Whether Appellate court should direct joint trial of accused even if the accused has not shown any prejudice due to separate trial?

 Even if it is conceded that the alleged offences committed in FIR 96 and FIR 197 were committed in the course of the same transaction, within the meaning of the phrase in Section 223(d), in view of the interpretation in Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (supra), it does not warrant the exercise of discretion to direct a retrial followed by a joint trial. It was imperative for the accused-respondents to prove that the separate trials caused a miscarriage of justice. The respondents have not been able to demonstrate before the Court that separate trials led to a miscarriage of justice. No explanation has been rendered on the aspect of a miscarriage of justice. Though the High Court has in the impugned judgment observed that the separate trials in FIR 96 and FIR 187 led to a miscarriage of justice, no analysis has been undertaken to explain the finding. Moreover, the High Court has only observed that there ‘may’ be a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, quite apart from the individual prejudice to the appellant which has been brought out before the Court, we are clearly of the view that the holding of separate trials was not contrary to law and that there was no resultant failure of justice demonstrated to the satisfaction of the High Court. {Para 47}

48. We are conscious of the fact that the State of Punjab is not in appeal before this Court against the retrial which has been ordered by the High Court. But as a matter of first principle, it is evident that even the appellant has been able to establish that a retrial would be a matter of serious prejudice since vital evidence which has been recorded during the course of the trial would be obliterated as a result of the death of the witnesses from the investigating team lead by the appellant. That apart, a retrial will not serve the ends of ensuring that justice is done in a heinous crime alleged to have been perpetrated on the prosecutrix resulting in her suicide.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1051-1054 of 2021

Nasib Singh Vs The State of Punjab 

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated: October 08, 2021.

Print Page

Whether joint trial of accused will be vitiated if there is misjoinder of charges?

Before adverting to the submission with regard to the question of sentence we would like to point out that there is misjoinder of charges on account of a joint trial of these two appellants with Ravi Shankar. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Tewatia, no objection to the joint trial had been raised by these two appellants either at the trial stage or at the appellate stage or even before this Court, nor the appellants had shown any prejudice having been caused to them by such a trial. However, as contemplated under Section 464 Crl. P.C. in absence of proof that failure of justice had occasioned by the joint trial, the finding and the sentence recorded by the competent Court cannot said to be invalid.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeals Nos. 544-545 of 1986

Decided On: 31.01.1989

Prem Chand  Vs  State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.C. Ray and S.R. Pandian, JJ.

Citations: AIR 1989 SC 937, 1989 CriLJ 1246, 1989 (1) Crimes 398 SC, JT 1989 (1) SC 158, 1989 (1) SCALE 199, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 286

Print Page

When court should not permit joint trial of civil suit and probate proceeding?

Court refused to order joint trial of a probate proceeding and a civil suit dealing with one of the properties mentioned in the Will inasmuch as it found that there was no challenge to the Will in the suit, and the challenge was only to the status of the property and the right of the testator to bequeath the same.

A reading of the above would clearly show that the petitioner infact accepted the execution of the Will by the testator. In view of the above, there will be no commonality of issues or evidence between the probate petition and the suit, especially when the Issue no. 4 framed in the probate petition by the order dated 31.10.2019 stands deleted by the subsequent order dated 07.03.2020.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Balbir Singh Wasu vs. Lakhbir Singh and Others, (2005) 12 SCC 503, and Nirmala Devi vs. Arun Kumar Gupta and Others, MANU/SC/3236/2000 : (2005) 12 SCC 505 to contend that in a similar circumstance the Supreme Court had directed the probate proceedings and the Civil Suit to be tried by the same Court. He further places reliance on the order dated 29.01.2013 passed by this Court in TR.P. (C) 20/2012 titled Sanjay Arora and Ors. vs. Sudhir Kumar Arora and Ors., as also of the order dated 10.01.2017 of this Court in TRP. (C) 127/2019 titled Ajay Kumar Gupta & Anr. vs. Roopa Gupta, to contend that even this Court has ordered transfer and joint trial of probate proceedings and Civil Suit.

10. In the peculiar facts of the present case, I am not persuaded by the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, in the Suit there is no challenge to the execution of the Will by the testator. The only challenge is to the status of the property and the rights of the testator to bequeath the same. This is not the subject matter of the probate petition and the learned Court has rightly deleted the issue with respect to the same by its order dated 07.03.2020.In view of the above, I find no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

TR. P. (C.) 161/2019 and CM No. 49960/2019

Decided On: 12.03.2020

 Amiteshwar Singh  Vs.  Kamal Nain

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Chawla, J.

Print Page

Whether confession of one accused is admissible against co-accused in same case if both are not tried jointly?

In the instant case, no doubt, the Appellant was absconding. That is why, joint trial of the Appellant with the other two Accused persons could not be held. As noticed above, Section 15 of the TADA Act specifically provides that the confession recorded shall be admissible in trial of a co-Accused for offence committed and tried in the same case together with the Accused who makes the confession. We are of the view, that if for any reason, a joint trial is not held, the confession of a co-Accused cannot be held to be admissible in evidence against another Accused who would face trial at a later point of time in the same case. We are of the further opinion that if we are to accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent-State, it is as good as re-writing the scope of Section 15 of the TADA Act as amended in the year 1993.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1120 of 2010

Decided On: 01.04.2020

 Raja Vs.  State of Tamil Nadu

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Abdul Nazeer and Deepak Gupta, JJ.

Print Page

What are limits of joint trial of criminal cases?

 This Court in Natwar Lal Sakar Lal Mody v. The State of Bombay 26 (1984) DLT 64 considered the question of joint trial of persons and offences for conspiracy as per provisions contained in Section 239(d) of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court has laid down that separate trial is the Rule and joint trial is an exception. Joint trial would be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows innumerable offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons to be under the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if each or some of the offences can be separately tried, it would be appropriate and lawful. Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the matter which might otherwise be simple, and it would confuse the Accused and cause prejudice to them. Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is satisfied that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant to conspiracy. This Court has laid down thus:

11. This discussion leads us to the following legal position. Separate trial is the Rule and joint trial is an exception. While Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a joint trial of person and offences within defined limits, it is within the discretion of the Court to permit such a joint trial or not, having regard to the circumstances of each case. It would certainly be an irregular exercise of discretion if a Court allows an innumerable number of offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons under the protecting wing of all-embracing conspiracy, if each or some of the offences can legitimately and properly form the subject-matter of a separate trial; such a joint trial would undoubtedly prolong the trial and would be a cause of unnecessary waste of judicial time. It would complicate matters which might otherwise be simple; it would confuse Accused and cause prejudice to them, for more often than not Accused who have taken part in one of the minor offences might have not only to undergo the long strain of protracted trial, but there might also be the likelihood of the impact of the evidence adduced in respect of other Accused on the evidence adduced against him working to his detriment. Nor can it be said that such an omnibus charge or charges would always be in favour of the prosecution for the confusion introduced in the charges and consequently in the evidence may ultimately benefit some of the accused, as a clear case against one or other of the Accused may be complicated or confused by the attempt to put it in a proper place in a larger setting. A Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is clearly satisfied on the material placed before it that there is evidence to prove prima facie that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and they committed the separate acts attributed to them pursuant to the object of the said conspiracy.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 394, 393 and 395 of 2017

Decided On: 08.05.2017

State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI Vs. Lalu Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy, JJ.

Citation:(2017) 8 SCC1

Print Page

When joint trial of persons accused of different offence committed in the course of same transaction is permisible?

 Examining the correctness of the conclusion recorded by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, this Court held:-

".....The question is whether for the purposes of s. 239(d) it is necessary to ascertain any thing more than this that the different offences were committed in the course of the same transaction or whether it must further be ascertained whether the acts are intrinsically connected with one another. Under s. 235(1) what has to be ascertained is whether the offences arise out of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, but the words "so connected together as to form" are not repeated after the words "same transaction" in s. 239. What has to be ascertained then is whether these words are also to be read in all the clauses of s. 239 which refer to the same transaction. Section 235(1), while providing for the joint trial for more than one offences, indicates that there must be connection between the acts and the transaction. According to this provision there must thus be a connection between a series of acts before, they could be regarded as forming the same transaction. What is meant by "same transaction" is not defined anywhere in the Code. Indeed, it would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not come across a single decision of any Court which has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. The connection between a series of acts seems to us to be an essential ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction and, therefore, the mere absence of the words "so connected together as to form" in cl. (a), (c) and (d) of s. 239 would make little difference.

(iii) This Court after taking note of the fact that the clause "same transaction" is not defined under the Cr.P.C. opined that the meaning of the clause should depend upon the facts of each case. However, this Court indicated that where there is a proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it is possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. This Court also cautioned that every one of the above-mentioned elements need not co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the "same transaction".

Supreme Court of India

R.Dineshkumar@Deena vs State Rep. By Inspector Of Police ... on 16 March, 2015

Bench: J. Chelameswar, C. Nagappan

Citation;(2015) 7 SCC 497

Print Page