LLM Notes: The Interrelation Between Criminology, Criminal Law, and Penology in Indian Law

The criminal justice system in India is a complex framework that integrates criminology, criminal law, and penology to address crime effectively. These three disciplines are interdependent, each contributing uniquely to understanding, preventing, and addressing criminal behavior. Below is an exploration of their interrelation within the Indian legal context.

Criminology: The Study of Crime and Criminal Behavior

Criminology is the scientific study of crime, its causes, consequences, and prevention. It examines the psychological, sociological, and environmental factors that influence criminal behavior. In India, criminology plays a pivotal role in:

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The Influence of Criminology, Criminal Law, and Penology on the Enactment of New Criminal Laws BNS, BNSS and BSA

 The enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) marks a significant transformation in India's criminal justice system. These new laws, effective from July 1, 2024, replace the colonial-era Indian Penal Code (IPC), Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and Indian Evidence Act, respectively. Their development reflects a profound interrelation between criminology, criminal law, and penology, which has shaped these legislative reforms to address contemporary challenges in crime and justice.

Criminology's Role in Legislative Reform

Criminology provides essential insights into the nature of crime and the factors that contribute to criminal behavior. In the context of the new laws:

- Understanding Crime Trends: Criminological research has highlighted the rise of organized crime, cybercrime, and other modern offenses. The BNS specifically addresses these issues by defining organized crime comprehensively and introducing stricter penalties to deter such activities.

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Whether concept of cause of action is applicable to criminal law?

 The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.

While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.

Supreme Court of India

Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors vs Inspector Of Police, Chennai & Anr on 17 August, 2004

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Supreme court guidelines modifying practice of recording of evidence as mandated in the case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal

  It was pointed out by learned amici that the practice adopted predominantly in all trials is guided by the decision of this court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (2001) 3 SCC 1 with respect to objections regarding questions to be put to witnesses. This court had termed the practice of deciding the objections, immediately as “archaic” and indicated what it felt was an appropriate course:

“It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage,

whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in

evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such

objection. But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial

court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material

from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and

disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or revisional court, when the

same question is re-canvassed, could take a different view on the

admissibility of that material in such cases the appellate court would be

deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record

by the trial court. In such a situation the higher court may have to send the

case back to the trial court for recording that evidence and then to dispose

of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on

account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised

through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady

and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or re-moulded to

give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial

proceedings.

When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this:

Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding

the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can

make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively

as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence)

subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final

judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is

sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from

consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course.

(However, we make it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of

stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before

proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above

can be followed.) The above procedure, if followed, will have two

advantages. First is that the time in the trial court, during evidence taking

stage, would not be wasted on account of raising such objections and the court can continue to examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long hours, if not days. Second is that the superior court, when the same objection is re-canvassed and reconsidered in appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by the trial court regarding that objection, without bothering to remit the case to the trial court again for fresh disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery or expenses.”{Para 12}

13. It was argued by amici that the procedure, whereby the courts record answers to all questions, regardless of objections, leads to prolonged and lengthy cross examination, and more often than not, irrelevant facts having no bearing on the charge

or the role of the accused, are brought on record, which often result in great prejudice. It is pointed out that due to the practice mandated in Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra), such

material not only enters the record, but even causes prejudice, which is greatly multiplied when the appellate court has to decide the issue. Frequently, given that trials are prolonged, the trial courts do not decide upon these objections at the final stage, as neither counsel addresses arguments. Therefore, it is submitted that the rule in Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra) requires reconsideration.

15. Apart from Section 148, there are other provisions of the Evidence Act (Sections 149-154) which define the ground rules for cross examination. During questioning, no doubt, the counsel for the party seeking cross examination has considerable leeway; cross examination is not confined to matters in issue, but extends to all relevant facts. However, if the court is not empowered to rule, during the proceeding, whether a line of questioning is relevant, the danger lies in irrelevant, vague and speculative answers entering the record. Further, based on the answers to what (subsequently turn out to be

irrelevant, vague or otherwise impermissible questions) more questions might be asked and answered. If this process were to be repeated in case of most witnesses, the record would be cluttered with a jumble of irrelevant details, which at best can be distracting,

and at worst, prejudicial to the accused. Therefore, this court is of opinion that the view in Bipin Shantilal Panchal should not be considered as binding. The presiding officer therefore, should decide objections to questions, during the course of the proceeding, or failing it at the end of the deposition of the concerned witness. This will result in decluttering the record, and, what is more, also have a salutary effect of preventing

frivolous objections. In given cases, if the court is of the opinion that repeated objections have been taken, the remedy of costs, depending on the nature of obstruction, and the proclivity of the line of questioning, may be resorted to. Accordingly, the practice mandated in Bipin Shantilal Panchal shall stand modified in the above terms.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

SUO MOTO WRIT (CRL) NO.(S) 1/2017

IN RE: TO ISSUE CERTAIN GUIDELINES REGARDING INADEQUACIES AND DEFICIENCIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS  Vs THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 

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Leading Supreme court judgment laying down procedure for expeditious trial of Criminal cases

 The court is of the opinion that the Draft Rules of Criminal Practice, 2021, (which are annexed to the present order, and shall be read as part of it) should be hereby finalized in terms of the above discussion. The following directions are hereby issued:

(a) All High Courts shall take expeditious steps to incorporate the said Draft Rules, 2021 as part of the rules governing criminal trials, and ensure that the existing rules, notifications, orders and practice directions are suitably modified, and promulgated (wherever necessary through the Official Gazette) within 6 months from today. If the state government’s co-operation is necessary in this regard, the approval of the concerned department or departments, and the formal notification of the said Draft Rules, shall be made within the said period of six months.

(b) The state governments, as well as the Union of India (in relation to investigating agencies in its control) shall carry out consequential amendments to their police and other manuals, within six months from today. This direction applies, specifically in respect of Draft Rules 1-3. The appropriate forms and guidelines shall be brought into force, and all agencies instructed accordingly, within six months from today. {Para 19}

Supreme Court directs High Courts To Adopt Draft Rules Of Criminal Practice Within 6 Months

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

SUO MOTO WRIT (CRL) NO.(S) 1/2017

IN RE: TO ISSUE CERTAIN GUIDELINES REGARDING INADEQUACIES AND DEFICIENCIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 

Vs THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 

Coram: S.A. BOBDE J, L. NAGESWARA RAO J, S. RAVINDRA BHAT J

Dated: April 20, 2021.

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Whether court in whose jurisdiction accused is apprehending arrest may apply for transit bail even if the offence is committed in another court's jurisdiction?

According to my view, the law laid down by the Division Bench

of this Court in N.K. Nayar’s case (supra) would then be applicable, wherein it has been observed -

“While considering the question as to whether the provisions of

Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Code, 1973 can be utilized by

this Court when the case or the contemplated criminal proceedings

would be in some other State, has held that, if arrest is likely to be

effected within the jurisdiction of this Court, the concerned person

should have the remedy of applying to this Court for anticipatory bail

even if offence might have been committed in some other State. It is

further observed that, consequently this Court would have jurisdiction

if a person is likely to be arrested at a place within the jurisdiction of

this Court.”

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

965 ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO.154 OF 2021

SHANTANU SHIVLAL MULUK Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI, J.

DATE : 16th FEBRUARY, 2021.

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Whether trial Judges have absolute discretion to prune or reject the list of witnesses submitted by the accused?

The above being the position, the decisions in Arivazhagan

or Santhosh Kumar cannot be understood to have held that the trial Judges have absolute discretion to prune or reject the list of witnesses submitted by the accused.

14. Going by the plain meaning of the words in Section 233(3)

and the settled legal position, the trial court is empowered to interfere with only when the court is convinced that the application seeking issuance of summons is submitted for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. In my considered opinion, the petitioner cannot be attributed with any such intention in having filed Annexures A2 and A3 and hence the interference with the list as per

Annexure A5 order cannot be sustained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 ANTONY ROSARIO FERNANDO Vs STATE OF KERALA

Coram: V.G.ARUN, J.

CRL.M.C.No. 19 of 2021

Dated this the 18th day of January, 2021

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Whether the court can direct concurrent running of default sentences in cheque dishonour case?

Having considered the facts and circumstances of the present case, offence involved, sentences awarded, period of detention of the petitioner as on date and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Madan Lal, V.K.Bansal vs. State of Haryana & Ors., Shyam Pal vs. Dayawati Besoya & Anr. and Ammavasai & Anr. vs. Inspector of Police & Ors. (supra), I am of the considered view that it would not be inconsistent with the administration of criminal justice if the petitioner is allowed the benefit of discretion contained in section 427 of the Code to meet the ends of justice. However, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.K.Bansal vs. State of Haryana & Ors. and Shyam Pal vs. Dayawati Besoya & Anr. (supra), the direction for concurrent running of sentences would be limited only to the substantive sentences alone.

In such circumstances, the present misc. petition is allowed and it is ordered that the substantive sentences awarded to the petitioner in the above referred 32 cases would run concurrently, however, the petitioner will have to serve default sentences as the provisions of section 427 of the CrPC do not permit a direction for concurrent running of substantive sentences with the sentences awarded in default of payment of fine/compensation. The sentences, which the petitioner has been directed to undergo in default of payment of fine/compensation shall not be effected by this direction and if the petitioner has not paid the fine/compensation as directed by the trial courts, the said sentences would run consecutively.

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT

JODHPUR

S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 947/2020

Lakshmi Narayan Songara Vs  State,

HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

Order : 21/01/2021

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Supreme Court: Court Hearing First Appeal In Criminal Matter is Required To Form Its Own Opinion

We would like to say that the First Appeal in

criminal matter requires the court to form his opinion on

the basis of the evidence on record and the opinion of

the Trial Court. A perusal of the impugned order shows

that the facts have been set out followed by what each

witness has deposed. Thereafter, all that is stated is

as under:

“In view of the above, we find that the

prosecution has been successful in proving guilt of

the accused-appellant, by adducing cogent and

reliable evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt.

Hence, from the circumstances brought on record

by the prosecution, the guilt of the accusedappellant

with regard to the commission of crime inquestion

stands duly established.”

The aforesaid is followed by dismissal of the appeal.

We are of the view that this can hardly meet the

requirements of law for considering the First Appeal in

criminal matters and thus, have no option but to set

aside the impugned order and remit the matter back for

consideration by the High Court on merits as a First

Appeal in a Section 302 case of the I.P.C. in accordance

with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.688 OF 2020

CHANDRABHAN SINGH VS. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN 

Dated: October 16, 2020.

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What is the difference between the jurisdiction of the court under civil law and criminal law?

 While the question of territorial

jurisdiction in civil cases, revolves mainly around (i) cause of

action; or (ii) location of the subject matter of the suit or (iii) the

residence of the defendant etc., according as the case may be,

the question of territorial jurisdiction in criminal Cases revolves

around (i) place of commission of the offence or (ii) place where

the consequence of an act, both of which constitute an offence,

ensues or (iii) place where the accused was found or (iv) place

where the victim was found or (v) place where the property in

respect of which the offence was committed, was found or (vi)

place where the property forming the subject matter of an

offence was required to be returned or accounted for, etc.,

according as the case may be.

19. While jurisdiction of a civil court is determined by (i)

territorial and (ii) pecuniary limits, the jurisdiction of a criminal

court is determined by (i) the offence and/or (ii) the offender.

But the main difference between the question of jurisdiction

raised in civil cases and the question of jurisdiction arising in

criminal cases, is twofold.

(i) The first is that the stage at which an objection as to

jurisdiction, territorial or pecuniary, can be raised, is

regulated in civil proceedings by Section 21 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. There is no provision in the Criminal

Procedure Code akin to Section 21 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

(ii) The second is that in civil proceedings, a plaint can be

returned, under Order VII, Rule 10, CPC, to be presented to

the proper court, at any stage of the proceedings. But in

criminal proceedings, a limited power is available to a

Magistrate under section 201 of the Code, to return a

complaint. The power is limited in the sense (a) that it is

available before taking cognizance, as section 201 uses the

words “Magistrate who is not competent to take

cognizance” and (b) that the power is limited only to

complaints, as the word “complaint”, as defined by section 2(d),

does not include a “police report”.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO.456 OF 2019

KAUSHIK CHATTERJEE  Vs STATE OF HARYANA 

Dated: SEPTEMBER 30, 2020

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Whether Appellate Court and the Revisional Court may pass a direction, that sentence granted to accused to run concurrently?

 It is settled position of the law that the direction to run the sentence concurrently may be passed by the Trial Court, Appellate Court and the Revisional Court.

13. Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Mani & Anr. vs. State of Kerala, has held that "when no direction is given by the trial court that the sentences were to run concurrently, direction can be issued by the High Court under inherent powers even if the stage of exercising discretion under section 427(1) of the Code is over, in circumstances which would serve the purposes mentioned in Section 482".

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. A. 611/2018, Crl. M.A. 40714/2019 and Crl. M.B. 5926/2020

Decided On: 12.06.2020

 Pankaj Verma  Vs.   State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Suresh Kait, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1232/2020

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Whether date of birth mentioned in ADHAR CARD is conclusive?

The learned A.G.A. has submitted that the date of birth entered in an Aadhar Card has not been conferred any conclusive status by law and, therefore, it would be appropriate that this petition be disposed off by requiring the investigating agency to determine the age of the victim and record the statement of the victim and, thereafter, take appropriate action as per law.

6. Having perused the record. We do not find any other documentary evidence on the basis of which we could hold the victim to be an adult.  It is not provided by law that the date of birth entered in an Adhaar Card would be conclusive.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 24015 of 2019

Decided On: 22.11.2019

 Kishan Kumar  Vs. State of U.P. 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manoj Misra and Virendra Kumar Srivastava, JJ.

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Whether prosecution evidence can be disbelieved if there is no recovery of weapon of offence?

As there is clear eyewitness

account of the incident and none of the two eyewitnesses could be

shaken during crossexamination

and they had stuck to the

recollection of the facts relating to the incident, the mere fact that the

weapon of assault or the bullet was not recovered cannot demolish the

prosecution case. 

NON REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 935 OF 2011

PRABHASH KUMAR SINGH  Vs  THE STATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND) 

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Whether revision is maintainable if FIR is registered on basis of order passed by Magistrate U/S 156 of CRPC?

 We may make now a reference to Section 397 and Section 401 of the Code. The power of revision under Section 397 will have to be read with Section 398 of the Code. Firstly, we may note here that power of the High Court or the Sessions Court under sub Section 3 of Section 397 is of calling for the record of proceedings before any subordinate Criminal Court for the purposes of satisfying itself about correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed in any proceeding before such subordinate Court. Thus, the power under Section 397 is confined to testing the legality, validity and propriety of the orders passed by the Courts which are subordinate to the High Court or the Sessions Court, as the case may be. Secondly, on conjoint reading of Sections 398, 399 and 401, it follows that there is no power conferred on the Revisional Court to quash FIR registered by the Police in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 154 of the Code and the investigation carried out on the basis of that and to quash the criminal proceedings on the basis of charge sheet, which may be eventually filed. Therefore, in a case where an order made under Sub-section 3 of Section 156 culminates into registration of FIR, the Revisional Court is powerless to pass an order of quashing the FIR and quashing a charge sheet filed on the basis of the FIR. Therefore, in a case where on the basis of an order under sub Section 3 of Section 156 of the Code, FIR is registered, the remedy of revision under the Code for challenging the order under sub Section 3 of Section 156 will not be an efficacious remedy at all. For the reasons which we have recorded above, even in a case where a revision application is entertained against an order under sub Section 3 of Section 156 where FIR on the basis of the said order is already registered, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, neither this Court nor Sessions Court can quash the FIR and proceedings subsequent to the FIR, as what can be gone into by the Court in revisional jurisdiction is the issue of legality, validity and propriety of the orders passed by a subordinate Criminal Court.

14. Therefore, we accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the Applicants that a revision under Section 397 of the Code is not at all an efficacious remedy in view of registration of FIR on the basis of an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application No. 152 of 2015

Decided On: 04.05.2016

 Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and P.D. Naik, JJ.

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

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Basic concept of issue estoppel in criminal law

The principle of issue-estoppel is entirely a creature of judicial decisions, and has not been embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The rule of issue-estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been decided by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding reached in favour of an accused, such a finding constitutes an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as barring the reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact in a subsequent or different trial of the accused.

The rule of issue-estoppel relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent Court at a previous trial. The rule as to issue-estoppel applies where same issue was distinctly raised and inevitably decided in earlier proceedings between the same parties.

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Supreme Court: Magistrate should not act as post office while issuing process against accused U/S 202 of CRPC

 Considering the scope of amendment to Section 202
Cr.P.C., in Vijay Dhanuka and Others v. Najima Mamtaj and
Others (2014) 14 SCC 638, it was held as under:-
“12. ….The use of the expression “shall” prima facie makes the
inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, by the
Magistrate mandatory. The word “shall” is ordinarily mandatory
but sometimes, taking into account the context or the intention, it
can be held to be directory. The use of the word “shall” in all
circumstances is not decisive. Bearing in mind the aforesaid
principle, when we look to the intention of the legislature, we find
that it is aimed to prevent innocent persons from harassment by

unscrupulous persons from false complaints. Hence, in our
opinion, the use of the expression “shall” and the background
and the purpose for which the amendment has been brought, we
have no doubt in our mind that inquiry or the investigation, as the
case may be, is mandatory before summons are issued against
the accused living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
Magistrate.”
Since the amendment is aimed to prevent persons residing
outside the jurisdiction of the court from being harassed, it was
reiterated that holding of enquiry is mandatory. The purpose or
objective behind the amendment was also considered by this
Court in Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar and
Another (2017) 3 SCC 528 and National Bank of Oman v.
Barakara Abdul Aziz and Another (2013) 2 SCC 488.
34. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must
reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and
the law applicable thereto. The application of mind has to be
indicated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. Considering
the duties on the part of the Magistrate for issuance of summons
to accused in a complaint case and that there must be sufficient
indication as to the application of mind and observing that the
Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of
the complaint, in Mehmood Ul Rehman, this Court held as under:-

“22. ….the Code of Criminal Procedure requires speaking order
to be passed under Section 203 Cr.P.C. when the complaint is
dismissed and that too the reasons need to be stated only briefly.
In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in
taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him
and issue process as a matter of course. There must be
sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he
is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an
offence and when considered along with the statements
recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under
Section 202 Cr.P.C., if any, the accused is answerable before the
criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the
accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C., by issuing process for
appearance. The application of mind is best demonstrated by
disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. If there is no such
indication in a case where the Magistrate proceeds under
Sections 190/204 Cr.P.C., the High Court under Section 482
Cr.PC. is bound to invoke its inherent power in order to prevent
abuse of the power of the criminal court. To be called to appear
before the criminal court as an accused is serious matter
affecting one’s dignity, self-respect and image in society. Hence,
the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of
harassment.”
35. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v. Special Judicial
Magistrate and Others (1998) 5 SCC 749, the Supreme Court has
held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious
matter and that the order of the Magistrate summoning the
accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of

the case and law governing the issue. In para (28), it was held as
under:-
“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious
matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of
course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two
witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the
criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate
summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his
mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He
has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint
and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof
and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in
bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate
is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary
evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has
to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may
even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses
to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or
otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie
committed by all or any of the accused.”
The principle that summoning an accused in a criminal case is a
serious matter and that as a matter of course, the criminal case
against a person cannot be set into motion was reiterated in
GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Limited
(2013) 4 SCC 505.
36. To be summoned/to appear before the Criminal Court as an
accused is a serious matter affecting one’s dignity and reputation

in the society. In taking recourse to such a serious matter in
summoning the accused in a case filed on a complaint otherwise
than on a police report, there has to be application of mind as to
whether the allegations in the complaint constitute essential
ingredients of the offence and whether there are sufficient
grounds for proceeding against the accused. In Punjab National
Bank and Others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha 1993 Supp (1) SCC
499, it was held that the issuance of process should not be
mechanical nor should be made an instrument of oppression or
needless harassment.
37. At the stage of issuance of process to the accused, the
Magistrate is not required to record detailed orders. But based on
the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in
support of the same, the Magistrate is to be prima facie satisfied
that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the
accused.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 875 OF 20

BIRLA CORPORATION LIMITED Vs  ADVENTZ INVESTMENTS AND HOLDINGS .

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:May 09, 2019.

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Whether S 164 of Evidence Act is applicable to criminal proceeding?

 However his failure to do so, is, it appears to the learned Magistrate, a ground to deprive him of the right to use these documents as material for his defence. The learned Magistrate based this view on the provisions of Section 164, Evidence Act, which provides that when a party refuses to produce a document which he has had notice to produce he cannot afterwards use the document as evidence without the consent of the other party or the order of the Court. Accordingly, when in cross-examination the complainant was shown these books he refused to have anything to do with them or to answer any question with regard to them and in his refusal it is clear that he was supported by the learned Magistrate. In my opinion the learned Magistrate misunderstood the meaning and intention of Section 164. Speaking for myself, I am by no means convinced that Section 164 applies to criminals proceedings. Section 164 does not contemplate the production of documents for inspection. What it contemplates is that one party should call upon another in Court to produce a document of which, the first party has given the other notice to produce. It does not give him any right at any stage of the case to call upon his opponent to produce the document and use it or not as he sees fit. I do not myself see any indication in the section that the complainant can call for a document in this sense. We think that the learned Magistrate was wrong in not permitting the pleader for the defence to put these documents to the complainant and cross-examine him on them. The fact that the accused adopted an unreasonable attitude with regard to their production may be material when the time comes to consider as to what weight to be attached to them. We think that the learned Magistrate-was wrong in not permitting the documents upon which the accused claims to base the main part of his defence to be put to this particular witness for the prosecution. This seems to us to be a sufficient reason for setting aside the conviction. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

Decided On: 13.07.1932

Sham Das Kapur  Vs.  Emperor

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.R. Panckridge and M.C. Ghose, JJ.

Citation : AIR 1933 Cal 65

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Landmark Judgment of Supreme court on Re-examination of witness

 The very purpose of re-examination is to explain matters which have been brought down in cross-examination. Section 138 of the Evidence Act outlines the amplitude of re-examination. It reads thus:

Direction of re-examination. - The re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross- examination; and if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter.

17. There is an erroneous impression that re-examination should be confined to clarification of ambiguities which have been brought down in cross-examination. No doubt, ambiguities can be resolved through re-examination. But that is not the only function of the re-examiner. If the party who called the witness feels that explanation is required for any matter referred to in cross-examination he has the liberty to put any question in re-examination to get the explanation. The Public Prosecutor should formulate his questions for that purpose. Explanation may be required either when ambiguity remains regarding any answer elicited during cross-examination or even otherwise. If the Public Prosecutor feels that certain answers require more elucidation from the witness he has the freedom and the right to put such questions as he deems necessary for that purpose, subject of course to the control of the Court in accordance with the other provisions. But the Court cannot direct him to confine his questions to ambiguities alone which arose in cross-examination.

18. Even if the Public Prosecutor feels that new matters should be elicited from the witness he can do so, in which case the only requirement is that he must secure permission of the Court. If the Court thinks that such new matters are necessary for proving any material fact, courts must be liberal in granting permission to put necessary questions.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Crl.A. No. 61 of 1999 with Crl.A. No. 33 of 1999

Decided On: 21.09.1999

Rammi Alias Rameshwar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.T. Thomas and A.P. Misra, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1999 SC 3544

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When right to file appeal accrues to victim of crime?

The question is whether the right of appeal conferred on the victim by the proviso to Section 372 of the Code, has to be determined with regard to the date of order of acquittal or conviction of the Accused for a lesser offence or order providing inadequate compensation, or, with respect to the date of incident giving rise to the prosecution of the accused. What is conferred by the Amendment Act 5 of 2009 on the victim is a substantive right to prefer an appeal in certain circumstances as specified, and that alone. Act 5 of 2009 has come into effect from 31.12.2009. Such right is available to a victim where a judgment is rendered by the court on or after 31.12.2009, provided, any one of the three circumstances covered by the proviso is involved in the case. The right is dependent on the judgment rendered by the court and not in relation to the incident which gave rise to the prosecution of the accused, whether or not it was at the instance of the victim...... Where there is no doubt that what is conferred under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code enabling the victim to prefer an appeal in the circumstances specified is a substantive right conferred on him by the Statute its effect cannot be nullified taking a view that the applicability of the proviso inserted has to be reckoned with reference to the date of incident in the case which led to the prosecution of the accused. Any such view would be against the letter and spirit of the aforesaid proviso and also the very purpose for which a right of appeal is conferred on the victim, illustrating and defining the person falling thereunder, and specifically limiting to what situation such a right could be exercised.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1281-82 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 7040-7041 of 2014)

Decided On: 12.10.2018

Mallikarjun Kodagali  Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Madan B. Lokur, S. Abdul Nazeer and Deepak Gupta, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2018 SC 5206,(2019)2 SCC 752

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Constitutional bench judgment of Supreme Court on summoning of additional accused as per S 319 of CRPC

110. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows:

Question Nos. 1 & III

Q.1 What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised?

AND

Q. III Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Code of Criminal Procedure has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?

A. In Dharam Pal's case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Code of Criminal Procedure and the Sessions Judge need not wait till 'evidence' under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure becomes available for summoning an additional accused.

Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure, significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Code of Criminal Procedure; and under Section 398 Code of Criminal Procedure are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure, and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the chargesheet.

In view of the above position the word 'evidence' in Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.

Question No. II

Q. II Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Code of Criminal Procedure could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?

A. Considering the fact that under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Code of Criminal Procedure the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.

Question No. IV

Q. IV What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?

A. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the Court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure would be the same as for framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial-therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.

Question No. V

Q. V Does the power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged?

A. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been chargesheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, in so far as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Code of Criminal Procedure has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1750, 1751 of 2008.

Decided On: 10.01.2014

 Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab 

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