The inevitable result on comparison of Section 13(5) of the Act,
1952 and Section 15(7) of Act, 1958 be that the Court would not be
bound to strike out the defence against ejectment in case of default in
payment of rent in compliance to the order passed under Section 15(1)
of the Act, 1958 and it is always open to the Controller to examine the
facts of each case while exercising its discretion which obviously has
to be judicious in approach and with circumspection.
18. While interpreting Section 15(7) of Act 1958, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.
in Miss. Santosh Mehta Vs. Om Prakash and Ors. 2 1980(3) SCC 610 held that the
power to strike out a party’s defence is an exceptional step and has
only to be exercised where a “mood of defiance” and “gross negligence”
on the part of the tenant is detected. This Court warned against the
landlord using Section 15(7) as a “booby trap” to get the tenant
evicted. It would be better to reproduce the passage which indicate
the approach which has to be adopted in such matters by the Court.
The relevant paras 3 & 4 are as under:“
3. We must adopt a socially informed perspective while
construing the provisions and then it will be plain that the
Controller is armed with a facultative power. He may, or may
not strike out the tenant's defence. A judicial discretion has
builtinselfrestraint,
has the scheme of the statute in mind,
cannot ignore the conspectus of circumstances which are
present in the case and has the brooding thought playing on
the power that, in a court, striking out a party's defence is
an exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive
extreme following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all,
there must be a failure to pay rent which, in the context,
indicates wilful failure, deliberate default or volitional nonperformance.
Secondly, the section provides no automatic
weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes no
mechanical consequence but invests a power to overcome
intransigence. Thus, if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or
deposit rent and the court discerns a mood of defiance or
gross neglect, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in
defence. The last resort cannot be converted into the first
resort; a punitive direction of court cannot be used as a
booby trap to get the tenant out. Once this teleological
interpretation dawns, the mist of misconception about
matterofcourse
invocation of the power to strike out will
vanish. Farewell to the realities of a given case is playing
truant with the duty underlying the power.
4. …..The effect of striking out of the defence under Section
15(7) is that the tenant is deprived of the protection given by
Section 14 and, therefore, the powers under Section 15(7) of
the Act must be exercised with due circumspection.”
19. Subsequent decisions rendered on the subject also recognises
that mere failure to pay rent on the part of the tenant is not enough to
justify an order striking out the defence. It is only a wilful failure or
deliberate default or volitional of nonperformance
that can call for the
exercise of the extraordinary power vested in the Court. More
importantly, the plentitude of the discretionary power of the Court
under Section 15(7) of the Act, 1958 is with the Rent Controller
whether or not to strike out the defence, needless to say that the effect
of striking out the defence under Section 15(7) of Act, 1958 is that the
tenant be deprived of the protection available to him under Section 14
and it is imperative that such power vested with the Rent Controller
under Section 15(7) of the Act, 1958 must be exercised with due care
and circumspection.
20. In Smt. Kamla Devi Vs. Shri Vasudev 3, this Court reiterated
3 1995(1) SCC 356
that the power to strike out the defence simply vested the Rent
Controller with the discretion to do so. It was not mandatory for the
Rent Controller to strike out the defence simply because a default had
occurred. It is imperative that exercise of discretion vested with the
authority obviously depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case and is not open to be exercised under the rule of thumb.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 4563 OF 2014
DINA NATH Vs SUBHASH CHAND SAINI
Rastogi, J.
Dated:SEPTEMBER 24, 2019