Showing posts with label voluntary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label voluntary. Show all posts

Saturday, 12 January 2019

Whether court should permit parties to adduce evidence if there is allegation that mediation settlement was obtained by force?

 Learned counsel for respondents had submitted that although signatures of authorized representative of respondent on the mediated settlement are not denied but he had no instructions to agree to the terms of the settlement as reflected in the mediated settlement. It was also submitted on behalf of respondents that signatures of authorized representative of respondent were obtained forcibly and so aforesaid settlement is not binding upon the parties and the parties have been rightly referred to mediation again vide impugned order. Thus, it was submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order and the decisions cited are distinguishable.
Since, question of fact are being raised regarding voluntariness of the mediated settlement, therefore, it would be appropriate that an opportunity is granted by trial court to respondents to lead evidence to show that the mediated settlement was not a voluntary one.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. M.C. No. 2498/2014, 

Decided On: 09.02.2015

 Manoj Chandak Vs. Tour Lovers Tourism (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sunil Gaur, J.

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Saturday, 27 February 2016

Whether wife suffering from sexually transmitted disease amounts to cruelty to husband?

 I must observe that the cruelty which is contemplated under
Section 13 as ground for divorce is that after the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty.
(emphasis supplied). Cruelty must be a voluntary act of person who visits
cruelty on the other. If a woman refuses sexual access, there are
authorities to the effect that such a voluntary refual would itself constitute
a cruelty and afford a ground for divorce. This is not a case where the
woman is complained of as having denied sexual access to the husband. On
the other hand, the apprehension of the petitioner is that if he has access
to the wife, he will get infected with Hepatitis B. I am afraid this argument
is not sound, for every communicable disease does not afford a spouse a
ground for divorce under the scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 13
provides for certain forms of illnesses in a spouse as affording a ground for
divorce which include under Clause (iv) where the person has been
suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy and clause (v)
states that a person has been suffering from venereal disease in
communicable form. Both could be illnesses which could be transmitted by
sexual access. These are the only two instances of illnesses, apart from
mental illness, which afford a ground for a spouse to seek for divorce. A
person suffering from Hepatitis B which could be communicated by sexual
access is not a ground which is available under Section 13. Perhaps it is for
the Parliament to look into the issue of whether any illness in
communicable form could afford ground for divorce. So long as legislation
does not provide for such a course, it is not possible for allowing for the
husband to make out a case for examination of the wife to assess whether
she is suffering from Hepatitis B or not.
4. A spouse suffering from an illness is surely traumatic and it
should under the normal circumstance give place to evoking compassion
and greater empathy for the other spouse. Unfortunately, here, the
husband does not feel sympathetic to an ailing wife and wants to make the
illness a ground for divorce. Law, as it stands, is compassionate at least in
that sense and rightly, there is no ground for affording a divorce for a
husband against a wife complaining of illness. In a typical Indian social
condition if husband is suffering from illness, it is hardly ever likely that a
wife will abandon the husband. If the husband is ill, she will spin herself
around him and give her life and blood for the husband to restore good
health. What could happen to a normal human being and more
particularly, to the woman does not unfortunately happen to a man. Ours
is a male dominated society and it leads to several ills. The present
petition itself is an example of how cruel a man can be to a woman in a
matrimonial relationship. Was the husband cruel to the wife by resorting
to divorce in her difficult times of illness or the wife guilty of cruelty in
contracting an illness unwittingly? 
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
C.R. No.237 of 2014 (O&M)
Date of Decision.04.11.2015
Nirmal Singh .
V
Smt. Reeta 

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. KANNAN

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Saturday, 22 August 2015

Distinction between offence punishable under S 326 of IPC and S 307 of IPC

Though the person convicted of the offence punishable under
Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code also can be sentenced to suffer life

imprisonment, two offences, one punishable under Section 326 of the Indian
Penal Code and other punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code
are distinct in nature inasmuch as 'intention' part of the offence is concerned.
The offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code involves
the act of accused which is 'voluntary' in nature whereas in the case for the
offence   punishable   under   Section   307   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   the
prosecution is always under obligation to establish the requisite intention.
8. Since   in   the   present   case,   this   Court   has   opined   that   the
appellant did not have intention to cause death of P.W. 1 nor had he intention
to cause injury to P.W. 2 of the nature which was sufficient to cause death in
ordinary course of the nature, I am inclined to set aside the order of the trial
Court convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 307
of the Indian Penal Code.   In my opinion, the appellant had committed
offence   punishable   under   Section   326   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code.   
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 287 OF 2014
Sanjay Shankar Shahu, V The State of Maharashtra,

                             CORAM : M.L. TAHALIYANI, J.
                              DATED   : NOVEMBER 07, 2014.
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(cri) 2670
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