Sunday 15 September 2024

Supreme Court: The Court can not recognize compromise if it is not reduced in to writing & not Signed By Parties

 During the pendency of appeal, on 22.08.1983

Mansha Ram and others executed a sale deed

in favour of Kartar Chand, Sansar Chand and

Rajinder Kumar- three sons of Bakshi Ram for

consideration of Rs. 12,500/-. The first

Appellate Court, by order dated 20.08.1984,

allowed the appeal, setting aside the decree of

Trial Court in light of statements made by

plaintiffs before the court. It noted that ‘the

plaintiffs have compromised the case and stated

that they do not want to pursue with the suit

and it to be dismissed.’ {Para 5}

22. Additionally, we must also note the case of

Som Dev v. Rati Ram (2006) 10 SCC 788. as presented by the

appellants to clarify the rigors of Order XXIII

Rule 3 of CPC. In this case, it was clarified by

this Court that after the amendment of Code of

Civil Procedure in 1977, a compromise decree

can be passed only on compliance with the

requirements of Rule 3 of Order XXIII, otherwise

it may not be possible to recognize the same as

compromise decree. When a compromise is to

be recorded and a decree is to be passed, Rule

3 of Order XXIII of the Code requires that the

terms of compromise should be reduced to

writing and signed by the parties.

23. In the present case, neither the

compromise deed has been reduced to writing,

nor it is recorded by the court. Mere statements

of the parties before court about such said

compromise, cannot satisfy the requirements of

Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. Therefore, the

compromise decree is not valid.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.14690 of 2015)

AMRO DEVI & ORS. Vs JULFI RAM.

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Citation:  2024 INSC 527.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal is filed by defendants

against the order of Himachal Pradesh High

Court dated 15.12.2014. The Respondents are

original plaintiffs who had filed the suit for

declaration and specific performance. The Trial

Court dismissed the suit. However, the first

Appellate Court reversed the finding of Trial

Court and decreed the suit. The High Court, by

the impugned order, dismissed the second

appeal.

3. Following are the facts leading to the Civil Suit

in question:

On 27.12.1979, Mansha Ram, Dev Raj,

Khazana Ram, Ramji Das and Bihari Lal

(hereinafter referred as “Mansha Ram and

others”) filed a suit (Civil Suit No. 43 of 1983) for

declaration and permanent injunction against

Julfi Ram, Tihru Ram, Bakshi Ram- all three are

sons of Khajana, Prem Chand-son of Julfi Ram,

Kartar Chand-son of Bakshi Ram and Dharam

Singh son of Nighu. Plaintiffs were the

landowners and defendants were the co-tenants

of the land. The Plaintiffs sought a declaration

that they are owners in possession of suit land

measuring 7 kanals 9 marlas. They also sought

permanent injunction restraining defendants

from interfering in the land in suit. The

defendants contested the suit and stated that

they are in cultivatory possession as tenants on

payment. Thus, they claimed to be owners by

virtue of tenancy.


4. Trial Court by order dated 11.04.1983, decreed

the suit in favor of plaintiffs- Mansha Ram &

others granting them both the reliefs of

declaration and permanent injunction by

holding that they are owners in possession.

Aggrieved, all six defendants preferred an

appeal before the District Judge. As one of the

plaintiffs -Dev Raj had died during the

pendency, his widow Asha Devi and his son

Suresh Kumar were arrayed as Respondents in

the First Appeal.

5. During the pendency of appeal, on 22.08.1983

Mansha Ram and others executed a sale deed

in favour of Kartar Chand, Sansar Chand and

Rajinder Kumar- three sons of Bakshi Ram for

consideration of Rs. 12,500/-. The first

Appellate Court, by order dated 20.08.1984,

allowed the appeal, setting aside the decree of

Trial Court in light of statements made by

plaintiffs before the court. It noted that ‘the

plaintiffs have compromised the case and stated

that they do not want to pursue with the suit

and it to be dismissed.’ Before the first Appellate

Court, Julfi Ram, Tihru Ram, Bakshi Ram,

Prem Chand and Kartar Singh made a joint

statement on 20.06.1984 that they have

reached a settlement with Respondents. They

have also paid money to Mansha Ram and

others and they shall be the owners and hold

possession of the land in dispute. Thus, Suit

filed by Plaintiffs be dismissed. Dharam Singhson of Nighu recorded a separate statement to

the same effect. On the other hand, Bihari Lal,

Suresh Kumar (son of Devraj and holder of

General power of attorney of Asha Devi), Ramji

Das and Dhyan Chand made a statement that

they have reached a settlement and have

received money. Thus, possession and

ownership of the land shall be with

appellants/defendants. Mansha Ram and

Khazana Ram also recorded their statements on

20.06.1984, that they have reached a

settlement and the suit may be dismissed.

These four statements are on record of the High

Court and of this Court.

6. Appellants submit that Bakshi Ram’s three son

got exclusive possession and mutation in

revenue records by virtue of the sale deed dated

22.08.1983. However, the Respondents submit

that by virtue of dismissal of suit by first

Appellate Court, all four brothers- Julfi, Tihru,

Bakshi and Nighu became owners and the sale

deed executed in favour of the three sons of

Bakshi Ram shall be subject to compromise

decree passed by first Appellate Court.

7. On 23.02.1988, the present suit (Civil Suit No.

41 of 1988) was instituted by

Respondents/Plaintiffs- Julfi Ram, Prem

Chand, Dharam Singh, Premi Devi, Atmi Devi,

Asha Devi, Subhash Chand and Gian Chandtwo sons of Nighu represented by their mother

Premi Devi (hereinafter referred as “Julfi Ram

and others”) against appellants/DefendantsBakshi Ram(since deceased), Tihru Ram, Amro

Devi (wife of Bakshi Ram), Sansar Chand,

Kartar Chand, Rajinder Kumar (minor son of

Bakshi Ram), Mansha Ram, Khazana Ram,

Ramji Das, Bihari Lal and Asha Devi- widow of

Suresh Kumar (hereinafter referred as “Bakshi

Ram and others”). Thus, the erstwhile owners

Mansha Ram and others were also impleaded as

defendants. The suit was filed for declaration

and permanent prohibitory injunction claiming

that plaintiffs are owners in possession of half

share i.e. 3 kanals 15 marlas in the suit land as

per the compromise between parties in Civil

Appeal decided by District Court on 20.08.1984.

Plaintiffs also stated that they continued to be

in possession and they were cultivating the

land. However, in June 1987 the defendants

started interfering with the land in suit stating

that they have purchased the land and plaintiff

cannot continue to cultivate. Only at this stage

plaintiffs claim to have received knowledge

about mutation entries where only the names of

defendants have been recorded.

8. On the other hand, defendants (Bakshi Ram

and others) submitted a written statement on

28.01.1992, contending that there was no

compromise in earlier proceedings since no

compromise deed was executed and placed on

record before the Court in appeal. They also

claimed that they have spent Rs. 9,000/- on

improvement of suit land after the purchase.

9. The Trial Court, by order dated 19.12.1992,

dismissed the suit. It held that for proceeding

under Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil

Procedure, 19081 the existence and production

of written compromise between the parties duly

signed by them is most important. It relied upon

the ruling of this Court in Gurpreet Singh vs

Chaturbhuj Gopal2

. Since the said compromise

was not presented in written form duly signed

by the parties, the mandate under Order XXIII

Rule 3 CPC is not fulfilled and thus it lacks legal

force. The Trial Court also held that statements

before the District Court cannot be treated as

agreement or compromise. On the fact of

possession, the Trial Court noted that plaintiffs

could not prove that they were in possession

and in cultivation of the land in suit as pleaded.

10. As the Trial Court dismissed the suit, Julfi

Ram and others preferred Civil Appeal

No.17/1993 before the District Judge,

Hamirpur. By order dated 21.12.2001, the

District Judge, allowed the appeal thereby

decreeing the suit. It held that the Trial Court

1 CPC

2 AIR 1988 SC 400.


had no occasion to comment upon the legality

of compromise because neither parties

challenged the compromise decree by filing an

appeal under Order 43 Rule 1-A of CPC. Thus,

it operated as res judicata and could not have

been re-opened in a subsequent suit. The said

compromise would be binding on parties. On

merits, it observed that the sale was

clandestinely executed by the vendors (Mansha

Ram and others) in favour of sons of Bakshi

Ram. It further stated that even if the sale deed

is considered to be valid, the same cannot be

allowed to be acted upon as it has been executed

during the pendency of Civil Appeal No. 64 of

1993 between the parties.

11. The Appellants/defendants preferred a

Regular Second Appeal No. 55 of 2002 before

the High Court. The High Court, by the

impugned order, dismissed the same and

confirmed the decree passed by the first

Appellate Court dated 21.12.2001. The High

Court held that execution of sale deed does not

either abrogate, detract or dilute the effect of a

previous conclusive determination comprised in

the decree of 1984. Thus, the rights of plaintiffs

remained intact to the extent of one-half share

in the suit land. The sale deed is thus hit by the

doctrine of lis pendens.

12. We have heard learned counsel for the

parties and perused the material on record. The

question to be determined in the present case is

as to what is the status of the so called

compromise order dated 20th August 1984 in

the first round of litigation. The plaintiffs in the

second round of litigation were the defendants

whereas the Mansha Ram and others were

plaintiffs in the first round of litigation. The first

suit was for declaration and for permanent

injunction on account of interference by the

defendants therein. The plaintiffs were already

recorded in the revenue records. Their suit was

decreed by the Trial Court on 11.04.1983. At the

time of execution of sale deed, on 22.08.1983,

in favour of present appellants (defendants in

second suit, Mansha Ram and others) were fully

competent to execute the sale deed. It is true

that when the said sale deed was executed, the

first appeal was pending before the first

Appellate Court.

13. Before the first Appellate Court, the

plaintiff-respondent therein Bihari Lal gave a

short statement to the effect that they had

reached a settlement, received money and that

possession and ownership of the land would be

with the appellants. Mansha Ram and Khazana

Ram stated that they had reached a settlement

with the appellants, they agreed to the

statement of the appellant that suit may be

dismissed. At the same time appellants Julfi

Ram and others stated that they have reached a

settlement with the respondents, they had paid

money to Mansha Ram and others, that they

shall be owners in possession of the land in

dispute and that the suit be dismissed.

14. Based on these statements, the District

Judge, Hamirpur by order dated 20.08.1984

accepted the appeal, set aside the judgement

and decree of Trial Court and dismissed the

suit. It further directed that decree sheet be

prepared and file be consigned to the record.

The effect of this decree would be that the suit

of the plaintiffs was dismissed. No declaration

was granted to the defendants in the said suit.

There was no written compromise deed between

the parties, there was no verification as such of

any written document.

15. At best, under the alleged compromise

order of dismissal of suit the defendants therein

could have claimed to be in possession of the

land in suit and no further. The ownership

could not have been transferred because of the

dismissal of the suit. Even assuming for the

sake of argument that ownership rights were

also transferred under the alleged compromise

deed, the sale deed executed prior to the said

compromise will not be affected in any manner

as the plaintiffs were not only recorded as land

owners but also had a decree of declaration and

permanent injunction in their favour at the time

when sale deed was executed.

16. The defendants, in the first round of

litigation, were admittedly tenants. They could

have become owners of the land in suit either by

way of a registered sale deed in their favour or

by way of a declaration by the Competent Civil

Court whether on merits or by way of a

compromise decree granting such declaration.

Neither of the two happened. Merely because

some statement of the parties is recorded by the

first Appellate Court that they have settled the

dispute and that the suit may be dismissed,

would not make the defendants therein from

tenants to owners. Dismissal of the suit would

only mean that their status as tenants would

continue.

17. The first Appellate Court and the High

Court failed to consider that there was no

challenge to the sale deed dated 22.08.1983.

The doctrine of lis pendens or the restriction

imposed under section 52 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 18823 may not be relevant or

applicable in present case considering the fact

that one of the parties- plaintiffs in the

proceedings and respondents in pending appeal

having executed the sale deed during the

pendency of appeal, by their subsequent

conduct of giving a statement that their suit be

3 The TP Act.


dismissed, acted in dishonest and unfair

manner. They were fully aware of having

executed the sale deed, their subsequent

statement would only be termed as collusive

and dishonest. The order in the appeal court

was not a decree on merits declaring any rights

of the defendants to the suit (appellants in the

appeal). In such circumstances, the sale deed

dated 22.08.1983 could not be said to be hit by

doctrine of lis pendens.

18. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to

note the judicial decision which has been relied

upon by the appellants to substantiate their

claim that the sale deed is not hit by Section 52

of the TP Act. In Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v.

Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd. (2013) 5 SCC 397.

it was

held that transfer of suit property pendente lite

is not void ab initio, as it remains subservient to

the pending litigation. The purchaser of any

such property takes the bargain subject to the

rights of the plaintiff in pending suit. Therefore,

in the present case the sale deed dated

22.08.1983 is not hit by section 52 of the TP Act.

19. Referring to the second submission of the

respondents regarding the compromise decree

being valid in law, at the outset, Order XXIII

Rule 3 CPC is reproduced:

“3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved

to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has

been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful

agreement or compromise 1 [in writing and

signed by the parties] or where the defendant

satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole

or any part of the subject-matter of the suit,

the Court shall order such agreement,

compromise or satisfaction to be recorded,

and shall pass a decree in accordance

therewith 2 [so far as it relates to the parties

to the suit, whether or not the subject matter

of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction

is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:]

[Provided that where it is alleged by one

party and denied by the other that an

adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived

at, the Court shall decide the question; but

not adjournment shall be granted for the

purpose of deciding the question, unless the

Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit

to grant such adjournment.]

[Explanation.— An agreement or

compromise which is void or voidable under

the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872),

shall not he deemed to be lawful within the

meaning of this rule.]”

20. A plain reading of the above provision

clearly provides that for a valid compromise in a

suit there has to be a lawful agreement or

compromise in writing and signed by the parties

which would then require it to be proved to the

satisfaction of the Court. In the present case

there is no document in writing containing the

terms of the agreement or compromise. In the

absence of any document in writing, the

question of the parties signing it does not arise.

Even the question of proving such document to

the satisfaction of the Court to be lawful, also

did not arise. Thus, it cannot be said that the

order dated 20.08.1984 was an order under

Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.

21. Once it is held that the order dated

20.08.1984 was not an order of compromise of

suit under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC the argument

relating to applicability and bar under Order

XXIII Rule 3A CPC would have no relevance at

all.


22. Additionally, we must also note the case of

Som Dev v. Rati Ram (2006) 10 SCC 788. as presented by the

appellants to clarify the rigors of Order XXIII

Rule 3 of CPC. In this case, it was clarified by

this Court that after the amendment of Code of

Civil Procedure in 1977, a compromise decree

can be passed only on compliance with the

requirements of Rule 3 of Order XXIII, otherwise

it may not be possible to recognize the same as

compromise decree. When a compromise is to

be recorded and a decree is to be passed, Rule

3 of Order XXIII of the Code requires that the

terms of compromise should be reduced to

writing and signed by the parties.

23. In the present case, neither the

compromise deed has been reduced to writing,

nor it is recorded by the court. Mere statements

of the parties before court about such said

compromise, cannot satisfy the requirements of

Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. Therefore, the

compromise decree is not valid.


24. In view of the above analysis, the present

Civil Appeal is allowed, the orders passed by the

High Court and first Appellate Court are set

aside. The judgment and decree of Trial Court

dated 19.12.1992 dismissing the suit is

confirmed.

25. Pending application(s), if any, is/are

disposed of.

……………………………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH)

……………………………………J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI

JULY 15, 2024

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