Friday, 1 December 2017

When it is permissible for landlord to file suit for eviction on ground of arrears of rent?

If   the   tenant   complies   the   notice
issued by the landlord demanding arrears
of   rent   and   pays   the   entire   amount   as
demanded   within   the   time   stipulated
under   section   15(2)   of   the   Maharashtra
Rent   Control   Act,   then   whether   the
landlord can still file a suit for eviction on
the ground of arrears of rent and whether
the   eviction   can   be   ordered   by   invoking
provisions   of   section   15(3)   of   the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act ?  
To infer that once the tenant pays the amount recorded in
the   notice   or   tenders   the   same,   the   landlord   has   no   right   to
institute a suit for recovery of possession for non­payment of those
arrears   or   continue   with   such   proceeding   for   eviction   and   no
decree for possession can be asked for, is not within contemplation
of provisions of section 15 of the Act.   The provision does not
interfere with the right of the landlord to initiate proceeding for
eviction,   however,   sub­section   (2)   of   section   15   prescribes
precondition for presentation of suit, that is to say that no suit can
be initiated without issuing a notice within contemplation of said
sub­section (2) of section 15 and tenant's entitlement to claim relief
against   forfeiture   shall   be   subject   to   fulfilment   of   conditions
stipulated under sub­section (1) and (3) of section 15 of the Rent

Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 76 OF 2010
  
Babulal s/o Fakirchand Agrawal Vs  Suresh s/o Kedarnath Malpani


CORAM : R.M. BORDE, 
      RAVINDRA V. GHUGE &
      SANGITRAO S. PATIL, JJJ
     
 PRONOUNCED ON : 12th June, 2017.
Citation: 2017(4) MHLJ 406 (FB)

1. The issue referred for consideration of the Full Bench is
recorded below :
If   the   tenant   complies   the   notice
issued by the landlord demanding arrears
of   rent   and   pays   the   entire   amount   as
demanded   within   the   time   stipulated
under   section   15(2)   of   the   Maharashtra
Rent   Control   Act,   then   whether   the
landlord can still file a suit for eviction on
the ground of arrears of rent and whether
the   eviction   can   be   ordered   by   invoking
provisions   of   section   15(3)   of   the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act ?  
2. The learned Single Judge of this Court noticing conflict of
views on the issue by the two different Division Benches of this
Court in the matter of Narhar Damodar Wani Vs. Narmadabai
T. Nave, 1984 Mh.L.J. 313 and Chandiram Dariyanumal Ahuja
Vs.   Akola   Zilla   Shram   Wahtuk   Sahakari   Sanstha,   Akola,
2013(1)   All  MR   177  has framed the question for consideration
and, the papers were directed to be placed before the Honourable
the   Chief   Justice   in   accordance   with   Rule   7   Chapter   I   of   the
Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960.  The Honourable
the Chief Justice has directed placement of the matter before us for
consideration, and decision on the issue.
3. The facts in the nutshell giving rise to the dispute can be
stated briefly thus :

Respondents   ­   landlords   have   presented   suit   for   eviction
against the tenant on the grounds that the premises are required
by the landlords reasonably and bonafide for their own use and
occupation, the tenant is using the suit shop for the purpose other
than for which it was leased   and has also committed default in
payment of rent of the suit premises.   Trial Court negatived the
plea of the landlords based on the ground of bonafide requirement
and change of user however, decreed the suit on the ground that
tenant   has   committed   default   in   payment   of   rent.     Appeal
presented by tenant to the District Court has been dismissed and
the decree of eviction against tenant on the ground of default in
payment of rent has been confirmed.  
4. During the course of hearing of the matter, it was submitted
on behalf of the tenant that on receipt of notice dated 01.08.2006
from the landlords, reply was tendered vide exh. 21 and the tenant
not   only   remitted   the   cheque   of   the   amount   demanded   by
landlords but also paid rent upto the date of reply to the notice.
According to tenant, in view of provisions of section 15(2) of the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the plaintiffs ­ landlords do not
have any cause of action to file a suit for eviction on the ground of
recovery of rent.  According to tenant, the cause of action to file the
suit for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent ceases to exist the
moment the tenant tenders rent as demanded by landlords within
90 days of receipt of  notice.  According to tenant, admittedly, the
rent as demanded has been deposited and as such no decree could
have been passed on the ground of default in payment of rent.
Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Division Bench in the
matter of Narhar Vs. Narmadabai (Supra) to contend that cause of

action   ceases   to   exist   for   proceeding   against   the   tenant   in
pursuance of the notice of demand.     According to the tenant,
section 15(3) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act also would not
be applicable as the provisions of section 15(2) themselves are not
attracted.  The landlords were disabled from filing suit for recovery
of possession on the ground of default in payment of rent in view of
provisions   of   section   15(2)   of   the   Act   and,   as   a   consequence
thereof, no question arises as regards applicability of provisions of
section 15(3) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.  
5. In order to rebut the contentions, it has been contended on
behalf of the landlords that the judgment of Division Bench of this
Court in the matter of Chandiram Ahuja Vs. Akola Zilla Shram
Wahtuk   Sahakari   Sanstha   (supra)     holds   the   field   and,   even
assuming   that   there   is   compliance   of   section   15(2)   of   the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, section 15(3) can be pressed in
service independently.   It is contended that sub­sections (1), (2)
and (3) of section 15 are independent provisions and full effect has
to   be   given   to   all   the   three   sub­sections   of   section   15   of   the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act.   It is contended on behalf of the
landlords that since the tenant has failed to pay the rent regularly
during the pendency of the suit, provisions of section 15(3) of the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act are required to be invoked and the
decree of eviction that has been passed shall have to be confirmed.
6. It   would   be   advantageous   to   refer   to   section   12   of   the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
(hereinafter   referred   to  as   "The   Bombay     Act").     The   aforesaid
provisions which are similar to the provisions of section 15 of the

Maharashtra Rent Control Act were matter of interpretation in the
cases of Narhar Vs. Narmadabai and Chandiram Ahuja Vs. Akola
Zilla Shram Wahtuk Sahakari Sanstha (Supra).  
12. (1) A landlord shall not be entitled
to the recovery of possession of any premises
so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and
willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent
and permitted increases, if any, and observes
and   performs   the   other   conditions   of   the
tenancy, insofar as they are consistent with
the provisions of this Act. 
(2) No suit for recovery of possession shall
be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on
the ground of non­payment  of the standard
rent   or   permitted   increases   due,   until   the
expiration of the month next after notice in
writing of the demand of the standard rent or
permitted increases has been served upon the
tenant in the manner provided in section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
(3) (a) Where the rent is payable by the month
and there is no dispute regarding the amount
of   standard   rent   or   permitted   increases,   if
such   rent   or  increases   are  in  arrears   for  a
period of six months or more and the tenant
neglects   to   make   payment   thereof   until   the
expiration   of   the   period   of   one   month   after
notice referred to in sub­section (2), the Court
may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit
for recovery of possession. 
(b) In any other case, no decree for eviction
shall be passed in any suit, if, on the first day
of hearing of the suit or on or before such
other date as the Court may fix, the tenant
pays or tenders in Court the standard   rent
and   permitted   increases   then   due   and
thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court
regularly such rent and permitted increases till

the suit is finally decided and also pays costs
of the suit as directed by the Court.
(4). Pending the disposal of any such suit,
the Courts may out of any amount paid or
tendered   by   the   tenant   pay   to   the   landlord
such   amount   towards   payment   of   rent   or
permitted increases due to him as the Court
thinks fit.  
Explanation ­ In any case where there is a
dispute as to the amount of standard rent or
permitted increases recoverable under this Act
the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and
willing to pay such amount if before the expiry
of the period of one month after notice referred
to in sub­section (2), he makes an application
to the Court under sub­section (3) of section
11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount
of rent or permitted increases specified in the
order made by the Court."
Section   12   of   the   Bombay   Rent   Act   has   undergone
amendment and sub­section (3) has been substituted which reads
thus :­
(3) No decree for eviction shall be passed
by   the   Court   in   any   suit   for   recovery   of
possession   on   the   ground   of   arrears   of
standard rent and permitted increases if, on
the first day of hearing of the suit or on or
before such other date as the Court may fix,
the   tenant   pays   or   tenders   in   Court   the
standard  rent   and  permitted   increases   then
due and together with simple interest on the
amount of arrears of such standard rent and
permitted   increases   at   the   rate   of   nine   per
cent per annum; and thereafter continues to
pay   or   tenders   in   Court   regularly   such
standard rent and permitted increases till the

suit is finally decided and also pays cost of the
suit as directed by the Court.
Provided that, the relief provided under
this   sub­section   shall   not   be   available   to  a
tenant to whom relief against forfeiture was
given in any two suits previously instituted by
the landlord against such tenant.
The amendment is incorporated by Amendment Act No. 18 of
1987.  Amended sub­section (3) of Bombay Rent Act is pari materia
to sub­section (3) of Section 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control
Act.  Section 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act contained in
Chapter III relating to relief against forfeiture is as extracted below :
CHAPTER III
RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE :
15.(1) No  ejectment   ordinarily  to  be   made   if
tenant   pays   or   is   ready   and   willing   to   pay
standard rent and permitted increases ­ (1) A
landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of
possession   of   any   premises   so   long   as   the
tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the
amount   of   standard   rent   and   permitted
increases, if any, and observes and performs
the other conditions of the tenancy, insofar as
they are consistent with the provisions of this
Act.  
(2) No suit for recovery of possession shall
be instituted by a landlord against the tenant
on the ground of non­payment of the standard
rent   or   permitted   increases   due,   until   the
expiration of ninety days next after notice in
writing of the demand of the standard rent or
permitted increases has been served upon the
tenant in the manner provided in section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

(3) No decree for eviction shall be passed by
the   Court   in   any   suit   for   recovery   of
possession   on   the   ground   of   arrears   of
standard   rent   and   permitted   increases   if,
within a period of ninety days from the date of
service of the summons of the suit, the tenant
pays or tenders in Court the standard rent
and   permitted   increases   then   due   together
with simple interest on the amount of arrears
at fifteen per cent per annum; and thereafter
continues to pay or tenders in Court regularly
such standard rent and permitted increases
till the suit is finally decided and also pays
cost of the suit as directed by the Court.  
(4) Pending   the   disposal   of   any   suit,   the
Court   may,   out   of   any   amount   paid   or
tendered by the tenant, pay to the landlord
such amount towards the payment of rent or
permitted increases due to him as the Court
thinks fit.
7. The   decision   in   Narhar's   case   is   in   pursuance   of   the
reference by the learned Single Judge (Masodkar, J) in Writ Petition
No. 1437 of 1979 decided on 8th September 1983 (Waman Deoram
Sonawane V. Shri Ganesh Mandir ) noticing conflict between the
two judgments of two learned Single Judges of this Court and, the
argument was put forth on behalf of respondents to the contrary
placing reliance on the judgment in the matter of Mranalini Shah
Vs. B.W. Shah, AIR 1980 SC 954.  In Waman's case, decree for
eviction   was   passed   on   the   ground   of   default   in   payment   of
education cess and it was contended therein that such a decree
could not have been passed under section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay
Rent Act.   According to Waman, the amount due was paid and
there was no default with regard to payment of rent and as such,

no cause of action survives in the landlord to file a suit and obtain
a decree.  Reliance was placed on the judgment of learned Single
Judge  in  the matter of  Ayudhyabai   Shrivallabha   Lahoti   Vs.
Sumanchand  Rupchand  Phulpagar  (Shah), 1983(2)  Bom.C.R.
368  and decision in the matter of  Shamrao  Abaji  Jadhav  Vs.
Chaturbai   Sidheshwra   Javeri, 1982   Mh.L.J.   347.     On   the
contrary, it has been contended by the landlords placing reliance
on the judgment in the matter of Mranalini (Supra) that even when
a decree of eviction cannot be made under section 12(3)(a) of the
Act, a decree for eviction can be made if the tenant fails to protect
himself by complying with the conditions available in clause (b) of
section 12(3).  On behalf of the landlords, attention of the Division
Bench   was  invited   to  judgments  of  the   Supreme   Court   in   the
matter  Shah   Dhansukhlal   Chhaganlal   Vs.   Dalichand
Virchand   Shroff, AIR   1968   SC   1109,  Harbanslal
Jagmohandas Vs. Prabhudas Shivlal, AIR  1976 SC 2005  and
Ganpat   Ladha   Vs.   Shashikan   Vishnu   Shinde,  1978   Mh.l.J.
550 and, it was contended that these decisions settle the law so far
as section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act was concerned and, it is
for the tenant to satisfy all the conditions apart from the obligation
of tendering in Court all the arrears due on the first day of hearing
of the suit or on or before such date as the Court may fix and pay
regularly such rental liability till the suit is finally decided and
there is no extinction of the cause of action by reason of payment
of existing arrears.  In the view of the learned Single Judge to avoid
a   decree,   once   a   notice   is   given,   the   tenant   has   to   fulfil   the
conditions laid down by section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act.
The relevant observations of the Division Bench in paragraphs 7 to
12 are recorded as below :

7. Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act
creates a positive bar in respect of a suit for
recovery   of   possession   and   it   expressly
provides   that   no   suit   for   recovery   of
possession shall be instituted by a landlord
against   a   tenant   on   the   ground   of   nonpayment
  of   standard   rent   or   permitted
increases   due,   until   the   expiration   of   one
month   next   after   notice   in   writing   of   the
demand   of   the   standard   rent   or   permitted
increases has been served upon the tenant in
the manner provided in section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882.  Subsection (3)
(a) undoubtedly provides that if the tenant is
in arrears of rent for a period of six months or
more   and   the   tenant   neglects   to   make
payment thereof within a period of one month
after the notice referred to in sub­section (2),
the Court has to pass a decree for eviction in
any such suit for recovery of possession.  It is
well established that clause (b) of sub­section
(3) of section 12 applies to a case which does
not fall under clause (a).  Attention must also
be invited to the provisions of sub­section (1)
of section 12 which provides that a landlord
shall   not   be   entitled   to   the   recovery   of
possession of  any  premises  so long as the
tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay,
the   amount   of   the   standard   rent   and
permitted increases, if any, and observes and
performs the other conditions of the tenancy,
in   so   far   as   they   are   consistent   with   the
provisions   of   the   Bombay   Rent   Act.     The
scheme   of   sub­sections   (1),   (2)   and   (3)   of
section 12, therefore, is that if a tenant is
ready   and   willing   to   pay   the   amount   of
standard   rent   and   permitted   increases,   a
landlord   is   not   entitled   to   recovery   of
possession.   The tenant has been given one
month's time during which be must pay the
rent which is demanded by a notice under
section 12(2) and if he does not pay that rent

or the amount due, then the consequences
specified   in   clauses   (a)   and   (b)   follow
depending upon which clause is attracted to
the facts of a given case.  One thing which is,
however, clear on the face of section 12 and
its provisions is that if the tenant pays the
arrears demanded by the notice under section
12(2), then the landlord is not entitled to file a
suit for possession on the ground of arrears
in respect of which he has to give or has given
a notice under section 12(2).  In such a case,
the   provisions   of   sub­section   (1)   will   also
come   into   operation   because   if   the   tenant
pays the amount required to be paid by the
notice under section 12(2), then the tenant is
a person who is ready and willing to pay the
standard rent and the permitted increases, as
the case may be, and the landlord is disabled
from filing a suit for recovery of possession.
In a case where the tenant has paid or must
in law be deemed to have paid the amount
demanded by the notice under section 12(2),
not only are the provisions of section 12(3)(a)
not attracted, but there is no occasion to call
in   aid   the   provisions   of   section   12(3)(b),
because even the provisions of section 12(3)
(b) will be attracted only if there is a claim for
recovery of possession.  If by the compliance
with   the requirements of the notice under
section   12(2)   the   landlord   is   disabled   from
filing a suit for recovery of possession, there
is   no   question   of   the   provisions   of   section
12(3)(b) being attracted at all.  
8. In the referring judgment reference has
been   made   to   the   three   Supreme   Court
decisions   which,   in   our   view,   and   with
respect, were not relevant for the decision of
the   question   which   arises   before   us.     In
Dhansukhlal's case  (supra), the  facts show
that the tenant was in arrears of rent on the
date   on   which   the   landlord   filed   the   suit
because the tenant had not made payment
even though he had received the notice under

section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act.   The
notice in that case was dated 18th April 1955
demanding the arrears of rent and, as the
Supreme Court observed, "No reply was sent
thereto  nor was  any payment  made  to  the
plaintiff."  The suit for ejectment in that case
was filed on 15th March 1956 on the ground
that the defendant was in arrears of rent and
permitted increases and was, therefore, not
entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rent
Act.     The   judgment   of   the   Supreme   Court
shows that in that case, the applicability of
section 12(3)(b) was not canvassed and the
High   Court   had   found   that   there   being
default   on   the   part   of   the   defendant,   the
operation of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay
Rent   Act   was   attracted.     Even   before   the
Supreme Court the material question raised
was whether applying section 12(3)(b) there
was no default on the part of the defendant
which would render him liable to eviction.  It
was while dealing with this contention that
the Supreme Court held that to be within the
protection of section 12(3)(b), the tenant must
not only pay all the arrears due from him on
the first day of hearing of the suit, but he
must thereafter continue to pay and tender in
Court regularly the rent and the permitted
increases   till   the   suit   is   finally   decided.
Dhansukhlal's   case   was,   therefore,   a   case
which   dealt   only   with   the   provisions   of
section 12(3)(b) on the admitted position that
no payment was made in pursuance of the
notice under section 12(2).
9. Harbanslal's case (Supra) dealt with the
limited question as to what should be done in
order to avoid the operation of section 12(3)(a)
and it was held that in order to avoid the
operation of section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay
Rent   Act,   the   dispute   in   regard   to   the
standard rent or permitted increases must be
raised at the latest before the expiry of one
month   from   the   date   of   service   of   notice

under section 12(2) of the Act and it was not
enough to raise the dispute for the first time
in   the   written   statement.     In   Harbanslal's
case, the notice dated 14th November 1966
was issued terminating the tenancy on the
ground that the tenant had paid rent only up
to August 1964.  This notice was received by
the tenant on the 6th December 1966 and the
suit was filed on 2nd February 1967.  In the
other connected appeal decided by the same
judgment, the notice terminating the tenancy
was dated 5th April 1963 and the suit was
filed on 11th September 1963.   The arrears
were alleged to be for the period from 15th
March 1960 to 15th March 1963 for a period
of more than six months.   The arrears were
not paid within a period of one month from
the date of the notice but were paid only on
23rd December 1964, that is, long after the
suit was filed.
10. Mranalini's case was once again a case
which   was   decided   with   reference   to   the
provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay
Rent Act and the question as to whether the
arrears of rent having been paid within the
period of one month from the date of service
of   notice   under   section   12(2),   a   suit   for
eviction could not be filed did not arise.
11. The learned Judge in the present case
has taken the view that "once a notice under
section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act is given
terminating   the   tenancy   on   the   ground   of
non­payment of rent, the landlord is entitled
to file a suit and maintain it and in case the
conditions of section 12(3)(a) are satisfied, he
is entitled to a decree under section 12(3)(b)
of the Act, if the tenant has not availed of the
protection   afforded   by   that   provision"   and
that once the notice is issued, "what reliefs
can be given are provided for by section 12(3)
(a) and section 12(3)(b) of the Act".   These
observations   in   our   view,   overlook   the   fact

that it is implicit in the provisions of section
12(2) that if within a period of one month
specified in section 12(2) the tenant pays the
entire   amount   of   rent   demanded   by   the
notice,   then   the   landlord   does   not   have   a
right to file a suit for recovery of possession.
Further, once there is no cause of action for a
suit for recovery of possession, the question
as   to   whether   the   tenant   claims   the
protection   of   section   12(3)(b)   cannot   also
arise.
12. It has to be pointed out that when the
tenant pays the entire amount demanded by
the   notice   under   section   12(2),   the   notice
becomes ineffective and in case the landlord
wants to claim possession on the ground of
arrears of rent for the period other than that
in respect of which the notice has been given,
the provisions of section 12(2) will once again
come   into   operation   and   the   landlord   will
have   to   serve   a   fresh   notice   because   the
arrears for non­payment of which possession
is now claimed are not arrears in respect of
which a notice contemplated by section 12(2)
had been earlier given.   Service of a notice
under section 12(2) is a condition precedent
to a claim for possession on the ground of
arrears of rent and such a claim cannot be
made unless a period of one month is allowed
to   expire   from   the   date   of   service   of   the
notice.     We  are,   therefore,  unable   to  agree
with the view of the learned Judge that there
is no expiration of cause of action by reason
of existing arrears demanded by the notice
under section 12(2).
As has been concluded by the Division Bench in the matter
of Narhar Vs. Narmadabai (Supra), once the tenant pays the entire
amount demanded by the landlord by notice issued under section
12(2), the notice becomes ineffective and, in case, the landlord

wants to claim possession on the ground of arrears of rent for the
period   other   than   the   period   covered   under   the   notice,   it   is
obligatory for him to issue a notice once again in view of mandate
of section 12(2) and claim arrears.   Service of notice demanding
rent   for   a   specified   period   required   under   section   12(2)   is   a
condition precedent for presentation of suit and landlord cannot be
permitted to deviate from the mandatory requirement and claim
eviction taking recourse of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act.
8. The aforesaid view of the Division Bench in the matter of
Narhar Vs. Narmadabai appears to be in conflict with the view
expressed   by   the   another   Division   Bench   in   the   matter   of
Chandiram Ahuja Vs. Akola Zilla Shram Wahtuk Sahakari Sanstha
(supra).   It does appear that although the attention of the court
while dealing with the matter of Chandiram was invited to the
decision   in   the   matter   of   Dhansukhlal   (supra),   however,   the
attention of the Court was not invited to the judgment in the
matter of Narhar Vs. Narmadabai.   The issue before the Division
Bench in Chandiram's case is concerning interpretation of section
15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.   As has been recorded
above, the provisions contained in the repelled Bombay Rent Act
and   the   Maharashtra   Rent   Control   Act   are   identical   and   the
decisions rendered interpreting the provisions of section 12 of the
Bombay Rent Act are relevant for consideration.  It must be noticed
that if the tenant is desirous of claiming protection under section
15(1) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, he must demonstrate
his readiness and willingness to pay the rent i.e. the quantum of
rent which forms the subject matter of landlord's grievance.  While
interpreting words "readiness and willingness to pay" one has to be

mindful of  the  provisions  of  section 15(3)  which  mandates  the
tenant to pay or tender in Court regularly such standard rent or
permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pay cost
of the suit as directed by the Court.  
9. After taking survey of various judgments, the Division Bench
has observed in paragraph no. 18 of the Chandiram's case as
under :
18. The entire Scheme of Chapter III
relief against forfeiture, as provided under
the provisions of section 15, indicates that a
tenant can perform his obligation and then
claim protection in the form of relief against
forfeiture as forfeiture occurs in accordance
with general law governing lease under the
Transfer   of   Property   Act.     The   provision
protects the tenant from the forfeiture when
the tenant is paying rent or has proved his
readiness and willingness to pay it.  Section
15(3)   added   further   obligation   upon   the
tenant to pay entire arrears till date with
interest and costs, as may be ordered by the
Court.   If tenant is continuing to pay rent
due   during   the   pendency   of   the   suit
instituted against him on the ground of nonpayment
  of   standard   rent   and   permitted
increases,   then  such  tenant   is  entitled   to
claim relief against forfeiture of tenancy.  To
put it otherwise, when tenant does not pay
rent as agreed or pays rent only when legal
notice   is   served   upon   him   or   Court
summons   is   issued   against   him,   the
landlord is not helpless because sub­section
(1)   of   section   15   enables   the   landlord   to
insist   upon   the   tenant   to   pay   rent   and
perform   the   conditions   of   tenancy.     The
tenant who disobeys legal provisions under
section   15(1)   of   the   Act   can   be   evicted

independently, though such tenant may not
necessarily be in arrears of rent on the date
of institution of the suit.   A tenant who is
prompted   or   induced   to   pay   only   after
service   of   legal   notice   or   after   service   of
Court   summons   cannot   be   viewed   as   a
tenant   who   either   pays   or   is   ready   and
wiling to pay standard rent and permitted
increases.   Section 15 of the Maharashtra
Rent Act has extended protection to a tenant
after the landlord seeks to exercise his right
to forfeit the tenancy in accordance with the
provisions of general law.  A tenant, in order
to claim relief against forfeiture of tenancy,
gets a period of 90 days after service of presuit
  statutory   demand   notice   by   the
landlord   calling   upon   the   tenant   to   pay
entire   arrears   of   standard   rent   and
permitted increases payable to the landlord.
Thereafter when suit is filed, the tenant gets
additional opportunity to pay entire arrears
of rent and permitted increases demanded
after the suit summons is served upon him.
Such a tenant has a period of 90 days from
the date of service of suit summons to pay
or  tender   the  arrears  of   rent   with  simple
interest   thereupon   @   15%   p.a.     During
pendency   of   the   suit,   the   protection   is
available   as  above   to  the   tenant   to  claim
relief against forfeiture of tenancy provided
that the tenant shall continue to be regular
in payment of standard rent and permitted
increases   payable   during   the   pendency   of
the suit as also costs of the suit as directed
by the Court.  The Court cannot be oblivious
of landlords who may have to survive only
on   rental   income.     Habitual   irregular
payment of rent and permitted increases by
the tenant will prejudice and jeopardize very
survival of such landlords who survive on
rental income only.  Therefore, such a tenant
who may be habitually irregular in payment
of   standard   rent   and   permitted   increases
can invite eviction in view of section 15(1) of

the Maharashtra Rent Act when the Court
considers   the   case   of   such  a   tenant   who
commits breach of conditions of tenancy as
also remains habitual in rental arrears.  In
such exceptional case, provisions of section
15(1)   are   applicable   and   procedural
compliances under section 15(2) and 15(3)
will not apply.  
10.  In the matter of Sitaram Maruti Nagpure and Fakirchand
Purushottam Dhase, 2008(3) Mh.L.J. 610, issue was referred for
consideration of Division Bench in view of two conflicting decisions
of the Single Judge concerning interpretation of section 12(3)(a) of
the Bombay Rent Act.  The basic issue raised is with regard to the
readiness and willingness of tenant to pay rent and whether the
rent should be paid only after notice of termination under section
12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act or whether the tenant can show
readiness and willingness even prior  to  termination of  tenancy
under section 15(3)(a) of the Act.  In the judgment delivered in the
matter   of  Suka   Ishram   Chaudhari   Vs.   Ranchhoddas
Manakchand   Shet   Gujarathi, 1972  Mh.L.J.   477, the learned
Single Judge (Bhole J.) has interpreted readiness and willingness
of tenant in tendering rent and if the tenants were to send rent by
money order and if the money order was refused by the landlord
then landlord cannot turn round and contend that the tenant was
in arrears of rent for a period of six months or more.    In another
judgment   in   the   matter   of  Abdul   Gani   Dinalli   Momin   Vs.
Mohamed   Yusuf   Mohamed   Isak, 1978   BLR   646, the learned
Single Judge (Jahagirdar, J.) disagreed with the view of  Justice
Bhole and recorded his observations that a tenant cannot be said
to be ready and willing to pay the rent within meaning of section

12(1) unless he complies with the other requirements mentioned in
section 12 and, in particular, unless he has paid or tendered the
amount in arrears within one month after expiry of notice referred
to under sub­section (2).  Sub­section (1) of section 12 forms a part
of the entire scheme relating to the payment of rent by the tenant
to the landlord and sub­section (1) could not be read in isolation in
so far at least it relates to the payment of the standard rent.  In the
light   of   the   observations   of   the   Supreme   Court,   in   both,   S.D.
Chhaganlal Vs. D.V. Shroff and in Harbanslal Vs. Prabhudas and
Fusanacht Vs. W.E. Works, where SD. Chhaganlal's case has been
referred to and reaffirmed, it cannot be said that the ratio in the
judgment in Suka Ishram's case represents the correct law.  
The   Division   Bench,   while   dealing   with   the   conflict,   has
approved the view taken by Justice Bhole to be correct one.
11. Reference   is   also   made   to   a   judgment   in   the   matter   of
Ayodhyabai Shrivallabha Lahoti Vs. Sumanchand Rupchand
Phulpagar, 1983(2)  Bom.C.R.  368.   In paragraph no. 5 of the
judgment, relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the
matter of  Md.   Shafi  Vs.  VIIth   Additional  Dist.  and   Sessions
Judge, Allahabad and another, AIR 1977 SC 836, it is observed
by the learned Single Judge that if two interpretations are possible
then the one in favour of tenant should be preferred since the
legislation   is   intended   to   protect   the   tenant   against   the
unreasonable eviction.  In the reported matter, the tenant paid all
the   arrears   of   rent   within   one   month  of   receipt   of   notice   and
nothing was due.   As such it is observed by the learned Single
Judge   that   at   the   fag   end   of   trial,   he   (landlord),   cannot   be

permitted to take recourse of provisions of section 12(3)(b) of the
Act.  It is further observed that if the suit is liable to be dismissed
on the ground that there was no cause of action for filing such
suit, then at the fag end of the trial, he (landlord) cannot take
recourse of section 12(3)(b) for fishing out the cause of action for
getting decree in a suit which was not properly instituted.  
12. The preamble of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act  1999
declares that the Act is enacted to unify, consolidate and amend
the   law   relating   to   the   control   of   rent   and   repairs   of   certain
premises and of eviction and for encouraging the construction of
new   houses   by   assuring   a   fair   return   on   the   investment   by
landlords   and   to   provide   for   the   matters   connected   with   the
purposes   aforesaid.     In   paragraph   no.3     of   the   Statement   of
Objects and Reasons it is recorded that the Central Government
announced the national Housing Policy which recommends inter
alia to carry out suitable amendments to the existing rent control
laws for creating enabling involvement in housing activity and for
guaranteeing access to shelter for the poor.  It is recorded that the
existing rent control legislation has resulted in freeze of rent, very
low return in investment and difficulty in resuming possession and
has  adversely  affected  investment   in  rental  housing  and  cause
deterioration of rental housing stock.  A number of expert bodies
such as Economic Administration Reforms Commission and the
National Commission on Urbanization have recommended reforms
of the rent legislation in a way that balances the interest of both
the landlord and tenants and also stimulates further construction.
On reading the preamble of the act as well as statement of objects
and reasons, it is clear that the Act is enacted to maintain the

balance between the the interest of both the landlords and tenants
and to take measures to stimulates growth in housing sector.  The
Act is not aimed at putting hurdles in the rights of the landlord to
resume possession inspite of violation of the terms and conditions
of the tenancy by the tenant.  
13. While dealing with the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act in
the   matter   of  Ganpat   Ladha   Vs.   Sashikant   Vishnu   Shinde,
1978  Mh.L.J.  550, the Apex Court has observed that "Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act interferes with
the landlord's right to property and freedom to contract only for
limited purpose of protecting tenants from misuse of landlord's
power to evict them in these days of scarcity of accommodation by
asserting his superior rights in property or trying to exploit his
position by extracting too high rents from helpless tenants.   The
object was not to deprive the landlord altogether of his rights to
property which have also to be respected.  Another object was to
make   possible   eviction   of   tenants   who   fail   to   carry   out   their
obligation to pay rent despite opportunities provided by law in that
behalf. "  It is, thus, clear that the rent control legislation does put
an embargo only to the limited extent on the right of landlord to
seek eviction of tenant.  The right to sue for possession in respect
of the property belonging to the landlord is inherent however, it is
made subject to certain limitations by the rent control legislation.
Chapter III of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, more particularly,
section 15 provides for relief against forfeiture to the tenant.  It is
provided that ejectment of tenant ordinarily shall not be made if
the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and
permitted increases.  The protection extended to the tenant is so

long as he complies with the terms of the tenancy in respect of
payment   and   pays   the   rent   and   is   ready   and   willing   to   pay
standard rent and permitted increases.  The phrase "tenant pays"
shall   have   to   be   read   in   harmony   with   his   "readiness   and
willingness"   to   pay   standard   rent   and   permitted   increases.
Protection afforded to the tenant is to such a tenant who observes
the terms of the tenancy and pays the rent regularly.  Readiness
and willingness to pay standard rent and permitted increases is a
state referable to the conduct of a tenant who is regular in payment
of rent.  
14. In   the   matter   of  Mistry   Premjibhai   Vithldas   Vs.
Ganeshbhai   Kshavji, AIR   1977   Supreme   Court   1707,   it   is
observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 14 thus :
14. The   readiness   and   the
willingness of the tenant to pay could be
found  only if  he  had  complied  with  the
provisions of the Act.   The Act does not
cover the case of a person who is unable to
pay   owing   to   want   of   means   but   is
otherwise "ready and willing".  Such a case
is no doubt a hard one, but, unfortunately,
it   does   not   enable   Courts   to   make   a
special law for such hard cases which fall
outside the statutory protection.
15. In   the   matter   of  Vora   Abbasbhai   Alimanhomed   Vs.   Haji
Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, AIR   1964   SC   1341, it is observed in
paragraph no. 16 that section 12(1) does not affect the jurisdiction
of the court to entertain and decide the suit for ejectment against
the tenant.  It merely confers protection upon the tenant if certain

conditions   are  fulfilled   and   clauses   (2)(3)(a)   and   (3)(b)   and   the
Explanation deal with certain specific cases in which readiness
and willingness to pay standard rent, may either be presumed or
regarded as proved.  
16. It is, thus, clear that the tenant who "pays" or "is ready and
willing   to   pay"   is   only   required   to   be   protected   on   recording
findings   in   that   regard.     Sub­section   (1)   of   section   15   of   the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act provides that the landlord shall not
be entitled to recovery of possession of any premises so long as
tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of standard
rent and permitted increases if any, and observes and performs the
other conditions of tenancy in so far as they are consistent with
the provisions of the Act.  Protection is extended to the tenant who
pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent
and permitted increases.   The latter part of the sub­section also
mandates the tenant to observe and perform other conditions of
tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the
Act.   The term "tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay" read
with observance and performance of other conditions of tenancy
would surely include observance of the terms of the tenancy and,
one of the terms of tenancy which is consistent with the provisions
of   the   Act   is   regularity  in   payment   of   rent.     A   tenant   who  is
irregular in payment of rent and pays the amount only under the
threat of action of eviction or only after issuance of notice for
recovery of rent cannot be considered to have complied with the
mandate   of   sub­section   (1)   in   respect   of   payment   of   rent   and
readiness and willingness on the part of the tenant so as to claim
relief against forfeiture cannot be presumed.   The only limitation

that has been put on the entitlement of the landlord to avail of the
remedies for enforcing his right to recover possession is to be found
in sub­section (2) of section 15.   Sub­section (2) of section 15
mandates that no suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted
by the landlord against a tenant on the ground of non­payment of
the standard rent or permitted increases due, until expiration of 90
days next after notice in writing for payment of standard rent or
permitted   increases   has   been   served   upon   the   tenant   in   the
manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882.   A suit by the landlord is thus not entertainable on the
ground of recovery of possession for non­payment of the standard
rent or permitted increases without transmitting a notice to the
tenant 90 days before institution of such suit, in the manner as
provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.  Subsection
(3) of section 15 provides that the Court shall not pass a
decree of eviction on the ground of arrears of standard rent and
permitted increases if within a period of 90 days from the date of
service of summons of the suit, the tenant pays or tenders in the
Court standard rent and permitted increases then due together
with simple interest on the amount of arrears at the rate of 15%
per annum and thereafter continues to pay or tenders in Court
regularly such standard rent and permitted increases till the suit
is finally decided and also pays cost of the suit as directed by the
Court.     It   is,   thus,   clear   that   if   the   tenant   pays   the   amount
demanded within the time stipulated and further continues to pay
the amount of standard rent and permitted increase during the
pendency of the proceeding regularly, the tenant is not liable to be
evicted and no decree shall be passed.  There is no whisper in the
provisions of section 15 putting an embargo on the entitlement of

the   landlord  to  file   a   suit   for  eviction   against   a   tenant   except
subject to compliance of the preconditions specified in sub­section
(2) of section 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.
17. On   consideration   of   provisions   of   section   15   of   the
Maharashtra   Rent   Control   Act   which   provide   for   relief   against
forfeiture   to   the   tenant,   it   is   clear   that   the   tenant   has   been
extended   protection   from   eviction   so   long   as   he   performs   his
obligation in respect of payment of rent as well as observance and
performance of other conditions of the tenancy.   The provisions,
thus, protect the tenant who is paying rent or has established his
readiness   and   willingness   to   pay.     Further   protection   is   also
provided in sub­section (3) of section 15 if the tenant pays entire
arrears of rent on receipt of notice within contemplation of subsection
(2) of section 15 before the period prescribed under subsection
(2) together with interest and cost as may be ordered by the
Court   and   continues   to   pay   rent   and   the   permitted   increases
regularly until the decision in the suit.  If the tenant does not pay
rent regularly and offers to pay only after issuance of notice within
contemplation of sub­section (2) of section 15 and does not observe
the other terms and conditions which include regular payment of
rent, the landlord is not disabled from proceeding against such
tenant.   In nutshell, to derive that if tenant offers or pays the
amount recorded in the notice issued in pursuance to sub­section
(2) of section 15, together with permitted increases, the landlord is
disabled   from   proceeding   against   the   tenant   is   not   within
contemplation of section 15 of the Act. The right to seek remedy
and claim possession of the premises owned by the landlord is
inherent in him however, initiation of such proceedings is subject

to fulfilment of certain pre­conditions such as issuance of notice in
accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as
provided under section 15(2).  It is, thus, clear that the tenant who
disobeys   the   provisions   of   section   15(1)   can   be   evicted
independently though such tenant may not necessarily pay any
arrears of rent on the date of institution of the suit.  Sub­section
(3) of section 15 shall have to be construed independently and if
the tenant does not observe the mandate of sub­section (3) in
respect  of payment  of amount  of rent  and permitted increases
regularly till disposal of the proceedings before the Court, is also
liable to be evicted.
18. In   the   matter   of  Shah   Dhansukhlal   Chhaganlal   Vs.
Dalichand Virchand Shroff, AIR 1968  Supreme Court 1109, a
decree was passed against a tenant since he failed to comply with
section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act.  The appeal preferred by
the   tenant   was   dismissed.     Before   the   High   Court,   the   only
contention that was raised was whether the tenant had or had not
complied with the requirements of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay
Rent Act.  It was found that there was no such compliance.  The
issue that was raised before the Supreme Court was as to whether
the provisions of section 12(1) of the Act was applicable throughout
the hearing of the suit and down to the date of final hearing and, if
at that stage, it was found that the tenant had paid all the arrears
due from him, whether he could be ejected.   While dealing with
the matter, the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph no. 14
of the judgment that to be within protection of provisions of section
12(3)(b) the tenant must not only pay all the arrears due from him
on the first day of hearing of the suit, but he must thereafter

continue   to pay  or  tender  in  court   regularly  the   rent   and  the
permitted increases till the suit is finally decided.  
19. In the matter of Mranalini B. Shah Vs. Bapalal Mohanlal
Shah (supra) the question as regards interpretation of section 12(3)
(b) of the Bombay Rent Act was a matter of consideration.   The
question that was formulated reads thus :
No decree for eviction shall be passed in
any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of
the suit or on or before such other date as the
Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in
Court   the   standard   rent   and   permitted
increases then due and thereafter continues
to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent
and permitted increases till the suit is finally
decided  and  also  pays  costs   of  the  suit   as
directed by the Court.  
While   dealing   with   the   issue,   the   Supreme   Court   has
observed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment thus :
11. We   have   perused   the   recent
Judgment of this Court in Ganpat Ladha V.
Sashikant Vishnu Shinde.  In our opinion, the
point raised by the appellants, before us is
fully covered by that Judgment.  The following
obervations of Beg, C.J., who spoke for the
Court are apposite :
... We think that the problem
of interpretation and application of
Section   12(3)(b)   need   not   trouble
us after the decision of this Court i
Shah   Dhansukhlal   Chagganlal's
case   MANU/SC/0166/1968   :
[1968]3SC   346   followed   by   the
more recent decision in harbanslal
Jagmohandas   v.   Prabhudas

Shivlal,   MANU/SC/048/1976   :
[1976] 3 SC 628, which completely
cover the case before us.
It is clear to us that the Act interferes
with   the   landlord's   right   to   property   and
freedom   of   contract   only   for   the   limited
purpose of protecting tenant from misuse of
the landlord's power to evict them, in these
days   of   scarcity   of   accommodation,   by
asserting   his   superior   rights   in   property   or
trying to exploit his position by extracting  too
high rents from helpless tenants.   The object
was not to deprive the landlord altogether of
his rights in property which have also to be
respected.     Another   object   was   to   make
possible eviction of tenants who fail to carry
out their obligation to pay rent to the landlord
despite   opportunities   given   by   'law   in   that
behalf   But   where   the   conditions   of   Section
12(3)(a) are  not   satisfied,  there  is  a  further
opportunity   given   to   the   tenant   to   protect
himself against eviction.  He can comply with
the conditions set out in those conditions, he
cannot claim the protection of Section 12(3)(b)
and   in   that   event,   there   being   no   other
protection   available   to   him,   a   decree   for
eviction would have to go against him.   it is
difficult   to   see   how   by   any   judicial   valour
discretion exercisable in favour of the  tenant
can be found in Section 12(3)(b), even where
the conditions laid down by it are satisfied, to
be   strictly   confined   within   the   limits,
prescribed for their operation.  We think that
Chagla,   C.J.   was   doing   nothing   less   than
legislating in Kalidas Bhavan's case 1958 Bom
LR   1359,   in   converting   the   provisions   of
Section   12(3)(b)   into   a   sort   of   discretionary
jurisdiction   of   the   Court   to   relieve   tenants
from hardship.   The decisions of this Court
referred   to   above,   in   any   case,   make   the
position quit clear that section 12(3)(b) does
not create any discretionary jurisdiction in the
court.  It provides protection to the tenant on

certain conditions and these conditions have
to be strictly observed by the tenant who seeks
the benefit of the Section.   If the statutory
provisions do not go far enough to relieve the
hardship of the tenant the remedy lies with
the legislature.  It is not in the hands of Court.
12. The above enunciation, clarifies beyond
doubt   that   the   provisions   of   Clause   (b)   of
Section   12(3)   are   mandatory,   and   must   be
strictly complied with by the tenant during the
pendency of the suit or appeal if the landlord's
claim for eviction on the ground of default in
payment of rent is to be defeated.   The word
"regularly" in Clause (b) of Section 12(3) has a
significance of its own.   it enjoins a payment
or   tender   characterised   by   reasonable
punctuality, that is to say, one made at regular
times   or   intervals.     The   regularity
contemplated   may   not   be   a   punctuality,   of
clocklike precision and exactitude, but it must
reasonably conform with substantial proximity
to the sequence of times or intervals at which
the rent falls due.   Thus, where the rent is
payable by the month, the tenant, must , if he
wants to avail of the benefit of the latter part
of Clause (b), tender or pay it every month as
it falls due, or at his discretion in advance.  If
he persistently defaults during the pendency
of the suit or appeal in paying the rent, such
as where he pays it at irregular intervals of 2
or 3 or 4 months as is the case before us, the
Court   has   no  discretion   to  treat   what   were
manifestly irregular payments, as substantial
compliance with the mandate of this Clause
irrespective of the fact that by the time the
Judgment was pronounced all the arrears had
been cleared by the tenant.
20.  On the analysis of the provisions of section 15 as well as
various judgments, it must be concluded that the provisions of

sub­sections   (1),   (2)   and   (3)   of   section   15   shall   be   read
independently.  In order to claim relief against forfeiture, the tenant
must satisfy all the conditions in respect of payment of rent or
tender in Court all the arrears then due on the first day of hearing
of the suit or within contemplation of provisions of law and to
deposit the rental liability regularly in the Court till the suit is
finally decided and there is no extinction of the cause of action by
reason of payment of existing arrears by the tenant.   It is, thus,
clear that in order to avoid decree, once the notice is issued within
contemplation of sub­section (2) of section 15 of the Maharashtra
Rent Control Act by the landlord, the tenant shall have to fulfil the
conditions laid down under sub­section (3) of section 15 of the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act and there is no escape therefrom.
21. It would be inappropriate to infer something which is not
specifically recorded in the provision and to read the restrictions
on   the   entitlement   of   the   landlord   to   present   proceeding   for
eviction of a tenant on payment of the amount of rent or permitted
increases, if any, as demanded by the landlord under a notice
within   contemplation   of   sub­section   (2)   of   section   15,   without
considering the impact of sub­section (3) of section 15.  It would
amount to adding to the provision in place and making violation
and thereby putting unnecessary restrictions on the right of the
landlord.  The principle that the Statute must be read as a whole is
equally applicable  to different  parts  of  the  same  section.     The
section must be construed as a whole whether or not one part is a
saving   clause.     Similarly,   "   elementary   rule   of   construction   of
section is to be made of all the parts together" and that "it is not
permissible to omit any part of it; the whole section must be read

together".     The   words   of   Statute   are   first   understood   in   their
natural, ordinary and popular sense and phrases and sentences
are constructed according to their grammatical meaning unless
there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in
which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used,
to show that they were used in special sense different from their
ordinary grammatical meaning.  
22. For a modern statement of the rule one may refer to the
speech   of   Lord   Simon   of   Glaisdale   in   a   case   where   he   said   :
"Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said
in an Act of parliament.  The drafting of statutes, so important to a
people   who   hope   to   live   under   the   rule   of   law,   will   never   be
satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply 'the
golden rule' of construction, that is to read the statutory language,
grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary
sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition.
Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that
when   such   an   approach   produces   injustice,   absurdity,
contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language
may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no
further."
23.    The Control of Rent and Eviction Acts which drastically limit
the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted are essentially to
benefit   the   tenants   but   they   also   to   some   extent   protect   the
landlords   in   the   sense   that   they   are   so   comprehensive   that   a
landlord can file a suit for eviction on the grounds mentioned in
the   Act   even   though   the   tenancy   has   not   been   terminated   in

accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. (V. Dhanpal Chettiar Vs. Yesoda Ammal, 1979(4) SCC 214).  A
provision enacting that a purchaser from a landlord cannot apply
for eviction on the ground of personal need before the expiry of
three years from the purchase and unless a notice of six months is
issued by him before or after expiry of three years period, was
construed to mean that no notice was necessary after the expiry of
three   years   or  at   any  rate   after   expiry   of   three   years   and   six
months from the purchase. (Anwar Hasan Khan Vs. Mohammad
Shafi, AIR   2001   SC   2984.)     Provisions   enacted   to   benefit   the
landlords cannot be so construed as to benefit the tenants. (Arjun
Khaiamal Makhijani Vs. Jamnadas C. Tuliani (1989) 4 SCC 612).
As expressed by Lahoti J.: "The courts have to adopt a reasonable
and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislaions
starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been
meted out to both the sections of the society.  Inspite of the overall
balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of
the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court
should   not   hesitate   in   leaning   in   favour   of   the   landlords.
(Joginder   Pal   Vs.   Naval   Kishore   Bahal,  AIR   2002   SC   2256).
Indeed, it has been held that in enacting a Control and Eviction
Act the Legislature has also to take into account that its provisions
are not so unjust to the landlords that they offend Article 14 of the
Constitution   in   which   event   they   will   become   unconstitutional.
(Malpe Vishwanath Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998
SC 602).
24. The   view   expressed   by   Division   Bench   in   the   matter   
Chandiram Ahuja (supra) lays down correct preposition and we are
in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench in
aforesaid matter.   The view expressed by Division Bench in the
matter of Narhar Wani (supra) does not lay down correct law and
we disagree with the view expressed therein.  
25.  To infer that once the tenant pays the amount recorded in
the   notice   or   tenders   the   same,   the   landlord   has   no   right   to
institute a suit for recovery of possession for non­payment of those
arrears   or   continue   with   such   proceeding   for   eviction   and   no
decree for possession can be asked for, is not within contemplation
of provisions of section 15 of the Act.   The provision does not
interfere with the right of the landlord to initiate proceeding for
eviction,   however,   sub­section   (2)   of   section   15   prescribes
precondition for presentation of suit, that is to say that no suit can
be initiated without issuing a notice within contemplation of said
sub­section (2) of section 15 and tenant's entitlement to claim relief
against   forfeiture   shall   be   subject   to   fulfilment   of   conditions
stipulated under sub­section (1) and (3) of section 15 of the Rent
Act.
26. The issue referred is answered accordingly.
27. The office is directed to place the Civil Revision Application
before appropriate court for disposal on merits.  
(SANGITRAO S. PATIL)    (RAVINDRA V. GHUGE)       (R. M. BORDE)

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