Saturday, 10 October 2020

What is the difference between the jurisdiction of the court under civil law and criminal law?

 While the question of territorial

jurisdiction in civil cases, revolves mainly around (i) cause of

action; or (ii) location of the subject matter of the suit or (iii) the

residence of the defendant etc., according as the case may be,

the question of territorial jurisdiction in criminal Cases revolves

around (i) place of commission of the offence or (ii) place where

the consequence of an act, both of which constitute an offence,

ensues or (iii) place where the accused was found or (iv) place

where the victim was found or (v) place where the property in

respect of which the offence was committed, was found or (vi)

place where the property forming the subject matter of an

offence was required to be returned or accounted for, etc.,

according as the case may be.

19. While jurisdiction of a civil court is determined by (i)

territorial and (ii) pecuniary limits, the jurisdiction of a criminal

court is determined by (i) the offence and/or (ii) the offender.

But the main difference between the question of jurisdiction

raised in civil cases and the question of jurisdiction arising in

criminal cases, is twofold.

(i) The first is that the stage at which an objection as to

jurisdiction, territorial or pecuniary, can be raised, is

regulated in civil proceedings by Section 21 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. There is no provision in the Criminal

Procedure Code akin to Section 21 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

(ii) The second is that in civil proceedings, a plaint can be

returned, under Order VII, Rule 10, CPC, to be presented to

the proper court, at any stage of the proceedings. But in

criminal proceedings, a limited power is available to a

Magistrate under section 201 of the Code, to return a

complaint. The power is limited in the sense (a) that it is

available before taking cognizance, as section 201 uses the

words “Magistrate who is not competent to take

cognizance” and (b) that the power is limited only to

complaints, as the word “complaint”, as defined by section 2(d),

does not include a “police report”.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO.456 OF 2019

KAUSHIK CHATTERJEE  Vs STATE OF HARYANA 

Dated: SEPTEMBER 30, 2020

1. Seeking transfer of three criminal cases, all pending on

the file of the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate,

Gurugram, Haryana, to any competent Court in New Delhi, a

person who is implicated as one of the accused in those three

cases has come up with the above transfer petitions.


2. I have heard Mr. Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Deepak Thukral, learned

counsel appearing for the State of Haryana and Mr. Neeraj

Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the de facto

complainant, who is the second respondent herein.

3. The petitioner herein was appointed on 04.08.2016 as the

Group Chief Risk OfficerExecutive

Director of the second

respondent, which is a nonbanking

finance company and

which happens to be the de facto complainant in the criminal

cases whose transfer is what is sought in these petitions. It is

relevant to note that the petitioner, upon his appointment,

joined the Delhi Office of the second respondentCompany

on 04.08.2016 and he was transferred to Mumbai on 10.04.2017.

The petitioner resigned in July2018.

4. Three loans sanctioned by the second respondentCompany,

during the period when the petitioner was in service,

became the subjectmatter

of three different complaints lodged

by the second respondentCompany.

All the three complaints

were lodged by the second respondent with the Station House

Officer, Civil Lines, Gurugram P.S. For the purpose of easy

appreciation, the particulars of the loan and the borrower, as

well as the particulars of the FIR are given in the tabular

column as follows:

S.No. FIR No. Offences

Complained

Borrower Date of

Sanction

Amount of loan

1. 452/2018 Sections

406, 408,

420, 120B

r/w Section

34 of the

IPC.

Zillion

Infraprojects

Private Ltd.

26.10.2016 Rs.4,30,00,000/2.

748/2017 114, 120B,

406,

420, 467,

468, 471

and 216 of

the IPC.

AlFatah

Tours and

Travels

22.09.2019 Rs.71,50,000/3.

356/2019 Sections

120B,

406, 408,

420, 387

r/w

Section 34

of the IPC

Hotel M.S. 30.12.2016 Rs.46,00,000/28.12.2017

Rs.5,13,594/5.

After completion of investigation, the police filed a

chargesheet

on 14.12.2018 in FIR No.452/18, for alleged

offences under Sections 406, 408, 420, 120B

read with Section

34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the

“IPC”).

6. Similarly, a chargesheet

was filed on 18.07.2019 in FIR

No.748 of 2017 for alleged offences under Sections 114, 120B,

406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 216 of the IPC. Likewise a chargesheet

was filed on 24.10.2019 in FIR No.356/2019 for offences

under Sections 120B,

406, 408, 420, 387 read with Section 34

of the IPC.

7. The police also filed supplementary chargesheets,

on 06.01.2020 in the first case and on 08.11.2019 in the third

case.

8. Contending (i) that no part of the cause of action arose in

Gurugram to enable the de facto complainant to lodge a

complaint in the Gurugram Police Station; (ii) that while first

loan was sanctioned at Delhi, the second loan was sanctioned

at Indore and third loan was sanctioned at Surat, nothing

happened in Gurugram, entitling the de facto complainant to

invoke the jurisdiction of the investigating agency and the

Court in Gurugram; (iii) that the second respondent defacto

complainant has deliberately filed the complaint at Gurugram,

as the promoter of the de facto complainant wields lot of

influence at Gurugram and (iv) that the petitioner will not get a

fair trial at Gurugram, the petitioner has come up with the

above transfer petitions.

9. Thus, in effect, transfer is sought primarily on 2 grounds

namely (i) lack of territorial jurisdiction and (ii) apprehension of

bias.

10. But Mr. Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner did not press into service the second ground,

revolving around the allegation that the second respondent

wields a lot of influence locally in Gurugram and that the

petitioner will not get a fair trial. This saves me of the

botheration to bring on record the transcript of certain

whatsapp messages filed before me as part of the paper book.

11. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel, took me

through the loan agreements under which the second

respondentCompany

sanctioned the subject loans and argued

that in all the three loan agreements, the place of execution of

the agreement, the Branch office of the lender and the address

of the borrower are indicated. For instance, the loan agreement

dated 26.10.2016 under which facilities were extended to

Zillion Infraprojects Private Limited (which forms the subject matter

of FIR No.452/2018), the place of execution of

agreement and the address of the Branch Office of the lender

are indicated to be at Delhi. The address of the borrower as well

as the Coborrower

are also stated to be in Delhi. The branch of

the bank on which the cheque for the loan amount was drawn

was also in Delhi.

12. Similarly the loan agreement under which facilities were

extended to Hotel M.S. (which forms the subject matter of the

third FIR) indicates the place of agreement and Branch Office of

the lender to be Indore. The address of the borrower is also

stated therein to be in Indore. The address of the lender is

indicated to be in Bombay.

13. Insofar as the loan agreement under which facilities were

extended to Al Fatah Tours and Travels (forming the subject

matter of second FIR) is concerned, the place of the agreement

and the Branch Office of the lender are stated to be at Surat.

The address of the borrower is indicated to be in Surat and the

address of the lender is stated to be in Mumbai.

14. Therefore, it was contended by Mr. Vikas Singh, learned

Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the entire cause of action

in respect of one case arose in Delhi, the entire cause of action

for the second case arose in Indore and the entire cause of

action for the third case arose in Surat. It is also contended by

him that the de facto complainant did not even have an office at

Gurugram and that the second respondent is guilty of perjury

by claiming even before this Court, as though they have an

office in Gurugram. The petitioner has also taken out an

application under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure for prosecuting the officials of the second respondent

for committing perjury through their claim that the second

respondent has an office at Gurugram.

15. Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the second respondent contended that the

question whether any part of the cause of action arose within

the local limits of jurisdiction of the Courts in Gurugram, is a

question of fact to be established by evidence and that the same

cannot be gone into in the transfer petitions. In support of this

proposition, he relied upon the decision of this Court in

Abhiram Veer Vs. North Eastern Regional Agricultural

Marketing Corporation Ltd.2000 (10) SCC 433.

He also contended that insofar

as the loan granted to Zillion Infraprojects limited is concerned,

the property offered as security is located in Gurugram and that

the second respondent was actually sharing the office space of

a company which is a 100% subsidiary of the second

respondent. Therefore, it is his contention that no wrong

statement was ever made. It is further contended that the

borrowers who are also the prime accused in these cases have

not sought a transfer and that therefore the petitioner is not

entitled to seek transfer.

16. The learned Standing Counsel for the State of Haryana

supplemented the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for

the second respondent and relied upon the decision of this

Court in Asit Bhattacharjee Vs. Hanuman Prasad Ojha &

Ors. 2007 (5) SCC 786

17. I have carefully considered the rival contentions.

18. As seen from the pleadings and the rival contentions, the

petitioner seeks transfer, primarily on the ground of lack of

territorial jurisdiction. While the question of territorial

jurisdiction in civil cases, revolves mainly around (i) cause of

action; or (ii) location of the subject matter of the suit or (iii) the

residence of the defendant etc., according as the case may be,

the question of territorial jurisdiction in criminal Cases revolves

around (i) place of commission of the offence or (ii) place where

the consequence of an act, both of which constitute an offence,

ensues or (iii) place where the accused was found or (iv) place

where the victim was found or (v) place where the property in

respect of which the offence was committed, was found or (vi)

place where the property forming the subject matter of an

offence was required to be returned or accounted for, etc.,

according as the case may be.



19. While jurisdiction of a civil court is determined by (i)

territorial and (ii) pecuniary limits, the jurisdiction of a criminal

court is determined by (i) the offence and/or (ii) the offender.

But the main difference between the question of jurisdiction

raised in civil cases and the question of jurisdiction arising in

criminal cases, is twofold.

(i) The first is that the stage at which an objection as to

jurisdiction, territorial or pecuniary, can be raised, is

regulated in civil proceedings by Section 21 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. There is no provision in the Criminal

Procedure Code akin to Section 21 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

(ii) The second is that in civil proceedings, a plaint can be

returned, under Order VII, Rule 10, CPC, to be presented to

the proper court, at any stage of the proceedings. But in

criminal proceedings, a limited power is available to a

Magistrate under section 201 of the Code, to return a

complaint. The power is limited in the sense (a) that it is

available before taking cognizance, as section 201 uses the

words “Magistrate who is not competent to take

cognizance” and (b) that the power is limited only to

complaints, as the word “complaint”, as defined by section 2(d),

does not include a “police report”.

20. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

contains provisions relating to jurisdiction of criminal Courts in

inquiries and trials. The Code maintains a distinction between

(i) inquiry; (ii) investigation; and (iii) trial. The words “inquiry”

and “investigation” are defined respectively in clauses (g) and (h)

of Section 2 of the Code.

21. The principles laid down in Sections 177 to 184 of the

Code (contained in Chapter XIII) regarding the jurisdiction of

criminal Courts in inquiries and trials can be summarized in

simple terms as follows:

(1) Every offence should ordinarily be inquired into and tried

by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

This rule is found in Section 177. The expression “local

jurisdiction” found in Section 177 is defined in Section 2(j) to

mean “in relation to a Court or Magistrate, the local area within which the Court or Magistrate may exercise all or any of its or his powers under the Code”

(2) In case of uncertainty about the place in which, among

the several local areas, an offence was committed, the Court

having jurisdiction over any of such local areas may inquire

into or try such an offence.

(3) Where an offence is committed partly in one area and

partly in another, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court

having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

(4) In the case of a continuing offence which is committed in

more local areas than one, it may be inquired into or tried by a

Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

(5) Where an offence consists of several acts done in

different local areas it may be inquired into or tried by a Court

having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. (Numbers 2 to

5 are traceable to Section 178)

(6) Where something is an offence by reason of the act done,

as well as the consequence that ensued, then the offence may

be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local

jurisdiction either the act was done or the consequence ensued.

(Section 179)


(7) In cases where an act is an offence, by reason of its

relation to any other act which is also an offence, then the first

mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court

within whose local jurisdiction either of the acts was done.

(Section 180)

(8) In certain cases such as dacoity, dacoity with murder,

escaping from custody etc., the offence may be inquired into

and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either the

offence was committed or the accused person was found.

(9) In the case of an offence of kidnapping or abduction, it

may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local

jurisdiction the person was kidnapped or conveyed or concealed

or detained.

(10) The offences of theft, extortion or robbery may be

inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction,

the offence was committed or the stolen property was

possessed, received or retained.

(11) An offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal

breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within

whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part

of the property was received or retained or was required to be

returned or accounted for by the accused person.


(12) An offence which includes the possession of stolen

property, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose

local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen

property was possessed by any person, having knowledge that

it is stolen property. (Nos. 8 to 12 are found in Section 181)

(13) An offence which includes cheating, if committed by

means of letters or telecommunication messages, may be

inquired into or tried by any Court within whose local

jurisdiction such letters or messages were sent or received.

(14) An offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery

of the property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within

whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered by the

person deceived or was received by the accused person.

(15) Some offences relating to marriage such as Section 494,

IPC (marrying again during the life time of husband or wife) and

Section 495, IPC (committing the offence under Section 494

with concealment of former marriage) may be inquired into or

tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was

committed or the offender last resided with the spouse by the

first marriage. (Nos. 13 to 15 are found in Section 182)

(16) An offence committed in the course of a journey or

voyage may be inquired into or tried by a Court through or into

whose local jurisdiction that person or thing passed in the

course of that journey or voyage. (Section 183).


(17) Cases falling under Section 219 (three offences of the

same kind committed within a space of twelve months whether

in respect of the same person or not), cases falling under Section

220 (commission of more offences than one, in one series of

acts committed together as to form the same transaction) and

cases falling under Section 221, (where it is doubtful what

offences have been committed), may be inquired into or tried by

any Court competent to inquire into or try any of the offences.

(Section 184).

21. Apart from Sections 177 to 184, which lay down in

elaborate detail, the rules relating to jurisdiction, Chapter XIII

of the Code also contains a few other sections. Section 185

empowers the State Government to order any case or class of

cases committed for trial in any district, to be tried in any

Sessions division. Section 186 empowers the High Court, in

case where 2 or more courts have taken cognizance of the same

offence and a question as to which of them should inquire into

or try the offence has arisen, to decide the district where the

inquiry or trial shall take place. Section 187 speaks of the

powers of the Magistrate, in case where a person within his

local jurisdiction, has committed an offence outside his

jurisdiction, but the same cannot be inquired into or tried

within such jurisdiction. Sections 188 and 189 deal with

offences committed outside India.

22. After laying down in such great detail, the rules relating

to territorial jurisdiction in Chapter XIII, the Code of Criminal

Procedure makes provisions in Chapter XXXV, as to the fate of

irregular proceedings. It is in that Chapter XXXV that one has

to search for an answer to the question as to what happens

when a court which has no territorial jurisdiction, inquires or

tries an offence.

23. Section 460 lists out 9 irregularities, which, if done in

good faith by the Magistrate, may not vitiate his proceedings.

Section 461 lists out 17 irregularities, which if done by the

Magistrate, will make the whole proceedings void. Clause (l) of

section 461 is of significance and it reads as follows:“

If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this

behalf, does any of the following things, namely:(

l) tries an offender:


This

proceedings shall be void”

24. Then comes Section 462, which saves the proceedings that

had taken place in a wrong sessions division or district or local

area. But this is subject to the condition that no failure of

justice has occasioned on account of the mistake. Section 462

reads as follows:

“462. Proceedings in wrong place. –

No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal

Court shall be set aside merely on the ground

that the inquiry, trial or other proceedings in the

course of which it was arrived at or passed,

took place in a wrong sessions division, district,

subdivision

or other local area, unless it

appears that such error has in fact occasioned a

failure of justice.”

25. A cursory reading of Section 461(l) and Section 462 gives

an impression that there is some incongruity. Under Clause (l)

of Section 461 if a Magistrate not being empowered by law

to try an offender, wrongly tries him, his proceedings shall be

void. A proceeding which is void under Section 461 cannot

be saved by Section 462. The focus of clause (l) of Section 461

is on the “offender” and not on the “offence”. If clause (l) had

used the words “tries an offence” rather than the words “tries

an offender”, the consequence might have been different.

26. It is significant to note that Section 460, which lists out

nine irregularities that would not vitiate the proceedings, uses

the word “offence” in three places namely clauses (b), (d) and

(e). Section 460 does not use the word “offender” even once.

27. On the contrary Section 461 uses the word ‘offence’ only

once, namely in clause (a), but uses the word “offender” twice

namely in clauses (l) and (m). Therefore, it is clear that if an

offender is tried by a Magistrate not empowered by law in that

behalf, his proceedings shall be void under Section 461. Section

462 does not make the principle contained therein to have force

notwithstanding anything contained in Section 461.

28. Section 26 of the Code divides offences into two

categories namely (i) offences under IPC and (ii) offences under

any other special law. Insofar as offences under the IPC are

concerned, Clause (a) of Section 26 states that they may be

tried by (i) the High Court or (ii) the Court of Session or (iii) any

other Court, by which such offence is shown in the first

Schedule to be triable. In respect of offences under any other

law, clause (b) of Section 26 states that they shall be tried by

the Court specifically mentioned in such special law. In case

the special law is silent about the Court by which it can be

tried, then such an offence may be tried either by the High

Court or by any other Court by which such offence is shown in

the first schedule to be triable.

29. But Clause (a) of Section 26 makes the provisions

contained therein, subject to the other provisions of the Code.

Therefore, a question arose before this Court in the State of

Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sabir Ali AIR 1964 SC 1673 as to 

whether a conviction and

punishment handed over by a Magistrate of first class for an

offence under the Uttar Pradesh Private Forest Act, 1948 were

void, in the light of Section 15(2) of the Special Act. Section

15(2) of Uttar Pradesh Private Forest Act made the offences

under the Act triable only by a Magistrate of second or third

class. Though the entire trial in that case took place before a

Magistrate of second class, he was conferred with the powers of

a Magistrate of first class, before he pronounced the Judgment.

This Court held that the proceedings were void under Section

530(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (as it stood at

that time). It is relevant to note that Section 461(l) of the Code

of 1973 is in pari materia with Section 530(p) of the Code of

1898.

30. What is now clause (a) of Section 26 of the Code of 1973,

is what was Section 28 of the Code of 1898. The only difference

between the two is that section 28 of the Code of 1898 referred

to the eighth column of the second schedule, but section 26(a)

of the Code of 1973 refers to the first schedule.

31. Similarly, clause (b) of Section 26 of the Code of 1973 is

nothing but what was Section 29 of the Code of 1898.

32. What is significant to note from the Code of 1898 and the

Code of 1973 is that the question of jurisdiction dealt with by

Sections 28 and 29 of the Code of 1898 and Section 26 of the

Code of 1973, is relatable only to the offence and not to the

offender. The power of a Court to try an offence is directly

governed by Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 26 of the Code of

1973, as it was governed by Sections 28 and 29 of the Code of

1898.

33. In other words, the jurisdiction of a criminal Court is

normally relatable to the offence and in some cases, to the

offender, such as cases where the offender is a juvenile (section

27) or where the victim is a women [the proviso to clause (a) of

section 26]. But Section 461(l) focuses on the offender and not

on the offence.

34. The saving clause contained in Section 462 of the Code of

1973 is in pari materia with Section 531 of the Code of 1898. In

the light of Section 531 of the Code of 1898, a question arose

before the Calcutta High Court in Ramnath Sardar Vs.

Rekharani Sardar (1975) Criminal Law Journal 1139, 

as to the stage at which an objection to

the territorial jurisdiction of the court could be raised and

considered. In that case, the objection to the territorial

jurisdiction raised before a Magistrate in a petition for

maintenance filed by the wife against the husband, was rejected

by the Magistrate both on merits and on the basis of the saving

clause in Section 531. But the High Court held that Section

531 would apply only after the decision or finding or order is

arrived at by any Magistrate or Court in a wrong jurisdiction

and that if any objection to the territorial jurisdiction is taken

in any proceeding, it would be the duty of the Magistrate to deal

with the same.

35. In Raj Kumari Vijh Vs. Dev Raj Vijh AIR 1977 SC 1101,

 which also arose

out of a case filed by the wife for maintenance against the

husband, the Magistrate rejected a prayer for deciding the

question of jurisdiction before recording the evidence. Actually

the Magistrate passed an order holding that the question of

jurisdiction must await the recording of the evidence on the

whole case. Ultimately the Magistrate held that he had

jurisdiction to entertain the application. One of the reasons why

he came to the said conclusion was that in the reply filed by the

husband there was no specific denial of the wife’s allegation

that the parties last resided together within his jurisdiction.

When the matter eventually reached this Court, this Court

relied upon the decision in Purushottam Das Dalmia Vs.

State of West BengalAIR 1961 SC 1589 

to point out that there are two types of

jurisdictional issues for a criminal Court namely (i) the

jurisdiction with respect of the power of the Court to try

particular kinds of offences and (ii) its territorial jurisdiction.

36. It was specifically held by this Court in Raj Kumari Vijh

(supra) that the question of jurisdiction with respect to the

power of the Court to try particular kinds of offences goes to the

root of the matter and that any transgression of the same would

make the entire trial void. However, territorial jurisdiction,

according to this Court “is a matter of convenience, keeping in

mind the administrative point of view with respect to the work

of a particular court, the convenience of the accused and the

convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the

Court.”



37. After making such a distinction between two different

types of jurisdictional issues, this Court concluded in that case,

that where a Magistrate has the power to try a particular

offence, but the controversy relates solely to his territorial

jurisdiction, the case would normally be covered by the saving

clause under Section 531 of the Code of 1898 (present Section

462 of the Code of 1973).

38. From the above discussion, it is possible to take a view

that the words “tries an offence” are more appropriate than the

words “tries an offender” in section 461 (l). This is because, lack

of jurisdiction to try an offence cannot be cured by section 462

and hence section 461, logically, could have included the trial

of an offence by a Magistrate, not empowered by law to do so,

as one of the several items which make the proceedings void. In

contrast, the trial of an offender by a court which does not

have territorial jurisdiction, can be saved because of section

462, provided there is no other bar for the court to try the said

offender (such as in section 27). But Section 461 (l) makes the

proceedings of a Magistrate void, if he tried an offender, when

not empowered by law to do.

39. But be that as it may, the upshot of the above discussion

is (i) that the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an “offence”

or “offender” as well as the issue of territorial jurisdiction,

depend upon facts established through evidence (ii) that if the

issue is one of territorial jurisdiction, the same has to be

decided with respect to the various rules enunciated in sections

177 to 184 of the Code and (iii) that these questions may have

to be raised before the court trying the offence and such court

is bound to consider the same.

40. Having taken note of the legal position, let me now come

back to the cases on hand.

41. As seen from the pleadings, the type of jurisdictional

issue, raised in the cases on hand, is one of territorial

jurisdiction, atleast as of now. The answer to this depends upon

facts to be established by evidence. The facts to be established

by evidence, may relate either to the place of commission of the

offence or to other things dealt with by Sections 177 to 184 of

the Code. In such circumstances, this Court cannot order

transfer, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, even

before evidence is marshaled. Hence the transfer petitions are

liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed.

41. However, it is open to both parties to raise the issue of

territorial jurisdiction, lead evidence on questions of fact that

may fall within the purview of Sections 177 to 184 read with

Section 26 of the Code and invite a finding. With the above

observations the transfer petitions are dismissed. There will be

no order as to costs.

…..……......................J.

(V. Ramasubramanian)

SEPTEMBER 30, 2020

NEW DELHI


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