Showing posts with label prison authority. Show all posts
Showing posts with label prison authority. Show all posts

Saturday, 22 November 2025

Bombay HC: Under which circumstances the prison authorities can transfer the prisoners from one prison to another prison?

 Security, peace and discipline in a prison are of paramount importance. They have to be maintained at all costs. Rule 13(2) of Chapter XXVI of the Maharashtra Prison Manual, 1979 deals with duties of the prisoners. Every prisoner is required to comply with their duty stated in Chapter XXVI which includes to show respect to all officers, not strike or assault or threaten any officer or any person in prison. This is set out in Rule 13(q) of Chapter XXVI of the Maharashtra Prison Manual, 1979. The petitioner by going on hunger strike has violated Rule 13(q) of Chapter XXVI, hence, authorities were well within their right to transfer the petitioner to another prison. {Para 15}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 2922 of 2016

Decided On: 08.09.2016

Sunil Devnarayan Singh Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Tahilramani and Mridula Bhatkar, JJ.

Author: V.K. Tahilramani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2103/2016

Print Page

Sunday, 24 August 2025

Supreme Court: Jail superintendents and Prison Officials providing special or preferential treatment to accused persons within jail premises are liable for disciplinary action including suspension

 Whether jail superintendents and Prison Officials providing special or preferential treatment to accused persons within jail premises are liable for disciplinary action including suspension -- Held, the day, the Court comes to know that the accused persons are provided with some special or five star treatment within the jail premises, the first step in the process will be to place the jail superintendent under suspension including all other officials involved in such misconduct.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Saturday, 4 July 2020

Whether jail authorities can detain prisoner in jail if the court has directed them to produce him before the court?

 Section 269 (c) of the Cr.P.C. prescribes that where a person in respect of whom an order is made under Section 267, requiring attendance of a prisoner before a particular court, is in custody for a period that would expire before expiration of the time required for complying with the order and for taking him back to the prison in which he is confined or detained, in those circumstances, the officer in charge of the prison must abstain from carrying out the Court's order and instead, should send a statement of reasons to the concerned court for the said absence. [See order dated 15/05/2020 passed in W.P. (Crl.) 802/2020: Vinod Bansal Vs. State & Anr.,]

9. Also the Allahabad High Court in Dharampal and another Vs. State of U.P. and another, MANU/UP/0349/1981 has held as under:-

"9. A consideration of the aforementioned provisions indicate that the requisition under S. 3(2), Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955, and S. 267(1), Cr.P.C. can be addressed to Supdt., of a District jail who is already holding a prisoner under an authority of law. The requisition by itself does not authorise the detention of any person. It merely requires the officer in charge of the prison (1) to produce the detenu before the requisitioning Court on the date fixed by it and (2) after the purpose of requisition is over, to take him back and to keep him in custody in accordance with the writ or direction issued by the Court which had authorised his detention in jail. As laid down in S. 55, Prisons Act, 1894, during the period the prisoner is away from the prison in pursuance of the requisition, he would throughout be deemed to be in the custody of the prison and would be subject to all the same incidents as if he were actually in prison.

10. The requisitions issued by the criminal Courts in Haryana, therefore, did not authorise the Supdt., District Jail, Meerut, to keep the two petitioners in his custody. They merely required the Supdt., to produce the two petitioners before the concerned courts only if the Supdt., was entitled to keep them in his custody under some valid authority. Since the various requisition orders did not authorise the Supdt., District Jail, Meerut to keep the two petitioners in custody and the moment the petitioners had been admitted to bail in all the criminal cases in connection with which their detention in District Jail, Meerut had been authorised, the authority of the Supdt., District Jail, to keep the petitioners under detention came to an end and the petitioners' detention after being released on bail, became illegal and without authority of law. The requisitions received from the criminal Courts at Haryana under S. 3, Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 or under S. 267 Cr.P.C. could not confer any valid authority on the Supdt., of jail to kept the petitioners under detention and render his custody in District Jail, Meerut valid."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P. (Crl.) 822/2020

Decided On: 19.05.2020

 Anil Mittal  Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Manmohan and Sanjeev Narula, JJ.

W.P.(CRL.) 822/2020
Print Page

Thursday, 7 April 2016

UK Supreme court Judgment on vicarious liability of prison authorities for torts of prisoners

The fact that the prison service, and the operators of contracted-out prisons,
are under a statutory duty to provide prisoners with useful work, is not incompatible
with the imposition of vicarious liability. The legislation does not itself exclude the
imposition of vicarious liability. Nor is it argued that any distinct point arises under
section 2(1)(a) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, in terms of which the Crown is
subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age
and capacity, it would be subject in respect of torts committed by its servants or
agents. Authorities concerned with compulsory pilotage are not in point: the prison
service is not required to provide particular types of employment, or to allocate 
particular prisoners to particular activities. In practice, prisoners can be allocated to
a variety of workplaces both inside and outside prisons, having regard to the relevant
risks. More particularly, the prison service is not compelled to employ prisoners in
the kitchen, and has a meaningful power of selection in respect of the prisoners it
chooses to employ there. It appears from the evidence that the prison service takes
particular care when selecting prisoners who are suitable to work in the kitchen,
having regard to the risks involved in that setting. A restricted pool from which to
select a workforce was a feature of the Christian Brothers case, and is not
uncommon even in ordinary cases of employment: an employer can only select from
those who apply for appointment, and may often have a small pool from which to
choose.
Hilary Term
[2016] UKSC 10
On appeal from: [2014] EWCA Civ 132
JUDGMENT
Cox (Respondent) v Ministry of Justice (Appellant)
before
Lord Neuberger, President
Lady Hale, Deputy President
Lord Dyson
Lord Reed
Lord Toulson
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
2 March 2016

LORD REED: (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Dyson and
Lord Toulson agree)
Print Page