Showing posts with label purchase. Show all posts
Showing posts with label purchase. Show all posts

Monday, 23 December 2019

Whether court can treat sale as nullity if auction purchaser fails to deposit value of stamp duty for drafting sale certificate along with purchase money?

 In Manilal Mohanlal Shah and others v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mohamad and others, MANU/SC/0005/1954 : AIR 1954 SC 349, the Apex Court observed thus:

"Having examined the language of the relevant rules and the judicial decisions bearing upon the subject we are of opinion that the provisions of the rules requiring the deposit of 25 per cent of the purchase-money immediately on the person being declared as a purchaser and the payment of the balance within 15 days of the sale are mandatory and upon non-compliance with these provisions there is no sale at all. The rules do not contemplate that there can be any sale in favour of a purchaser without depositing 25 per cent of the purchase-money in the first instance and the balance within 15 days. When there is no sale within the contemplation of these rules, there can be no question of material irregularity in the conduct of the sale. Non-payment of the price on the part of the defaulting purchaser renders the sale proceedings as a complete nullity. The very fact that the Court is bound to re-sell the property in the event of a default shows that the previous proceedings for sale are completely wiped out as if they do not exist in the eye of law. We hold, therefore, that in the circumstances of the present case there was no sale and the purchasers acquired. No rights at all."

15. (a) In Uttamchand Milapchand v. Balkrishna Ramnath, MANU/MH/0053/1961 : AIR 1961 Bom. 224, referring to Manilal Mohanlal Shah and others case (supra), the Bombay High Court expressed the similar view holding thus:

In Para No. 4 xxx....... In view of these observations of the Supreme Court it is clear that the provisions of Order 21 Rule 85 as well as Rule 86 are mandatory in the sense that in the event of the auction purchaser failing to deposit the full purchase price within 15 days from the date of the auction sale the Court will have no option but to order a re-sale of the property. This necessarily implies that the Court has no jurisdiction whatever to extend the time for the payment of the balance of the purchase price as fixed under Order 21 Rule 85 of the Code. Either the purchaser pays the price within 15 days of the sale or he does not. If he pays, the sale would be complete; if he does not pay then, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, there is no sale at all and all the proceedings in respect of the auction sale would be a nullity. Applying the ratio of that decision to the facts of this case, it is clear that as auction purchaser, who is the applicant in the present revision application, failed to pay the full purchase price within 15 days of the auction sale, there was no sale at all in his favour and, therefore, there was no question of any irregularity in such a sale being waived on account of the consent of the judgment-debtor to the time being extended in favour of the auction purchaser. Following upon the default in the payment of the purchase price as required under Order 21 Rule 85 the Court had straightaway to order re-sale of the property which the learned Judge in the Court below has done in this case. Accordingly, in my opinion, the order passed by the learned Judge ordering re-sale of the property is perfectly valid.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

CRP No. 6528 of 2018

Decided On: 18.03.2019

 G. Venkata Ramana Naidu Vs.  K. Venkataramana Reddy and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
U. Durga Prasad Rao, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 AP 21
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Monday, 23 March 2015

Whether a person can acquire right to easement by prescription in a property by purchasing said property?

 As regards the question of acquisition of easement by prescription within the meaning of Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the section itself lays down the conditions for acquisition of such a right by way of prescription. It would be apposite to reproduce herein Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963 :-
“25. Acquisition of easement by prescription.----
(1) Where the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peacefully enjoyed therewith as an easement, and as of right, without interruption, and for 20 years, and where any way or watercourse or the use of any water or any other easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been peacefully and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption and for 20 years, the right to such access and use of light or air, way, watercourse, use of water, or other easement shall be absolute and indefeasible.
(2) Each of the said periods of 20 years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates i.e. contested.
(3) Where the property over which a right is claimed under sub-section (1) belongs to the Government that sub-section shall be read as if for the words “20 years” the words “30 years” were substituted.”
From the language employed in section 25 as above, it is evident that a person claiming easement by way of prescription must have enjoyed the access and use of the said right openly, peacefully and without interruption for a period of 20 years.
17. In the instant case it is the admitted position of fact that Derrila Lingdoh having purchased the suit land in the year 1935 has been openly, peacefully and continuously using Schedule-B strip of land for access to Schedule-A land until her death prior to 1982 i.e. for a period more than 20 years. Therefore, Derrila Lingdoh had evidently acquired easement by prescription over the B-scheduled land. The
usage of words such as “absolute” and “ indefeasible” in section 25 denotes that such right would be conclusive, unconditional and irrevocable in nature.
Therefore, such right accruing to Derrila Lingdoh during her life time over the Schedule-B passage was incidental to her title and interest over the Schedule-A land and hence, would be in the nature of a permanent, inheritable and transferable right.
18. There can be no doubt about the fact that in order to acquire easement by prescription under Section 25 of the Act of 1963, the claimant not only would have to lay down factual foundations in the pleadings but would also have to lead evidence so as to establish the peaceful, open and uninterrupted usage of the said right continuously for a period of 20 years. In the present case the defendant himself has admitted in his evidence that Derrila Lingdoh had been using the Schedule –B strip of land during her life time till her death i.e. prior to the year 1982. The defendant/ respondent has stated in his evidence that he has seen Derrila in the schedule-A land around 1950 and that she was in use of the passage shown in Schedule-B land. It is also admitted by the defendant/ respondent that the Schedule –B land is the only path way to access the Schedule-A land.
19. It is settled law that facts admitted need not be proved. An admission of fact is the best evidence that can be gainfully pressed into service by the opposite side. From the material evidence
available on record it is found that an easement by prescription within the meaning of section 25 of the Limitation Act 1963 had clearly accrued in favour of Derrilla Lingdoh over Schedule-B land during her life time. Such right having been accrued upon the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff’s vendor by operation of law, the said right devolved upon her successors-in-interest after death of Derrilla and eventually stood transferred in favour of the plaintiff on his stepping into the shoes of his vendor upon purchase of the Schedule-A land by means of a registered deed of sale. The right to use the passage in Schedule –B is a bare necessity for the Plaintiff since there is no other access to the Schedule-A land belonging to him. The Plaintiff would, therefore, be entitled to enjoy such easement over Schedule-B passage until his right ,title and interest over the suit land stands extinguished under due process of law .
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH CORT
(THE HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT GUWAHATI
(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
R.S.A.No. 139 of 2001

Shri Dwaraka Prasad Agarwalla, 
V 
On the death of sole respondent
Sri Nil Kamal Bezbarua, his legal heirs :-
1. (a) Smti. Sarada Bezbarua (wife)
(b) Sri Prabhat Bezbarua (son)
(c) Sri Kamal Kishore Bezbarua (son)

BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMAN SHYAM
Dated;20-1-2015
Read original judgment here;click here
Citation;AIR2015 Gauhati High court33
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Saturday, 14 March 2015

Payment of purchase of immovable property should be by cheque,demand draft or electronic transfer

MEASURES TO CURB BLACK MONEY
 Mode of taking or accepting certain loans, deposits and specified sums and mode of repayment of loans or deposits and specified advances The existing provisions contained in section 269SS of the Income-tax Act provide that no person shall take from any person any loan or deposit otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft or online transfer through a bank account, if the amount of such loan or deposit is twenty thousand rupees or more. However, certain exceptions have been provided in the section. Similarly, the existing provisions contained in section 269T of the Income-tax Act provide that any loan or deposit shall not be repaid, otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft or online transfer through a bank account, by the persons specified in the section if the amount of loan or deposit is twenty thousand rupees or more. In order to curb generation of black money by way of dealings in cash in immovable property transactions it is proposed to amend section 269SS, of the Income-tax Act so as to provide that no person shall accept from any person any loan or deposit or any sum of money, whether as advance or otherwise, in relation to transfer of an immovable property otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft or by electronic clearing system through a bank account, if the amount of such loan or deposit or such specified sum is twenty thousand rupees or more.
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Sunday, 7 September 2014

Bombay HC: Guidelines for proving possession over suit property

In the case of "Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Ors. Vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (Dead) through L.R.s" (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that truth must be foundation of justice and Judges should not sit as mere umpire during trial but should play an active role to find out truth. It has been held that in an action for recovery of possession of immovable property, or for protecting possession thereof, upon legal title to the property being established, the possession or occupation of the property by a person other than the holder of the legal title will be presumed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, and it will be for the person resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right to continue in possession, to establish that he has such a right. It has been further held that wherever pleadings and documents establish title to a particular property and possession is in question, it will be for the person in possession to give sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars and documents to support his claim in order to continue in possession. It would be imperative that one who claims possession must give the following below:
(a) Who is or are the owner or owners of the property;
(b) Title of the property;
(c) Who is in possession of the title documents;
(d) Identity of the claimant or claimants to possession;
(e) The date of entry into possession;
(f) How he came into possession whether he purchased the property or inherited or got the same in gift or by any other method;
(g) In case he purchased the property, what is the consideration, if he has taken it on rent, how much is rent, license fee or lease amount;
(h) If taken on rent, license fee or lease then insist on rent deed, license deed or lease deed;
(i) Who are the persons in possession/occupation or otherwise living within him, in what capacity; as family members, friends or servants etc.;
(j) Subsequent conduct, i.e., any event which might have extinguished his entitlement to possessions or caused shift therein; and
(k) Basis of his claim not to deliver possession but continue in possession.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
First Appeal No. 265 of 2005 and M.C.A. No. 669 of 2011
Decided On: 08.03.2013

Francisco Xavier Ferrao
Vs.  Filomeno Bonifacio de Viera Menezes and Ors.


Coram:U.V. Bakre, J.

Citation:2013(3)ABR412,MANU/MH/0226/2013

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Sunday, 11 March 2012

Whether court can permit purchase of Divorce Decree?

The law does not permit the purchase of a decree of divorce for consideration, with or without the consent of the other side. 
The affidavit referred to in the order is the one filed by the respondent and consideration of submission of counsel for the parties does not indicate that the appellant had given her consent for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent on payment of Rs.10,00,000.00 (rupees ten lakhs only). Secondly, and more importantly, the consent of the parties is of no relevance in the matter. No court can assume jurisdiction to dissolve a Hindu marriage simply on the basis of the consent of the parties de hors the grounds enumerated under section 13 of the Act, unless of course the consenting parties proceed under section 13B of the Act.


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8196-8197 OF 2010

Sanjeeta Das vs Tapan Kumar Moahnty on 22 September, 2010

Bench: Aftab Alam, R.M. Lodha
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