Supreme Court: Cattle Transport Can't Be Presumed To Be For Slaughter Due To Mere Absence Of Documents

 Section 6 specifically indicates the offence of transportation of cattle for the purpose of slaughter or knowledge that such cattle are likely to be slaughtered. But for a mere presumption of such intention, by the Head Constable, PW3, there is nothing on record to show that the cattle were carried for slaughter. The reverse presumption provided by Section 11 would apply only if the essential ingredients for alleging the offence are proved before the Trial Court. In which event, the accused has the onus to prove that the transport for slaughter or the slaughter itself was not in violation of the provisions of the Act. The mere fact that the transport was not accompanied by any documents cannot lead to a presumption that the transport was for slaughter. The absence of documents to validate the transportation, if it is in violation of any statute, then the consequences should flow from that statute and cannot lead to an assumption of violation of the provisions of the Act. {Para 8}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No……….of 2026

[ @ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.16871 of 2026 ]

Saurabh Bajaj  Vs State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.

Citation: 2026 INSC 1076.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 29, 2026.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant is one of the six accused who were

convicted under the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle

Preservation Act, 2004(For brevity, ‘the Act’). The allegation was of transport of cattle in violation of Section 6 and were sentenced to one

year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- under

Section 10 of the Act.

3. The allegation was that 32 bullocks were carried in a

truck from Keduwa and the same was proceeding towards

Odisha, when it was detained by PW3, a Head Constable,

who had received information of such transport being

made. The cattle were seized, and the driver and the

cleaner were arrested. Together with them, a Bolero car,

which was moving in front of the truck, was also detained,

alleging that the car was escorting the truck. Four persons

travelling in the car were also arrested, one of whom was

the petitioner herein.

4. The Trial Court convicted the accused, which was

affirmed by the First Appellate Court and the Revisional

Court. The Revisional Court, the High Court, in the

impugned order restricted the sentence to that already

served. The appellant is before us specifically challenging

the conviction.

5. Five witnesses were examined by the prosecution.

PW1, a Veterinary Doctor, submitted his report as Ex.P1,

which clearly indicated that all the animals were fit and

were good for agricultural purposes; suitable for

ploughing. The apparent health of the cattle was also

corroborated by PW5, the President of the Gaushala

Committee Jogidadar, who was entrusted with the

possession of the cattle. PW3, the Head Constable who

carried out the interception and the seizure of the cattle, as

indicated by all the Courts, clearly established the

interception and seizure of the cattle. PWs 2 and 4 were the

independent witnesses who attested the seizure. The

seizure witnesses turned hostile but accepted their

signatures on the mahazar. The seizure witnesses did not

identify any of the accused.

6. The High Court extracted Sections 6 and 10, the first

of which is the offence alleged and the latter the provision

determining the penalty. The High Court also referred to

Section 11, where there is a reverse burden cast on the

accused to prove that the slaughter or the transportation of

the agricultural cattle was not in violation of the provisions

of the Act.

7. As we see from the impugned order, what has been

established is only that the truck was intercepted and the

cattle seized by PW3. There is nothing substantial to prove

that the Bolero car was escorting the truck. Before the

Revisional Court, the driver of the truck had raised an

argument that the passengers in the Bolero car had hired

the truck and the cattle belonged to them. However, such a

contention was not taken by the accused even before the

trial court and nor was such an explanation offered in the

Section 313 Statement.

8. Section 6 specifically indicates the offence of

transportation of cattle for the purpose of slaughter or

knowledge that such cattle are likely to be slaughtered. But

for a mere presumption of such intention, by the Head

Constable, PW3, there is nothing on record to show that

the cattle were carried for slaughter. The reverse

presumption provided by Section 11 would apply only if

the essential ingredients for alleging the offence are

proved before the Trial Court. In which event, the accused

has the onus to prove that the transport for slaughter or the

slaughter itself was not in violation of the provisions of the

Act. The mere fact that the transport was not accompanied

by any documents cannot lead to a presumption that the

transport was for slaughter. The absence of documents to

validate the transportation, if it is in violation of any statute,

then the consequences should flow from that statute and

cannot lead to an assumption of violation of the provisions

of the Act.

9. We find absolutely no reason to uphold the

conviction especially when a Veterinary Doctor and the

President of Gaushala Committee categorically stated

before Court that the cattle seized by PW3 were fit and

good for use in agriculture like for ploughing.

10. The revisional order impugned in this appeal, along

with the order of conviction and sentence of the Trial Court

and the First Appellate Court, is set aside. The appellant’s

conviction is thus set aside, and the appeal is allowed

accordingly.

11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand rejected.

.......…….……………………. J.

(J. B. PARDIWALA)

....……….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 29, 2026.

Print Page