause of the said development agreement provides for the transfer of land in favour of NIT which is earmarked in the layout for the public utility purpose. The same is in terms of the approved development plan by Maharashtra Government and as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966 contained in its Chapter-V i.e., Sections 59-112 and Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948.
The findings recorded on the relevant contentious issues by the High Court in the impugned judgment with cogent and valid reasons are legal and justifiable. Therefore, we do not find any valid reason, whatsoever, to interfere with the said impugned judgment and order as the same, in our opinion, is a well-considered and reasoned decision. The same does not suffer from erroneous reasoning or error in law which requires interference by this Court.
Supreme Court of India
Narayanrao Jagobaji Gawande ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 4 February, 2016
Bench: V. Gopala Gowda, Amitava Roy
Non-REPORTABLE
 CIVIL APPEAL NO.870 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.25972 of 2009)

Citation;(2016) 4 SCC 443
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Monday, 12 October 2015

When offence under S 409 of IPC is not made out in case of govt contract?

 Some of the peculiar factors to be noted in this case are as under : (1) It took Cbi 8 years to file the chargesheet and that too without the requisite documents which would substantiate the said charges and without making K.D. Mitra, authorised representative of the contractor company a co-accused notwithstanding the fact that K.D. Mitra is the one who was taken delivery of the said goods from Delhi site and he had also got the indented material weighed at the site at Delhi. (2) This is not a case of vicarious liability and thirdly, it is not show as to how section 409, Indian Penal Code is attracted in a case on present nature because the petitioner is neither a public servant nor a banker nor a merchant, broker, Attorney nor agent. (3) It is also not shown as to how delivery of material which was taken by K.D. Mitra could be attributed to the present petitioner without any specific evidence of entrustment. In a case under Section 409 Ipc, the factum of entrustment and the factum of misappropriation of the entrusted articles is absolutely necessary. In the absence of these two essential ingredients, no charge can be framed underSection 409 Indian Penal Code (See Janeshwar Das Aggarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ). In the absence of proof of entrustment, there can be no question of accused being found guilty of the offence (See Roshan Lal Raina v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, ). The petitioner, who is the Managing Partner of M/s B.K. Roy Choudhary & Company and is based at Calcutta, which is the Head Office of the said firm, had signed the aforesaid documents for the purposes of accounts irrespective of the fact that his Field Officer who was present at the site at Delhi, had taken the actual physical delivery after due weighment and he had also signed the necessary transfer entries in Mas register. Peculiarly, the Court has not summoned any of the other five co-accused. (4) There is no evidence shown of the petitioner being present on site for taking delivery of the material. (5) The documents which are signed by the contractor, could be to ascertain the civil liability in respect of each contract for costing and accounting purposes by transferring the value of the goods transferred from one site store to another site store. Under the terms of the contract/agreement awarding the contract, the Clauses-10 and 42(i) may be considered, which for the convenience are reproduced hereunder:- Clause-10 "If the specification or schedule of items provides for the use of any special description of materials to be supplied from Engineer-in-Charge's stores, or it is required that the contractor shall use certain stores to be provided by the Engineer-in-Charge as shown in the schedule of materials hereto annexed, the contractor shall be bound to procure and shall be supplied such materials and stores as are from time to time required to be used by him for the purposes of the contract only, and the value of the full quantity of materials and stores so supplied at the rates specified in the said schedule of materials may be set off or deducted from any sums then due, or thereafter to become due to the contractor under the contract, or otherwise or against or from the security deposit, or the proceeds of sale thereof if the same is held in government Securities, the same or a sufficient portion thereof being in this case sold for the purpose. All materials so supplied to the contractor shall remain the absolute property of government and shall not be removed on any account from the site of the work, and shall be at all times open to inspection by the Engineer-in-Charge. Any such materials remaining unused and in perfectly good condition at the time of the completion or determination of the contract shall be returned to the Engineer-in-Charge at a place directed by him, if by a notice in writing under his hand he shall so require, but the contractor shall not be entitled to return any such materials unless with such consent, and shall have no claim for compensation on account of any such materials so supplied to him as aforesaid not being used by him or for any wastage in or damage to any such materials. Provided that the contractor shall _____ no case be entitled to any compensation or damages on account of any delay in supply or non-supply thereof all or any such materials and stores." Clause-42(i) "The contractor shall see that only the required quantities of materials are got issued. Any such material remaining unused and in perfectly good condition at the time of completion and determination of the contract shall be returned to the Engineer-in-charge at a place where directed by him, if by a notice in writing under his hand, he shall so require. Credit for such material will be given at the prevailing market rate not exceeding the amount charged from him, excluding the storage charges levelled at the time of issue of materials to him. The contractor shall also not be entitled to cordage and incidental charges for returning the surplus materials from and to the stores wherefrom they were issued..."; Reading of the said clauses does not in any manner make out a case of entrustment. The delivery of the said materials and its transfer from one site to another and all the documentation primarily is a part of accounting procedure so that the cost of the material which is actually used at a different site, does not get added on to the first site wherefrom the material is shifted. The material which is supplied to the contractor is in the nature of sale from government to the contractor and the contractor unless and until the department required contractor by giving a notice in writing under the signatures of Engineer-in-Charge, cannot exercise his option to return the material. As and when the material is returned, the contractor is given credit for the value of the returned material. In the chargesheet, there is no allegation that at any point of time, the department had required the contractor to return unused material to the department because so far as Delhi contract is concerned, on the basis of Transfer Entries, Unstamped Receipt and Advice of Transfer of Debt, the account of the contractor appears to have been debited with the value of the materials transferred. There is no charge or allegation of misappropriation in respect of Tor Steel and cement indented by K.D. Mitra which was received at the transferee site. I am informed that arbitration is already pending in respect of the discrepancy in mild steel valued at Rs. 41,824.00 . As I have already noticed hereinabove in terms of Clauses-10 and 42(i) of the contract, there does not appear to be any case for entrustment. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, reported as 1968 Crl.L.J. 803, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to deal with the question of entrustment and in para-8 observed as under:- "8.The term "entrusted" found inSection 405, Indian Penal Code governs not only the words "with the property" immediately following it but also the words "or with any dominion over the property" occurring thereafter - see Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra, . Before there can be any entrustment there must be a trust meaning thereby an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him for the benefit of another or of another and the owner. But that does not mean that such an entrustment need conform to all the technicalities of the law of trust - see Jaswantrai Manilal v. State of Bombay, 1966 Scr 483 at pp.498-500 = (AIR 1956 Sc 475 at pp.582-583). The expression "entrustment" carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create a judiciary relationship between them. A mere transaction of sale cannot amount to an entrustment. It is true that the government had sold the cement in question to Bss solely for the purpose of being used in connection with the construction work referred to earlier. But that circumstance does not make the transaction in question anything other than a sale. After delivery of the cement, the government had neither any right nor dominion over it. If the purchaser or his representative had failed to comply with the requirements of any law relating to cement control, he should have been prosecuted for the same. But we are unable to hold that there was any breach of trust."
(4) The offence alleged can be constituted only if accused had failed or refused to return he material which was held by him is trust which is not the case here. The transaction being that of sale and that the department having never exercised its option for return of the goods, there was no question of any misappropriation on failure to return or refusal to return the said material return thereof having not been sought by the department. Failure to return such material could not, in any event, constitute an offence under Section 409 Indian Penal Code because an independent contractor cannot be described as an agent of the department. Even assuming that the contractor had any dominion over the material and there was an element of entrustment and some offence under Section 406 could be constituted. It is pointed out that the said offence underSection 406 is punishable with imprisonment of three years and, therefore, the limitation for prosecution under Section 406 is three years from the date of commission of the offence and in the present case, launching of prosecution would be hopelessly time barred. Apart from all the a foregoing facts and circumstances and keeping in view that this is not a case of vicarious liability, it is amazing to note how in the face of the facts that the petitioner had not indented the material nor did he get it weighed nor did he accept the actual physical delivery thereof and in the absence of evidence that the petitioner had disposed of any of the material in question or had refused to return the same, or acknowledged liability, could the offence under Section 409 Indian Penal Code be made out. No criminal liability can be created unless the involvement of the accused himself is substantiated by evidence, which in the present case, appears to be absent. Unless vicarious liability is created by a special statute, no such liability can give rise to criminal liability in respect of the petitioner, particularly in view of the allegations that all acts were being performed by the individual local representatives of the firm.
Delhi High Court
B.K. Roy Choudhary vs State (Central Bureau Of ... on 15 July, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997 IVAD Delhi 490, 1997 CriLJ 4204, 1998 (1) Crimes 95, 68 (1997) DLT 484, 1997 (42) DRJ 615

Bench: J Mehra
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Wednesday, 22 July 2015

How to calculate damages for breach of contract in case of govt contract?

In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. 
(supra), the Court specifically dealt with the method for computation
of damages. The Court prefaced its discussion with the remarks that
“In the assessment of damages, the Court must consider only strict
legal obligations, and not the expectations, however reasonable, of
one contractor that the other will do something that he has assumed
no legal obligation to do.” The Court then explained each of the
formulae commonly adopted. The Court noted the criticisms of the
Hudson‟s formula observing that “it adopts the head office overhead
percentage from the contract as the factor for calculating the costs and
this may bear little or no relation to the actual head office costs of the
contractor.” The Emden formula which has received judicial support
in a number of cases has the advantage of using the “contractor‟s
actual head office and profit percentage rather than those contained in
the contract.” The Eichleay formula is used “where it is not possible
to prove loss of opportunity and the claim is based on actual cost.”
The Court did not endorse any one particular formula since “it is an
accepted position that different formulas can be applied in different
circumstances and the question as to whether damages should be
computed by taking recourse to one or the other formula, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, would
eminently fall within the domain of the arbitrator.” What is significant
as far as the above discussion is concerned is that it is only concerned
with the application of formulae and not whether the formulae would
apply notwithstanding there is no proof of the contractor having
suffered overhead charges or loss of profit.
The net result of the discussion is that nowhere in the decision in
McDermott International Inc (supra) did the Supreme Court hold
that even without producing any material to show loss of overheads or
profit, the Arbitrator could apply one of the formulae to award the
claims.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI O.M.P. 249/2013
Decision on: March 25 2015 NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA..... Petitioner
versus BUMI HIWAY (M) SDN BHD ..... Respondent
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR Dated; 25.03.2015  
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)877 Delhi
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Whether claim for loss of profit can be allowed to contractor when it is not proved that he suffered loss of profit?

 On the other hand, the Court finds that it has been repeatedly
stressed in the decisions of the Court that some basic material has to
be placed on record by the contractor to demonstrate loss of profits. It
is one thing to say that on account of the premature termination of a
contract, losses would be suffered and such in such instances it will
be possible to demonstrate loss of profit. However, that is not the case
here. Extension of time was given by NHAI up to 30th September
2004 without levy of LD. As the AT itself noted, BHSB did earn
profits but over an extended period of time. Secondly, as the AT itself
noted, BHSB did not produce any material to show that it had  
suffered any overhead costs or loss of profit. Therefore, the question
of the AT simply applying the formulae did not arise. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
O.M.P. 249/2013

Decision on: March 25 2015
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA.
Vs
BUMI HIWAY (M) SDN BHD 

CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
Dated; 25.03.2015
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)877 Delhi
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Friday, 19 June 2015

When contractor is not entitled to get profit under the head 'loss of profit' in case of breach of work contract?

Here when claim for escalation of wages bills and price for materials compensation has been paid and compensation for delay in the payment of the amount payable under the contract or for other extra works is to be paid with interest thereon, it is rather difficult for us to accept the proposition that in addition 15% of the total profit should be computed under the heading 'Loss of Profit'. It is not unusual for the contractors to claim loss of profit arising out of diminution in turn over on account of delay in the matter of completion of the work. What he should establish in such a situation is that had he received the amount due under the contract, he could have utilised the same for some other business in which he could have earned profit. Unless such a plea is raised and established, claim for loss of profits could not have been granted. In this case, no such material is available on record. In the absence of any evidence, the arbitrator could not have awarded the same. This aspect was very well settled in Sunleyn (B) & Co. Ltd. vs. Cunard White Star Ltd., [1940] 1 K.B. 740, by the Court of Appeal in England. Therefore, we have no hesitation in deleting a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- awarded to the claimant.

Supreme Court of India

Bharat Coking Coal Ltd vs L.K. Ahuja on 12 April, 2004

Bench: S. Rajendra Babu, Bhan.
Citation; (2004)5SCC109, [2004]3SCR1105

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Thursday, 11 June 2015

Whether damages can be claimed by a contractor where the government is proved to have committed breach by improperly rescinding the contract ?


This Court in A.T. Brij Pal Singh and Ors. v. State or Gujarat, [1984] 4 SCC 59) while interpreting the provisions of Section 73 of the Contract Act, has held that damages can be claimed by a contractor where the government is proved to have committed breach by improperly rescinding the contract and for estimating the amount of damages court should make a broad evaluation instead of going into minute details. It was specifically held that where in the works con-tract, the party entrusting the work committed breach of contract, the contractor is entitled to claim the damages for loss of profit which he expected to earn by undertaking the works contract. Claim of expected profits is legally admissible on proof of the breach of contract by the erring party. It was observed :
"What would be the measure of profit would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. But that there shall be a reasonable expectation of profit is implicit in a works contract and its loss has to be compensated by way of damages if the other party to the contract is guilty of breach of contract cannot be gainsaid.

Supreme Court of India

Dwaraka Das vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr on 10 February, 1999
Bench: V.N. Khare, R.P. Sethi
        
Citation;(1999)3 SCC500
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Wednesday, 6 May 2015

What are essential and non-essential conditions in tender in case of govt contract?

The Apex Court after scrutinising the law on the issue as to what could be construed as essential and non-essential conditions in tender matters, in the case of Rashmi Metaliks Ltd.
(supra) has observed thus :-
"13. So far as clause (j) of the detailed notice inviting E-tender No.1/KMDA/MAT/CE/2013-2014 dated 10.5.2013 emanating from the office of the Chief Engineer is concerned, it seems to us that contrary to the conclusion in the impugned judgment, the clause is not an essential element or ingredient or concomitant of the subject NIT. In the course of hearing, the Income Tax Return has been filed by the Appellant-company and scrutinized by us. For the Assessment year 2011-2012, the gross income of the Appellant- company was Rs.15,34,05,627, although, for the succeeding Assessment Year 2012-2013, the income tax was NIL, but substantial tax had been deposited. We think that the Income Tax Return would have assumed the character of an essential term if one of the qualifications was either the gross income or the net income on which tax was attracted. In many cases this is a salutary stipulation, since it is indicative of the commercial standing and reliability of the tendering entity.
This feature being absent, we think that the filing of the latest Income Tax Return was a collateral term, and accordingly the Tendering Authority ought to have brought this discrepancy to the notice of the Appellant-company and if even thereafter no rectification had been carried out, the position may have been appreciably different.
It has been asserted on behalf of the Appellant- Company, and not denied by the learned counsel for the Respondent-Authority, that the financial bid of the Appellant-Company is substantially lower than that of the others, and, therefore, pecuniarily preferable."
 In the said case, the appellant before the Apex Court was refused participation in the financial bid on the ground that the tenderer i.e. the appellant had failed to place on record the latest Income Tax and Professional Tax Returns. The Apex Court found that the Income Tax Return would have assumed the character of an essential term if one of the qualifications was either the gross income or the net income on which tax was attracted. It was further observed that in many cases this is a salutary stipulation, since it is indicative of the commercial standing and reliability of the tendering entity. It is further observed that filing of the latest Income Tax Return was a collateral term and accordingly the  Tendering Authority ought to have brought this discrepancy to the notice of the Appellant -Company and if even thereafter no rectification had been carried out, the position would have been different.
Bombay High Court
Khare And Tarkunde ... vs The State Of Maharashtra Through ... on 5 December, 2014

CORAM : B.R. GAVAI & V.M. DESHPANDE, JJ.
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Wednesday, 29 April 2015

When govt is not entitled to forfeit security deposit given by contractor?

 We find that there is no term in the agreement between the parties enabling the appellant to forfeit the security deposit. The only right given to the appellant was to deduct out of the security deposit the amount of loss incurred by the appellant which was caused to them by reason of non-completion of the work by the respondent in time and to recover the extra cost of the work which had to be completed by the appellant departmentally on account of default of the respondent subject to certain limits. The appellant has neither proved the amount of damage incurred by it nor has it proved the extra amount of cost incurred by it for getting the uncompleted work done departmentally. Thus, the argument that the appellant was entitled to forfeit the security deposit or any part of the same, must fail. 

Supreme Court of India
State Of Rajasthan vs Botamal Sachdeva (Dead) Through ... on 2 August, 1989
Equivalent citations: AIR 1989 SC 1811, 1989 (2) ARBLR 354 SC, JT 1989 (3) SC 315, 1989 (2) SCALE 288, (1989) 4 SCC 35, 1989 (2) UJ 632 SC

Bench: M Kania, T Thommen

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Saturday, 25 April 2015

Whether Government's freedom to contract as well as freedom to break free from obligations of a contract is restricted?

I have given due thought to the contentions of the rival parties. The freedom which exists under the realm of private contract in respect of the performance of contractual obligation does not apply in the same measure where the Government is a party. Every action of the Government has to pass the rigorous inquisition of fair play, lack of arbitrariness, and its being founded on good and sound reasons. Government's freedom to contract as well as freedom to break free from the obligations of a contract is now rightly restricted in diverse manners. While the Government may enjoy the role of distribution of largesse, it may also suffer from the vulnerability of committing errors or perpetrating an inequitable or unjust implementation of its policies through its faceless and unidentifiable officers and agents. It, Therefore, behoves the Court to treat Government contracts in a manner altogether different to that of the compact between private parties. Reliance of Ms. Jyoti Singh on the decisions mentioned above is of no avail as the learned authors of the judgments have taken care to highlight the fact that they had to pronounce upon contracts between private parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that even where the State is empowered by a particular clause in a contract to terminate it by a notice simplicitor, the only possible construction that can be given to such a clause is that the reasons which prevailed upon it for justifying the termination need not be conveyed to the adversary. The Apex Court has clarified that such a clause does not permit the taking of arbitrary, biased, unreasonable or an ill-informed decisions.

Delhi High Court
Pioneer Publicity Corporation vs Delhi Transport Corporation And ... on 27 February, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003 IIAD Delhi 469, 2003 (1) ARBLR 672 Delhi, 103 (2003) DLT 442, 2003 (2) RAJ 132, 2004 50 SCL 331 Delhi

Bench: V Sen

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