Supreme Court: Provisions of CRPC does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise

  Mr. Kharat, relied on the case of Biman Chatterjee (supra) to submit that now fulfillment of the terms of compromise cannot be basis of granting or cancelling the bail. He places reliance on the paragraph No. 7 of the said decision. Case in Biman Chatterjee (supra) was a proposed settlement between a couple having matrimonial discord. Bail granted to the Accused in the said crime was cancelled on the ground that the Accused was not adhering to the settlement terms. It is in this context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph-7 has made the observations as under:

7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in cancelling the bail on the ground that the Appellant had violated the terms of the compromise. Though in the original order granting bail there is a reference to an agreement of the parties to have a talk of compromise through the media of well wishers, there is no submission made to the court that there will be a compromise or that the Appellant would take back his wife. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the courts below could not have cancelled the bail solely on the ground that the Appellant had failed to keep up his promise made to the court. Here we hasten to observe first of all from the material on record, we do not find that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties at all, hence, question of fulfilling the terms of such compromise does not arise. That apart non-fulfilment of the terms of the compromise cannot be the basis of granting or cancelling a bail. The grant of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure is governed by the provision of Chapter XXXIII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise. What the court has to bear in mind while granting bail is what is provided for in Section 437 of the said Code. In our opinion, having granted the bail under the said provision of law, it is not open to the trial court or the High Court to cancel the same on a ground alien to the grounds mentioned for cancellation of bail in the said provision of law. {Para 20}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3219/2025

Decided On: 28.07.2025

Gajanan Dattatray Gore Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1004/2025,2025 INSC 913.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: The court must grant bail solely on law and the merits of each case — not on extraneous undertakings, assurances, or financial conditions.

 Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any Accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail. {Para 24}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3219/2025

Decided On: 28.07.2025

Gajanan Dattatray Gore Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1004/2025,2025 INSC 913.

Print Page

Kerala HC: Wife can claim maintenance after divorce despite prior compromise agreement if she is unable to maintain herself

Apparently, Ext.B2 was executed in the year 2004, and the claim for maintenance was raised only in the year 2012. Thus, without much discussion, it can be held that the consolidated payment of Rs. 30,000/- towards permanent alimony under Ext. B2 compromise will not disentitle the first appellant from raising a claim for maintenance at a later stage if she is actually unable to maintain herself. Therefore, it can be concluded that the first appellant is entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent, notwithstanding the terms of Ext.B2 agreement, either under Section 37 of the Act or under Section 125 of Cr. P.C., if she was unable to maintain herself during the relevant time. {Para 20}

 In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before Sathish Ninan and P. Krishna Kumar, JJ.)

Sheela George and Another V V.M. Alexander 

Mat. Appeal No. 586 of 2017

Decided on June 2, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 3501

Print Page

Supreme Court: The Court can not recognize compromise if it is not reduced in to writing & not Signed By Parties

 During the pendency of appeal, on 22.08.1983

Mansha Ram and others executed a sale deed

in favour of Kartar Chand, Sansar Chand and

Rajinder Kumar- three sons of Bakshi Ram for

consideration of Rs. 12,500/-. The first

Appellate Court, by order dated 20.08.1984,

allowed the appeal, setting aside the decree of

Trial Court in light of statements made by

plaintiffs before the court. It noted that ‘the

plaintiffs have compromised the case and stated

that they do not want to pursue with the suit

and it to be dismissed.’ {Para 5}

22. Additionally, we must also note the case of

Som Dev v. Rati Ram (2006) 10 SCC 788. as presented by the

appellants to clarify the rigors of Order XXIII

Rule 3 of CPC. In this case, it was clarified by

this Court that after the amendment of Code of

Civil Procedure in 1977, a compromise decree

can be passed only on compliance with the

requirements of Rule 3 of Order XXIII, otherwise

it may not be possible to recognize the same as

compromise decree. When a compromise is to

be recorded and a decree is to be passed, Rule

3 of Order XXIII of the Code requires that the

terms of compromise should be reduced to

writing and signed by the parties.

23. In the present case, neither the

compromise deed has been reduced to writing,

nor it is recorded by the court. Mere statements

of the parties before court about such said

compromise, cannot satisfy the requirements of

Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. Therefore, the

compromise decree is not valid.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.14690 of 2015)

AMRO DEVI & ORS. Vs JULFI RAM.

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Citation:  2024 INSC 527.

Print Page

Whether Bar To Suit Challenging Compromise Decree is Attracted When Compromise Recorded But Suit Not Disposed?

 Keeping in mind the aforesaid legal principles, in our view, the order passed by the Trial Court on 4th July 1995 in SCS No.611/1994 dismissing the suit on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction suffers from various legal infirmities and is liable to be set aside for the following reasons :-

(a) The Trial Court has recorded a finding that in view of the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of the Code, SCS No.611/1994 was not maintainable. The provisions of Rule 3A of Order XXIII of the Code read as under :-

"3-A. Bar to suit - No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not

lawful." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforesaid provision indicates that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on the basis of which the decree is passed was not lawful. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that the earlier suit should have been disposed of by passing a decree in view of a compromise entered into between the parties. In such contingency, a subsequent suit raising a challenge that the compromise recorded in the earlier suit was not lawful would not lie. Undisputedly, in the present case the earlier suit being SCS No.268/1978 was pending when the Trial Court proceeded to decide the preliminary issue of jurisdiction in SCS No.611/1994 on 4th July 1995. SCS No.268/1978 came to be subsequently decided on 18th/20th December 1996. In fact, the Trial Court, in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the impugned order has recorded in clear terms that the earlier suit was pending when the issue of jurisdiction was being considered in the subsequent suit. It is thus clear from the record that there was no decree passed on 4th July, 1995 based on compromise as stated to be recorded below Exhibit-53 in SCS No.268/1978, when the Trial Court proceeded to hold that the subsequent suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of the Code. If the earlier suit itself was pending and no decree therein had been passed, there would be no question of the provisions of Rule 3A of Order XXIII of the Code being attracted. {Para 13}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 92 of 1996,

Decided On: 25.01.2024

Moti Dinshaw Irani and Ors. Vs. Phiroze Aspandiar Irani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar and Jitendra Jain, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/0444/2024.

Print Page

Whether Family Court is empowered to lay down its own procedure in contentious matters?

  Learned counsel for the review petitioner contended that by virtue of Section 10(3) of the Act, the Family Courts are empowered to lay down its own procedure and therefore, insistence on meticulous adherence to the provisions of the CPC may be against the spirit of the legislation. We are unable to accept this argument for the following reasons. Section 10 of the Act deals with in generality the procedure to be followed in the Family Courts. It is to be remembered that a Family Court, as per the statute, is an entity having both civil and criminal jurisdictions. Disputes pertaining to family falling within Section 7 of the Act, whether it be a civil action or a criminal case, stands exclusively transferred to a Family Court by operation of Section 8 of the Act. Going by the provisions in the Act, it cannot be said that Family Courts are either purely Civil Courts or purely Criminal Courts. Actually, powers of a Civil Court and that of a Criminal Court have been conferred by the statute on the Family Courts. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act vividly indicates that subject to other provisions in the Act and Rules, the provisions in the CPC and of any other law for the time being in force, shall apply to suits or proceedings other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, Cr.P.C.) before a Family Court. It is also explicitly stated that a Family Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all the powers of such Court. Sub-section (2) of the said Section makes it clear that the provisions in the Cr.P.C. shall apply to the proceedings before the Family Court falling under Chapter IX of that Code. These provisions in Section 10 of the Act certainly pertain to matters in which the parties put up a contest before the Court. Intent and purport of establishment of Family Courts are relevant for interpreting Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. Preamble to the Act shows that it is intended for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs. Section 9 of the Act mandates that the Family Court shall make an endeavour to settle the dispute in the first instance. If we keep in mind the object of the Act and the functions of the Courts established thereunder, there will be no difficulty in appreciating Section 10(3) of the Act. The said Sub-section makes it clear that a Family Court need not be detained by the provisions in Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 10 of the Act in laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the suit or proceeding or at the truth of the fact alleged by one party and denied by another. This sweeping power is exercisable only when the Family Court makes an endeavour to settle the disputes between the parties in a suit or proceeding. That is, the power given to Family Court is to achieve the avowed object of the Act. Based on this provision, it cannot be contended that the Family Courts are not bound to follow the respective procedural laws, depending on the nature of the jurisdiction exercised, to adjudicate a contested suit or proceeding. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the procedure under CPC and other relevant Rules are totally inapplicable in a proceeding before the Family Court. Freedom under Section 10(3) of the Act can only be availed for effectuating a settlement between the parties, which is the sacred object of the Act and it cannot be used in contested proceedings.{Para 10}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

R.P. No. 507 of 2014 (R) in O.P. (FC) 4076/2013

Decided On: 03.07.2015

Sindhu P.K. Vs.  Sunil Kumar P.A. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Mohanan and A. Hariprasad, JJ.

Author: A. Hariprasad, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/0865/2015.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

How Family Court dealing with matters of civil nature should draft a decree if there is compromise between the parties?

The expression "suit" in Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC will have to be read as "suit or proceeding" in the context of a Family Court. Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC unequivocally states that the decree shall be in accordance with the compromise or agreement. The only inquiry contemplated by the Court when the parties compromise a matter is regarding the lawfulness of the compromise or agreement. If that is found to be in the affirmative, the Court has no option, but to record the same and pass a decree in tune with the compromise or agreement. Nothing in Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC prohibits a Court from preparing a judgment in terms of the compromise or agreement. If for any reason, the Court could not pronounce a judgment incorporating all the terms and conditions in the compromise or agreement, it is incumbent on the Court to make the compromise or agreement itself a part of the decree. In this case, the Judge concerned failed to do so. Dismissal of the suit or proceeding in its entirety by the Family Court, as seen from the judgment extracted above, was nothing but an illegality. It is to be remembered that in the absence of any challenge against the legality of the terms of compromise, none of the parties could have filed an appeal against the decree, which should have been passed in the proceedings, because of the interdict in Section 96(3) CPC. Therefore, care should have been taken by the trial Judge to record the compromise and pass a decree in terms of the compromise. The Court should not have ignored the terms and conditions arrived at by the parties. Basis of any compromise decree is a lawful contract or adjustment of rights and obligations between the parties, which the Courts are bound to respect. And if they are found to be lawful, the Courts are bound to record the same and pass a decree in accordance therewith. It will be the highest impropriety on the part of a Court to substitute the terms of the agreement or compromise by its own reasons and pass a decree against the terms arrived at by the parties.

19. The Family Court, after recording the compromise, should have passed a judgment incorporating all the terms of the compromise without doing any violence to the intent and purport of the compromise or to the intention of parties for arriving at a settlement while reproducing the same in the judgment or it should have passed a judgment in terms of the compromise by incorporating the same as part of the decree. In that event, there will be no conflict between the provisions in Order XX Rule 6 and Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. We are sure for the above reasons that the Family Court in this case could only have passed a decree in terms of the compromise and not in terms of the perfunctory judgment quoted above.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

R.P. No. 507 of 2014 (R) in O.P. (FC) 4076/2013

Decided On: 03.07.2015

Sindhu P.K. Vs.  Sunil Kumar P.A. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Mohanan and A. Hariprasad, JJ.

Author: A. Hariprasad, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/0865/2015.

Print Page

Can a party holding a preliminary decree of a partition suit acquire title to a specific portion of a particular property and can transfer it to third party?

Therefore, the question of specific immovable properties or specifically identified portions of immovable properties getting allotted to any person merely holding a preliminary decree with respect to an undivided share does not arise. A preliminary decree in a suit for partition merely declares the shares that the parties are entitled to in any of the properties included in the plaint schedule and liable to partition. On the basis of a mere declaration of the rights that take place under the preliminary decree, the parties cannot trade in, on specific items of properties or specific portions of suit schedule properties. Since there are three stages in a partition suit, namely (i) passing of a preliminary decree in terms of Order XX Rule 18(2); (ii) appointment of a Commissioner and passing of a final decree in terms of Order XXVI Rule 14 (3); and (iii) taking possession in execution of such decree under Order XXI Rule 35, no party to a suit for partition, even by way of compromise, can acquire any title to any specific item of property or any particular portion of a specific property, if such a compromise is struck only with a few parties to the suit. {Para 195}

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.)

Civil Appeal Nos. of 2023

Trinity Infraventures Ltd. and Others Vs M.S. Murthy and Others.

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Can the court accept a compromise petition if the party has not given authority to his advocate to compromise the case through a special Vakalatnama?

 The third question that arises for our consideration in context with the legality and validity of the settlement is whether the learned advocate appearing for the cross-objector i.e., Defendant No. 2 could have signed the compromise petition without an express consent. It is an imperative duty of the Court to ascertain the genuineness and lawfulness of the compromise deed. Indisputably, in the case on hand, the First Appellate Court had neither recorded the statements of the parties in the Court nor had made any inquiry into the terms of the settlement. It is in such circumstances that the High Court in its impugned order has observed that the Compromise Petition was signed by the advocate without any express authority or without special vakalatnama executed in favour of the advocate. In fact, the authority was expressly curtailed in the compromise deed. {Para 100}

103. Almost six decades back, the Madras High Court speaking through Justice Ramaswami (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Govindammal v. Marimuthu Maistry and Ors. reported in MANU/TN/0103/1959 : AIR 1959 Mad 7 had sounded the note of caution observing as under:

5.... The decisions appear to be fairly clear that even in cases where there is no express authorization to enter into a compromise, under the inherent authority impliedly given to the Vakil he has power to enter into the compromise on behalf of his client. But in the present state of the clientele world and the position in which the Bar now finds itself and in the face of divided judicial authority and absence of statutory backing prudence dictates that unless express power is given in the vakalatnama itself to enter into compromise, in accordance with the general practice obtaining a special vakalatnama should be filed or the specific consent of the party to enter into the compromise should be obtained. If an endorsement is made on the plaint etc., it would be better to get the signature or the thumb impression of the party affixed thereto, making it evident that the party is aware of what is being done by the Vakil on his or her behalf.

104. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the High Court committed no error in holding that the settlement between the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was unlawful.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Can a court issue a partition decree with the consent of only some of the coparceners?

 

Indisputably, in the case on hand, the Plaintiff has not put her signature on the deed of settlement, which was produced before the High Court in first appeal. The Plaintiff has made herself very clear that she never joined in the settlement between her brother i.e., the Defendant No. 1 and her sister i.e., the Defendant No. 2. On this ground alone, the settlement could be said to be unlawful, being without any written consent of all the parties. In a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot be maintained.

{Para 94}

95. In Nityamoni Dasi v. Gokul Chandra Sen reported in MANU/WB/0534/1910 : (1911) 9 Ind Cas 210 (Cal), the Calcutta High Court observed:

... The decree of the Subordinate Judge must be set aside and the whole case retried, because as this is a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot possibly be maintain ed.....

96. In Vir Singh and Ors. v. Kharak Singh and Ors. reported in MANU/LA/0229/1924 : AIR 1925 Lah 280, all the proprietors had not assented to the compromise, Moti Sagar, J. observed:

...the alleged compromise not having been assented to by all the proprietors was clearly contrary to law and the Court was, therefore, fully justified in refusing to enforce it....

97. In Taraprasanna Sarkar and Anr. v. Kalikamohan Sarkar and Ors. reported in MANU/WB/0026/1923 : AIR 1924 Cal 80 Mookerjee and Rankin, JJ., held:

...There can be no compromise binding upon, all the parties to a partition suit until and unless all the parties have joined in the compromise:...

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Can the court declare the compromise decree invalid if consideration for the alleged compromise was inadequate and there was variance between the agreement and compromise petition?

 

We shall now look into the circumstances, as highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Defendant No. 2, rendering the settlement agreement dated 28.03.1991 invalid and not binding Under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

First, the alleged compromise agreement has admittedly not been signed by the Plaintiff who concededly has a share in the property as a coparcener. A written consent of all parties is necessary.

Secondly, a coparcenary undivided property in specie (Plot No. 140) has been allotted to Defendant 2 by Defendant No. 1 over which the Plaintiff also has an interest.

Thirdly, there is variance between the agreement and the compromise petition producing the agreement.

The Variance noted is as follows-

(a) The compromise petition takes in consideration yet another property already purchased by Defendant No. 2 by her own income (Schedule B property) which was not a part of compromise agreement.

(b) The sketch map appended to the petition shows plot No. 1086 and 1085 which for part of plot No. 141 instead of plot No. 140 mentioned in Clause 3 of compromise agreement, and does not indicate any consensus ad idem, therefore, the execution of the compromise agreement becomes unenforceable.

(c) The species of suit property, which was given/provided to Defendant No. 2 in Clause 3 (page 141) of agreement was changed to will be allotted to her in final decree proceeding.

(d) The payment of Rs. 12000 which was to be deposited to court without any caveat in agreement (See para 4 @ 141) was made subject to further orders of the Court in the petition.

(e) There is no express mentioning about the mesne profits in agreement whereas a definite Clause was inserted in the compromise petition.

(f) The easement rights to property of Defendant No. 2 were recognised in agreement and later in petition was altered to that Defendant No. 2 along with others have to file and take steps to easement rights for which the Defendant 1 shall not object.

(h) The agreement provided that the Defendant No. 2 shall sign the compromise petition which was later altered to signing and swearing the affidavit in compromise petition.

Fourthly, the judgment dated 01.08.2000 of the first appellate court accepting the compromise does not make allotment of the property allotted in specie to the Defendant No. 2. The first appellate court has proceeded on the wrong premise that the Defendant No. 2 has surrendered her rights to the Defendant No. 1. The first appellate court was further wrong in specifically noting that the compromise agreement does not cause any prejudice to the rights of the Plaintiff and therefore can be given effect.

Fifthly, the compromise agreement was entered into by beckoning a smaller share to the Defendant No. 2, while she has a larger share in view of Vineeta Sharma (supra). The consideration for the alleged compromise/settlement was therefore inadequate and whole agreement has to fall to the ground due to changed and supervening circumstances effectuated by change in law. {Para 92}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Must the court entertaining a compromise petition examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act?

 

When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, "the Court shall decide the question", the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise "which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act..." shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal Under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of Order 43 of the Code.

 {Para 13}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

What is the duty of the court before accepting a compromise petition?

 The present case depicts as to how on February 27, 1991 the court recorded the alleged agreement and compromise in a casual manner. It need not be impressed that Rule 3 of Order 23 does not require just a seal of approval from the Court to an alleged agreement or compromise said to have been entered into between the parties. The statute requires the Court to be first satisfied that the agreement or compromise which has been entered into between the parties is lawful, before accepting the same. Court is expected to apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of the settlement before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties. It need not be pointed out that once such a petition of compromise is accepted, it becomes the order of the Court and acquires the sanctity of a judicial order. {Para 11}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Whether the court should accept compromise petition if it is not signed by a party or his Advocate?

  The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent took a stand that the High Court was justified in taking the view that the suit had been simply withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellant Under Rule 1 of Order 23 and it had not been compromised in terms of Rule 3 of the said Order 23; as such there was no occasion for the Appellant to file an application for recall of the said order and for restoration of the suit in question for being heard on merit. From the copy of the petition which was filed on February 27, 1991 it appears that the terms and conditions of settlement and agreement had been mentioned saying that both parties had entered into a compromise because of which the Plaintiff-Appellant had thereafter no connection with the disputed land and Defendant-Respondent shall be deemed to be in possession and the owner of the said disputed land. The prayer made in the said petition also says that the compromise may be ordered to be accepted. On basis of that petition, as already mentioned above, the court passed an order saying that the compromise had been accepted. In the order it has been mentioned that the suit of the Plaintiff be "dismissed as per compromise deed Ex. C". In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is difficult to hold that by order dated February 27, 1991 the Court allowed the suit to be withdrawn in terms of Rule 1 of Order 23. The order on face of it purported to dismiss the suit of the Plaintiff on basis of the terms and conditions mentioned in the petition of compromise. As such, the validity of that order has to be judged treating it to be an order deemed to have been passed in purported exercise of the power conferred on the Court by Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. The learned Subordinate Judge should not have accepted the said petition of compromise even if he had no knowledge of the fraud alleged to have been practised on the Appellant by his counsel, because admittedly the petition of compromise had not been signed either by the Respondent or his counsel. This fact should have been discovered by the Court. In the case of Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel [MANU/SC/0032/1987 : (1988) 1 SCC 270 : AIR 1988 SC 400] it has been said: (SCC p. 276, para 10)

Under Rule 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The court must therefore insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing.

The requirement of the petition of compromise being signed by the parties concerned has been considered also in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India [MANU/SC/0485/1991 : (1992) 1 SCC 31 : AIR 1991 SC 2234]. It appears the attention of learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid case of this Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel [MANU/SC/0032/1987 : (1988) 1 SCC 270 : AIR 1988 SC 400]. {Para 10}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Is a government servant entitled to 100% back wages if acquitted for cruelty upon his wife upon compromise?

 

 In the present case, respondent is not acquitted on merits. His

acquittal is attributable to compromise with his wife. Petitioner-State therefore cannot be saddled with the liability to pay salary and allowances during the period when respondent remained under dismissal. He incapacitated himself from performing duties owing to his conviction. It is also pertinent to note that respondent’s conviction was upheld even by the appellate court. This further prolonged the period of his dismissal. in such

circumstances it is highly debatable whether any back wages were payable to Respondent. Nonetheless the State Government decided to pay 50% salary and allowances to him during the intervening period. However, to expect payment of 100% salary and allowances during that period would be highly undesirable. Respondent had involved himself in a criminal case arising out of his private affairs unconnected with performance of his duties.

He kept himself away from his duties on account of his conviction. In such circumstances there is no question of payment of full salary and allowances to the respondent. {Para 16}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2470 OF 2018

The State of Maharashtra  Vs Shri Surendra G. Ghodake 

CORAM : S. V. GANGAPURWALA, ACJ &

SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

DATE : 8th MARCH, 2023.

JUDGMENT : (PER - SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.)

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 14.

Print Page

Whether the court can pass decree the suit or mould the relief on the basis of reneged compromise?

 In view of the aforesaid, a compromise pursis at

Exh.13 duly signed by the parties to the appeal, was

presented before the first appellate Court on 3/9/2020 with

the following prayer therein :

“The appeal be ordered as withdrawn in terms of

the Compromise and the Decree of R.C.S.

No.119/2015 passed by C.J.S.D. (M.C.A.),

Aurangabad on 9.9.2019 be confirmed as per terms

and conditions of this Compromise and oblige.” {Para 25}

26. Thereafter the Law Officer of the AMC submitted a

pursis dated 15/9/2020, whereunder the AMC reneged on the

compromise pursis. The first appellate Court, therefore, did

not endorse the compromise. The appeal was heard on its

merits and came to be dismissed.

35. The subsequent event of the compromise between

the AMC and the plaintiff firm or concessionaire is a fact not in

dispute. Most of the terms of compromise were executed in

nature. True, some of them were executory. To be specific,

additional FSI was to be granted permitting further

construction. It is also true that, the subject matter of the

present appeal is not the enforcement of the terms of the

compromise.

This Court, relying on decision of the Apex Court

in case of Nidhi (supra), finds that, when the AMC went back

on its promise and it has offered every excuse therefor, this

Court finds that, those facts need not be brought on record by

amending the respective pleadings. This subsequent event is

the admitted fact. The defendant AMC is a local authority. It

has a battery of lawyers on its panel to advice it. True, it has

every authority not to take the compromise terms to logical

conclusion. The Court seized of the present Second Appeal,

however, could not be oblivious to the factum of settlement.

 In the present case, a compromise pursis was

submitted for withdrawal of the appeal. Be that as it may.

This Court is neither endorsing the compromise nor enforcing

the same. The factum of compromise, however, is viewed to

hold the defendant – AMC to have diluted its stand on the

decision of cancelling the lease agreement for illegality

committed by the plaintiff firm and/or its sister concern.

In view of the above, the substantial questions of

law are answered accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

SECOND APPEAL NO.335 OF 2022 WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.8534 OF 2022

M/s Shalaka Engineers and JV Vs Aurangabad Municipal Corporation,

CORAM : R. G. AVACHAT, J .

Dated : 22nd December, 2022

Print Page

Whether the court can confirm conviction of accused U/S 138 of NI Act if there is agreement to compromise between him and complainant?

It is also to be noted that as per the terms of the agreement, the Respondent No.2 was bound to file a compromise petition before the High Court, however he failed to do so. The lack of filing of such a compromise petition, as agreed upon by the Respondent No.2, has now led to the High Court dismissing the Revision and confirming the Conviction of the Appellants. 

{Para 7}

8. In our view, the terms and conditions of the settlement entered into by the parties binds them to settle the dispute amicably, or through an arbitration as has been stated in clause 8 of the Memorandum of Understanding.

9. In such a circumstance, the Appellants cannot be convicted on the basis of the orders passed by the courts below, as the settlement is nothing but a compounding of the offence.

11. This is a very clear case of the parties entering into an agreement and compounding the offence to save themselves from the process of litigation. When such a step has been taken by the parties, and the law very clearly allows them to do the same, the High Court then cannot override such compounding and impose its will.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2023 

 B.V. SESHAIAH  Vs THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ANR.

Coram:  KRISHNA MURARI; J., V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN; J.

Author: KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Dated:  1st February, 2023

Print Page

Whether High court can quash prosecution under The prevention of Corruption Act if there is compromise between victim and accused?

  Thus it is clear from the march of law that the Court has to go slow even while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC or Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of a settlement reached between the parties, when the offences are capable of having an impact not merely on the complainant and the accused but also on others. {Para 42}

43. As seen from the final report filed in this case and the counter affidavit filed by the I.O., persons who have adopted corrupt practices to secure employment in the Transport Corporation fall under two categories namely, (i) those who paid money and got orders of appointment; and (ii) those who paid money but failed to secure employment. If persons belonging to the 2nd category are allowed to settle their dispute by taking refund of money, the same would affix a seal of approval on the appointment of persons belonging to the 1st category. Therefore, the High Court ought not to have quashed the criminal proceedings on the basis of the compromise.

44. It is needless to point out that corruption by a public servant is an offence against the State and the society at large. The Court cannot deal with cases involving abuse of official position and adoption of corrupt practices, like suits for specific performance, where the refund of the money paid may also satisfy the agreement holder. Therefore we hold that the High Court was completely in error in quashing the criminal complaint.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1514 OF 2022 

 P. DHARAMARAJ Vs SHANMUGAM & ORS.

Coram: S. ABDUL NAZEER; J., V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN; J. 

Author: V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

Dated: September 8, 2022

Print Page

Whether Litigant is Entitled To Refund Of Court Fees If Matter is Settled Outside Court Without Invocation Of S.89 CPC?

 In view of the aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that even if the matter is settled by the parties outside the Court without invoking the provisions of section 89 CPC, the appellant while withdrawing his first appeal, is entitled to the refund of full Court fees as provided under section 16 of the Court Fees. {Para 7} Act, 1870. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

FIRST APPEAL No. 222 of 2015

DAYARAM  BALARAM PATEL,  Vs SMT. LAXMI AGRAWAL 

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL

ON THE 20th OF SEPTEMBER, 2022.

Print Page

Can the court enforce a settlement done in mediation if one party contends that he was compelled to sign a mediation agreement?

  For all these reasons, I hold that the Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the DV Act has the power to refer thematter before it to mediation applying the principles of Section 89 of CPC, record the compromise and pass an order in terms of the settlement applying the principles of Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC.

11. When the parties settle the dispute at mediation by

signing an agreement detailing the procedure to be followed to

work out the settlement, certainly that agreement is having all

the characteristics of Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC. The scheme of

Order XXIII Rule 3 is to avoid multiplicity of litigation to enable the parties to settle their dispute once and for all. When the parties agreed to settle the dispute in terms of compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC, one of the parties cannot unilaterally withdraw from the compromise. The Explanation to Order XXIII Rule 3 makes it clear that only an agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act could be considered as not lawful agreement for the purpose of the Rule. Chapter II of the Indian Contract Act contains provisions relating to voidable contracts and void agreements. The petitioner has absolutely no case that the compromise is vitiated by any one of the grounds enumerated in Chapter II of the Indian Contract Act.

The only contention taken by the petitioner is that he was

compelled to sign the mediation settlement agreement without

understanding the consequences of its terms. So long as there is

no contention that the compromise is vitiated by one of the

grounds enumerated in Chapter II of the Indian Contract Act, the parties of the compromise are bound to honour the compromise and the court has the duty to enforce it.The Apex Court in Salkia Businessmens' Association and Others v. Howrah Municipal Corporation and Others [(2001) 6 SCC 688] has held that the terms of the compromise which become part of the order of the court should be strictly enforced. It was observed that if the courts are not to honour and implement their own orders, and encourage party litigants - be they public authorities, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go-by to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders of the court - the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the process - a costly consequence to be zealously averted by all and at any rate by the highest Courts in the States in the country. {Para 10}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP(CRL.) NO. 390 OF 2020

MATHEW DANIEL Vs  LEENA MATHEW, 

PRESENT

 DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH

Dated: 16th day of August, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page