Showing posts with label wilful default. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wilful default. Show all posts

Saturday, 12 November 2016

Principles to be followed by court for striking off defence for disobedience of order of court

The provisions of Order 39 Rule 11(2) of the Civil Procedure Code,
would also have to be taken note of which clearly provides that when sufficient
cause is shown, the Court may hear the parties in defence upon such terms as it
deems fir. The provisions under Order 39 Rule 11(1) of the Civil Procedure Code

are directory in nature. In this connection, the Judgment passed by this Court in
Writ Petition no. 381 of 2013 along with Appeal From Order Nos. 40 of 2013 and
other connected Appeals dated 03.07.2014, in the case of M/s. V. G. Quenim &
Ors. vs Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., at Paras 16, 17, 19 and 20 would be
material which read thus :
“16. On plain reading of sub-section (2) of Order 39
Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code, I find that in case the
party who has been responsible for the default or
contravention, makes amends for such default or
contravention to the satisfaction of the Court and
shows sufficient cause, the Court may hear the parties
in defence upon such terms as it deems fit. In the
present case, taking note of the fact that it is not in
dispute that the value of the re-constructed bungalow
would exceed the total claim of the Plaintiffs in the said
suits, the breach or contravention, if any, by the
defendants can be said to have been amended.
These aspects have not been considered by the
learned Judge whilst passing the impugned Order. No
doubt, the conduct of the Plaintiffs to demolish the
bungalow without taking any permission from the
Court nor informing the Court to that effect is
deplorable. The defendants ought to have taken
necessary precautions to see that they had taken
appropriate permission from the Court before
embarking into the exercise of demolishing the
construction. In fact the Judgments relied upon by the
learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiffs clearly
suggests that it is not open to a party to make its own
interpretation of the order to defeat such orders. In the
present case, the defendants are not at all justified to

demolish the construction without informing the Court
what further course of action they wanted to follow
after such demolition. In such circumstances, the
apprehension of the Plaintiffs that the defendants
wanted to breach the orders of temporary injunction
and the undertaking, were well founded. But,
however, in order to suffice the consequences
provided in Order 39 Rule 11 as well as Order 39 Rule
2-A of the Civil Procedure Code there should be willful
disobedience of such orders and the party should
persist in committing such contempt. In the present
case, in the reply filed to the application, the defendant
offered to give a Bank Guarantee covering the value of
the said bungalow. Apart from that, they have clearly
stated that they had no intention not to comply with the
Orders passed by the Court. In this connection, there
is also an apology given by the Defendants. In such
circumstances, considering that the Defendants made
amends to the contravention or the default of the
undertaking, I find that the learned Judge was not
justified to strike off the defence of the defendants and
dismiss the counter claim filed by the Defendants. No
doubt, exercise of such powers under Order 39 Rule
11(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, would have to be
upon terms deemed fit. The terms to be imposed
would be dealt with whilst dealing with the challenge to
the Orders under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Civil
Procedure Code.
17. The Division Bench of this Court in the
Judgment reported in 2004(1) ALL M. R. 822, in the
case of Ramavatar Surajmak Modi vs. Mulchand

Surajmal Modi, has observed at Para 7 thus :
“7. Rule 11 of Order 39 as introduced
by the Bombay amendment provides for
a procedure on parties defying orders of
the Court and/or committing breach of
any undertaking to the Court. We are
concerned with the question whether
sub-rule (1) of Rule 11, Order 39 leaves
no discretion on the Court and that it
obliges the Court to visit the defaulting
party with the penalty prescribed therein
irrespective of the circumstances that
default is not willful or the conduct of the
party responsible for the default is not
contumacious or there is reasonable
explanation for default. The meaning
and intention of the rule making authority
must govern, and these are to be
ascertained not only from the
phraseology of the provision but also by
considering its nature, its design, and
the consequences which would follow
from construing it the one way or the
other. Inter alia the courts have applied
the test whether the object of the
provision will be defeated or furthered by
holding the provision mandatory or
directory. Let us not forget that the
dismissal of suit or proceeding or striking
out the defence of a defendant for noncompliance
of the Courts order or

breach of an undertaking is serious and
grave consequence. By making
provision of serious penalty of dismissal
of suit or striking out the defence against
the party responsible for default, the rule
making authority did not intend to leave
no discretion to the Court. The object of
the provision of Order 39, Rule 11(1) is
not defeated if it is held to be directory
as the Court can in its discretion for
adequate reasons visit the defaulting
party with the penalty envisaged therein.
On the other hand if the provision is held
mandatory, the Court "shall" be left with
no discretion and peremptorily shall
have to dismiss the suit where the
plaintiff is responsible for the default or
to strike off the defence when the
defendant is guilty of default even
though the default is not found willful or
conduct of such party not obstinate or
contumacious. In our considered view,
the provision in sub-rule (1) merely vests
power in the Court to dismiss the suit or
proceeding where the default is by the
plaintiff and strike off the defence of the
defendant where the defaulter is the
defendant. It does not obligate to do so
in every case of default. This is further
fortified by the provision contained in
sub-rule (2) which gives a discretion to
the Court that even after the order

contemplated under the sub-rule (1) of
Rule 11 has been passed, upon
sufficient cause being shown by the
party responsible for the default or
contravention or breach and such party
makes amend for the default or
contravention or breach to the
satisfaction of the Court, the Court may
restore the suit or hear the defence on
such terms and conditions it deems fit. If
the Court has power to restore the party
to the same position even after the
adverse order has been passed under
sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 if the case is
made out under sub-rule (2), the
provision of sub-rule (1) has to be held
to be directory and not imperative. The
provision in the nature of sub-rule (2)
leaves no manner of doubt the intention
of the rule making authority that the
provision of sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 is
directory and that by such provision
power has been vested in the Court to
dismiss the suit or proceeding where the
plaintiff is in default or striking off the
defence of the defendant, where
defendant is responsible for the default.
Unfortunately, neither in Ratnakar D.
Patade nor in Smt. Asha M. Joshi, the
learned Judges adverted to sub-rule (2)
of Rule 11 and its effect. The Supreme
Court in (M/s. Babbar Sewing Machine

Co. v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan)6, A.I.R. 1978
S.C. 1436 held that the power of
dismissal of suit or striking out of the
defence under Order 11, Rule 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure should be
exercised only where the defaulting
party fails to attend the hearing or is
guilty of prolonged or inordinate and
inexcusable delay which may cause
substantial or serious prejudice to the
opposite party. It was further observed
that an order striking out the defence
under Order 1, Rule 21 should be made
unless there has been obstinacy or
contumacy on the part of the defendant
or willful attempt to disregard the order
of the Court to produce the
documents.....

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NOS. 279, 362 AND 626 OF 2006
WRIT PETITION NO. 279 OF 2006

Sachin Y.Mense, V  Shri Sunil Noronha,

 Coram :- F. M. REIS, J

 Dated  : 16th January, 2015.
Citation:2016(5) ALLMR 146
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Sunday, 8 March 2015

Whether court should award damages in case of wilful default by vendor in case of agreement of sale?

The defendant knew that the immoveable property, which he agreed to sell, was his ancestral property; and it is difficult to accept the suggestion made before us under the circumstances of this case that he could not realise the limitations upon his power to alienate this property which was part of the ancestral property and in which his minor sons had a vested interest according to Hindu Law. The limitations upon his power to alienate ancestral immoveable property are by no means obscure; and I do not believe that the defendant was not aware of them at the date of the agreement. When he was called upon to make good the title, he did not, and it is now conceded that he could not ask for the sanction of the Court for the sale on behalf of the minors on the ground of necessity or any other ground which would entitle him to convey the full title to the property so as to bind his minor sons. I do not see how he could be heard now to say that when he entered into this agreement he did not realise the limitations upon his power to sell this property. In the case of, a vendor who agrees to sell property which he knows he is not competent to sell except under certain circumstances he cannot take advantage of a Clause in the contract such as we have in the present case; nor can he urge with justice that he is not liable to pay damages on the footing of wilful default. On the facts it seems to me that this is clearly a case in which with full knowledge of the limitations on his power the defendant contracted to sell this property. It is right, therefore, that the damages should be assessed on the lines directed by the Trial Court.

Bombay High Court

Vallabhdas Tulsidas vs Nagardas Juthabhai on 23 September, 1921
Equivalent citations: 92 Ind Cas 143

Bench: N Macleod, Shah

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Sunday, 27 July 2014

Whether a party can execute interim order of injunction without proving willful default?

The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner herein has drawn my attention to Section 36 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is posited in Section 36 that the provisions of this Code relating to the execution of decrees (including provisions relating to payment under a decree) shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of the Orders (including payment under an Order). Hence the finding of the Executing Court that the said Application Exhibit 21 was not tenable cannot be sustained in the light of the Section 36 of the CPC. However, even if the said Application for execution is tenable, considering the fact that the Petitioners have invoked Order 21 Rule 32 of the CPC, the Executing Court would have to adjudicate upon the said Application on the touchstone of the said provision as also sub Rule 5 of Rule 32 of the CPC. It is only after the Executing Court is satisfied that there is a willful default / disobedience of the said Order that the said provision under Order 21 Rule 32 could be invoked. In that view of the matter, the impugned Order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Executing Court for a de novo consideration of Exhibit 21 in the light of the observations made herein above. The contentions of the parties are explicitly kept open for being agitated before the Executing Court.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.4849 of 2010
IN THE  HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Dina   Dora   Sukhia   Vs Jimmy Dora Sukhia

CORAM :   R.M.SAVANT, J.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
          DATE     :   7th DECEMBER,  2011

Citation: 2012(1)ALLMR555, 2012(3)BomCR138, 2012(2)MhLj735,2012(1)AIRBOMR863
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Friday, 14 March 2014

Whether it is mandatory for a party pleading fraud to state particulars thereof with dates?



The unfair advantage or the hardship contemplated 

under Section 20 has to be seen   as working against the defendant and not the 
plaintiff.     There   are     no     circumstances   either   making   enforcement   of   specific 
performance of the contract as inequitable.  For these reasons,  this case cannot be 
seen to be  falling  in any of  the instances mentioned in clauses (a)to (c)  of sub­
section (2) of Section 20 of Specific Relief Act. Then, no details of pending litigations 
have been given so as to make out the  case that  the defendant was cheated into 
signing stamp papers,  as required under Order VI Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure. 

Order VI Rule 4 makes it mandatory for a party pleading fraud, misrepresentation, 
breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, to state the particulars thereof 
with dates and items and so on.  This is because to put the other side on sufficient 
notice of the case it has to meet.  Here, neither the particulars nor any evidence has 
been adduced in regard to the pending litigations, dates etc. to make out the case of 
misuse of stamp papers.  I, therefore, find   no substance in the arguments canvassed 
in this regard on behalf of the defendant and find merit in the argument of learned 
counsel for the plaintiff.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
SECOND APPEAL No. 342  OF 1989
Chintaman Sitaram Bajad (DEAD)   
   VERSUS
Shankar Sonaji Shingne   

CORAM :   
 S.B. SHUKRE, J.
             DATE :     JANUARY 07, 2014.
        
   Citation; 2014 (2) ALLMR 156 Bombay
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