Showing posts with label malicious prosecution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label malicious prosecution. Show all posts

Friday, 2 August 2024

Whether limitation for filing suit for damages for malicious prosecution will be suspended if order of termination of proceeding is challenged before higher court?

Thus, the aforesaid judgments of this Court have consistently held that once the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated, the period of limitation is triggered and that when time begins to run, it cannot be held in abeyance or suspended, only because an order of acquittal or otherwise terminating the prosecution has been made subject matter of challenge before the Higher Court. It is clear from the said position of law that if the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant in the present case are accepted, it would amount to reading something more in Article 74 of the Act of 1963, than what is plainly stated therein, which is not acceptable. If the contentions are accepted, it would amount to reading the words "finally terminated" or "finally acquitted" in the said provision, which is wholly impermissible. {Para 22}


23. If there is a challenge to an order that terminates the prosecution, it would not amount to a suspension of time of the period of limitation that starts to run on an order being passed terminating the prosecution. Even if there is interim order passed in the proceeding challenging the order terminating the prosecution, it would only amount to stay of the suit or suspension of the proceedings in the suit for malicious prosecution preferred by the plaintiff. If the appeal/revision proceedings challenging an order terminating the prosecution wherein an interim order is operating, is dismissed, the proceedings in the suit for malicious proceedings could commence again. Conversely, if the appeal/revision proceeding challenging the order terminating prosecution is allowed, the suit will not survive. But, it does not mean that merely because a proceeding has been instituted challenging an order terminating the prosecution, a suit for malicious prosecution would not be maintainable. The period of limitation would start to run from the date of the order terminating the prosecution which in the present case was the order dated 05-11-2003 passed by this Court quashing the FIR and charge sheet. Any other interpretation would do violence to Article 74 of the Act of 1963, because it would amount to reading something more into the said provision than what it provides. The aforesaid judgments of this Court are binding and therefore, the first substantial question of law pertaining to limitation on which this appeal was admitted, is answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant herein. Consequently, it is held that the appellate Court was justified in allowing the appeal of the respondent and dismissing the suit filed by the appellant for damages for malicious prosecution.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 464 of 2016

Decided On: 03.05.2018

Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs. Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/0857/2018,2019 MHLJ(2) 265.

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Sunday, 28 July 2019

Whether plaintiff is entitled to get interest on decretal amount in suit for malicious prosecution?

 Under Section 34 of the Code the Court has a discretion to order interest when "a decree is for the payment of money". The learned Counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Ramalingam Chettiyar (supra) to urge that the expression "money" should not be understood in a limited sense of an unascertained sum. It was held by the Division Bench in that case that a decree for payment of damages was also a decree "for the payment of money" as contemplated by Section 34 of the Code. This judgment has been subsequently followed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in K.S.E. Board (supra). Following the view as taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, it is held that a decree for payment of money would also include a decree for grant of damages. On that count the plaintiff is entitled to claim interest on the said decree from the date of filing of the suit. It is by now well settled that the grant of interest pendente lite is a matter within discretion of the Court and its grant is not limited only to commercial transactions. Reference in that regard can be made to the decision in Vikram Somaji Dhabale (supra). There has to be a justifiable reason therefore to deny a successful plaintiff the grant of pendente lite interest. In the facts of the present case, there does not appear to be any reason whatsoever to deny the plaintiff that relief. Though it was urged on behalf of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that they could not be blamed for the delay in deciding the proceedings, the same cannot be a reason to deprive the successful plaintiff the fruits of interest pendente lite. The appellate Court without assigning any reason did not grant interest pendente lite. Substantial question of law No. 3 is answered by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the decreetal amount from the date of filing of the suit.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 63 of 2018 and Cross Objection/Appeal No. 22 of 2018 in Second Appeal No. 63 of 2018

Decided On: 29.06.2018

 Rajendra  Vs. Ashish and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 451
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Sunday, 28 April 2019

How to ascertain limitation for suit for malicious prosecution?

Thus, the aforesaid judgments of this Court have consistently held that once the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated, the period of limitation is triggered and that when time begins to run, it cannot be held in abeyance or suspended, only because an order of acquittal or otherwise terminating the prosecution has been made subject matter of challenge before the Higher Court. It is clear from the said position of law that if the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant in the present case are accepted, it would amount to reading something more in Article 74 of the Act of 1963, than what is plainly stated therein, which is not acceptable. If the contentions are accepted, it would amount to reading the words "finally terminated" or "finally acquitted" in the said provision, which is wholly impermissible.

23. If there is a challenge to an order that terminates the prosecution, it would not amount to a suspension of time of the period of limitation that starts to run on an order being passed terminating the prosecution. Even if there is interim order passed in the proceeding challenging the order terminating the prosecution, it would only amount to stay of the suit or suspension of the proceedings in the suit for malicious prosecution preferred by the plaintiff. If the appeal/revision proceedings challenging an order terminating the prosecution wherein an interim order is operating, is dismissed, the proceedings in the suit for malicious proceedings could commence again. Conversely, if the appeal/revision proceeding challenging the order terminating prosecution is allowed, the suit will not survive. But, it does not mean that merely because a proceeding has been instituted challenging an order terminating the prosecution, a suit for malicious prosecution would not be maintainable. The period of limitation would start to run from the date of the order terminating the prosecution which in the present case was the order dated 05-11-2003 passed by this Court quashing the FIR and charge sheet. Any other interpretation would do violence to Article 74 of the Act of 1963, because it would amount to reading something more into the said provision than what it provides. The aforesaid judgments of this Court are binding and therefore, the first substantial question of law pertaining to limitation on which this appeal was admitted, is answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant herein. Consequently, it is held that the appellate Court was justified in allowing the appeal of the respondent and dismissing the suit filed by the appellant for damages for malicious prosecution.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 464 of 2016

Decided On: 03.05.2018

 Nilkanth Baliram Sawarkar Vs.  Vidyanand Balkrishna Ogale

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Manish Pitale, J.

Citation: 2019(2) MHLJ 265
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Wednesday, 28 September 2016

Leading Judgment on malicious prosecution

On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent bank would contend that when the suit is filed for malicious prosecution, in order to succeed, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the essential ingredients, viz., i) that the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant; ii) that the prosecution ended in plaintiff's favour; iii) that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause and iv) that the defendant was actuated by malice.  The learned counsel further contended that the  first defendant bank had only lodged the complaint with the police based on the letter received from British Bank and sought for investigation into the matter since the card and the signature of the card holder were forged with the connivance of the merchant.  The learned counsel would draw the attention of this Court to the FIR Ex.P7 and would submit that there is no mention about the plaintiff's name, but merely mentioned that a bill was received from M/s.Sangam and subsequently, when the customer's account was debited, the customer came back to them with his travel details and stated that he was not available in India on that date, but being present at Sultanate of  Oman. Therefore, the defendants merely set the criminal law into motion. Hence, the defendants have acted with reasonable and probable cause in order to find about the real culprits and since it appears that a gang is involved in such fraudulent activities with the connivance of merchants and that the defendants were not actuated by malice. He submitted that the entire action was taken by the Investigating Officer in pursuant to the complaint supported by the letter sent by the British Bank under Ex.P5 which in turn was supported by the complaint from Mr.Yegneswaran Kumar, who was the card holder.  He also contended that the prosecution did not end in honorable acquittal, but only on the ground that the charges were not proved beyond reasonable doubt, but giving the benefit of doubt and therefore, the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit for malice prosecution.  
 In order to succeed in a suit for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has to establish that the defendant had acted without any reasonable and probable cause, but maliciously. The meaning and ingredients of malicious prosecution are widely considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal State Electricity versus Dileep Kumar Ray reported in AIR 2007 SC 976. The relevant paragraphs are re-produced as under:
'MALICIOUS PROSECUTION" is a prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or its bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy.
In malicious prosecution there are two essential elements, namely, that no probable cause existed for instituting the prosecution or suit complained of, and that such prosecution or suit terminated in some way favorably to the defendant therein.
"When it comes to the knowledge of anybody that a crime has been committed, a duty is laid on that person as a citizen of the country, to state to the authorities what he knows respecting the commission of the crime, and if he states, only what he knows and honestly believes he cannot be subjected to an action of damages merely because it turns out that the person as to whom he has given the information is after all not guilty of the crime. In such cases to establish liability the pursuer must show that the informant acted from malice, i.e., 'not in discharge of his public duty but from an illegitimate motive, and must also prove that the statements were made or the information given without any reasonable grounds of belief, or other information given without probable cause; 
The performance of a duty imposed by law, such as the institution of a prosecution as a necessary condition precedent to a civil action, does not constitute "malice". (Abbott v. Refuge Assurance Co., (1962) 1 QB 432). 
(Emphasis added)
 As regards the judgment rendered in C.C.No.2863 of 2000  by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, is concerned, the findings made therein, are not binding on Civil Court.  The judgment, is a fact, which can be taken note of. However, a perusal of the Ex.P1, it is clear that learned Magistrate has merely held that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and thus, the benefit of doubt was given to the accused. After all, investigation and filing the final report is the role of the police for which neither the defendants have any role to play.  Therefore, this Court does not find any of the parameters which are required for a righteous claim for malice prosecution, in the present case. Merely because the criminal proceedings concluded with an acquittal by itself is not sufficient to label the proceedings as malicious prosecution.

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED :  07.09.2016

 C O R A M :

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.M.SUNDRESH

CIVIL SUIT No.347  of 2012
C.Kishin Chand
Versus

City Bank N.A.

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