Sunday, 1 September 2019

Whether magistrate can direct further investigation after discharge of accused?

Once the learned Magistrate takes the cognizance and, considering the materials on record submitted along with the report forwarded by the police Under Section 173(2)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Magistrate in exercise of the powers Under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure discharges the Accused, thereafter, it will not be open for the Magistrate to suo moto order for further investigation and direct the investigating officer to submit the report. Such an order after discharging the Accused can be said to be made at the post-cognizance stage. There is a distinction and/or difference between the pre-cognizance stage and post-cognizance stage and the powers to be exercised by the Magistrate for further investigation at the pre-cognizance stage and post-cognizance stage. The power to order further investigation which may be available to the Magistrate at the pre-cognizance stage may not be available to the Magistrate at the post-cognizance stage, more particularly, when the Accused is discharged by him. As observed hereinabove, if the Magistrate was not satisfied with the investigation carried out by the investigating officer and the report submitted by the investigating officer Under Section 173(2) (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as observed by this Court in catena of decisions and as observed hereinabove, it was always open/permissible for the Magistrate to direct the investigating agency for further investigation and may postpone even the framing of the charge and/or taking any final decision on the report at that stage. However, once the learned Magistrate, on the basis of the report and the materials placed along with the report, discharges the Accused, we are afraid that thereafter the Magistrate can suo moto order the further investigation by the investigating agency. Once the order of discharge is passed, thereafter the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo moto direct the investigating officer for further investigation and submit the report. In such a situation, only two remedies are available: (i) a revision application can be filed against the discharge or (ii) the Court has to wait till the stage of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, at the same time, considering the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is always open for the investigating agency to file an application for further investigation and thereafter to submit the fresh report and the Court may, on the application submitted by the investigating agency, permit further investigation and permit the investigating officer to file a fresh report and the same may be considered by the learned Magistrate thereafter in accordance with law. The Magistrate cannot suo moto direct for further investigation Under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or direct the re-investigation into a case at the post-cognizance stage, more particularly when, in exercise of powers Under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate discharges the Accused. However, Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers power upon the officer-in-charge of the police station to further investigate and submit evidence, oral or documentary, after forwarding the report Under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, it is always open for the investigating officer to apply for further investigation, even after forwarding the report Under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 and even after the discharge of the Accused. However, the aforesaid shall be at the instance of the investigating officer/police officer-in-charge and the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo moto pass an order for further investigation/reinvestigation after he discharges the Accused.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 687 of 2019 

Decided On: 16.04.2019

 Bikash Ranjan Rout Vs.  State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: (2019) 5 SCC 542
This Caselaw is overruled in 

Supreme Court: Magistrate Can Invoke Power U/S 156(3) CrPC Even At Post-Cognizance Stage 

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Whether it is necessary to pay ad valorem Court-fee on application for restitution?

In my considered view, law is quite clear that the application for restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. is an application for execution of decree within the purview of Section 2(2), C.P.C. read with Order 21 , C.P.C.

6. This Court also in a case between Sri Tapan Sarkar v. Smt. Sukhila Boro reported in 1990 (2) GLR 29 held that the application for restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. is an application for execution of the decree. In view of the above well principle of law, I am of the view that the First Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal arising from the order passed under Section 144, C.P.C. I am also of the view that as the application for restitution under Section 144, C.P.C. is an application for execution of the decree, no ad valorem Court-fee is required on the value of the suit land or mesne profit except the required Court-fees for the purpose of execution of decree or order.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI (AGARTALA BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 30 of 1984

Decided On: 13.06.1996

Ramesh Ch. Deb Vs.  Barindra Kr. Chakraborty

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N. Surjamani Singh, J.

Citation : AIR 1997 Gau 24

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Whether appellate court can direct restitution of premises?

Another grievance was made that after setting aside the ex parte decree, the learned appellate Judge has granted restitution of the premises to the tenant. On this short ground, rule is granted and both the parties are heard finally on this question.

Under S. 144 C. P. C. when a decree or order of a trial Court has been set aside in appeal or revision, it is only the Court of first instance which is given power to order restitution. That is the law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Saurashtra v. Chitranjan Rangnath, reported in MANU/SC/0006/1980 : [1980]3SCR915 . The Section itself is very clear that the application for restitution should be filed to the Court of first instance. Here in his enthusiasm to do justice, the learned appellate Judge has himself granted an order of restitution which cannot be strictly sustainable within the four corners of S. 144 C. P. C.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petn. No. 3219 of 1995

Decided On: 20.07.1995

V.T. Hundlani  Vs.  Robert C. Kenny

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.G. Vaidyanatha, J.

Citation: Citation : AIR 1996 Bom 48
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When time will not be essence of contract?

 The defendants, both in their pleadings as well as evidence clearly admit that there are provisions in the contract for extension of time. The only reason stated by the defendants for non extension of the time for completion was that there was no formal application from the plaintiff seeking extension of time. Such a plea backed by the evidence led by the defendants, itself suggest that the time was never intended to be essence in so far as the present contract is concerned. Besides, the contract itself provides for extension of time, levy of compensation in case of delay and such other provisions. All such provisions clearly militate against the time being of essence of contract in the present case. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

First Appeal Nos. 60 of 2011 and 33 of 2017

Decided On: 08.02.2019

 P.B. Ibrahim Vs.  State of Goa

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Sonak and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ.

Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 759
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