Showing posts with label weapons. Show all posts
Showing posts with label weapons. Show all posts

Thursday, 28 December 2017

Whether prosecution case can be disbelieved if weapon of offence is not recovered?

In any case, it is an established proposition of law that mere non-recovery of weapon does not falsify the prosecution case where there is ample unimpeachable ocular evidence. [See Lakhan Sao v. State of Bihar and Anr. MANU/SC/0359/2000 : (2000) 9 SCC 82; State of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/1017/2011 : (2011) 9 SCC 115 and Manjit Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0936/2013 : (2013) 12 SCC 746].
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1482 of 2013

Decided On: 20.10.2016

 Yogesh Singh Vs.  Mahabeer Singh and Ors.

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Tuesday, 13 June 2017

When culpable homicide will not amount to Murder?

The weapon used in the fight between the parties is ‘Kirpan’ which is used by ‘Amritdhari Sikhs’ as a spiritual tool. In the present case, the Kirpan used by the appellant-accused was a small Kirpan. In order to find out whether the instrument or manner of retaliation was cruel and dangerous in its nature, it is clear from the deposition of the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased that stab wounds were present on the right side of the chest and of the back of abdomen which implies that in the spur of the moment, the appellant-accused inflicted injuries using Kirpan though not on the vital organs of the body of the deceased but he stabbed the deceased which proved fatal. The injury intended by the accused and actually inflicted by him is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not, must be determined in each case on the basis of the facts and circumstances. In the instant case, the injuries caused were the result of blow with a small Kirpan and it cannot be presumed that the accused had intended to cause the inflicted injuries. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. It is clear from the materials on record that the incident was in a sudden fight and we are of the opinion that the appellant-accused had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this Exception provided he has not acted cruelly.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(Before A.K. Sikri and R.K. Agrawal, JJ.)
Surain Singh .
v.
The State of Punjab .
Criminal Appeal No. 2284 of 2009
Decided on April 10, 2017
Citation: 2017 SCC ONLINE SC364
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Thursday, 6 April 2017

Whether recovery Evidence can be doubted on ground that there was paper sealing of recovered weapons?

All recovery panchanamas by which weapons were recovered at the instance of appellant/accused shows that P.W.15 P.I. Suryawanshi, P.W.13-A.P.I. Bhalsing and P.W.12-A.P.I. Vibhandik have used paper seals while sealing bloodstained weapons recovered at the instance of appellants. Cross-examination of P.W.15-P.I. Suryawanshi throws light on this aspect. It makes it clear that those weapons were separately wrapped in separate papers and then labels under signatures of panchas and investigating officers were affixed on those bundles. This procedure is sought to be criticized by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the matter of Malhari Gopal Bhoval & Ors. (Supra). It is observed in the said case that non-sealing of articles at the spot is a serious infirmity because possibility of tampering with said articles cannot be ruled out. However, in the case in hand, it cannot be said that recovered weapons were not sealed. In-fact, perusal of contents of duly proved recovery panchanamas as well as the evidence coming on record from cross-examination of P.W.15-P.I. Suryawanshi goes to show that weapons were separately wrapped in papers and paper seals containing signatures of Investigating Officers and panch witnesses were affixed to those bundles. There is no cross-examination of official witnesses seizing those weapons to demonstrate that when those weapons were sent for chemical analysis, paper seals were in broken condition. On the contrary, C.A. reports (Exh. 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169 and 170) shows that the Forensic Science Laboratory has received sealed packets with seals intact. There is no rule of law that sealing must be done by wax seal and sealing by paper seal is not permissible. Ultimately, there should be a reasonable doubt about tampering of seized bloodstained articles/weapons. Such doubt cannot be an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt. It should be a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. When C.A. report shows that seized articles were received by the Forensic Science Laboratory in sealed condition with seals in-tact, then it cannot be said that there was possibility of tampering with seized articles/weapons. We, therefore, are unable to accept arguments of learned Counsel for appellants that because of non-sealing of articles/weapons by a wax seal, seized weapons were susceptible to tampering and therefore C.A. Reports are of no use to infer guilt of appellants.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Criminal Appeal Nos. 109 and 110 of 2011
Decided On: 10.01.2017
 Pravin Dhondiram Chorge and Ors.
Vs.
 The State of Maharashtra
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:V.K. Tahilramani and A.M. Badar, JJ.
Citation: 2017 ALLMR(CRI)1196
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Monday, 18 July 2016

Whether prosecution U/S 3 of Arms Act is tenable without sanction of district magistrate?

Shri   R.H.   Raolani,   advocate   for   the   appellant   No.1   has
submitted that the Sessions Court has committed an error in convicting the
appellant No.1 for the offence under Section 3 read with Section 25 of the
Arms Act, 1959, overlooking the provisions of Section 39 of the Arms Act
which lay down that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person in
respect of any offence under Section 3 without the previous sanction of the
District Magistrate.  In support of his submission, the learned advocate has
relied on the judgment given in the case of  Kamalsingh Vs. State of Mah.,
reported in 2005(1) Mh.L.J. 218.  

It is undisputed that the prosecution is launched against the
appellant No.1 for the offence under Section 3 read with Section 25 of the
Arms Act, 1959 without there being sanction of the District Magistrate.  The
learned A.P.P. has not been able to counter the submission made on behalf of
the appellant No.1  relying on the provisions of Section 39 of the Arms Act.
In the facts of the case, it has to be held that the conviction of the appellant
No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 3 read with Section 25 of the
Arms Act is unsustainable and it has to be set aside.  
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 27  OF 2000
Viransingh @ Simansingh S/o.
Attarsingh Tomar,
 V
State of Maharashtra,

               CORAM : Z.A.HAQ, J.
               DATED   : MAY 11, 2016.
Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)2616
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Sunday, 30 August 2015

Leading Supreme Court Judgment on basic concept of possession in criminal law

 When one conceives of possession, it appears in the strict sense that the concept of possession is basically connected to "actus of physical control and custody". Attributing this meaning in the strict sense would be understanding the factum of possession in a narrow sense. With the passage of time there has been a gradual widening of the concept and the quintessential meaning of the word possession. The classical theory of English law on the term "possession" is fundamentally dominated by Savigny- ian "corpus" and "animus" doctrine. Distinction has also been made in "possession in fact" and "possession in law" and sometimes between "corporeal possession" and "possession of right" which is called "incorporeal possession". Thus, there is a degree of flexibility in the use of the said term and that is why the word possession can be usefully defined and understood with reference to the contextual purpose for the said expression. The word possession may have one meaning in one connection and another meaning in another.
9. The term "possession" consists of two elements. First, it refers to the corpus or the physical control and the second, it refers to the animus or intent which has reference to exercise of the said control. One of the definitions of possession given in Black's Law dictionary is as follows: "Having control over a thing with the intent to have and to exercise such control. Oswald v. Weigel[6]. The detention and control or the manual or ideal custody, of anything which may be the subject of property, for one's use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the proprietor of a qualified right in it, and either held personally or by another who exercises it in one's place and name. Act or state of possessing. That condition of facts under which one can exercise his power over a corporeal thing at his pleasure to the exclusion of all other persons. The law, in general, recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is then in actual possession of it. A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it. The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint."
In the said dictionary, the term "possess" in the context of narcotic drug law means:-
"Term "possess." Under narcotic drug laws, means actual control, care and management of the drug. Collini v. State[7]. Defendant 'possesses' controlled substance when defendant knows of substance's presence, substance is immediately accessible, and defendant exercises "dominion or control" over substance. State v. Hornaday[8]."
And again "Possession as necessary for conviction of offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual, U.S. v. Craig[9]; as well as joint or exclusive, Garvey v. State[10]. The defendants must have had dominion and control over the contraband with knowledge of its presence and character. U.S, v. Morando- Alvarez[11].
Possession, as an element of offense of stolen goods, is not limited to actual manual control upon or about the person, but extends to things under one's power and dominion. McConnell v. State[12].
Possession as used in indictment charging possession of stolen mail may mean actual possession or constructive possession. U.S. v. Ellison[13].
To constitute "possession" of a concealable weapon under statue proscribing possession of a concealable weapon by a felon, it is sufficient that defendant have constructive possession and immediate access to the weapon. State v. Kelley[14]."
10. In Stroud's dictionary, the term possession has been defined as follows:
""Possession" (Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964 (c. 64), s.1 (1)). A person does not lose "possession" of an article which is mislaid or thought erroneously to have been destroyed or disposed of, if, in fact, it remains in his care and control (R. v. Buswell[15]).
11. Dr. Harris, in his essay titled "The Concept of Possession in English Law[16]" while discussing the various rules relating to possession has stated that "possession" is a functional and relative concept, which gives the Judges some discretion in applying abstract rule to a concrete set of facts. The learned author has suggested certain factors which have been held to be relevant to conclude whether a person has acquired possession for the purposes of a particular rule of law. Some of the factors enlisted by him are;
 (a) degree of physical control exercised by person over a thing, 
(b) knowledge of the person claiming possessory rights over a thing, about the attributes and qualities of the thing,
 (c) the persons' intention in regard to the thing, that is, 'animus possessionis' and 'animus domini',

(d) possession of land on which the thing is claimed is lying; also the relevant intention of the occupier of a premises on which the thing is lying thereon to exclude others from enjoying the land and anything which happens to be lying there; and Judges' concept of the social purpose of the particular rule relied upon by the plaintiff. 

The learned author has further proceeded to state that quite naturally the policies behind different possessory rules will vary and it would justify the courts giving varying weight to different factors relevant to possession according to the particular rule in question. According to Harris, the Judges have at the back of their mind a perfect pattern in which the possessor has complete, exclusive and unchallenged physical control over the subject; full knowledge of its existence; attributes and location, and a manifest intention to act as its owner and exclude all others from it. As a further statement he elucidates that courts realise that justice and expediency compel constant modification of the ideal pattern. The person claiming possessory rights over a thing may have a very limited degree of physical control over the object or he may have no intention in regard to an object of whose existence he is unaware of, though he exercises control over the same or he may have clear intention to exclude other people from the object, though he has no physical control over the same. In all this variegated situation, states Harris, the person concerned may still be conferred the possessory rights. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid principles and passages is that over the years, it has been seen that courts have refrained from adopting a doctrinaire approach towards defining possession. A functional and flexible approach in defining and understanding the possession as a concept is acceptable and thereby emphasis has been laid on different possessory rights according to the commands and justice of the social policy. Thus, the word "possession" in the context of any enactment would depend upon the object and purpose of the enactment and an appropriate meaning has to be assigned to the word to effectuate the said object.

Supreme Court of India

Mohan Lal vs State Of Rajasthan on 17 April, 2015

Bench: Dipak Misra, S.A. Bobde
Citation;(2015) 6 SCC 222.
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