P & H HC: Even when the regular bail petition is pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court or Magistrate court are competent to grant default bail

Resultantly, a pendency of bail petition either in the High Court or the Sessions Court would not disentitle the Magistrate or even the Sessions Court, as the case may be, from their statutory powers under Section 187(2) BNSS, 2023 or Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973. On the contrary, if the Magistrate or the Sessions Court does not grant default bail, in such circumstances, then there might be a possibility of such Court(s) violating the fundamental right or contravening the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. {Para 16}

17. Given the above and in the light of the binding judicial precedents, the answer to the proposition is that even when the regular bail petition was pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court is competent to grant default bail, also known as compulsive bail or statutory bail, and similarly the Magistrate is competent to grant default bail even when the regular bail petition was pending before the Sessions Court or the High Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-21371-2025

Decided On: 05.08.2025

Gurmeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop Chitkara, J.

Citation: 2025:PHHC:100608, MANU/PH/1919/2025

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Punjab & Haryana HC: Can the applicant take recourse to the Domestic Violence Act proceedings to enforce her property rights?

 It needs to be clarified here that resort to Domestic Violence Act can not be done to enforce property rights as for enforcement of property right the parties are supposed to approach the Civil Court. Resort to Domestic Violence Act can only be done where there is urgent requirement of the wife of maintenance or residence because of domestic violence and she has been rendered home less or has lost source of maintenance. In this case the husband had pleaded that he was giving monthly maintenance and the wife had refused to accept the same. The Magistrate shall consider all these aspect and consider the domestic incident report and contents of the application and then proceed with the case in accordance with law. {Para 23}

 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

(Before Anita Chaudhry, J.)

Crl. Misc. No. M-24058 of 2014

Om Parkash Syngal and others Vs Shimla Garg .

Citation: 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 16071 : 2016 Cri LJ 3111 : (2016) 3 RCR (Cri) 310 : (2016) 3 RCR (Civil) 225 : (2016) 1 HLR 362

Decided on December 1, 2015.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Punjab & Haryana HC: What remedies are available if violence is committed against an aggrieved woman by any relative of her husband, if not residing with her in a shared household?

 Domestic relationship continues so long as the parties live under the same roof and enjoy living together in a shared household. However, where the living together has been given up and a separate household is established and belongings are removed, domestic relationship comes to an end and a relationship of being relatives of each other survives. This is very normal in families that a person whether, a male or a female attains self sufficiency completes the education or otherwise or take up a job outside and lives in some other city or country, he or she cannot be said to have domestic relationship with the persons whom they have left behind. His relationship of that of a brother and sister, father and son, father and daughter, father and daughter-in-law etc. survives but the domestic relationship of living in a joint household would not survive & comes to an end. {Para 17}

18. The purpose of the Act is to give remedy to the aggrieved persons against domestic violence. The domestic violence can take place only when one is living in shared household with the respondents. The acts of abuses, emotional, economic or physical if committed when one is living in the same shared household constitutes domestic violence. However, such acts of violence can be committed even otherwise when one is living separate. When such acts of violence take place when one is living separate, these may be punishable under different provisions of IPC or other penal laws, but, they cannot be covered under Domestic Violence Act. One has to make distinction between violence committed on a person living separate in a separate household and the violence committed on a person living in the shared household.

 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

(Before Anita Chaudhry, J.)

Crl. Misc. No. M-24058 of 2014

Om Parkash Syngal and others Vs Shimla Garg .

Citation: 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 16071 : 2016 Cri LJ 3111 : (2016) 3 RCR (Cri) 310 : (2016) 3 RCR (Civil) 225 : (2016) 1 HLR 362

Decided on December 1, 2015.

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Punjab and Haryana HC: Domestic violence Act proceeding against persons not residing in shared household is not maintainable

Respondent has filed the complaint under the Act. Admittedly, petitioners are not residing in the matrimonial home of the respondent. {Para 4}

6. A combined reading of the above definitions reveals that an 'aggrieved person' is a woman, who is in a domestic relationship with the respondent and has been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. 'Domestic relationship' would mean a relationship between two persons, who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household. 'Shared household' means a household where the person aggrieved lives at any stage in a domestic relationship either singly or along with respondent. The respondent has, thus, never resided with the petitioners in the household along with her husband to constitute an offence under the Act against the petitioners.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Criminal Misc. No. M-22385 of 2011 (O&M)

Decided On: 11.10.2012

Girish and Ors. Vs. Poonam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sabina, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/2999/2012.

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Punjab & Haryana HC: Jurisdiction of district court under S 9 of guardian and wards Act is mixed question of law and fact

 It is evident from a bare reading of the above that the solitary test for determining the jurisdiction of the court under Section 9 of the Act is the 'ordinary residence' of the minor. The expression used is "Where the minor ordinarily resides". Now whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a question of intention which in turn is a question of fact. It may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted, it can never be a pure question of law, capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy. The factual aspects relevant to the question of jurisdiction are not admitted in the instant case. There are serious disputes on those aspects to which we shall presently refer. {Para 14}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CR No. 3925 of 2024 (O&M)

Decided On: 07.01.2025

Sulbhi and Ors. Vs. Bhavnesh Kumar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Deepak Gupta, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/0001/2025,2025PHHC000299.

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Punjab & Haryana HC: Motor accident claim tribunal can allow medical expenses more than 15000/- in petition under S 163A of Motor vehicle Act

In my opinion, the submissions cannot be accepted. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a number of decisions that the second schedule contains a number of fallacies. It has to be followed in broad principles. In suitable cases where treatment is long or loss is heavy, the compensation cannot be kept confined within the limits prescribed by the second schedule. The law on the point is well settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Trilok Chandra MANU/SC/1154/1996 : 1996 (4) SCC 362. The decision in Trilok Chandra's case [supra] has been reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Saroj & Ors. MANU/SC/0988/2009 : 2009 (3) RCR (Civil) 431. In this view of the matter, I do not find any ground to interfere with the award passed by learned Tribunal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed in limine. 

{Para 4}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

F.A.O. No. 3874 of 2013 [O&M]

Decided On: 26.07.2013

The Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Kulwinder Kaur and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vijender Singh Malik, J.

Citation: 2014 ACJ 16252014 ACC P&H 4 1482014 RCR CIVIL 1 7562013 PLR 172 3722013 SCC ONLINE P&H 144242013 PUNLR 4 372, MANU/PH/1225/2013.

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P & H HC: Whether Motor accident claim tribunal can reject claim petition if some of legal heirs are not added as party to the proceeding?

A bare perusal of the above-mentioned provision shows that where the death has resulted from the accident, the application for compensation may be filed by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. {Para 12}

13. Learned Claim Tribunal while deciding the claim petition adjudicated upon the petition like a trial where principles of Code of Civil Procedure are strictly applied, whereas it failed to appreciate the very fact that as per Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, once the application for compensation is filed before it, the claim should not be dismissed for non joinder of party.

14. In the present case only because the mother was not impleaded as party, the claim petition of the appellant was dismissed.

15. Learned Single Judge of this Court in FAO No.120 of 2003 titled as New India Insurance Company Vs. Janak decided on 12.07.2010 held as under:-

"3. Even the issue of whether a non-impleadment of all legal representatives would be material, has been considered literally by all High Courts including this Court where the consistent line of authority is that such a defect will not have a bearing to the maintainability of the petition. The law does not require that all the legal representatives of a deceased should be impleaded in a claim petition. In a given situation, where all the representatives are not impleaded, an opportunity shall be given to the claimants to implead the legal representatives not so impleaded. If on the other hand, the proceedings has gone without impleadment of them, it should be seen whether the persons who have not been impleaded were required to be impleaded and whether the claimant could be treated as trustee for all others as well. One method of ensuring that all the legal representatives take the benefit of the award would be to array the legal representatives, who are not impleaded as respondents. Another situation could be when the claimant amongst several persons is the only person, who is deprived of his dependence by the death and other siblings are not in any way affected since they had their own means of support. In a typical Indian social setting, it could be that the younger brother would be dependent on particular brother while there could be other major brothers, who had independent sources of income by their own earning and they did not depend on the brother who died. All this is only to state that there could be several instances where to show that the mere absence of all the legal representatives on the one side figuring as petitioners or respondents is not a sine qua non for considering the maintainability of the petition."

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

FAO-3516-2006 (O&M)

Decided On: 22.03.2024

Kaushal and Ors. Vs. Raj Kamal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudeepti Sharma, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/2083/2024,2024: PHHC:052973.

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Under which circumstances the legal guardian of muslim minor is competent to sell or . mortgage the property of the minors?

SECTION 108 OF B.R. VERMA'S COMMENTARY ON MOHAMMEDAN LAW:

108. Power of guardian.- A legal guardian shall be entitled to exercise the following powers:

(a) He may sell or mortgage immovable property of the minor in the following cases (but not otherwise)

(i) where he can obtain double the value of the property;

(ii) where it is necessary to do so for the maintenance of the minor, the minor having no other property'

(iii) where debts are due from the deceased person from whom the minor inherits the property or any legacies have to be paid and there are no means of paying them;

(iv) where the expenses exceed the income of the property;

(v) where the property is falling into decay;

(vi) where the property has been usurped and the guardian has reason to fear that there is no chance of fair restitution ;

(vii) where it is to manifest advantage of the minor.

(b) he may borrow money and sell or pledge the movable imperative property of the minor where the necessity, such as, for food, clothing or nursing.

(c) He may carry on business on behalf of the minor if it can be done by ordinary prudence and there is no reason to believe it to be hazardous.

(d) He may enter into any contract on behalf of and for the benefit of the minor.

(e) He may surrender a right or preemption of the minor,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Decided On: 12.05.2009

Gulzar Singh Vs. Julphan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vinod Kumar Sharma, J.

Citation:  Gulzar Singh vs. Julphan and Ors. (12.05.2009 - PHHC) : MANU/PH/0455/.

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Punjab And Haryana HC: Sale deed executed by person having no title over it, such sale deed do not confer any title on purchaser and can be ignored even in collateral proceeding

  Firstly, the proprietors are not party to the decree dated 6.3.1986 or the subsequent sale deeds. The said sale deeds are without any title or interest in the suit property. The sale deeds have been executed by defendant No. 1 even though he had no title or interest to sell the same in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 5. Since the sales are by incompetent person without having title in the suit property, such sale deed will not confer a valid title in favour of the purchasers. Since such sale deeds are without any title of the vendor, the same can be ignored even in collateral proceedings. This is what has been held by supreme Court in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Parkash University and others, 2001(4) RCR(Civil) 280 : Judgments today 2001(6) SC 573, wherein the distinction between void and voidable order has been discussed in detail.  {Para 16}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

R.S.A. No. 4041 of 2007

Decided On: 12.08.2009

Lajja Ram and Ors. Vs. Rati Chand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Hemant Gupta, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/2423/2009,2010(1) ICC 70, 2009(4) R.C.R(Civil) 598.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Punjab and Haryana HC: Limitation to set aside sale deed executed by person having no title commences from the date when such sale becomes known to plaintiff

 Thus, the decree granted against Gram Panchayat cannot be used against the proprietors as none of them was party before the Assistant Collector. Such void order can be ignored in collateral proceedings i.e. the present suit by proprietors. This is apart from the fact that the limitation to challenge the sale deed would arise when the right to sue accrue to the plaintiff in terms of the Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Even under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the period of 3 years to set aside an instrument or a decree or for recession of a contract, the time begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside, first became known to him. Therefore, the period to set aside the sale deed will not commence from the date the sale deed was registered, but when such sale became known to the plaintiff. On such knowledge alone, the right to sue would arise to the plaintiff and the suit would be within the period of limitation. {Para 17}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

R.S.A. No. 4041 of 2007

Decided On: 12.08.2009

Lajja Ram and Ors. Vs. Rati Chand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Hemant Gupta, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/2423/2009,2010(1) ICC 70, 2009(4) R.C.R(Civil) 598.

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Whether executing court can pass an order of attachment of Residential premises/home in execution of claim petition award?

Learned counsel seeks to contend that a procedure prescribed for enforcement of process against land must be understood as a procedure that causes an interdict against attachment through enforcement provided under the Civil Procedure Code. This argument, in my view, is fallacious. for there are no means by which the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be incorporated in a procedure, which is independently prescribed under the Land Revenue Act. They operate in two distinct fields and certain special privileges which Civil Procedure Code provides for enforcement of decrees cannot be applied to enforcement of awards. The Motor Vehicles Act itself is a complete Code and the extent to which Civil Procedure Code provisions are applicable are brought through the Motor Vehicles Act itself. Such procedure and powers are set out under section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act. The references to civil and criminal procedures are available only in so far as taking of evidence on oath, enforcement of attendance of witnesses and compelling the party for production of documents. Power under section 174 is independent of any power to recover under the Civil Procedure Code itself by attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor. If the decree holder seeks to resort to attachment of the property enforcing the award as a decree of civil court, he shall be perfectly at liberty to do so but if the recovery of money is sought from any person under an award after securing a certificate for amount from the Collector then the procedure that the Collector will follow shall only be what is provided under the Land Revenue Act itself. {Para 2}

3. The issue of whether the exceptions provided under the Civil Procedure Code for properties that cannot be attached could be invoked in proceedings for recoveries under the Land Revenue Act has come for consideration before the Supreme Court itself in State of Punjab v. Dina Nath, 1986 RRR 490. The point which was directly at issue was whether an attachment and sale of property for recovery of revenue due to State was barred in respect of building used for residential purpose and whether the provisions of section 60(ccc) would be applicable was taken up and the court held that exemption was only for properties specified under the Act. The court held that Punjab Land Revenue Act was a complete Code providing for modes and machinery for recovery of arrears of revenue and the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to attachment and sale in revenue recovery proceedings. The award which is passed by Tribunal, which obtains a status through a certificate issued by the Collector as land revenue payable, ought to therefore obtain a different treatment and the trappings of the Civil Procedure Code and limitations contained therein cannot, therefore, be attracted. This point was also subsequently decided under the Motor Vehicles Act itself by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Vorghese v. Sunny, 2009 ACJ 2704 (Kerala), where the court held that execution of award by Tribunal after issuance of a certificate to the land recovery authority cannot avail to a judgment-debtor to plead for the benefit of section 60(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Code.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

C.R. No. 2000 of 2012

Decided On: 04.02.2013

Prem Chand Vs. Akashdeep

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Kannan, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/4481/2013,2014 ACJ 1467 (P&H).

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Whether the court can direct automatic cancellation of bail if accused is involved in a subsequent crime?

In my view, merely because of the reason that such a

condition was imposed while granting bail to the accused,

that would not result in the cancellation of bail

automatically. This is particularly because, since the order

of cancellation of bail is something that affects the personal

liberty of a person, which is guaranteed under Article 21 of

the Constitution of India, unless there are reasons justifying

or warranting such an order, the bail already granted

cannot be cancelled.

5. No doubt, involvement of an accused on bail in another

crime is a supervening circumstance that would justify

cancellation of bail. To reiterate, the question here is

whether such cancellation is automatic or can be done in a

mechanical manner. In my opinion, the answer to that

question can only be in the negative. While deciding bail

applications, the court has to always keep in mind the

fundamental principle that bail is the rule and jail, the

exception. Yet another pertinent aspect is that by cancelling

the bail, a person is being deprived of the liberty granted to

him after considering all relevant aspects. Therefore, very

cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for

cancellation of bail once granted and there cannot be a

mechanical cancellation of the bail. 

11. The mere registration of a subsequent crime against the

accused by itself cannot result in an automatic cancellation

of bail. Registration of a subsequent crime is only an

indication of an allegation or a complaint of the accused

having been involved in a subsequent crime. The

presumption of innocence available to the accused in the

second crime, the right to liberty as a fundamental right

under Article 21 of the Constitution of India which

envelopes every provision of the Code of Criminal

Procedure are factors which cannot be forgotten by the

Court when called upon to cancel the bail. The possibility of

false accusations being alleged with oblique motives also

cannot be ignored. The nature of the subsequent offence and

the persons against whom the offence is alleged to have

been committed, the stage of the case wherein cancellation

is sought are also factors that require appreciation. Apart

from the above, while arriving at the conclusion to cancel

the bail, the Court must also consider whether the accused

had misused the liberty granted in such a manner that it has

a tendency to interfere with the due course of the

administration of justice. Thus, every case presents a unique

situation and close scrutiny ought to be indulged in to

identify whether overwhelming circumstances are indeed

present in the subsequent crime which necessitates the

cancellation of bail earlier granted.

12. As held in Dolat Ram and Others v. State of Haryana

[(1995) 1 SCC 349] very cogent and overwhelming

circumstances are necessary to cancel the bail already

granted and that bail once granted should not be cancelled

in a mechanical manner without considering whether the

supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer

conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his

freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial.

13. Further, the decision in P. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) does not imply that on violation of any of the conditions of bail, there should be an automatic cancellation. A perusal of the judgments referred to hereinabove would show

that no condition for the automatic cancellation of bail can be imposed while granting bail. The only condition that can be imposed is that the Investigating Agency/complainant would be at liberty to move an application for cancellation of bail which would be adjudicated upon in accordance with law.

In fact, bail once granted cannot be cancelled automatically and in a mechanical manner. There must be cogent and overwhelming circumstances necessary to cancel the bail once granted. Mere violation of the bail conditions would not be sufficient to cancel the bail. The Court must be satisfied that it is necessary to cancel the same keeping in view various factors. In the instant case, however, the bail has been cancelled automatically without examining any circumstances whatsoever one of which would have been that in the two other cases registered against the petitioner,she had been granted the concession of bail prior to her bail being cancelled in the instant case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-35903-2023

RAJIYA Vs STATE OF HARYANA

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASJIT SINGH BEDI

Date of Decision: 21.12.2023.

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Whether wife can claim streedhan in proceeding U/S 27 of Hindu Marriage Act?

 That a wife has an independent right to recover "Stridhan " by filing a civil suit or by invoking any other independent remedy under the common law, can be no ground to oust the special jurisdiction conferred upon the matrimonial Court under Section 27 of the Act. There appears to be explicit legislative intendment behind Section 27 of the Act that all ancillary and allied disputes between a husband and wife should also be resolved along with the main controversy. Only the items with a definite life span like the clothes, shoes or other wearables, can fall within the scope of 'exclusive property' of either the husband or the wife and not the other valuable assets which can be utilized by any one of them. Traditionally, the gold ornaments are considered to be a valuable property and an addition to the joint assets of a family and, thus, can not be excluded from the purview of Section 27 of the Act even if it is a part of "Stridhan". The aforesaid conclusion stands fortified by the views taken by their Lordships of the Apex Court in Balkrishna Ramchandra Kadam's case (supra) where the wife's claim for return of jewelry was not turned down on the ground that it was an " Stridhan " or that a petition under Section 27 of the Act for recovery of those items was not maintainable, as also in Pratibha Rani's case (supra).

{Para 19}

20.A perusal of the list (Ex.PA) reveals that the "ornaments" include items like a 'gold ring' given to the appellant (Sr. No. 18 of the list). Similarly, several other items like the Television, Stablizer, Wall Clock, Alarm, Wrist Watch, Iron Press, Transistor, Table Fan and Suit case etc. are of common and joint use, though most of the jewelry items, (mentioned in the said list Ex.PA) are those which might be exclusively belonging to the respondent. However, all such items having been given by the parents of the respondent at or about the time of marriage, the same can not be segregated to compel the respondent to seek recovery thereof through multifarious legal proceedings.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

F.A.O. No. 159-M of 1995

Decided On: 11.08.2006

Subhash Chander Rohila Vs. Asha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/0657/2006.

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Can the court call a witness in a criminal case on an application filed by a third party U/S 311 of the CrPC?

In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner-Company is neither the complainant nor is a victim but is a telecasting company who had conducted a sting operation and the video was telecasted which bearing has got direct bearing upon the subject matter of the present FIR. This Court is of the view that the subject matter of the telecast goes to the root of the matter. The scope of Section 311 Cr.P.C is very wide as has been so held in a plethora of judgments as discussed above. The journalist namely Abhishek who has been summoned as a prosecution witness is not an authorized person, according to the petitioner-Company, whereas the Deputy General Manager namely Arunesh Kumar is an authorised person to issue a certificate and prove the same under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act vide Annexure P-7 which is an authorization letter. Therefore, this Court is of the view that even if the petitioner is not a victim nor complainant but he could have certainly filed application under Section 311 Cr.P.C on the basis of facts and circumstances. {Para 26}

27. It is therefore held that for the purpose of filing of application under Section 311 Cr.P.C, it is not necessary that the applicant has to be either complainant or prosecution or victim or a listed witness. The provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C can be invoked by any other person who is able to show that the evidence of witness sought to be examined will be necessary for just decision of the case. Rather, a persual of Section 311 Cr.P.C would show that it is the duty of Court to apply its mind to ascertain as to whether testimony of person sought to be summoned is required for just decision of the case. However in such like cases, power has to be exercised in a very careful, diligent and judicious manner for which cogent and strong reasons should be recorded.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-52970-2022 (O&M)

Bennett Coleman and Company Limited Vs State of Haryana and others

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI

Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:046881

Date of Decision: 29.03.2023

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Whether an offence U/S 153-A of IPC is made out against the accused if the prosecution has failed to show that he intended to cause disorder or incite people to violence?

I have gone through the entire case record including the challan prepared under Section 173 Cr.P.C and considered the submissions of respective counsel for the parties. It is true that except wearing a T-shirt with a photograph of a leader of his own party by the petitioner, no overt act has been attributed against him and there is no material whatsoever even to infer that the petitioner was acting under any pre-oriented plan as alleged or to suggest that by words either spoken or written or by any other means as enumerated under Section 153-A IPC, he incited anyone to create violence or promote communal hatred. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and there is no existence of mens rea for the prosecution to succeed . Therefore, having found no prima facie material against the petitioner to constitute an offence punishable under Section 153-A IPC, this Court is of the view that the benefit of bail can be extended to him.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-45796-2022 (O&M)

KARAMJIT SINGH GILL Vs STATE OF PUNJAB 

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL

DECIDED ON: 13th DECEMBER, 2022

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Whether the court can release accused on default bail in NDPS Case if prosecution has filed chargesheet without report of FSL?

 It is no doubt correct that Hon’ble the Supreme Court and also a full Bench of this Court have held that a challan even if not accompanied by a report of the Chemical Examiner or of the expert cannot be said to be incomplete. However, it needs to be highlighted that the said cases did not pertain to an offence under the NDPS Act. A case under the NDPS Act can only survive in case the prosecution is able to establish that the article recovered is indeed a contraband and which can only be established on the basis of its chemical examination, which is normally got done through FSL established by the Government. In other words, the report of the FSL forms the foundation of the case of prosecution and in case the same is not there the entire case of prosecution falls to ground. {Para 9}

10. On the other hand, in other cases say any injury or hurt or murder case under IPC, even the ocular version coupled with some medical evidence or some other circumstantial evidence may suffice to bring home the guilt of the accused. Though, a report of an expert, if sought, pertaining to some blood stains or comparison of handwriting, ballistic report, could be helpful to establish the case of the prosecution for such offences under IPC or some other Acts but cannot be said to be indispensable in each and every case and even in the absence of such reports, the prosecution may well be able to establish its case. As such, the contention of the petitioner that the report of FSL form very foundation of the case of prosecution and is an integral part of the challan cannot be brushed aside.

11. As noticed above, there are some conflicting judgments of this Court and the matter stands referred to a Division Bench and is still

subjudice. In this context a reference may also be made to an order of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed on 9.11.2022 in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos. 8164-8166/2021 titled as Mohd. Arbaz and others Versus State of NCT of Delhi which has been cited by learned counsel for petitioner to contend that the matter as regards the challan inNDPS cases being incomplete on account of absence of FSL report is also being adjudicated by Hon’ble Apex Court. The said order dated 9.11.2022 of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Arbaz’s case reads as follows :-

“In all these petitions the question that arises for consideration is

relating to the completeness of the charge sheet in accordance with law if the same is filed without the CFSL Report. The matter would require detailed consideration. In the meantime, all parties to complete their pleadings. For the present, though the issue of default bail is to be considered in the petitions since it would require some time, without reference to that aspect of the matter, keeping in view that the petitioners in SLP(Crl.) Nos. 6876- 6877/2022, SLP (Crl.) No. 532/2022 and SLP (Crl.)No. 5190/2022 are still in custody, we order that they be released on bail subject to the conditions to be imposed by the concerned trial courts. 

 In The High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana

At Chandigarh

CRR-1046-2022 (O&M)

Mukesh Pal @ Makha Vs  State of Haryana 

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GURVINDER SINGH GILL

Author: GURVINDER SINGH GILL, J . 

Date of Decision:- 29.11.2022

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Under which circumstances can the court set aside temporary injunction order granted after hearing both parties?

The order which has been vacated by the Trial Court is an ad interim order and not a temporary order on injunction which had been adjudicated upon by the Trial Court after hearing the parties in its proper perspective. Order XXXIX Rule (4) reads as under:

"4. Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.-

Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order:

Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in an affidavit supporting such application a party has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in the interest of justice:

Provided further that where an order for injunction has been passed after giving a party an opportunity of being heard, the order shall not be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of that party except where such discharge, variation or setting side has been necessitated by a change in the circumstances, or unless the Court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship to that party."

16. A perusal of the above would go on to show that the order of injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside by the Court on an application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order. The proviso further provides that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit supporting such application, a party knowingly makes a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular whereby the temporary injunction was obtained by way of false and misleading statement and the same was granted without notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction. Similarly, the second proviso further provides that the injunction order can be set aside in changed circumstances or in case of causing undue hardship to a party.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CR-1857-2020, CR-1858-2020 and CR-1859-2020

Decided On: 03.09.2020

Ravinder and Ors.  Vs.  Gram Panchayat, Damla and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/0787/2020

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Can the court continue interim relief to the plaintiff if the defendant fails to file his written statement?

 Admittedly the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC is still pending consideration, since the written statement had not been filed by the parties disclosing their true stand. In such circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that interim protection which has been granted shall be liable to be continued, though the present revision petition is being disposed of. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Civil Revision No. 1556 of 2021 (O&M)

Decided On: 06.09.2021

Sainik Textile Mills (P) Ltd.  Vs.  Prestige Developers and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/1809/2021

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Whether high court can quash prosecution for an offence under POCSO Act if compromise is done by parents of victim child?

 Another thing that needs to be noticed is that in the case of

child the compromise affected between the parents cannot be recognized. Any agreement/compromise executed by the child (till the age of majority) himself/herself as in the present case will be void ab initio and thus cannot be accorded validity. Parents cannot be allowed to compromise the dignity of a child by an agreement. Where ever and whenever in a society governed by rule of law the question will arise: who will protect from the

protector? The only and obvious answer will be-LAW. “Children are human beings to whom respect is due, superior to us by reason of this innocence and of the greater possibilities of their future”

Maria Montessori

It is the aforesaid ethos that stands embedded in the

Constitution of India by the founding fathers and the POCSO Act

recognizes this.

The compromise affected by the child and/or her parents,

compromising the dignity of the child cannot be raised to a status where it defeats the very object of the Act. Power granted under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised to defeat the purpose of an enactment enacted in discharge of Constitutional mandate as well as obligation arising out of International Conventions.

Consequently, this Court finds that the FIR registered for

offences punishable under the Act cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M- 3397-2021(O&M)

Surinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ JAIN

Decided on: May 11, 2022

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Whether the court can refuse to execute decree for permanent injunction by holding that DH should file suit for partition?

 A perusal of the judgement dated 24.08.2002 passed by the Trial

Court while decreeing the suit for permanent injunction filed by the petitioner shows that at no point was a defence raised by respondent no.1 that he is a cosharer in the suit land. Infact, no such plea having been raised by respondent no.1 is discernable from the said judgement and respondent no.1 only raised pleas on

behalf of Balwant Singh Goraya who was not even a party to the suit. The Trial Court while deciding issue no.1 categorically held that the petitioner was in possession of the suit property. This finding was upheld by the lower Appellate Court and this Court. The respondent no.1 withdrew his SLP and did not challenge this finding. That being the position, this Court is unable to accept the findings recorded by the Executing Court that the respondent no.1 is a co-sharer in the suit land. Further, once the suit for permanent injunction of the petitioner stood decreed the Executing Court could not render the said decree nugatory byholding that the petitioner ought to file a suit for partition. The impugned order passed by the Executing Court shows that it (the Executing Court) permitted the respondent no.1 to set-up a case beyond that pleaded by him in the suit itself.The Executing Court clearly traversed beyond the decree dated 24.08.2002 which it was called upon to execute and exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it.

The petitioner had filed the suit for permanent injunction against respondent no.1 which stands decreed in his favour and the said decree stands affirmed right upto the Supreme court. The suit for permanent injunction was filed on the basis, of the sale deed dated 02.02.2002 and the petitioner was held to be in possession of the suit land. Even if it was to be assumed and presumed that the land is unpartitioned, which was neither pleaded nor proved in the suit, even then the petitioner would have a right to enjoy the land in his possession to the extent of his share. Even before this Court the case of respondent no.1 is not that the petitioner is wanting to construct anything beyond the area sold to him but he apprehends that the petitioner would stake ownership in the adjoining land. 

The Executing Court has also relied upon certain revenue documents to non-suit the petitioner. However, these revenue documents were not part of any evidence and were merely produced by respondent no.1. Without any issues having been framed and evidence being led, the Executing Court could not accept any document merely produced by any party. The procedure adopted by the Executing Court cannot be accepted in our jurisprudence. The reasoning given by the Executing Court while allowing the objections filed by respondent no.1 is wholly unsustainable in law.

The Executing Court has further held that respondent no.1 is a cosharer in the suit property and, hence, the only remedy with the

petitioner/decree-holder would be to file for partition. Even if it was to be assumed for the sake of arguments that respondent no.1 is a co-sharer in the suit property, the petitioner having been held to being in possession of Plot Nos.7 and 8 right-up to the Supreme Court, he (the petitioner) would have every right to enjoy his property. It is well settled that a co-owner in exclusive possession of joint property or its portion can raise construction on the portion in his possession as long as it does not amount to ouster of the other co-owners. The construction, if any, would at best be subject to the outcome of the partition. However, in the present case the petitioner cannot be termed to be a co-owner since respondent no.1 neither pleaded nor proved this in the suit and neither did

he plead or prove his ownership over any part of the suit land.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

CR-1719-2019 (O&M)

Yoginder Kumar Sud Vs Thakur Rajiv Singh and Another 

CORAM : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ALKA SARIN

Date of decision : 18.04.2022

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