Showing posts with label interest. Show all posts
Showing posts with label interest. Show all posts

Tuesday, 11 August 2026

Supreme Court: Contract Denying Interest On Security Deposit Not Against Public Policy

How to interpret this clause?

"19. Security deposit shall carry no interest:- The security deposited by the Contractor/Contractors shall not carry any interest. It shall be refunded to the Contractor within three months from the date of expiry or sooner determination of the contract.”

The High Court, both single judge bench and division bench, held Clause 19 to be unsustainable in law and against public policy.

The Supreme Court rejected this holding -
"The public policy cannot be pressed into service to set at naught the commercial contract which expressly denies interest on security deposit. Such a stipulation is neither immoral nor unlawful nor can it be classified as unsustainable in the legal sense."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3145-3146 of 2012

Decided On: 13.07.2026

State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Jai Durgaa Finvest P. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Surya Kant, C.J.I. and V. Mohana, J.
Author: V. Mohana, J.
Citation: MANU/SC/0690/2026
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Thursday, 19 March 2026

Principal Sum Adjudged and Three Stages of Interest Under Section 34 CPC

 In money decrees, one of the most important questions is: what exactly is the principal sum adjudged, and how is interest calculated before the suit, during the pendency of the suit, and after the decree. Under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this distinction is crucial because the court does not treat all kinds of interest in the same manner.

For district judge interview purposes, the concept should be understood in three parts: first, the meaning of principal sum adjudged; second, the three stages of interest; and third, the leading case law explaining the doctrine.

Meaning of principal sum adjudged

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Sunday, 10 August 2025

Supreme court: Motor accident claim tribunal must give interest on future prospect while granting compensation for motor accident

 In fact, it is due to the repudiation of or refusal to consider the claim that the claimants are driven to the Tribunal. When the matter is pending before the Tribunal or in appeal before the higher forums, the claimants are deprived of the compensation for future prospects. If they are paid in time, it could be utilized by the claimants and on failure, the loss of dependency would force the claimants to source their livelihood from elsewhere. This is sought to be compensated at least minimally by award of interest, which oftener them ever is nominal also since only simple interest is awarded. If the amounts were disbursed to the claimants on a rough calculation, on intimation of the accident to the Insurance Company, subject to the award of the Tribunal, necessarily there would not have been any interest liability atleast to the extent of the disbursement made. {Para 11}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 11340 of 2020 and 22136 of 2024

Decided On: 14.07.2025

The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Niru and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0894/2025,2025 INSC 822

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Monday, 12 May 2025

Bombay HC: If An Employee Is Exonerated In Disciplinary Proceedings, Interest Ought To Be Provided On Delayed Payment Of Retirement Benefits

 Thus, from a bare perusal of the order dated 09.05.2023, it is evident that the order imposing penalty dated 30.09.2008 and the rejection order dated 09.01.2013 were set aside on the ground of procedural irregularities. The said orders being set aside, S.M. Pillay would have to be treated as having retired on 31.01.2007 with a clean slate, consequently, being entitled to his retiral benefits, pension, etc. on the date of his retirement. The said payments were withheld on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. In view of the exoneration of S.M. Pillay in the disciplinary proceedings, the Petitioner would be entitled to interest on the delayed payment. Retirement benefits being due to him w.e.f. the date of his retirement, the delay in payment would have to be considered from 31.01.2007. {Para 9}


10. With reference to the contention of the learned Advocate for the Respondents that the proceedings filed by S.M. Pillay against the penalty order being abated, consequently Petitioner not being entitled to interest, will have to be rejected in view of the specific observation in the order dated 09.05.2023 which has set aside the penalty order on the ground of procedural irregularity. Mere observation that the proceedings stood abated would not come to the aid of the Respondent No.2 to deny Petitioner interest on delayed payments of the retiral benefits payable to S.M. Pillay. This is more so on account the fact that his retiral dues were withheld on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings.


11. S.M. Pillay retired from service on 31.01.2007 upon attaining the age of superannuation. Though S.M. Pillay was placed on the suspension on 22.01.2007, he was served with the charge memo on 05.02.2007. It is trite law that the departmental proceedings is not initiated merely by issuance of show cause notice, it is initiated only when charge-sheet is issued (see Union of India & Others versus K.V. Jankiraman MANU/SC/0445/1991 : 1991:INSC:209 : (1991) 4 SCC 109). Mr. Bhaskar Reddy, learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that the said Rules do not contemplate disciplinary proceedings after retirement of the employees. Mr. Tushad Kakalia, learned Advocate for Respondent No.2 was unable to point out any provision in the said Rules which would enable the Respondent No.2 to initiate or continue proceedings upon the retirement of its employees. This is an additional ground to hold that S.M. Pillay was denied his retirement dues, upon his retirement.


12. Upon exoneration of S.M. Pillay, the period of suspension Petitioner i.e. 22.01.2007 to 31.01.2007 would have to be considered on duty and consequently, he would be entitled to his full pay during the said period, less the subsistence allowance paid during the said period. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1918 of 2025

Decided On: 17.04.2025

Maheshwari Shanmugam Pillay Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Ghuge and Ashwin D. Bhobe, JJ.

Author: Ashwin D. Bhobe, J.

Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:17375-DB,MANU/MH/2387/2025.

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Sunday, 2 March 2025

Supreme Court: Motor accident claim tribunal can not reduce Compensation Merely Because Dependents Took Over Business Of Deceased

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

11. Having examined the matter, the Court finds that the Award rendered by the Tribunal is well-considered. Though the claimed compensation was Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore) each with regard to the father and the mother, the Tribunal granted Rs.58,24,000/- (Rupees Fifty-Eight Lakhs Twenty-Four Thousand) re the father and Rs.93,61,000/-(Rupees Ninety-Three Lakhs Sixty-One Thousand) re the mother. The documents produced by the Appellants and the reasoning given by the Tribunal as well as the Karnataka High Court's Division Bench judgment in B. Parimala (supra) indicate, and in our opinion, rightly so, that merely because the Appellants stepped into the shoes of the deceased, by such factum itself, the Appellants would not be capable of running the Mill. It would be of relevance as to whether due to their lack of experience and maturity, real/expected downfall in the profitability of the firm or the business would ensue. Such factor, while considering a claim pertaining to loss of future income/earnings, would have to be dealt with. In the present cases, even the monthly incomes of the parents as claimed by the Appellants i.e.. income of the father being Rs.25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs) per year and the mother's being Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) per year, the notional income fixed by the Tribunal of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees Sixty Thousand) each per month, is much more reasonable. It is no longer res integra that Income Tax Returns are reliable evidence to assess the income of a deceased, reference whereof can be made to Amrit Bhanu Shali v National Insurance Co. Ltd.,   MANU/SC/0537/2012 : (2012) 11 SCC 7388; Kalpanaraj v Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,   MANU/SC/0345/2014 : (2015) 2 SCC 7649, and K. Ramya (supra)10.

12. The observations, as under, in Sushma (supra) fortify our view:

'7. Therefore in the matter of determining the compensation certain larger aspects have to be kept in perspective and even if it is expected that the Bakery business is continued, the loss due to the death of the husband and his expertise in such business certainly would be at least to the extent of 50% of the normal way in which the business was conducted...'

17. The mere fact that the Deceased's share of ownership in these businesses ventures was transferred to the Deceased's minor children just before his death or to the dependents after his death is not a sufficient justification to conclude that the benefits of these businesses continue to accrue to his dependents. On the contrary, it has come on record that the Deceased was actively involved in the day- to-day administration of these businesses from their stage of infancy, had undergone specialized training to administer his business and that the audit reports neatly delineate Deceased's share of income from the businesses. These facts necessitate that the entire amount from the business ventures is treated as income. Similarly, the amount earned from the bank interests and remaining investments must also be included as income.' (sic)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1162-1163 of 2025.

Decided On: 29.01.2025

S. Vishnu Ganga and Ors. Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited Rep. by its Divisional Manager and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.

Author: Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 123,MANU/SC/0119/2025.
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Saturday, 8 February 2025

Bombay HC: Motor accident claim tribunal should grant interest on future prospect from the date of filing of the claim petition

 This Court has held in the case of Kalpana Madhu Gavali [supra] that interest on future prospects should not be paid. However, I have not applied the said judgment for the following reasons :


i] The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various judgments, noted in para no.10 above, has granted interest on the future prospects and the same is not granted in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.


ii] The entire compensation is computed based on loss of future income which includes future prospect.


iii] The compensation becomes payable from the date of filing of the claim petition and the interest is awarded by the tribunal from the date of filing of claim petition. The claim petition may be adjudicated within one year or may take 20 years up till the appellate stage. But, the amount becomes payable from the date of filing of the claim petition, as such, the interest is granted from the date of claim petition till it's realization. {Para 11}


12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently granted interest on future prospect from the date of filing of the claim petition. As such, the argument of the Insurance Company on that interest should not be granted on future prospect is rejected.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

First Appeal No. 401 of 2014

Decided On: 01.10.2024

IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Suvarna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun R. Pedneker, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/6153/2024,2024:BHC-AUG:23391.

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Sunday, 28 July 2024

What precautions the court should take while granting leave to defend in a summary suit based dishonoured cheque?

 A Summary Suit based on dishonoured cheques stands on a higher pedestal. In addition to the proof of underlying consideration, evidenced by the documents and material on record, in a given case, the plaintiff can bank upon the presumptions contained in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 114 illustration (c) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

32. A slightly distinct position of a Summary Suit based on a dishonoured cheque has been expounded by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Laxmichand Udeshi @ Bhatia v. Pravin Hiralal Shah8 wherein the Court adverted to the effect of the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, while considering the prayer for leave to defend the suit based on a negotiable instrument.

33. The observations of the Division Bench in paragraph 14 and 15 of the said judgment are material and, hence, extracted below.-

14] When a summary suit instituted is based on a cheque which is dishonoured, effect of Sections 138 and 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act raising statutory presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of a liability, is a relevant consideration to be kept in mind. The said Sections cast a burden upon the defendant to rebut the presumption. Summary suits instituted on cheques which are dishonoured will, therefore, stand on a higher footing than summary suits instituted on the basis of other documents. In such cases, the Court will have to take into consideration the statutory presumption which is raised when the cheques are dishonoured. The object behind providing a statutory presumption under the N egotiable Instruments Act has to be kept in mind while judging the credibility of a defence raised by the defendant in summary suit. Thus, the test of more than “shadowy” and less than “probable” as adverted to by the Apex Court cannot apply in cases where the law requires a person to explain certain state of affairs. The judgments which are relied upon by the learned counsel do not consider the effect of the statutory presumptions raised under the Negotiable Instruments Act when a cheque is dishonoured. In our opinion, when a cheque is dishonoured, the Court is enjoined with the duty to scrutinize the defence put up by the defendant with a much higher degree of care and circumspection. Such summary suits cannot be treated as on par with the cases instituted on contracts or invoices etc. where such statutory presumptions do not operate.

15] The legislative intent behind enactment of Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to prevent abuse of the banking system. Thus, one who issues a cheque extends a solemn promise to pay. Based on this promise and action, the recipients arrange their affairs and quite often enter into further transactions. Unless extra ordinary circumstances are made out, one who issues cheque is deemed to have undertaken to pay. Negotiable Instruments Act enforces the promise strictly by raising statutory presumption and treating it as an offence. This provision elevates a cheque to a higher status than the other instruments, such as written contract etc. to which no such statutory presumption is attached. What needs to be emphasized is that presumption in respect of a dishonoured cheque places a higher burden on the defendant to elucidate the defence than the burden which is cast on a defendant where the suit is filed on the basis of ordinary instruments. In the cases based on dishonour of cheques, the defendant must satisfy the conscience of the Court and cannot take shelter behind the rules formulated primarily in respect of suits based on ordinary instruments. The Court while exercising the discretion to grant leave or otherwise to the defendant in such cases cannot be oblivious of the legislative intent to place the promise made through a cheque on a higher pedestal than the promise made through an ordinary instrument. This is not to state that moment a Summary Suit is lodged based on a dishonoured cheque, it must be decreed without anything more. What needs to be emphasised is that the fact that there is a statutory presumption attached to the dishonoured cheque will constitute an important ingredient while considering the question whether leave to defend should be granted in cases of dishonoured cheques and the Court must scrutinise the defence strictly. The object of the summary procedure is ultimately to see that the defendant does not needlessly prolong the litigation by creating untenable, frivolous and casual defences so as to deprive the plaintiff of the monies due to him.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before N.J. Jamadar, J.)

Shailesh Bhagoobhai Bhoolabhai Vs  Deepak Raheja.

Summons for Judgment No. 36 of 2021,

Decided on December 15, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCCONLINE Bom 11643.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Under which circumstances defendant is not entitled to get leave to defend the Summary suit qua the interest component?

  Even the endeavor of Mr. Momaya to seek leave to defend by canvassing a submission that plaintiff has charged interest at an exorbitant and unconscionable rate does not advance the cause of the defendant. The plaintiff is seeking pre-suit, pendent lite, and future interest at the agreed rate of 12% per annum. In a business transaction in a commercial city like Mumbai, interest at the rate of 12% per annum can not be said to be exorbitant and unreasonable. Moreover, in the case at hand, there is an unequivocal undertaking to pay interest. In any event the award of interest on the amount covered by dishonoured cheques would be governed by the provisions contained in Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which stipulates rate of 18 % per annum. Therefore, I am not persuaded to accede to the submission on behalf of the defendant to grant leave to defend the suit qua the interest component. {Para 35}

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before N.J. Jamadar, J.)

Shailesh Bhagoobhai Bhoolabhai Vs  Deepak Raheja.

Summons for Judgment No. 36 of 2021,

Decided on December 15, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCCONLINE Bom 11643.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Sunday, 9 June 2024

Bombay HC: The court must award interest on maintenance amount

 The trial Courts are not awarding interest on maintenance amount. There is no any legal ban to award interest on that amount of maintenance. The husbands or fathers are many a times are not depositing the arrears of maintenance for years together. They have no fear or burden to payment of interest on that amount of maintenance. It is a serious legal mischief in mischief. Section 125 of the CrPC does not prohibit to wards maintenance. Therefore, Courts of District Judiciary are expected to award interest on the amount of maintenance, so that these weaker sections of the society will get their maintenance amount expeditiously. It will serve the purpose of speed justice. Thus, in order to secure their rights fully, effectively and speedily which is an object of justice interest must be awarded which is rationally expected. Their amount of maintenance shall not remain in the hands of the other side which deprives them for maximum period from it. Thus, it is now mandatory to award interest on the amount of maintenance for that this judgment shall be circulated to the District Judiciary of Maharashtra.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Revision Application No. 175 of 2023

Decided On: 10.05.2024

Prakash Vs. Vithabai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay A. Deshmukh, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3360/2024.

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Wednesday, 22 May 2024

Whether in claim petition insurance company can be permitted to pay interest from the date it was impleaded as party if it was impleaded at later stage?

Claim petition, in the instant case, was filed and the insurer was arrayed as party at later stage for the simple reason that it was not known to the claimant as to who was the insurer of the offending vehicle. The name of the insurer was disclosed by the insured during the pendency of the claim application and only thereafter the insurer was arrayed as party respondent in the claim petition. Thus, how it can be said that the claimant is not entitled for interest or interest is to be recovered from the owner prior to arraying of the insurer as a party respondent. {Para 6}

7. The purpose of mandate of the Insurance Act, read with the mandate of sections 146 to 149 of the Act, is that the owner is under legal obligation to get the vehicle insured and the purpose of insurance is that third parties, as also the damage caused to the vehicle by the driver, are protected. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the liability of the insurer to pay interest starts from the date of its impleadment as party in the claim petition.

8. It is also well established that a person who is impleaded as party to a lis in terms of Order 1, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, the CPC), he becomes party to the lis right from the date of institution of the lis, and thus, it cannot be claimed that the petition is barred by time and he should be saddled with the liability from the date of impleadment. If that ground was available to the insurer, it should have questioned the impleadment order, which it has not. The insurer has accepted the order of impleadment and has not made any murmur.

12. Thus, from the bare perusal of the above provision, it is clear that section 171 of the Act mandates that the claimant is entitled to interest from the date of filing of the claim petition or from the date of the judgment and not earlier to that. Section 171 of the Act nowhere provides that in case a party is arrayed in the claim petition at a subsequent date, that party has to be saddled with the interest from the date of impleadment and not prior to that. Having said so, no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, the impugned award is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

F.A.O. No. 215 of 2008

Decided On: 07.08.2015

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Manohar Lal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mansoor Ahmad Mir, C.J.

Citation: 2016 ACJ 1612 (HP), MANU/HP/1387/2015.

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Monday, 29 April 2024

Supreme Court: Motor accident claim tribunal should grant interest on compensation at the rate 7.5%

The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court. {Para 13}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 4079-4081 of 2019 

Decided On: 23.04.2019

National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Manohar Sapre and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.

Author: Dinesh Maheshwari, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0589/2019.

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Sunday, 17 September 2023

Whether high court can direct husband to pay interest towards the price of ornament to wife if he is ready to return ornament as per order of family court?

The Family Court in its judgment and order dated 9.10.1995 did not grant any interest on the said sum of Rs. 3,25,655/-. An alternative, decree was only passed to the effect that the Respondent would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,25,655/- in the event, the ornaments are not returned to the Respondent by the Appellant herein. {Para 23}

24. A decree in the nature of mandatory injunction directing a party to the suit to deliver certain movable property in favour of the Appellant cannot be equated with a decree for payment of a specified sum.

26. The question of the Appellant's paying the price of the ornaments' value at Rs. 3,25,655/- together with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the decree of the Family Court dated 9.10.1995 could have been the subject- matter of the Execution Petition only if the Appellant did not return the same to the Respondent within a reasonable time. The High Court did not interfere with the judgment of the Family Court to the effect that the Respondent was entitled to get back all the ornaments except the fact that in case the said ornaments or articles are not returned by him, he will have to pay interest on the price thereof. Thus, the question of payment of interest would have arisen only in the event of the Appellant's failure to return the ornaments to the Respondent.

29. Thus, the direction upon the Appellant to return the ornaments is not concomitant with the order to pay the price thereof. The second direction was, thus, a conditional one which comes into operation only upon non- fulfillment of the first direction. Thus, by reason of the first direction no decree to pay interest on a specified sum was passed. In that view of the matter, if no occasion had arisen for paying the aforementioned sum of Rs. 3,25,655/-, the question of paying any interest thereupon would not arise.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1780 of 2005.

Decided On: 16.03.2005

Ramesh Chand Daga  Vs.  Rameshwari Bai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Singh and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Author: S.B. Sinha, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0210/2005

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Saturday, 25 March 2023

Whether Husband is Entitled To TDS Credit On Interest Earned From Amount Gifted To His Wife?


A careful perusal of sub-rule (2) indicates that where the

income, on which tax has been deducted at source, is assessable in the hands of a person other than deductee, then credit for the

proportionate tax deducted at source shall be given to such other

person and not the deductee. The proviso to sub-rule (2) provides

for deductee filing a declaration with the deductor giving

particulars of the other person to whom credit is to be given. On

receipt of such declaration, the deductor shall issue certificate for

the deduction of tax at source in the name of such other person.

The crux of section 199 read with Rule 37BA(2) is that if the

income, on which tax has been deducted at source, is chargeable

to tax in the hands of the recipient, then credit for such tax will be allowed to such recipient. If, however, the income is fully or

partly chargeable to tax in the hands of some other person because of the operation of any provision, like section 64 in the extant case, the proportionate credit for tax deducted at source should be allowed to such other person who is chargeable to tax in respect of such income, notwithstanding the fact that he is not the recipient of income. It is with a view to regularise the allowing of credit for tax deducted at source to the person other than recipient of income, that the proviso to Rule 37BA(2) has been enshrined necessitating the furnishing of particulars of such other person by the recipient for enabling the deductor to issue TDS certificate in the name of the other person. The proviso to Rule 37BA(2) is just a procedural aspect of giving effect to the mandate of section 199 for allowing credit to the other person in whose hands the income is chargeable to tax. The entire purpose of this exercise of allowing credit to the other person is to ensure that the benefit of tax deducted at source is availed once and that too, by the right person, who is chargeable to tax in respect of such income. It is just to streamline the procedure for giving effect to this intent and rule out the possibility of taking any inappropriate credit for the amount of tax deducted at source, firstly, by the recipient who is not chargeable to tax and secondly, by the person who is rightly chargeable to tax in respect of such income, that the procedural provision has been put in place in Rule 37BA(2). One needs to draw a line of distinction between substantive provision [section 199 read with Rule 37BA(2) without proviso] and the procedural provision [proviso to Rule 37BA(2)]. Non-compliance of a procedural provision, which is otherwise directory in nature, cannot disturb the writ of a substantive provision. {Para 6}

7. Adverting to the facts of the extant case, it is seen that out of

total interest income credited to assessee’s wife as per Form

No.26AS amounting to Rs.39.26 lakh, she included interest from

SBI in her total income to the extent of Rs.1,84,212/-. The

assessee included the remaining interest of Rs.37.42 lakh in his

income because of the applicability of section 64 of the Act. The

assesse and his wife claimed proportionate tax credit, which totals

up to Rs.2,94,474/-. This deciphers that the total interest income

received by the assessee’s wife got taxed partly in her own

assessment and partly in the assessment of her husband, the

assessee in question, as per the mandate of section 64. The

benefit of TDS has also been claimed accordingly. Merely

because the assessee’s wife did not furnish declaration to the bank

in terms of proviso to Rule 37BA(2), the amount of tax deducted

at source, which is otherwise with the Department, cannot be

allowed to remain with it eternally without allowing any

corresponding credit to the person who has been subjected to tax

in respect of such income. As the substantive provision of section

199 talks of granting credit for tax deducted at source to the other

person, who is lawfully taxable in respect of such income, we are

satisfied that the matching credit for tax deducted at source must

also be allowed to him. In view of the fact that the tax of

Rs.2,80,656/- has actually been deducted at source on the interest

income of Rs.37.42 lakh, we hold that the credit for such TDS

should be allowed to the assessee, who has been subjected to tax

in respect of such income. This ground is allowed.

 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

PUNE BENCH, ‘A’ PUNE

BEFORE SHRI R.S. SYAL, VICE PRESIDENT AND

SHRI S.S. VISWANETHRA RAVI, JUDICIAL MEMBER

आयकर अपील सं.

/ ITA No.675/PUN/2022

नधारण वष / Assessment Year : 2021-22

Anil Ratanlal Bohora, Vs. ACIT, Circle-1, Nashik


आदेश / ORDER

PER R.S. SYAL, VP :

Date of pronouncement 19-01-2023

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Sunday, 19 February 2023

Supreme Court directs all Court/Tribunals to deposit money in banks if Pay Order, Demand Draft, Banker’s Cheque, etc. were deposited with it without seeking any order

 Before parting with this case, this court is of the opinion that all courts and judicial forums should frame guidelines in cases where amounts are deposited with the office / registry of the court / tribunal, that such amounts should mandatorily be deposited in a bank or some financial institution, to ensure that no loss is caused in the future. Such guidelines should also cover situations where the concerned litigant merely files the instrument (Pay Order, Demand Draft, Banker’s Cheque, etc.) without seeking any order, so as to avoid situations like the present case. These guidelines should be embodied in the form of appropriate rules, or regulations of each court, tribunal, commission, authority, agency, etc. exercising adjudicatory power. {Para 35}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1401 & 4530 OF 2019; 

K.L. SUNEJA & ANR.Vs DR. (MRS.) MANJEET KAUR MONGA (D) THROUGH HER LR & ANR.

Coram: M.R. SHAH; J., S. RAVINDRA BHAT; J.

Author: S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

Dated: JANUARY 31, 2023

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Saturday, 31 December 2022

Bombay HC: 9% is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in motor accident compensation cases

  The Tribunal awarded an interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of application till its realization and I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel to the effect that the interest ought to have awarded @ 9% p.a., which is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in case of compensation to be payable for motor accidents and the Apex Court in case of Kaushnuma Begum & Ors. Vs. New India Assurance Co., MANU/SC/0002/2001 : 2001 (1) SCR 8, has observed that 9% is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in motor accident compensation cases. Perusal of the latest decision of the Apex Court in case of Parvinder Singh (supra), the compensation is awarded with interest @ 9%.

{Para 21}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here


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Friday, 26 August 2022

When claimant is entitled to get interest on solatium under The Land acquisition Act?

  In paragraph 54 of the judgment in Gurpreet Singh (supra), the above issue was considered specifically in the context of the earlier decision in Sunder vs. Union of India., (2001) 7 SCC 211. Dealing with the issue, Justice P K Balasubramanyan speaking for the Constitution Bench observed thus:

“54….….That question is whether in the light of the decision in Sunder (2001) 7 SCC 211 : 2001 Supp (3) SCR 176], the awardee/decree-holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had been made and the same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication by the judgment or decree of the Reference Court or of the appellate court, the execution court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on solatium based on Sunder [(2001) 7 SCC 211 : 2001 Supp (3) SCR 176] on the ground that the execution court cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of the Reference Court or that of the appellate court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the Reference Court or the appellate court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it would be open to the execution court to apply the ratio ofSunder [(2001) 7 SCC 211 : 2001 Supp (3) SCR 176] and say that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an event interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and not in closed executions and the execution court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder [(2001) 7 SCC 211 : 2001 Supp (3) SCR 176] (19-9- 2001) and not for any prior period. We also clarify that this will not entail any reappropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of our power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this question.”(emphasis supplied)

8. The test which Gurpreet Singh (supra) mandates is that interest on solatium would be payable if the reference court has either not referred to it or has not rejected it expressly or by necessary implication. Moreover, the claim can only be made in pending execution proceedings.  {Para 7}

Supreme Court of India

Civil Appeal No 94 of 2021

Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. Abdul Salam Sarkar and Others

Coram: JUSTICE Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud JUSTICE Sanjiv Khanna

Author: Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.

Dated: 13th January 2021

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 22.

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Saturday, 23 April 2022

Whether interim order ends if the proceeding in which stay is granted is dismissed?

  From the above discussion, it is clear that imposition of a stay on the operation of an order means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order. However, it does not mean that the stayed order is wiped out from the existence, unless it is quashed. Once the proceedings, wherein a stay was granted, are dismissed, any interim order granted earlier merges with the final order. In other words, the interim order comes to an end with the dismissal of the proceedings. In such a situation, it is the duty of the Court to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim order of the court, unless the order granting interim stay or final order dismissing the proceedings specifies otherwise. On the dismissal of the proceedings or vacation of the interim order, the beneficiary of the interim order shall have to pay interest on the amount withheld or not paid by virtue of the interim order. {Para 24}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2417 OF 2022 

 STATE OF U.P. THR. SECRETARY AND ORS. Vs PREM CHOPRA

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Whether a party should pay interest on the amount payable by him which he has not paid due to stay order after the dismissal of that proceeding?

When the interim order was in force, the recovery of license fee was temporarily suspended. The restraint was only against the Department not to recover the license fee. There was no prohibition for the respondent to deposit the balance of license fee. {Para 18}

24. From the above discussion, it is clear that imposition of a stay on the operation of an order means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order. However, it does not mean that the stayed order is wiped out from the existence, unless it is quashed. Once the proceedings, wherein a stay was granted, are dismissed, any interim order granted earlier merges with the final order. In other words, the interim order comes to an end with the dismissal of the proceedings. In such a situation, it is the duty of the Court to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim order of the court, unless the order granting interim stay or final order dismissing the proceedings specifies otherwise. On the dismissal of the proceedings or vacation of the interim order, the beneficiary of the interim order shall have to pay interest on the amount withheld or not paid by virtue of the interim order. 


25. Coming to the facts of the present case, the respondent was not successful in his challenge to the notice dated 06.01.2003 demanding the balance of license fee before the Authorities under the Act. Therefore, he filed the writ petition bearing Misc. Single No.2582 of 2003 before the High Court wherein the High Court, by an interim order, stayed the recovery of the monthly instalment of license fee for the months January 2003 to March 2003, subject to deposit of Rs.2,75,000/within a period of six weeks before the District Excise Officer. It is not disputed that this amount of Rs.2,75,000/was deposited by the respondent. The said writ petition was dismissed by the High Court for nonprosecution vide Order dated 21.12.2015. On 23.12.2017, the respondent deposited the remaining amount of Rs.3,68,562/towards license fee. However, the respondent did not make payment of interest to the Department. The writ petition was restored on 19.01.2018. In the meantime, the appellants issued a notice calling upon the respondent to pay Rs.10,08,210.51/towards interest due. The High Court held that the respondent was not liable to pay interest as he was under the protection of the interim order. Given the settled position of law, in our view the High Court has erred in holding that the respondent was not liable to pay interest due to the protection given under the interim order.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2417 OF 2022 

 STATE OF U.P. THR. SECRETARY AND ORS. Vs PREM CHOPRA

Coram: S. ABDUL NAZEER; VIKRAM NATH; JJ. 

Author: S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.

Dated: March 25, 2022 

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Monday, 7 February 2022

Can a party challenge interest awarded by arbitrator U/S 34 of arbitration Act if there is no prohibition for granting an interest in an arbitration agreement?

 The contention that the arbitral award is vitiated as the

Arbitral Tribunal has awarded exorbitant interest is equally

unmerited. The Arbitral Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 12%per annum. The same cannot be considered by any stretch of imagination as exorbitant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited (PUNSUP) and Anr. v Ganpati Rice Mills: SLP (C) 36655 of 2016, decided on 20.10.2021, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal has wide discretion in awarding interest under Section 31(7)(a) of the A&C Act and the impugned award cannot be interfered with except on the ground as set out in Section 34 of the A&C Act. {Para 20}

21. There is no provision in the Agreement which prohibits

award of interest. Thus, the decision in Jaiprakash Associates

Ltd. Through Its Director v. Tehri Hydero Development

Corporation India Ltd. Through Its Director (supra) is clearly

inapplicable. In that case, the challenge to the arbitral award was

sustained as the contract between the parties prohibited grant of

any interest. Clearly, award of interest contrary to the express

terms of the agreement between the parties would be susceptible

to challenge under Section 34 of the A&C Act. But since there is

no agreement proscribing award of interest, the award of interest cannot be faulted.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 O.M.P. (COMM) 432/2019 and IA Nos. 14333/2019,

NATIONAL SEEDS CORPORATION LTD Vs NATIONAL AGRO SEEDS CORPORATION

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

 Date of Decision: 05.01.2022

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Wednesday, 29 December 2021

Whether arbitrator should grant interest pendente lite contrary to agreement between the parties?

Having regard to the above, we are of the view that the High Court was justified in rejecting the claim of the appellant seeking pendente lite interest on the award amount. {Para 18}

19. This takes us to the next question as to whether Clause 17 of the Contract is ultra vires in terms of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. According to Section 28, a contract is void to the extent it restricts absolutely a party from enforcing his rights by usual proceedings in ordinary courts or if it limits the time within which he may enforce his rights. Exception I to this section contains a rule that a contract by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which has arisen or which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration is not illegal. The question, therefore, is whether the contracts barring payment of interest extinguish the rights of the parties. Exception 1 to Section 28 reads as under :
“Exception 1: Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may arise. – This section shall not render illegal a contract, by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the amount awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred.”

20. Exception I to Section 28 saves contracts where the right to move the Court for appropriate relief is restricted but where the parties have agreed to resolve their dispute through arbitration. Thus, a lawful agreement to refer the matter to arbitration can be made a condition precedent before going to courts and it does not violate Section 28. No cause of action then accrues until the Arbitrator has made the award and the only amount awarded in such arbitration is recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred. Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act which allows parties to waive any claim to interest including pendente lite and the power of the Arbitrator to grant interest is subject to the agreement of the parties.

21. It is pertinent to note that interest payments are governed in general by the Interest Act, 1978 in addition to the specific statutes that govern an impugned matter. Section 2 (a) of the Interest Act defines a “Court” which includes both a Tribunal and an Arbitrator. In turn, Section 3 allows a “Court” to grant interest at prevailing interest rates in various cases. The provisions of Section 3 (3) of the Interest Act, 1978 explicitly allows the parties to waive their claim to an interest by virtue of an agreement. Section 3(3)(a)(ii) states that the Interest Act will not apply to situations where the payment of interest is “barred by virtue of an express agreement”.

22. Thus, when there is an express statutory permission for the parties to contract out of receiving interest and they have done so without any vitiation of free consent, it is not open for the Arbitrator to grant pendent lite interest. We are of the considered opinion that Clause 17 of the contract is not ultra vires in terms of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

                      Supreme Court

JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER JUSTICE KRISHNA MURARI

GARG BUILDERS Vs. BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6216 OF 2021

4th October 2021

Author: S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR 2191

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