Showing posts with label onus of proof. Show all posts
Showing posts with label onus of proof. Show all posts

Sunday, 21 May 2023

Under which circumstances onus of proof is on defendant to prove Adverse possession?

 It is trite law that once the title of the property has been upheld namely a finding has been recorded by a judgment and decree in the name of plaintiff in an earlier suit, in such circumstances, the onus to prove acquisition by adverse possession lay on the defendant. This proposition gets support from the judgment of this court in Saroop Singh Vs. Banto and Others (2005) 8 SCC 330. It states:

“28. The statutory provisions of the Limitation Act have undergone a change when compared to the terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1908, in terms whereof it was imperative upon the plaintiff not only to prove his title but also to prove his possession within twelve years, preceding the date of institution of the suit. However, a change in legal position has been effected in view of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the instant case, the plaintiff-respondents have proved their title and, thus, it was for the first defendant to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession. As noticed hereinbefore, the first defendant-appellant did not raise any plea of adverse possession. In that view of the matter the suit was not barred.’

8. In the present case, the title of the property has been decreed in the name of Mudegowda vide order dated 10.09.1987 passed in O.S. No. 22 of 1986 and thus there was no requirement for the deceased respondent to establish possession prior to the institution of the suit. It is apt and appropriate to note at this juncture that appellants herein had failed to establish that they were in possession of the suit schedule property to claim the relief of adverse possession.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5217 of 2011.

PRASANNA AND OTHERS Vs MUDEGOWDA (D) BY LRS.

Coram: RAJESH BINDAL; J., ARAVIND KUMAR; J. 

Author: Aravind Kumar, J.

Dated:  April 27, 2023

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Sunday, 15 January 2023

Can the plaintiff get possession of the suit property if the defendants fail to prove their title over the suit property?

In the above factual background, for the Plaintiff to succeed, she has to establish that she has a legal title to the Schedule 'A' property, and consequently, is entitled to a decree of possession. The Defendants cannot be dispossessed unless the Plaintiff has established a better title and rights over the Schedule 'A' property. A person in possession of land in the assumed character as the owner, and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership, has a legal right against the entire world except the rightful owner.9 A decree of possession cannot be passed in favour of the Plaintiff on the ground that Defendant Nos. 1 to 12 have not been able to fully establish their right, title and interest in the Schedule 'A' property. The Defendants, being in possession, would be entitled to protect and save their possession, unless the person who seeks to dispossess them has a better legal right in the form of ownership or entitlement to possession. {Para 30}


31. The burden of proof10 to establish a title in the present case lies upon the Plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims relief11. This is mandated in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which states that burden on proving the fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not on the party which is denying it. This Rule may not be universal and has exceptions13, but in the factual background of the present case, the general principle is applicable. In terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail.15 Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the Plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the Defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title.16 The weakness of the defence cannot be a justification to decree the suit.17 The Plaintiff could have succeeded in respect of the Schedule 'A' property if she had discharged the burden to prove the title to the Schedule 'A' property which squarely falls on her. This would be the true effect of Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act.18 Therefore, it follows that the Plaintiff should have satisfied and discharged the burden under the provisions of the Evidence Act, failing which the suit would be liable to be dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 878 of 2009

Smriti Debbarma (Dead) through Legal Representative Vs. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjiv Khanna and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.

Author: Sanjiv Khanna, J.

Decided On: 04.01.2023.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0010/2023

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Saturday, 23 April 2022

How to appreciate evidence in suit for recovery of money for supply of goods to government department?

 The plaintiff has filed affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC reiterating the plaint averment saying that he has supplied the material to the Block Development Officer Farasgaon valued at Rs. 61,464/-. In the cross examination he has admitted that no order has been issued in his favour for supply of material. It has stated that as per document (Ex.P-4) he was directed to supply material, which was supplied by him and additional to that order supply was demanded which he has provided and receipt has been obtained. He has also stated that he has no knowledge whether the material supplied to the defendants has been mentioned in the stock register or not. He has reiterated that for supply of goods two cheques of Rs. 20,000/- and 40,000/- have been issued on 14.07.2000, but the said cheques were not honoured and returned unpaid due to insufficient fund in the account on 10.01.2001. He has further admitted that he has filed a complaint before Chief Judicial Magistrate under section 138 of Negotiate Instruments Act which was dismissed for want of prosecution. {Para 6}

7. The defendants have examined in their support Devi Prasad Rai, Principal Govt. Higher Secondary School Farasgaon and BEO Farasgaon who has deposed in his examination-in-chief that tender is called when purchase of material is valued more than twenty thousand and tender will be allotted to the lowest quoted persons. As per office of Block Education Officer there is no mention about payment to plaintiff in cash or through cheque, if any material is received in the office then it has to be mentioned in the stock register. He has further stated that plaintiff has not given any bill to Block Education Officer, Farasgaon and purchase order has not been issued by the office. The witness was cross examined and in the cross examination he has denied that any order was given to the plaintiff. He has also denied that cheque (Ex.P-5) has been issued from the office. He has denied that plaintiff

is entitled to get interest on the some dues and he has stated that since no record is available in the office he has given this statement.

It is well settled legal position, that the genuineness of the document has to be proved by the plaintiff who relies upon the document and thereafter it is for the defendants to dislodge the

credibility of the document as fake, sham and bogus document. In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the work order was issued in his favour and genuineness of the challan has also not been proved. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to examine the witnesses who has delivered the goods and thereafter the concerning officer has put his signature on the challan, no witnesses was examined by the plaintiff in his support. It is well settled practice in the government department that supply order is always made in writing but no

work order has been placed by the plaintiff before the trial Court. 

19. In the light of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering the fact that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he has supplied the material despite this, the learned trial Court has held that plaintiff has supplied material to the defendants and he is entitled to receive Rs. 60,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from 2004 till the payment is actual made is perverse, contrary to record and deserves to be set aside by this Court.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

FA No. 120 of 2007

State of Chhattisgarh  Vs M/s. Hindustan Supply Agency, 


Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas

Judgment Delivered on 20/04/2022

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Tuesday, 31 December 2019

Delhi HC: A party upon whom onus lies to prove an issue cannot be permitted to fill lacunae in his own evidence by leading rebuttal evidence

A perusal of the impugned order shows that the only reason given by the Trial Court is that the question of rebuttal evidence arises after the Defendant's evidence is concluded and that the Bank must get a fair opportunity to disprove the facts.

16. The approach of the Trial Court is clearly erroneous. The Bank has been aware of the case of Defendant No. 2 right from inception i.e. from the written statement as also the expert report of Mr. Deepak Jain which was placed on record. The Bank's witness clearly admitted that Defendant No. 1 was guilty of forgery of documents with various other banks. With such knowledge at hand, the primary obligation to prove that the documents are genuine is that of the Bank and not of Defendant No. 2. The onus of the main issue i.e. the issue to prove that the Bank is entitled for recovery, is on the Bank and not on Defendant No. 2. Under Order XVIII Rule 3 CPC, the Plaintiff would only be entitled to rebuttal evidence if the onus is on the opposite side. The onus in respect of issue framed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is on Defendant No. 2, however, the said issue is a general issue-that there is no cause of action. The Bank has to first discharge the onus that the documents which form the basis of the suit are genuine and the signatures are not forged. For that purpose, the Bank always had the opportunity to, produce the documents relating to the first Honda City loan availed of by Defendant No. 2 and compare the same with the signatures on the second application to see if the signatures on the second set of documents were forged or were genuine. Even when PW-1 appeared in the witness box, he had already perused the report of Mr. Deepak Jain. At that stage, the Bank knew that Defendant No. 2 is leading the evidence of an expert. There was no reason as to why the Bank could not have adduced evidence of an expert at that stage. Clearly, the Bank waited for the expert of Defendant No. 2 to be cross-examined and lead his evidence. In fact, even DW-3-Deepak Jain was initially not cross-examined, but vide order dated 28th March, 2018, upon costs being imposed, leave was granted. The first application seeking the same relief was already rejected on 28th March, 2018. A fair chance cannot mean that the Bank can have an indefinite chance to prove its case. There is no doubt that even without reserving right to lead rebuttal evidence, the Plaintiff could have been permitted to lead rebuttal evidence provided the basic onus was on Defendant No. 2. However, in this case, the onus to prove that the loan was availed of and that recovery can be sought by the Bank was on the Bank and not on Defendant No. 2. The question of granting permission to lead rebuttal evidence thus, does not arise. As held in Suman Kapoor (supra), rebuttal evidence can be permitted only if the onus is on the opposite side on a particular issue. The observation of the Court is as under:

"6. Perusal of the Rule 1, 2 and 3 of Order XVIII CPC would show that the plaintiff has a right to begin unless defendant admits the fact, hence state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues he is bound to prove. Under Rule 3 out of the several issues if the burden to prove some issue lies on other party, then the party can begin at his option, either produce his evidence on these issues or reserve it by way of answer to the evidence produced by the other party and I the latter case, the party beginning may produce the evidence. However, there is no provision in the CPC which permits the party to lead evidence later on even on an issue onus of which lies on it."

17. Under these circumstances, for the reason that the Bank has utterly failed in leading evidence in the first place and is only trying to fill up lacunae by seeking rebuttal evidence and also due to the fact that a similar relief was sought earlier and was rejected by the Trial Court on 28th March, 2018, the impugned order is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CM (M) 1457/2019, CM Appls. 44339 and 44340/2019

Decided On: 10.12.2019

Hemant Kumar Singhal  Vs. Indian Overseas Bank and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Prathiba M. Singh, J.

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Saturday, 1 June 2019

Supreme Court: Difference between Article 64 and Article 65 of Limitation Act

Both articles 64 and 65 are rules of limitation, the only difference being that in the former the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove his dispossession within 12 years while in the latter it is for the defendant to prove when his possession became adverse.
Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908) is restricted to suits for possession on dispossession or discontinuance of possession. In order to bring a suit within the purview of that article, it must be shown that the suit is in terms as well as in substance based on the allegation of the plaintiff having been in possession and having subsequently lost the possession either by dispossession or by discontinuance. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908) on the other hand is a residuary article applying to suits for possession not otherwise provided for. Suits based on plaintiffs' title in which there is no allegation of prior possession and subsequent dispossession alone can fall within article 65. The question whether the article of limitation applicable to a particular suit is article 64 or article 65 has to be decided by reference to pleadings. The plaintiff cannot invoke article 65 by suppressing material facts. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5864 of 1999

Decided On: 10.08.2004

Ramiah Vs. N. Narayana Reddy (Dead) by Lrs.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Ashok Bhan and S.H. Kapadia, JJ.

Citation: 2004 AIR SCW 4695
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Monday, 29 April 2019

Notes on Burden of proof (S 101-111 of Evidence Act)

The word "burden of proof" has not been defined in Indian Evidence Act. Burden of proof  in simple words means responsibility to prove a fact in a case or obligation to prove a fact.

Principles of burden of proof are mentioned below:
a) Onus probandi means burden of proof. Generally a party who alleges affirmative has to prove it.
b) Factum probans is proving the fact.

The phrase"burden of proof" has two distinct meanings:

1) The burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading-The burden as it has been called of establishing a case. This burden rests upon the party whether plaintiff or defendant who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue.It is fixed at the beginning of trial by statements of pleading, and it is settled as a question of law,remaining unchanged under any circumstances whatever.This rule is embodied in S 101.
2)The burden of proof as matter of adducing evidence - The burden of proof in this sense is always unstable,and may shift constantly throughout the trial.This aspect of burden of proof is contained in S 102.It lies at first on the party who would be unsuccessful if no evidence at all was given on either side.This being the  test,burden of proof cannot remain constant,but must shift as soon as he produces evidence which prima facie gives rise to a presumption in his favour.

Difference between burden of proof and onus of proof: Burden of proof lies on the person who has to prove a fact and  it never shifts,but onus of proof shifts.Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence.

Read important Judgments on Burden of proof : Click here
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Saturday, 22 December 2018

Whether defendant is bound to prove plea of limitation if he has raised it ?

Next submission on the issue of limitation raised by Mr. Patwardhan is that in view of the positive assertion by defendant No. 3 in affidavit filed before this Court that claims made by the plaintiff are barred by law of limitation, defendant No. 3 was bound to lead oral evidence to prove such positive assertion made in the affidavit and not having led any oral evidence, this Court shall draw adverse inference against the third defendant. In my view, the initial onus to prove that suit was filed within time was on the plaintiff and thus, plaintiff was required to lead his evidence first on the issue of limitation. Since plaintiff has failed to discharge that initial onus cast on him to prove that suit filed by the plaintiff was within time, onus of proof is not shifted to defendant No. 3.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Suit No. 808 of 2011

Decided On: 18.10.2013

 Naresh Lachmandas Aswani  Vs. Haridas and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.D. Dhanuka, J.

Citation: 2016(4) ALLMR 286
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Wednesday, 1 November 2017

Whether burden of proof to prove legal necessity is on purchaser of property?

There is no debate before us that the impugned sale can be upheld if it is for legal necessity and not otherwise. It is admitted position that burden in this respect lies on the purchasers i.e., defendants who are the respondents before us.
Accordingly, We record our findings on the points for determination framed supra. The material on record does not show any inquiry conducted by the respondents before us about the legal necessity felt by Trimbakrao for the sale of kh. No. 10 ad-measuring 20.69 acres of mouza Kheda, Tah. Warora Distr. Chandrapur on 20.10.1951 vide sale-deed at Ex. 44. Such an inquiry into alleged legal necessity should have been prior to the obtaining the sale-deed Ex. 44 and evidence about it can not be adduced for the first time in a suit filed by the appellants' vide Special Civil Suit No. 33 of 1971. It also follows that here the sale of kh. No. 10 is not proved to be of an agricultural land which could not have been cultivated profitably or then to avoid any legislation. In any case, such a sale in present facts can not be construed as one for legal necessity. The burden to prove the existence of the legal necessity always continued on the purchaser respondents,
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Letters Patent Appeal No. 28/1991 in First Appeal No. 133/1976

Decided On: 31.03.2017

 Shrikant and Ors. Vs. Natthu Maroti Shivarkar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.P. Dharmadhikari and Swapna Joshi, JJ.
Citation 2017(4) MHLJ 591

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Sunday, 29 October 2017

Privy council :Landmark judgment on burden of proof and onus of proof

What is called the burden of proof on the pleadings should not be confused with the burden of adducing evidence which is described as "shifting." The burden of proof on the pleadings never shifts, it always remains constant see Pickup v. Thames Insurance Co. (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 594. These two aspects of the burden of proof are embodied in Sections 101 and 102 respectively of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 101 states: Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

26. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any "fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person." Section 102 states: "The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side." This section shows that the initial burden of proving a prima facie case in his favour is cast on the plaintiff; when he gives such evidence as will support a prima facie case, the onus shifts on to the defendant to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case made out by the plaintiff. As the case continues to develop the onus may shift back again to the plaintiff. It is not easy to decide at what particular stage in the course of the evidence the onus shifts from one side to the other. When, after the entire evidence is adduced, the tribunal feels it cannot make up its mind as to which of the versions is true, it will hold that the party on whom the burden lies has not discharged the burden; but if it has on the evidence no difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion, then the burden of proof on the pleadings recedes into the background.

27. How the above rules relating to onus operate in a case is thus described by Lord Dunedin in Robins v. National Trust Co. Ld. (1927) A.C. 515, 520: "Their Lordships cannot help thinking that the appellant takes rather a wrong view of what is truly the function of the question of onus in such cases. Onus is always on a person who asserts a proposition or fact which is not self-evident. To assert that a man who is alive was born requires no proof. The onus is not on the person making the assertion, because it is self-evident that he had been born. But to assert that he was born on a certain date, if the date is material, requires proof; the onus is on the person making the assertion. Now, in conducting any inquiry, the determining tribunal, be it judge or jury, will often find that the onus is sometimes on the side of one contending party, sometimes on the side of the other, or as it is often expressed, that in certain circumstances the onus shifts. But onus as a determining factor of the whole case can only arise if the tribunal finds the evidence pro and con so evenly balanced that it can come to no such conclusion. Then the onus will determine the matter. But if the tribunal, after hearing and weighing the evidence, comes to a determinate conclusion, the onus has nothing to do with it, and need not be further considered."
BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Decided On: 14.06.1949

Kumbham Lakshmanna and Ors. Vs. Tangirala Venkateswarlu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Porter, Mac Dermott, Madhavan Nair and John Beaumont, JJ.
Citation: AIR (36) 1 949 Privy Council 278

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Tuesday, 11 October 2016

Leading judgment on burden of proof and onus of proof

 There cannot be any quarrel about the legal proposition canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the best available evidence should be placed before the Court. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that though the petitioners have discharged their initial burden that the shop premises were closed from road-side and were not in use, the onus should shift to the defendant-tenant to show that the shop was actually in use. The principle of burden of proof is based on the rule i.e. incumbent probation qui dicit, non qui negat to mean that the burden of proving a fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue and not upon the party who denies it; for a negative is usually incapable of proof. In the present case, the plaintiffs came out with a specific pleading that on termination of the ration shop, the defendant-tenant closed the shop from front but used it for an illegal purpose i.e. for running a matka den. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs could not lead any evidence to show that the defendant-tenant was using the premises for illegal purpose as pleaded. The defendant-tenant has not only denied this fact but has in terms led evidence to show that he was running his business. It has further come on record that the defendant-tenant found that the ration shop was not profitable and he was not successful in carrying on with the grocery business and so he has changed his business to selling of medicine drugs in retail. To the action brought by the plaintiff-landlords that they are entitled to seek eviction of the defendant-tenant as contemplated under Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act, the plaintiffs ought to have discharged their burden as it is a settled principle of the Law of Evidence that if no evidence is given by the party on whom the burden is cast, the issue must be found against him. The facts and circumstances placed on record by the defendant-tenant clearly indicate that he has been successful in rebutting the prima facie case made out by the plaintiffs. Further on the principle enunciated in Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, it can be said that the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the doctrine of onus of proof as it is a settled law that the plaintiff should stand on his own legs and merely because the defendant is unable to produce certain documents for which he has given a plausible explanation and even if this explanation is not accepted, still it does not dislodge the defendant-tenant as he has otherwise produced sufficient documents of the period in question to show that he was doing business in the premises and the premises were in use for the said purpose.
Bombay High Court
Laxmibai Ramji (Since Deceased) ... vs Khimji Palan (Since Deceased) By ... on 3 August, 2000
Citation: AIR 2001 Bom 3

Bench: J Patel
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Friday, 9 September 2016

Whether onus of proof that suit was barred by law of limitation will be on defendant?

  I   am   thus   not   inclined   to   accept   submission   of   Mr   Patwardhan,
learned counsel for the plaintiff that onus of proof that suit was barred by law of
limitation   was   on   the   defendant   and   the   defendant   ought   to   have   laid   his

evidence first before the plaintiff would have examine his witness in support of
his plea that suit is within time and not barred by law of limitation.    
56. In so far as submission of Mr Patwardhan that since the defendant did
not lead his evidence on the issue of limitation, defendant cannot say that suit be
dismissed on the ground of limitation, merely on the basis of cross examination
of the plaintiff's witness is concerned, Mr Subramanian, learned senior counsel
appearing for defendant No.3, in my view is right in placing reliance on the
Judgment  of  this   Court  delivered  by  R.D.Dhanuka,J.,on  8th  January  2013  in
Arbitration Petition No.556 of 2012 in case of  Zee Entertainment Enterprises
Ltd.   (supra) and in particular paragraphs 20 and 22 of the said Judgment in
which it has been held that if witness examined by the party in cross examination
admitted the liability to the other party, such other party having proved his claim
by cross examination is not liable to examine any witness. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION 
SUIT NO. 808 OF 2011
Naresh Lachmandas Aswani  

Vs
  Haridas alias Hardas Lachmandas
     
     CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
    
    Dated : 18th OCTOBER, 2013

Citation: 2016(4) ALLMR 286
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Friday, 12 August 2016

Leading Supreme Court Judgment on onus of proof

In the first place, the High Court has misplaced the onus of proof, as will appear from the conclusion just quoted above. The onus of proof loses much of its importance where both the parties have adduced their evidence. But the High Court seems to have laid some emphasis on onus of proof, with a view to examining for itself whether that onus had been discharged by the contesting defandant, the deity. 
Supreme Court of India
Pares Nath Thakur vs Smt. Mohani Dasi And Others on 12 May, 1959
Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 1204, 1960 SCR (1) 271


BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.

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Wednesday, 2 December 2015

When architects are liable to pay damages for their professional negligence?

Regarding the duty of an architect Windeyer J said in Voli v Inglewood Shire Council
(1963) 110 CLR 74 at 84:
An architect undertaking any work in the way of his profession accepts the
ordinary liabilities of any man who follows a skilled calling. He is bound to
exercise due care, skill and diligence. He is not required to have an
extraordinary degree of skill or the highest professional attainments. But he
must bring to the task he undertakes the competence and skill that is usual
among architects practising their profession. And he must use due care. If he
fails in these matters and the person who employed him thereby suffers
damage, he is liable to that person. This liability can be said to arise either
from a breach of his contract or in tort.22
[52] I have considered sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Civil Liability Act 2003. These
sections provide:-
9 General principles
(1) A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of
harm unless—
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the
person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of
the person would have taken the precautions.
(2) In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken
precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the
following (among other relevant things)—
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not
taken;
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm;
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;
(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.
10 Other principles
In a proceeding relating to liability for breach of duty happening on or
after 2 December 2002—
(a) the burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of harm
includes the burden of taking precautions to avoid similar
risks of harm for which the person may be responsible; and
(b) the fact that a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing
something in a different way does not of itself give rise to or
affect liability for the way in which the thing was done; and
(c) the subsequent taking of action that would (had the action
been taken earlier) have avoided a risk of harm does not of
itself give rise to or affect liability in relation to the risk and
does not of itself constitute an admission of liability in
connection with the risk.
11 General principles
(1) A decision that a breach of duty caused particular harm comprises the
following elements—23
(a) the breach of duty was a necessary condition of the
occurrence of the harm (factual causation);
(b) it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of the person in
breach to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability).
(2) In deciding in an exceptional case, in accordance with established
principles, whether a breach of duty—being a breach of duty that is
established but which can not be established as satisfying subsection
(1)(a)—should be accepted as satisfying subsection (1)(a), the court is
to consider (among other relevant things) whether or not and why
responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the party in breach.
(3) If it is relevant to deciding factual causation to decide what the person
who suffered harm would have done if the person who was in breach
of the duty had not been so in breach—
(a) the matter is to be decided subjectively in the light of all
relevant circumstances, subject to paragraph (b); and
(b) any statement made by the person after suffering the harm
about what he or she would have done is inadmissible except
to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or her
interest.
(4) For the purpose of deciding the scope of liability, the court is to
consider (among other relevant things) whether or not and why
responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the party who was
in breach of the duty.
12 Onus of proof
In deciding liability for breach of a duty, the plaintiff always bears the
onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to
the issue of causation.
[53] As I accept the evidence of Mr Fyfe I conclude that the school cannot be refused relief
against the architect. Not only has there been a breach of the contract of retainer there
has also been a breach of the duty of care and this has caused the school’s loss.
[54] I find the architect breached the duty of care owed to the school because the risk of
harm to the school by not following Mr Fyfe’s instructions was foreseeable. That is
because by not following the instructions the school would receive a basketball court
that was not full-size and the school could elect, as it did, to remedy the deficiency at a 24
substantial cost to it. In that way the risk was not insignificant and in the
circumstances a reasonable person in the position of the architect would have taken
precautions by designing the basketball court as instructed.
[55] I find it was obvious harm would occur if the instructions were not followed. Further,
the seriousness of the harm would be significant, or it could require substantial
expenditure to rectify the omission.
[56] I find the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm was minor as the
architect could have designed the required size at the same time as the balance of the
design.
[57] I do not consider the social utility of the omission of the instructions has any bearing
on deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk
of harm.
[58] I find the breach of duty by the architect caused the school’s loss. I find the breach of
duty was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm and it is appropriate for
the scope of the liability of the architect to extend to the harm so caused.
[59] I find if the architect had not been in breach of the duty of care there would not have
been any action for the school to take as a full-size basketball court would have been
designed and built.25
[60] I find there is no good reason not to impose responsibility for the school’s loss on the
architect.
[61] I find the school has satisfied the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities that the
architect’s breach of duty caused the school’s loss.
DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Christian Education Ministries – Qld Ltd v Thomson Adsett
Pty Ltd [2015] QDC 292
PARTIES: CHRISTIAN EDUCATION MINISTRIES – QLD LTD
ACN 125 183 637
(plaintiff)
v
THOMSON ADSETT PTY LTD ACN 105 314 654
(defendant)
FILE NO/S: BD 5120/2011
DIVISION: Civil
PROCEEDING: Trial
ORIGINATING
COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 26 November 2015
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 18, 19 and 20 November 2015
JUDGE: Samios DCJ
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Sunday, 27 September 2015

When adverse inference should be drawn against prosecution if it fails to produce CCTV footage?

 The trial court in its judgment held that non-collection of CCTV footage, incomplete site plan, non-inclusion of all records and sim details of mobile phones seized from the accused are instances of faulty investigation and the same would not affect the prosecution case. Non- production of CCTV footage, non-collection of call records (details) and sim details of mobile phones seized from the accused cannot be said to be mere instances of faulty investigation but amount to withholding of best evidence. It is not the case of the prosecution that CCTV footage could not be lifted or a CD copy could not be made.
28. As per Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, if a party in possession of best evidence which will throw light in controversy withholds it, the court can draw an adverse inference against him notwithstanding that the onus of proving does not lie on him. The presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act is only a permissible inference and not a necessary inference. Unlike presumption under Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act, where the court has no option but to draw statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court has the option; the court may or may not raise presumption on the proof of certain facts. Drawing of presumption under Section 114 (g) of Evidence Act depends upon the nature of fact required to be proved and its importance in the controversy, the usual mode of proving it; the nature, quality and cogency of the evidence which has not been produced and its accessibility to the party concerned, all of which have to be taken into account. It is only when all these matters are duly considered that an adverse inference can be drawn against the party.

Supreme Court of India
Tomaso Bruno & Anr vs State Of U.P on 20 January, 2015

Bench: Anil R. Dave, Kurian Joseph, R. Banumathi

Citation;(2015)7 SCC178:AIR 2015 SC(SUPP)412
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Friday, 3 April 2015

Whether court should consider question of onus of proof at the time of framing of issues?


That the propounder of the will has to prove both due execution as well as the testamentary capacity of the testator, and that once those were established the onus which rests on the propounder stands discharged. If, however, there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, such as, where the signature was doubtful, or the testator was in a feeble state of mind, or the disposition in the will appeared to be unnatural or improper, or the propounder had taken a prominent part in the execution of the will which conferred substantial benefits on him, the onus was on the propounder to explain Satisfactorily those suspicious circumstances before probate could be ordered to issue, for after all, ultimately it was the conscience of the Court that had to be satisfied. Where, however, the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion having been practised on the deceased in regard to the execution of the will, the onus was on the caveator to prove the same. In regard to undue influence, it is not sufficient that the propounder of the will should have been in a position to exercise such influence or should have the opportunity or chance of practising it, but it is further necessary that there must be evidence to show that undue influence was, in fact, exercised on the deceased by the person who seeks to propound the will and who may have benefited substantially from it.
Surendra Pal v. Saraswati [1974] A.I.R. S.C. 1999, Bur Singh v. Uttam Singh (1910) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 855, P.C. : s.c. 13 Bom. L.R. 59 and Gomtibai v. Kan-chhedilal [1949] A.I.R. P.C. 272 : s.c. 52 Bom. L.R. 5, followed.
The question of onus is sometimes a complicated question which may also have a bearing on the further question of the right to begin under Rules 2 and 3 of O. XVIII of the Civil Procedure Code, and is, therefore, best left to be decided after the issues are framed and arguments are heard in regard to the same. It cannot be fixed by the mere form in which the issues have been framed by the Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
First Appeal No. 320 of 1966
Decided On: 24.03.1975

Totaram Maharu Vs. Ramabai Chavdas Kolhe
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.R. Vimadalal and N.B. Naik, JJ.
Citation:AIR1976Bom315, 1977(79)BOMLR87, 1977MhLJ97
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Friday, 27 September 2013

once a party proves its title, onus of proof would be on other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession

 The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned: once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession. The ingredients of adverse possession have succinctly been stated by this Court in S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina in the following terms: (AIR p.1256, para 5) Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.(emphasis supplied) A bare and plain reading of the above excerpts would indicate and show that the plea of adverse possession cannot be assumed and presumed unless there are clinching evidence to prove the same.


Madras High Court
Abdul Khasim(Deceased) vs Mrs.Nagalakshmi on 27 June, 2011

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