Whether Arbitrator can apply principles of Civil procedure code and Evidence Act to arbitration proceeding?

There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral tribunal is a quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral tribunal, we do not find any such distinction between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. We have already noticed that Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Rules of procedure as contained in Code of Civil Procedure. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This was clearly laid down in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, MANU/SC/1330/2009 : (2009) 8 SCC 646. In Paragraph 98(n), following was stated:

(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code. It may however be noticed in this regard that just because the Tribunal is not bound by the Code, it does not mean that it would not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in the Code. "Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice," (See Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd.)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 15036 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16636 of 2015)

Decided On: 20.09.2017

 Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited  Vs. Tuff Drilling Private Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 11 SCC 470

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Whether Direction of supreme court regarding early delivery of judgment is applicable to quasi judicial authority?

The aspect of early delivery of judgment order has been particularly dealt with in details by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai, supra. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with a situation when the judgment is not pronounced within three months from the date of reserving it. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, any of the parties to the case would be permitted to file an application in the High Court with a prayer for early judgment and as and when such an application is filed, it shall be listed before the same Bench by which the judgment is reserved for fixing the date of the judgment or passing of appropriate orders. It has also been held that if the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months thereafter, any of the parties to the lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the case and make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. The ratio of this case has also been followed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Devang Vora and by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Pradeep Sangodker, supra. Though the directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai, supra, were in the context of a judgment reserved by a judicial authority and not by a quasi-judicial authority, in view of the fact that this Court has already taken a view that these directions would also be applicable to quasi-judicial authorities and Tribunals respectively would have their application to the instant matter. So, the directions given in the case of Anil Rai, supra, would have to be followed even by the quasi-judicial authorities and parties before the quasi-judicial authorities. Therefore, the procedure, as laid down in clauses (iv) and (v) of paragraph 10, regarding filing of applications with a prayer for early judgment and prayer for making over the matter to some other bench, in this case, to some other authority, was required to be followed by the petitioners. That has not been shown to be done by them. Then the question of causing of prejudice to the petitioners by belated delivery of the judgment would also have to be considered. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, non consideration of the legal submissions by the respondent no. 2 is a prejudice caused to the petitioners. I am not inclined to accept the argument for the reason that the violation of guidelines contained in Standing Order No. 36 having a binding effect upon the petitioners has been established in the inquiry conducted under Section 311 of the Act, 1965 and it has never been the case of the petitioners that they had followed the guidelines and terms and conditions determined by the Municipal Council for exercise of powers by them in contractual matters. As such, there was no question of disregarding the instructions in the Standing Order No.36. There is thus no prejudice caused to the petitioners by belated passing of the impugned order in as much the petitioners have not shown that they had followed the procedure prescribed in Anil Rai, supra.

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Rahul S/O. Virendra Deshmukh And ... vs State Of Maharashtra Thr. ... on 6 May, 2016

Bench: S.B. Shukre

   WRIT  PETITION   No. 1442  OF 2016 

Citation: 2016(6) MHLJ 450

Read full judgment here: Click here

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Whether principles of limitation Act are applicable to proceedings before quasi judicial authority?

We have already held that the Limitation Act including Section
14 would not apply to appeals filed before a quasi-judicial
Tribunal such as the Collector (Appeals) mentioned in Section
128 of the Customs Act. However, this does not conclude the
issue. There is authority for the proposition that even where
Section 14 may not apply, the principles on which Section 14 is
based, being principles which advance the cause of justice,would nevertheless apply. We must never forget, as stated in
Bhudan Singh & Anr. v. Nabi Bux & Anr., (1970) 2 SCR 10,
that justice and reason is at the heart of all legislation by
Parliament. This was put in very felicitous terms by Hegde,J.
as follows:
“Before considering the meaning of the word "held"
in Section 9, it is necessary to mention that it is
proper to assume that the lawmakers who are the
representatives of the people enact laws which the
society considers as honest, fair and equitable. The
object of every legislation is to advance public
welfare. In other words as observed by Crawford in
his book on Statutory Constructions the entire
legislative process is influenced by considerations
of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute
the great general legislative intent in every piece of
legislation. Consequently where the suggested
construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any
other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of
justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem
that the apparent or suggested meaning of the
statute, was not the one intended by the
law-makers. In the absence of some other indication
that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually
intended by the legislature, there is little reason to
believe that it represents the legislative intent.”
32. This is why the principles of Section 14 were applied in J.
Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12 SCC 175 to a
revision application filed before the High Court of Kerala. The
Court held:
“16. The provisions contained in Sections 5 and 14
of the Limitation Act are meant for grant of relief
where a person has committed some mistake. The
provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act
alike should, thus, be applied in a broad based
manner. When sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act per se is not applicable, the same
would not mean that the principles akin thereto
would not be applied. Otherwise, the provisions of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. There

cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same
would be applicable to a case of this nature.
17. There cannot furthermore be any doubt
whatsoever that having regard to the definition of
“suit” as contained in Section 2(l) of the Limitation
Act, a revision application will not answer the said
description. But, although the provisions of Section
14 of the Limitation Act per se are not applicable, in
our opinion, the principles thereof would be
applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay
in filing an appeal or a revision application in terms
of Section 5 thereof.
18. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that
mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning
of any provision of law would, by itself, be not
sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it
is otherwise vested in it in law. While exercising its
power, the court will merely consider whether it has
the source to exercise such power or not. The court
will not apply the beneficent provisions like Sections
5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner.
When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact
found to be applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a case, in our opinion, there is no
reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the
same only because a wrong provision has been
mentioned. In a case of this nature, sub-section (2)
of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be
applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the
principles thereof would be applicable for the
purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section
5 thereof.”

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4367 OF 2004
M.P. STEEL CORPORATION …APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL
EXCISE ...RESPONDENT
Citation;(2015)7 SCC58
R.F. Nariman, J.

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Delhi HC: Grounds for initiating disciplinary proceedings against quasi judicial officer clarified

Therefore, if the decisions in K.K. Dhawan case, Nagarkar case, Duli Chand case, Ramesh W.P.(C) No.3209/2012 Page 20 of 27 Chander Singh case and Inspector Prem Chand case are read together, it is necessary that before initiating disciplinary action, the Department must have a prima facie material to show recklessness and that the officer had acted negligently or by his order unduly favoured a party and his action was actuated by corrupt motive. In fact, K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ in Ramesh Chander Singh‟s case even took an exception to the practice of initiating disciplinary action against Officers merely because the orders passed by them were

wrong."

Applying the aforesaid test in the case at hand, the Madras High Court affirmed the view of the Tribunal in the following manner:-

"16. If all these tests are cumulatively applied, the Tribunal in the present case had correctly found that there was no mala fide motive on the part of the first respondent in passing the order and that a Government servant cannot be punished for a wrong interpretation of law. In the light of the above discussion, we feel that the CAT has correctly understood the scope of judicial review and has set aside the order of recovery passed against the petitioner."1

Delhi High Court

U.O.I And Ors vs Ajit Kumar Singh & Ors on 5 August, 2013

Author: Pradeep Nandrajog

   CORAM:
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO

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