rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for
bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of S.6, what is
required to be established is that it must be almost
contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval
which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be
admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestate, must have been
made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter
[(see Sukhar v. State of U.P. (1999 (9) SCC 507)].
Where the transaction consists of different acts, in
order that the chain of such acts may constitute the same
transaction, they must be connected together by proximity of time,
proximity or unity of place, continuity of action and community of
purpose or design. The spontaneity of the statement is the
guarantee of the truth. The reasons for its admissibility under
Section 6 of the Evidence Act is that it is a part of the transaction
and not merely because it is spontaneous. The statement is
relevant only if it is that of a person, who had seen the actual
occurrence and who uttered it simultaneously with the incident or
soon thereafter as to make it reasonably certain that the speaker is
still under the stress of the excitement caused by his having seen
the incident. In order to make the statement of a bystander
admissible, it must have been made, at the time of transaction or
shortly before or after it. The statement uttered or the act done must
be a spontaneous reaction of the person witnessing the crime and
forming part of the transaction. The bystanders' declaration must
relate only to that which came under their observation.[See
Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 122)]. In the present
case, the declaration was made by the victim himself, immediately
after the incident of sustaining injury by him. In the said
circumstances, the evidence of PW5 and PW6 about what the
victim/deceased said immediately after the incident, is admissible
under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The above discussion would
make it clear that apart from Sec.32 (1) of the Evidence Act, the
aforesaid statement of the deceased can be admitted under Sec.6
of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to the act of
murder. In either case, whether it is admissible under S.32 (1) or
under S.6 of the Evidence Act, it is substantive evidence, which can
be acted upon with or without corroboration in finding guilt of the
accused [(see Rattan Singh's case (supra)].
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.T.SANKARAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.SUDHEENDRA KUMAR
FRIDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF JUNE 2015
CRL.A.No. 1157 of 2010 (G)
AHRAF, S/O.MOIDU,
THARAYIL VEEDU, VELLARKAD,
ERUMAPETTY, PUNNAYOOR,
THRISSUR DISTRICT.
Vs
THE STATEOF KERALA,
Citation: 2015(3)KLJ201
