When Presence Becomes Culpability: Supreme Court Redefines the Line Between Bystander and Criminal in Mob Violence Cases

 Landmark 2025 Judgment Sets New Standards for Section 149 IPC Convictions

In a landmark judgment that promises to reshape criminal prosecutions involving mob violence across India, the Supreme Court in Zainul and Others v. State of Bihar (2025) has delivered authoritative guidance on one of the most contentious questions in Indian criminal jurisprudence: When does mere presence at a crime scene transform an innocent bystander into a culpable member of an unlawful assembly?

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Video of the Supreme Court judgment explaining the distinction between Unlawful Assembly and Innocent Bystanders

 This video is produced and presented for educational and informational purposes only. The content is based on the Supreme Court of India judgment,

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1187 of 2014

Decided On: 07.10.2025

Zainul Vs. The State of Bihar

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 1192, MANU/SC/1387/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Section 149 criminal liability is not automatic for mere presence; it requires proof of shared intent and participation. This ruling refines the law around vicarious liability in mob violence, guiding courts, advocates, and law enforcement for fairer trials and justice.

Disclaimer

The video and accompanying materials do not constitute legal advice or opinion and should not be relied upon as a substitute for professional legal counsel. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, the creators and host disclaim any liability for errors or omissions.

Viewers are encouraged to refer to the original Supreme Court judgment and consult qualified legal experts for specific cases or issues. Use of this video is at the viewer's discretion, and the creators assume no responsibility for outcomes based on this information.

Print Page

Deciphering Section 149 IPC: Supreme Court’s “Bystander Vs. Member” Ruling Redefines Constructive Liability

a. Innocent Bystander v. Member of an Unlawful Assembly

53. Once the two broad essentials of Section 149 are fulfilled, i.e., (1) an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object, or (2) if the members of the assembly knew that the said offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of the said common object, every person who at the at the time of commission of the offence was a member of the assembly is to be held guilty of that offence.

54. At the same time, mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established that such an Accused also shared its common object. A mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within the ambit of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution has to establish, through reasonably direct or indirect circumstances, that the Accused persons shared a common object of the unlawful assembly. The test to determine whether a person is a passive onlooker or an innocent bystander is the same as that applied to ascertain the existence of a common object. The existence of a common object is to be inferred from the circumstances of each case, such as:

a. the time and place at which the assembly was formed;

b. the conduct and behaviour of its members at or near the scene of the offence;

c. the collective conduct of the assembly, as distinct from that of individual members;

d. the motive underlying the crime;

e. the manner in which the occurrence unfolded;

f. the nature of the weapons carried and used;

g. the nature, extent, and number of the injuries inflicted, and other relevant considerations.

i. Rule of Prudence in Convicting Members of an Unlawful Assembly

55. This Court, as a matter of caution, has enunciated parameters to safeguard innocent spectators or passive onlookers from being convicted merely on account of their presence. This cautionary rule, however, does not dilute the doctrine of constructive liability, under which proof of an overt act by each individual is not indispensable. Where the presence of a large number of persons is established and many are implicated, prudence mandates strict adherence to this Rule of caution.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1187 of 2014

Decided On: 07.10.2025

Zainul Vs. The State of Bihar

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J

 Citation: 2025 INSC 1192, MANU/SC/1387/2025.

Print Page

Supreme Court: General Statements By Witnesses Without Specific Attribution Insufficient To Convict Individuals In Cases Involving Large Crowds

In cases of group clashes where a large number of

persons are involved, an onerous duty is cast upon the

courts to ensure that no innocent bystander is

convicted and deprived of his liberty. In such type of

cases, the courts must be circumspect and reluctant to

rely upon the testimony of witnesses who make general

statements without specific reference to the accused, or

the role played by him4. This is so, because very often,

particularly when the scene of crime is a public place,

out of curiosity, persons step out of their home to

witness as to what is happening around. Such persons

are no more than bystander though, to a witness, they

may appear to be a part of the unlawful assembly. Thus,

as a rule of caution and not a rule of law, where the

evidence on record establishes the fact that a large

number of persons were present, it may be safe to

convict only those persons against whom overt act is

alleged.5 At times, in such cases, as a rule of caution

and not a rule of law, the courts have adopted a plurality

test, that is, the conviction could be sustained only if it

is supported by a certain number of witnesses who give

a consistent account of the incident. {Para 13}

15. In the instant case, the appellants were residents

of the same village where riots broke out, therefore their

presence at the spot is natural and by itself not

incriminating. More so, because it is not the case of the

prosecution that they came with arms or instruments of

destruction. In these circumstances, their presence at

the spot could be that of an innocent bystander who had

a right to move freely in absence of prohibitory orders.

In such a situation, to sustain their conviction, the

prosecution ought to have led some reliable evidence to

demonstrate that they were a part of the unlawful

assembly and not just spectator. Here no evidence has

come on record to indicate that the appellants incited

the mob, or they themselves acted in any manner

indicative of them being a part of the unlawful

assembly. 

16. The suggestion given by the defense counsel to the

investigating officer, during cross-examination, that the

accused were trying to douse the fire when they were

apprehended, though might be useful to confirm their

presence at the spot, cannot be used to infer that

accused were a part of the unlawful assembly. This we

say so, because it does not rule out their presence as a

bystander or a spectator. Besides that, in absence of

any inculpatory role ascribed to the appellants, their

arrest on the spot is not conclusive that they were a part

of the unlawful assembly, particularly when neither

instrument of destruction nor any inflammatory

material was seized from them. Besides that, the police

resorted to firing causing people to run helter skelter. In

that melee, even an innocent person may be mistaken

for a miscreant. Thus, appellants’ arrest from the spot

is not a guarantee of their culpability. In our view,

therefore, mere presence of the appellants at the spot,

or their arrest therefrom, was not sufficient to prove that

they were a part of the unlawful assembly comprising of

more than a thousand people. The view to the contrary

taken by the High Court is completely unjustified.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.816 OF 2016

DHIRUBHAI BHAILALBHAI  CHAUHAN & ANR. Vs  STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

Author: MANOJ MISRA, J.

Citation:2025 INSC 381.

Print Page

When evidence of bystander is admissible?

Sec.6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general

rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for

bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of S.6, what is

required   to  be    established   is  that  it  must    be   almost

contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval

which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be

admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestate, must have been

made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter

[(see Sukhar v. State of U.P. (1999 (9) SCC 507)].




       Where the transaction consists of different acts, in

order that the chain of such acts may constitute the same

transaction, they must be connected together by proximity of time,

proximity or unity of place, continuity of action and community of

purpose or design.      The spontaneity of the statement is the

guarantee of the truth.    The reasons for its admissibility under

Section 6 of the Evidence Act is that it is a part of the transaction

and not merely because it is spontaneous.         The statement is

relevant only if it is that of a person, who had seen the actual

occurrence and who uttered it simultaneously with the incident or

soon thereafter as to make it reasonably certain that the speaker is



still under the stress of the excitement caused by his having seen

the incident.   In order to make the statement of a bystander

admissible, it must have been made, at the time of transaction or

shortly before or after it. The statement uttered or the act done must

be a spontaneous reaction of the person witnessing the crime and

forming part of the transaction. The bystanders' declaration must

relate only to that which came under their observation.[See

Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 122)]. In the present

case, the declaration was made by the victim himself, immediately

after the incident     of sustaining     injury by him. In the said

circumstances, the      evidence of PW5 and PW6 about what the

victim/deceased said immediately after the incident, is admissible

under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The above discussion would

make it clear that apart from Sec.32 (1) of the Evidence Act, the

aforesaid statement of the deceased can be admitted under Sec.6

of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to the act of

murder. In either case, whether it is admissible under S.32 (1) or

under S.6 of the Evidence Act, it is substantive evidence, which can

be acted upon with or without corroboration in finding guilt of the

accused [(see Rattan Singh's case (supra)].


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM

                              PRESENT:

            THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.T.SANKARAN
                                  &
        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.SUDHEENDRA KUMAR

        FRIDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF JUNE 2015

                    CRL.A.No. 1157 of 2010 (G)



       AHRAF, S/O.MOIDU,
           THARAYIL VEEDU, VELLARKAD,
           ERUMAPETTY, PUNNAYOOR,
           THRISSUR DISTRICT.

   Vs

           THE STATEOF KERALA,
           

Citation: 2015(3)KLJ201

Print Page