Big Relief for Widows in Maharashtra: Court Fees Slashed - Reduction in maximum court fees from Rs. 75,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-

 2. In view of the requisition raised by the Testamentary Registrar, Ms. Chavan, Learned AGP, on instructions, submits that the State Government has issued a notification dated 9th August, 2024, which reads thus:

“Maharashtra Court Fees Act.

No. Mudrank-2023/C.R.641/M-1(Policy).- In exercise of the powers conferred by section 46 of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act (XXXVI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra, hereby reduces the maximum limit of fees from Rs. 75,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-, payable by widows on probate of a will or letters of administration with or without will annexed, specified in Article 10 of the First Schedule appended to the said Act, to be filed in any Civil Court in respect of obtaining Heirship Certificate from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette.”

3. In light of this, it is her submission that it should apply to all

widows in cases for application for probate, letters of administration, succession certificate and legal heirship certificate irrespectively. With this clarification, nothing further remains.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION

MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 108 OF 2025

Subhadra Anant Kesarkar ...Petitioner

Rukmini Vithoba Khedekar ...Deceased

CORAM : ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.

DATE : 09 th  APRIL, 2025

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Supreme Court Rejects Refund Claim For Private Out-of-Court Settlement : 'Court Fee Refund Only If Case Settled Through ADR Mechanisms'

The refund of court fees is permissible only if the

matter is referred to Arbitration, Conciliation, judicial

settlement, including through Lok Adalat or mediation for

settlement and the case is decided in terms of such a

settlement and not otherwise. {Para 6}

7. In the case at hand, the settlement in terms of which

the second appeal was decided by the High Court is not on

reference to any of the above authorities/fora rather it was

an amicable settlement out of the court.

8. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the petitioner

is not entitled to refund of the court fees and the High

Court has not committed any error or illegality in refusing

such a prayer.

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

PETITION(S) FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO(S). 723/2023

JAGE RAM Vs VED KAUR & ORS.

Date : 28-01-2025 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ MITHAL

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH

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Maharashtra Court Fees Act: Appellate Court Must Refund Court Fees If Matter Is Remanded Back To Original Court

 Section 15 in Maharashtra Court-fees Act.

15. Refund of Fees paid on memorandum of appeal-

If an appeal or plaint, which has been rejected by the lower Court on any of the grounds mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is ordered to be received, or if a suit is remanded in appeal, on any of the grounds mentioned in rule 23 of Order XLI in the first Schedule to the same Code for a second decision by the lower Court, the Appellate court shall grant to the appellant a certificate, authorising him to receive back from the Collector or by way of e-payment, in the manner as prescribed by rules the full amount of fee paid on the memorandum of appeal:Provided that if, in the case of remand in appeal, the order of remand shall not cover the whole of the subject-matter of the suit, the certificate so granted shall not authorise the appellant to receive back more than so much fee as would have been originally payable on the part or parts of such subject-matter in respect whereof the suit has been remanded.

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Supreme Court: Plaintiff in Maharashtra will get refund of entire court fees if case is settled in any one of the modes of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of CPC after court fees amendment Act 2018

 As extracted supra, the High Court in the impugned judgment had made a suggestion to the State legislature that the differences in the court fees in Lok Adalat, vis-à-vis, the forms of ADR should be done away with the view to promote the adaptation of such methods of dispute resolution among the public. It has been brought to our attention that the State legislature has indeed carried out such an amendment to the MCFA, 1959 and Section 16A has been introduced therein by way of Maharashtra Act No. X of 2018, the relevant extract of which reads under:

MAHARASHTRA ACT No. X OF 2018.

(First published, after having received the assent of the Governor in the "Maharashtra Government Gazette", on the 16th January 2018.)

An Act further to amend the Maharashtra Court-fees Act.

WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Maharashtra Court-fees Act, for the purposes hereinafter appearing; it is hereby enacted in the Sixty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:

2. After Section 16 of the Maharashtra Court-fees Act (hereinafter referred to as "principal Act"), the following Section shall be inserted, namely:

16A. Where the court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the modes of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and suit is disposed of by the court by adaptation of any of the modes prescribed under the said section, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to a certificate from the court authorising him to receive back from the collector, the full amount of the fee paid in respect of such plaint.''. {Para 22}

23. The effect of the above being that for the time when the amendment to the MCFA, 1959 granting partial or complete refund, as the case may be, in accordance with Section 43 as amended, the persons whose matters were settled by way of ADR would not be entitled to 100% refund. Any matter settled under the processes mentioned in Section 89 Code of Civil Procedure after the coming into force of the above-extracted amendment, such parties shall receive refund of court fees in its entirety.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 14742 of 2024.

Decided On: 19.12.2024

Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1377/2024.

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How the court should deal with issue of grant of mesne profits under different types of suits?

 It is necessary at the outset to distinguish between three different types of cases in which a question of profits or mesne profits might arise. (1) Suits for ejectment or recovery of possession of Immovable property from a person in possession without title, together with a claim for past or past & future mesne profits. (2) Suits for partition by one or more tenants-in-common against others with a claim for account of past or past & future profits. (3) Suits for partition by a member of a joint Hindu family with a claim for an account from the manager. In the first case, the possession of the defts. not being lawful, the plff. is entitled to recover "mesne profits" as defined in Section 2, Clause (12), Civ. P. C., such profits being really in the nature of damages. In the second case, the possession & receipt of profits by the deft, not being wrongful the plff's. remedy is to have an account of such profits making all just allowances in favour of the collecting tenant in common. In the third case, the plff. must take the joint family property as it exists at the date of the demand for partition and is not entitled to open up past accounts or claim relief on the ground of past inequality of enjoyment of the profit, except where the manager has been guilty of fraudulent conduct or misappropriation. The plff. would, however, be in the position of a tenant-in-common from the date of severance in status & his rights would have to be worked out on that basis. {Para 3}

4. Order 20, Rule 12, Civil P. C. deals with the first class of suit above referred to, while Order 20, Rule 18, Ideals with the second & the third categories. In view, however, of the considerable reliance placed on Order 20, Rule 12, Civil P. C. in Ghulusum Bivi v. Ahmadsa Rowther, 42 Mad. 296in dealing with the right of a plff. to profits accruing during the pendency of a partition suit, it is desirable to consider the scope of this provision. A claim for possession & a claim for past mesne profits have been held to be based on different causes of action, at any rate, in the decisions of this Court. Order 2, Rule 4, Civil P. C. however permits their joinder in one suit. There is a material difference between a claim for past & a claim for future mesne profits. Order 7, Rule 2, Civil P. C. & Section 7 Sub-section (1), Court fees Act, require that the amount of past mesne profits claimed should be approximately stated in the plaint & ad valorem court-fee should be paid on such amount. These provisions can have no application to future profits, for it is not possible for the plff. to predicate how long the litigation is going to last or give even an approximate statement of the amount of mesne profits that might become payable at the end. The cause of action for future mesne profits is the plff's. being kept out of possession during the suit & arises subsequent to the suit. In empowering Courts to award future mesne profits Order 20, Rule 12, Civ. P. C. makes an exception to the general rule that a plff. can only sue on such cause of action as has arisen on the date of instituting his suit. The object is to avoid the multiplicity of litigation that would result if persons, unlawfully kept out of possession of their lands were obliged to file suits every three years for mesne profits accruing after the institution of a suit in ejectment & during its pendency in the original & appellate Courts. But the plff. could not claim future mesne profits as a matter of right, the cause of action for such profits not having arisen to him at the date of the suit. Hence it is that the power of the Court to award mesne profits subsequent to the suit has been held to be discretionary & a mere omission, as distinguished from a refusal, to grant future mesne profits asked for, has been held not to bar a fresh suit for that relief. Doraiswami v. Subramania, 41 Mad. 188. In re Ekanathalingaswami, I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 284. Section 11, Court-fees Act, (as amended in Madras) requires payment of court-fee on future mesne profits only if the plff. desires to execute the decree awarding him such profits. The Judicial Committee interpreting the provisions of Section 196, Civ. P. C. of 1859 & this Court, construing the corresponding provisions of Order 20, Rule 12 held that whether a plaint contained or not a claim to future profits the Court has the power to grant them under these special provisions, Fakharuddin Mohamed Ashan v. Official Trustee of Bengal, 8 Cal. 178 & Kemgamswami v. Subbamma, 53 Mad. 838. When the Legislature has expressly empowered the Court to grant relief for future mesne profits, that is to say, in respect of a cause of action arising subsequent to the suit, there is no reason to circumscribe this power by importing a qualification that there must have been a specific prayer in the plaint for the recovery of such unascertainable & unpredictable profits. Future mesne profits could, we think, well be awarded as part of the general relief to which a plff. is entitled.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

FULL BENCH

Civil Revn Petn No. 1695 of 1948

Decided On: 02.02.1951

Babburu Basavayya and Ors. Vs. Babburu Guravayya and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Rajamannar, C.J. Vishwanatha Sastri and A.S. Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ.

Author: P.V. Rajamannar, C.J.

Citation: AIR 1951 Madras 938.

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Kerala HC: The Appellate court can not consider appeal against rejection of counter claim if no court fees is paid on said appeal

In the light of these decisions let us consider as to whether non payment of Court-fee on the plea of counter claim in the appeal will work as res judicata. By non-payment of Court-fee on the counter claim in appeal, the appellate Court is not in a position to consider the question of counter claim. Thus it has to be held that the counter claim as rejected by the lower Court has become final. That portion of the discharge of the suit amount as raising the counter claim cannot be considered by the appellate Court on the principle of res judicata. But at the same time the question of discharge of the decree amount can be considered by the appellate Court. {Para 6}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

A.S. No. 291 of 1993

Decided On: 31.03.1997

Nherapoyil N.P. Moideen Vs. K. Narayanan Nair

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T. Ramachandran, J.

Citation:  MANU/KE/0068/1997,AIR 1997 Ker 318.

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Supreme Court: Can A Person, Awarded Monetary Compensation, But Has Not Received It, File Appeal As Indigent?

Order XLIV Rule 3(2) provides as under :

“3. Inquiry as to whether applicant is an

indigent person.-(1)……

(2) Where the applicant, referred to in rule

11, is alleged to have become an indigent

person since the date of the decree appealed

from, the inquiry into the question whether

or not he is an indigent person shall be made

by the Appellate Court or, under the orders

of the Appellate Court, by an officer of that

Court unless the Appellate Court considers

it necessary in the circumstances of the case

that the inquiry should be held by the Court

from whose decision the appeal is

preferred.”

The Appellate Court, in accordance with the above,

did not conduct any inquiry. The same was necessitated

since nothing on record speaks of the claimant-appellant

having filed the claim before the learned Tribunal as an

indigent person, in which case she would be covered under

Rule 3(1), which provides that no further inquiry would

be required in respect of a person who was allowed to

sue or appeal as an indigent person if they make an

affidavit to the effect that they have not ceased to be

an indigent unless the Government pleader objects or

disputes such claim in which case an inquiry shall be

held by the Appellate Court or under the orders thereof.

18. On both counts, one, that she had not yet received

the money and, therefore, at the time of filing the

appeal she was arguably indigent; and second, that the

statutory requirement under the C.P.C., as described

above, was not met – the order of the learned Single

Judge has to be set aside. {Para 17}

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

ALIFIYA HUSENBHAI KESHARIYA  Vs SIDDIQ ISMAIL SINDHI & ORS. 

SANJAY KAROL J.,

Dated: May 27, 2024.

Citation: 2024 INSC 457.

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Whether plaintiff must pay ad valorem court fees if he is challenging demand notice issued by municipal corporation for specific amount?

 Suit R.C.S. No. 26 of 2021 has been filed challenging the

notice dated 21.06.2021. By this notice a demand has been

raised by the Municipal Corporation for a sum of Rs. 7,57,203/-

seeking reimbursement of expenses incurred in cleaning the

nallah on the basis that it was obligation of the petitioner to

clean the nala, and as the obligation was not complied by the

petitioner, the said work was undertaken by the Municipal

Corporation.{Para 6}

7. It is clear that although one of grounds of challenge is to

the obligation of the Municipal Corporation by relying upon the

provisions of the Corporation Act, what has been challenged in

effect is a demand notice which has been issued by the Municipal

Corporation seeking to recover the amount. In my view, the

submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as

regards the authority of the corporation and on the lease deed

are in fact grounds in support of the challenge to the demand

notice. The subject matter of the suit has been valued at Rs.

1,000/- on the ground that the petitioner is claiming declaration

and the notice is not susceptible to the monetary valuation and

as such has been valued under Section 6(iv)(a) of the

Maharashtra Court Fees Act. In my view since the demand

notice which is under challenge seeks to recover a monetary

component, it cannot be said that notice is not susceptible to

monetary valuation as submitted.

10. In my view, the Petitioner seeks adjudication of demand

notice seeking to recover a sum of Rs. 7,57,203/ which is capable

of monetary valuation and hence the impugned order directing

to value the suit as per the provisions of Section 6(iv)(a) of the

Maharashtra Court Fees Act is proper and deserves no

interference at the hands of this Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

WRIT PETITION NO. 3692 OF 2022

The Aurangabad Jilha Chemists and Druggists Association Vs

The Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad

CORAM : SHARMILA U. DESHMUKH, J.

DATE : 16TH JANUARY, 2023.

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 13.

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Bombay HC: 9% is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in motor accident compensation cases

  The Tribunal awarded an interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of application till its realization and I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel to the effect that the interest ought to have awarded @ 9% p.a., which is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in case of compensation to be payable for motor accidents and the Apex Court in case of Kaushnuma Begum & Ors. Vs. New India Assurance Co., MANU/SC/0002/2001 : 2001 (1) SCR 8, has observed that 9% is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in motor accident compensation cases. Perusal of the latest decision of the Apex Court in case of Parvinder Singh (supra), the compensation is awarded with interest @ 9%.

{Para 21}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether claimant must prove percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability in motor accident case?

 When a claimant suffers a disability as a result of such injuries and on ascertaining that the disability is of permanent nature, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. It is expected that the mechanical formulae of calculating the loss of earning capacity depending upon the percentage of permanent disability, is not to be applied as in most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss i.e. the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability.

Accepting the aforesaid principle, it can be seen that as far as the respondent claimant is concerned, the disability certificate has certified his disability to be 83% and the Tribunal has accepted his functional disability to be 83% and therefore, the loss of earning capacity to be 83%. However, if the claim of the claimant is that on 83% disability, he has incurred 100% functional disability, then it was imperative for the claimant to bring on record some evidence to that effect. Since the claimant suffer 83% physical disability in the present case, in order to establish that this amounted to 100% functional disability, none of the witnesses are examined by the claimant to prove the said aspect. The claimant has not projected his case before the Tribunal to the effect that on account of the permanent disability incurred by him, his functional disability is also 100%, which has resulted in loss of 100% earning capacity. In absence of any such specific evidence being brought on record, the submission of learned Advocate Ms. Nandini Chittal to that effect, do not deserve any consideration. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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What are Special Damages and General Damages under which compensation is awarded in motor accident cases?

 The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following:

Pecuniary damages (Special Damages)

(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:

(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;

(b) Loss of future earnings on disability. account of permanent

(iii) Future medical expenses.

Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages)

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).

(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).

Recording that in routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under Head 1, 2-A and 4, but in serious cases of injury where there is specific medical evidence, corroboration the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi), relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.

20. When a claimant suffers a disability as a result of such injuries and on ascertaining that the disability is of permanent nature, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. It is expected that the mechanical formulae of calculating the loss of earning capacity depending upon the percentage of permanent disability, is not to be applied as in most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss i.e. the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the court can enhance compensation in motor accident case even if claimant has not filed cross-Appeal or cross-objection?

 The counsel for the claimant/respondent Ms. Nandini would submit that though the claimant has not filed any Appeal, against the inadequate amount of compensation awarded to him, though his claim was to the tune of Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, the compensation is awarded in the meager sum of Rs. 52,63,219/- and this require enhancement.

The said claim of the learned counsel is opposed by the counsel for the appellant but in the wake of the settled legal position, I do not have any hesitancy in accepting the submission of the learned counsel for the claimant that the Court on it's motion is also empowered to enhance the compensation, if it is found that the compensation awarded is not 'just' compensation. {Part 14}

15. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and provide for some solace to a victim, who meet with an accident or to the family of the victim who is a sufferer, when the bread-earner is disabled or succumb to the said accident. The duty of the Court in granting compensation to the victim or to his family, for its survival and meet the harness is to ensure 'just' compensation, irrespective of whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant. The parameters of awarding compensation and the various heads under which the claimant is entitled for compensation are well determined by the Constitution Bench and the Apex Court in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi MANU/SC/1366/2017 : 2017(16) SCC 680, and if the compensation is not accorded, in accordance with the legal settled position by the Tribunal, it is the duty of the Court to ensure just and fair compensation.

The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Kunti Binod Pandey & ors., 2020 (1) BCR, 629, where a similar objection was raised in an Appeal filed by the Insurance Company, challenging the judgment and award of compensation by the MACT, holding that it is a statutory obligation of the Tribunal and the Court to do complete justice and award, 'just compensation', it has been held that by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Justice R.D. Dhanuka), that there can be no restriction to enhance compensation in appropriate case even in absence of cross-Appeal or cross-objection.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022

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Whether Litigant is Entitled To Refund Of Court Fees If Matter is Settled Outside Court Without Invocation Of S.89 CPC?

 In view of the aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that even if the matter is settled by the parties outside the Court without invoking the provisions of section 89 CPC, the appellant while withdrawing his first appeal, is entitled to the refund of full Court fees as provided under section 16 of the Court Fees. {Para 7} Act, 1870. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

FIRST APPEAL No. 222 of 2015

DAYARAM  BALARAM PATEL,  Vs SMT. LAXMI AGRAWAL 

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL

ON THE 20th OF SEPTEMBER, 2022.

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Whether suit for perpetual or mandatory injunction is to be valued as per market value of immovable property involved in it?

 The High Court has not even considered the overall circumstances of the present case where the Plaintiff has valued the reliefs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction at the nominal Rs. 250 but, at the same time, has also valued the suit with reference to the claim of damages at Rs. 1 lakh and had paid the Court fees accordingly. It is apparent on the face of the record that despite unquestionable principle of law that such a suit for mandatory and prohibitory injunction is not required to be valued at the market value of the property, the High Court has relied only upon the market value of the property to hold the valuation of the present suit to be "arbitrary". Such a conclusion of the High Court neither stands in conformity with law nor with the frame and the nature of the present suit. {Para 10}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4577 of 2022 

Decided On: 16.06.2022

 Bharat Bhushan Gupta   Vs.  Pratap Narain Verma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath, JJ.

Author: Dinesh Maheshwari, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0783/2022,2022 ALL SCR 1485

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Whether proceedings under Sec 154 of Electricity Act before special court for fixing civil liability needs payment of court fee as a civil case?

In any case, the complaint filed by the petitioner before the Special Court cannot be construed as a 'plaint' by any logical construction of the document. A bare perusal of this document, styled as a complaint Under Section 135 r/w Section 151 of Electricity Act would show that the main prayer made by the complainant/petitioner was to summon, try and punish the respondents/accused persons on the ground that they had committed theft of electricity and had thereby committed offences punishable Under Section 135(1) of Electricity Act, 2003. The complaint also contains an additional prayer to the court to determine the civil liability as provided in Section 154(5) of the Act. In my view, merely because this complaint also contains a prayer for determination of civil liability that by itself does not convert it into a 'plaint'. A document cannot be said to be a criminal complaint as well as a plaint at the same time. A criminal plaint lies before a criminal court whereas the plaint lies before a civil court. The procedure prescribed in Code of Criminal Procedure for trial of a case instituted on a complaint is altogether different from the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, for trial of a suit instituted by filing a plaint. Therefore, this document cannot be termed as a plaint within the meaning of Article 1 of Schedule 1 of Court Fee Act.{Para 24}

31. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, I am of the considered view that ad valorem court fee is not payable on the complaints filed by the petitioner before the Special Courts.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. M.C. 3284, 3453, 3454, 3455, 3456/2008

Decided On: 25.11.2009

BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. Vs. State N.C.T. of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Jain, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/3143/2009

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Whether Plaintiff Can Value Suit Differently For Purpose Of Jurisdiction & For Payment Of Court Fees?

 Section 8 of Suit Valuation Act, 1887 puts an obligation on the plaintiff to value the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction identically except for the Exceptions provided in Section 7 paragraph 5, 6, 9, 10 Clause (d) of the Court Fee Act, 1870. 12. It therefore, follows that though it is in the discretion of the plaintiff to value his suit as per his bona fide belief and discretion, but once he has valued his suit in terms of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, the court fee shall become payable on the same amount in terms of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. The plaintiff cannot adopt a dual policy of valuing his suit at a certain value for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the purpose of payment of court fees. Once the suit has been valued at a certain value, the advolerum court fees has to be paid mandatorily on the same valuation. {Para 11}

13. The plaintiff in the present case has valued his suit for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs.2.5 crores while for the purpose of court fee has assessed each relief at Rs.500/- each It is no doubt true that the law gives a discretion to the plaintiff to value his suit and such discretion as exercised by the plaintiff in mentioning the valuation of the suit must not be interfered by the Court as observed by the Full Bench in Smt. Sheila Devi and Ors. Vs. Sh. Kishan Lal Kalra and Ors. ILR (1974) II Delhi 491. However, once the valuation has been done on a certain value by the plaintiff in exercise of his discretion, he is obliged to pay the court fee on the same amount in terms of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act as has been held in the decision of Apex Court in Commercial Aviation T. Co.(supra) and this court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra). 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

 CS(OS) 172/2021

 RAJINDER SINGH BHATIA Vs MANJU BHATIA 

 CORAM: MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

Decided on: 22nd August, 2022 

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Whether a party must pay Ad Valorem Court-Fees in Suit For recovery of Compensation And Damages?

  The moot question for consideration is whether the suit in question as framed was a money suit for compensation/damages falling under Clause (i) of Section 7 or was a suit falling in any of the categories specified in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. A reading of the relief clause would make it abundantly clear that this was a money suit for compensation/damages and not falling under any of the categories mentioned in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, there would be no question at all for the applicability of Section 7(iv) of the Act. It would be a simple case of applicability of Section 7(i) of the Act and ad valorem Court-fees would have to be paid as per Schedule 1 entry 1.{Para 20}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2064 OF 2022 

 STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS Vs DEV BRAT SHARMA

Coram: DINESH MAHESHWARI; VIKRAM NATH, JJ. 

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Dated: MARCH 16, 2022 

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Whether court can direct plaintiff to amend valuation clause in plaint if it is vague?

 Valuation clause in the plaint cannot be vague. It must reflectas to how the suit is valued under the Suit Valuation Act and Rules framed thereunder for the purpose of jurisdiction of the Court and furthermore, as to how the suit is valued under the Maharashtra Court Fees Act for the payment of court fees payable under the relevant and appropriate provisions thereof. {Para 8}

11. Plaint in paragraph 16 reproduced supra is vague andomnibus. Without observing anything on merit, therefore, it would be expedient to quash and set aside impugned order with direction to the petitioner/plaintiff to amend paragraph 16 of the plaint in order to incorporate detailed pleading for the payment of court fees as to value the suit for purposes of jurisdiction and court fees. In view of the leave so granted, petitioner shall carry out amendment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this order. Trial Court shall then decide application (exhibit 14) afresh after hearing both the sides bearing in mind observations made in this order.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,

NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

Writ Petition No. 1150 of 2014

 Lokesh  Ramraoji Navghare Vs Janardhan  Haribhau Bhisikar,

Coram : A. P. Bhangale, J

Dated : 27th June 2014

Citation: 2014 (5) MHLJ 789

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Bombay HC: When the land is put to non agricultural use, court fees will have to be computed treating it as non agricultural land

A short question involved in this petition i.e. whether the suit property” can be treated as an agricultural land or non agricultural land for computation of court fees. {Para 10}

11. Admittedly, in the case at hand, no record is produced to show that the suit property was converted to non agricultural use. However, pleadings of the plaintiffs themselves show that predecessor in title of the plaintiffs and Manjulabai had put the property ad-measuring 2 acres 2 gunthas to non agricultural use. It is pleaded in the plaint that original owner Harnam Singh had constructed a bungalow in the suit property. He had permitted Manjulabai to start brick kiln in the suit property. These pleadings show that land to the extent of 2 acres 2 gunthas was converted to non agricultural use. This view of mine is fortified by the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.E. v. Nandkumar Aggarwal cited (supra), which are as under:

“6. In the master plan the area in question is no doubt shown as agriculture. If we refer to the Schedule mentioned in the definition of urban agglomeration it could be seen that area in question falls within urban agglomeration as it is situated within the peripheral area of the Municipal Corporation of Lucknow (Lucknow Nagar Mahapatika). The land in question will not be urban land if though situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration, it is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture. Operating of a Bhatta cannot certainly be an agriculture purpose. High Court was not, therefore, correct in holding that the land was being mainly used for the purpose of agriculture merely on the strength of the purpose in master plan which is specified as agriculture (Krishi Bhumi) and that the land is entered in the revenue records. High Court has wrongly applied Explanation B to clause (o) of Section 2 of the Act Simply because land is entered in the revenue record would not mean that it is being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture. Here the land is mainly for the purpose of brick kiln business of the 1st respondent. It is not material if a small portion of the land was being used for the purpose of agriculture as well.”

12. From this authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is evident that when land is being used mainly for brick kiln it cannot be said that it is agricultural land. It has been put to non agricultural use. In the case at hand, not only brick kiln was constructed but also a bungalow was constructed in the land owned by Harnam Singh the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs and their mother Manjulabai. Therefore, I find much substance in the arguments advanced by learned counsel Shri Kasliwal that the suit property was put to non agricultural use. When the land is put to non agricultural use, court fees will have to be computed treating it as non agricultural land.

In the High Court of Bombay Aurangabad Bench 

(Before M.G. Sewlikar, J.)

Sardar Gurpreetsingh Gurnamsingh Pander  Vs Sangeeta Bhagchand Bhavle and Others 

Writ Petition No. 8225 of 2020

Decided on January 3, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 36

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Whether claimant should pay court fees in land acquisition reference?

 The only question that arises for consideration is whether the claimant is required to pay court-fee on an application seeking reference under Section 18. We are at a loss to understand that a claimant is required to pay ad valoram court fee on an amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 for seeking reference under Section 18. What is required is to make a written application with particulars envisaged under Section 18(2) of the Act, to the Collector requiring the matter to be referred to civil Court to decide his objection regarding measurement of the land or the amount of compensation or the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation awarded to the persons interested. The Act is a self-contained Code and it does not speak of payment of any court-fee. It requires only that the application should be made within the limitation prescribed either in clause (a) or (b) of Sub- section (2) of the Act. It is, therefore, clear that non- payment of the deficit court-fee, though wrongly made by the appellant, is not a necessary. The owner or person interested is not enjoined under law to pay any court-fee on the application made under Section 18(1) seeking reference for determination of the compensation by the civil court etc. The civil court and the High Court, therefore, have committed grave error of law in rejecting the claim of the appellant for determination of the compensation.

Supreme Court of India

Kashi Ram Namdeo Zambro vs State Of Maharashtra on 31 October, 1995

Equivalent citations: 1996 SCC (1) 289, JT 1995 (8) 157

Author: K Ramaswamy

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. KIRPAL B.N. (J)

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