Showing posts with label Force Majeure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Force Majeure. Show all posts

Saturday, 23 May 2020

Delhi HC: Tenant can not seek suspension of payment of rent owing to COVID-19


 In Raichurmatham Prabhakar and Ors. v. Rawatmal Dugar,
(2004) 4 SCC 766 the Supreme Court held that suspension of rent may be
claimed by the tenant if the lessee has been dispossessed. Thus, mere nonuse
may not always entitle the tenant for suspension of rent.
28. This view has been followed by a ld. Single Judge of this Court in
Aranya Hospitality Management Services Pvt. Ltd. v. K. M. Dhoundiyal
& Ors. [Arb. A. (Comm.) 6/2017, decided on 21st March, 2017], where the
Court considered the force majeure clause of the contract to hold that the
mere non-approval by the concerned authority for running a restaurant
would not entitle the tenant to seek suspension of rent. The Court held that
under circumstances wherein the tenant cannot use the property for the
purpose for which it was leased, the tenant would have no right to continue
enjoying the property and seek suspension of rent at the same time.
29. In relation to some contracts which are not classic tenancy or lease
agreements, where the premises is occupied and a monthly pre-determined
amount is paid purely as `Rent’ or `Lease amount’, the manner in which
pandemics, such as COVID-19, can play out would depend upon the nature
of the contract. In contracts where there is a profit-sharing arrangement or an

arrangement for monthly payment on the basis of sales turnover, the
tenant/lessee may be entitled to seek waiver/suspension, strictly in terms of
the clause. Such cases would purely be governed by the terms of the contract
itself, and the tenant’s claim could be that there were no sales and no profits
and thus the monthly payment is not liable to be made. Thus, the entitlement
of the client in such a situation is not governed by any overriding force
majeure event but by the consequence of the said event, being that there
were no sales or profits.
Conclusions:
30. In light of the above legal position, the Tenants’ prayer for suspension
of rent in the present case is to be considered. There is no rent agreement or
lease deed between the parties and hence Section 32 of the ICA has no
applicability. The case is governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. Section 56 of the ICA does not apply to tenancies. The
Tenants also do not urge that the tenancy is void under Section 180 (B)(e) of
the TPA. The tenants are also not `Lessees’ as an eviction decree has already
been passed against them.
31. The Tenants’ plea is for extension of the doctrine of suspension of
rent to cases which are covered by lockdown due to COVID-19. Insofar as
this prayer is concerned, this Court considers the following factors as
necessary for determining the question as to whether the Tenants herein are
entitled to any relief of suspension of rent:
i. Nature of the property: The tenanted premises are located in the
prime commercial area of Khan Market for running of a shop. It is
well-known that the commercial area of Khan Market is a sought-after
location for business purposes.

ii. Financial and social status of the parties: The Landlord is a dentist
who wishes to use the tenanted premises and has sought eviction on
the ground of bonafide use under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
The Tenants, on the other hand, run a footwear shop on the tenanted
premises, which they have been in possession of since 1975 at a
monthly rental of merely Rs.300/-.
iii. Amount of rent: The monthly payment of Rs.3.5 lakhs has been
fixed by this Court, as a condition for grant of stay for continued use
and occupation, after the decree of eviction was passed. The Tenants
do not wish to vacate the property due to the lockdown but wish to
continue to occupy the property. The amount being paid, when
compared to the prevalent market rent in the area, is on the lower side.
This is clear from a perusal of the lease deed of a neighbouring
property placed on record by the Landlord. Even if the said lease deed
is to be ignored and not taken on record, judicial notice can be taken
of the fact that the prevalent rent in Khan Market is amongst the
highest in the whole of Asia. The amount being paid by the Tenants,
though substantial, is on the lower side as compared to other
properties in Khan Market.
iv. Other factors: The Tenants are `unauthorised occupants’ of the
tenanted premises as a decree of eviction has already been passed.
The monthly payment of rent being made has been fixed by this Court
vide the interim order dated 25th September, 2017 in view of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v.
Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705. The use and occupation
charges have to be determined in a manner so as to fully compensate

the Landlord as if the Landlord had let out the property to a third
party. The Tenants are continuing to occupy the premises and do not
intend to vacate the same. In any case, the compensation ought to be
reasonable and should make up for the loss caused to the Landlord
due to delay in execution of the eviction decree. These factors
completely tilt the balance in favour of the Landlord.
v. Any contractual condition(s): There is no contractual condition that
permits non-payment or suspension of rent.
vi. Protection under any executive order(s): There are cases where the
central and state governments may have, from time to time, given
protection to some classes of tenants such as migrants, labourers,
students, etc. These include Order No. 40-3/2020-DM-I (A) dated 29th
March, 2020 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA),
Government of India and Order No. F/02/07/2020/S.1/PT. File/81
dated 22nd April, 2020 and Order No. 122-A F/02/07/2020/S.I/9 dated
29th March, 2020 both issued by the Delhi Disaster Management
Authority (DDMA), Government of NCT of Delhi. Without going
into the legality and validity of such Executive orders, suffice it to say
that the present case is not covered by any of these executive orders.
32. The Tenants’ application for suspension of rent is thus liable to be
rejected inasmuch as while invoking the doctrine of suspension of rent on
the basis of a force majeure event, it is clear from the submissions made that
the Tenants do not intend to surrender the tenanted premises. While holding
that suspension of rent is not permissible in these facts, some postponement
or relaxation in the schedule of payment can be granted owing to the
lockdown. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 21st May, 2020
 RC. REV. 447/2017 

RAMANAND Vs   DR. GIRISH SONI 
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
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Thursday, 7 May 2020

Whether doctrine of frustration of contract is applicable to leases of immovable property?

 We are unable to agree with counsel for the appellant in the present case that the relation between the appellant and the respondents rested in a contract. It is true that Court of Wards had accepted the tender of the appellant and had granted him a lease on agreed terms of lands of Dada Siba Estate. But the rights of the parties did not after the lease was granted rest in contract. By S. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act the chapters and sections of the Transfer of Property Act which relate to contracts are to be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. That section however does not enact and cannot be read as enacting that the provisions of the Contract Act are to be read into the Transfer of Property Act. There is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract, and events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer.

10. By its express terms s. 56 of the Contract Act does not apply to cases in which there is a completed transfer. The second paragraph of s. 56 which is the only paragraph material to cases of this nature has a limited application to covenants under a lease. A covenant under a lease to do an act which after the contract is made becomes impossible or by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. But on that account the transfer of property resulting from the lease granted by the lessor to the lessee is not declared void.

11. By the agreement of lease the appellant undertook to pay rent for the year 1947-48 and the Court of Wards agreed to give on lease the land in its management. It is not claimed that the agreement of lease was void or voidable. Nor is it the case of the appellant that the lease was determined in any manner known to law. The appellant obtained possession of the land. He was unable to continue in effective possession on account of circumstances beyond his control. Granting that the parties at the date of the lease did not contemplate that there may be riots in the area rendering it unsafe for the appellant to carry on cultivation, or that the crops grown by him may be looted, there was no covenant in the lease that in the event of the appellant being unable to remain in possession and to cultivate the land and to collect the crops, he will not be liable to pay the rent. Inability of the appellant to cultivate the land or to collect the crops because of widespread riots cannot in the events that transpired clothe him with the right to claim refund of the rent paid.

12. Authorities in the Courts in India have generally taken the view that s. 56 of the Contract Act is not applicable when the rights and obligations of the parties arise under a transfer of property under a lease.

13. In Tarabai Jivanlal Parekh v. Lala Padamchand MANU/MH/0046/1950 : AIR1950Bom89 it was held that monthly tenants of residential premises from whose occupation the premises were requisitioned continued to remain the monthly tenants of the landlord as before and that by reason of the requisition there was no eviction by title paramount or a frustration of adventure. The Court in that case observed that the doctrine of frustration did not apply where there is a lease whether the term is one for a fixed period or one which can be terminated by notice to quit, as the estate vested in the lessee by a lease is not extinguished by the order of requisition which is of a temporary nature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1965

Decided On: 01.03.1968

Dhruv Dev Chand Vs. Harmohinder Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.K. Mitter, J.C. Shah and Vaidynathier Ramaswami, JJ.

Citation:  (1968) 3 SCR 339 

J.C. Shah, J.
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Tuesday, 5 May 2020

Latest Supreme court judgment on interpretation S 32 and S 56 of Contract Act if there is frustration of contract

 In the present case, parties have agreed, and in Clause 14 of the Agreement, it was contemplated that during the contract if there is any prohibition of the export or any other executive or legislative Act by or on behalf the Government of the Country of origin, the unfulfilled part of the contract shall be cancelled. Because of the refusal by the Government, it was not permissible to the NAFED to make a supply to the Alimenta S.A. Hence; the unfulfilled part was required to be cancelled. Thus, NAFED was justified in not making the supply as it would have violated the Export Control Order, and it was not permissible to carry forward the quantity of the previous year to the next year because of the Export Control Order without permission of the Government.

44. It is apparent that the contract came to an end in terms of Clause 14 of the Agreement. The contract became void in view of the provisions contained in Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1881 (for short, "Contract Act"). The stipulation in Clause 14 releases both parties from the performance of the contract.

45. Section 32 of the Contract Act provides for enforcement of contingent contracts. Section 32, along with illustrations, is reproduced hereunder:

32. Enforcement of contracts contingent on an event happening.--Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens, cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened.

If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.

Illustrations

(a) A makes a contract with B to buy B's horse if A survives C. This contract cannot be enforced by law unless and until C dies in A's lifetime.

(b) A makes a contract with B to sell a horse to B at a specified price, if C, to whom the horse has been offered, refuses to buy him. The contract cannot be enforced by law unless and until C refuses to buy the horse."

(c) A contracts to pay B a sum of money when B marries C. C dies without being married to B. The contract becomes void.

46. Section 56 of the Contract Act deals with the agreement to do an impossible act or to do acts afterward become impossible or unlawful. It also provides for liability of the promisor to do something which he knew or might have known with reasonable diligence an act which is impossible or unlawful; as such, the promisor must make compensation for the non-performance of the promise.

47. Section 32 of the Contract Act applies in case the agreement itself provides for contingencies upon happening of which contract cannot be carried out and provide the consequences. To this case, provisions of Section 32 of the Contract Act is attracted and not Section 56. In case an act becomes impossible at a future date, and that exigency is not provided in the agreement on the happening of which exigency, impossible or unlawful, the promisor had no control which he could not have prevented, the contract becomes void as provided in Section 56. However, Section 56 also provides liability for a cause where the promisor has agreed to do something which he knew or with reasonable diligence might have known and which the promisee did not know to be impossible or unlawful. Such a promisor must make compensation to such promise and is liable to pay damages. The latter part of Section 56 is applicable when promisee did not know the act to be impossible or unlawful and that it was not known to the promisor; the action was impossible or unlawful or with reasonable diligence might have known.

48. In the present case, because of the clear stipulation in Clause 14 of the Agreement, it is apparent that the parties have agreed for a contingent contract. They knew very well that the Government's executive, or legislative actions might come in the way as provided in Clause 14 of the Agreement. Thus, in this case, Section 32 of the Contract Act is attracted and not the provisions of Section 56. It was an agreement to do an act impossible in itself without permission, and that is declared to be void by Section 32. The contract was capable of being performed in case the Government gave the requisite authorization. It is not an event that was not in contemplation at the time of entering into the agreement. Government permission was necessary. Section 56 is not attracted as the promisor and promisee both knew the reason in advance as in agreement such a contingency was provided itself in case of Government's executive order comes in the way, for cancellation of the contract. Thus, the contract became void on the happening of the contingency, as provided in Section 32 of the Contract Act.

49. This Court in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. MANU/SC/0131/1953 : AIR 1954 SC 44, considered the applicability of Sections 32 and 56 while considering the doctrine of frustration of contract. Impossibility and frustration are used as interchangeable expressions. The principle of frustration is an aspect of the discharge of a contract. In India, the only doctrine the courts have to go by is that of intervening impossibility or illegality as laid down in Section 56, and the English decisions in this regard may have persuasive value but are not binding. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 667 of 2012

Decided On: 22.04.2020

 National Agricultural Co-Operative Marketing Federation of India
Vs. Alimenta S.A.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Arun Mishra, M.R. Shah and B.R. Gavai, JJ.

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Friday, 27 March 2020

Leading Supreme Court judgment on Force Majeure

 "Force majeure" is governed by the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In so far as it is relatable to an express or implied Clause in a contract, such as the PPAs before us, it is governed by Chapter III dealing with the contingent contracts, and more particularly, Section 32 thereof. In so far as a force majeure event occurs de hors the contract, it is dealt with by a Rule of positive law Under Section 56 of the Contract. Sections 32 and 56 are set out herein:

32. Enforcement of Contracts contingent on an event happening-Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens, cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened. If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.

56. Agreement to do impossible act-An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void.

Contract to do act afterwards becoming impossible or unlawful. A contract to do an act which, after the contract made, becomes impossible or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.

Compensation for loss through non-performance of act known to be impossible or unlawful. Where one person has promised to do something which he knew or, with reasonable diligence, might have known, and which the promisee did not know, to be impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make compensation to such promise for any loss which such promisee sustains through the non-performance of the promise.

33. Prior to the decision in Taylor v. Caldwell MANU/UKWQ/0001/1863 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 24, the law in England was extremely rigid. A contract had to be performed, notwithstanding the fact that it had become impossible of performance, owing to some unforeseen event, after it was made, which was not the fault of either of the parties to the contract. This rigidity of the common law in which the absolute sanctity of contract was upheld was loosened somewhat by the decision in Taylor v. Caldwell in which it was held that if some unforeseen event occurs during the performance of a contract which makes it impossible of performance, in the sense that the fundamental basis of the contract goes, it need not be further performed, as insisting upon such performance would be unjust.

34. The law in India has been laid down in the seminal decision of Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. MANU/SC/0131/1953 : 1954 SCR 310. The second paragraph of Section 56 has been adverted to, and it was stated that this is exhaustive of the law as it stands in India. What was held was that the word "impossible" has not been used in the Section in the sense of physical or literal impossibility. The performance of an act may not be literally impossible but it may be impracticable and useless from the point of view of the object and purpose of the parties. If an untoward event or change of circumstance totally upsets the very foundation upon which the parties entered their agreement, it can be said that the promisor finds it impossible to do the act which he had promised to do. It was further held that where the Court finds that the contract itself either impliedly or expressly contains a term, according to which performance would stand discharged under certain circumstances, the dissolution of the contract would take place under the terms of the contract itself and such cases would be dealt with Under Section 32 of the Act. If, however, frustration is to take place de hors the contract, it will be governed by Section 56.

35. In M/s. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India MANU/SC/0057/1960 : 1960 (2) SCR 793, this Court, after setting out Section 56 of the Contract Act, held that the Act does not enable a party to a contract to ignore the express covenants thereof and to claim payment of consideration, for performance of the contract at rates different from the stipulated rates, on a vague plea of equity. Parties to an executable contract are often faced, in the course of carrying it out, with a turn of events which they did not at all anticipate, for example, a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices which is an unexpected obstacle to execution. This does not in itself get rid of the bargain they have made. It is only when a consideration of the terms of the contract, in the light of the circumstances existing when it was made, showed that they never agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different situation which had unexpectedly emerged, that the contract ceases to bind. It was further held that the performance of a contract is never discharged merely because it may become onerous to one of the parties.

36. Similarly, in Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Hyaliram Jagannath MANU/SC/0348/1967 : 1968 (1) SCR 821, this Court went into the English law on frustration in some detail, and then cited the celebrated judgment of Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. Ultimately, this Court concluded that a contract is not frustrated merely because the circumstances in which it was made are altered. The Courts have no general power to absolve a party from the performance of its part of the contract merely because its performance has become onerous on account of an unforeseen turn of events.

37. It has also been held that applying the doctrine of frustration must always be within narrow limits. In an instructive English judgment namely, Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl GmbH 1961 (2) All ER 179, despite the closure of the Suez canal, and despite the fact that the customary route for shipping the goods was only through the Suez canal, it was held that the contract of sale of groundnuts in that case was not frustrated, even though it would have to be performed by an alternative mode of performance which was much more expensive, namely, that the ship would now have to go around the Cape of Good Hope, which is three times the distance from Hamburg to Port Sudan. The freight for such journey was also double. Despite this, the House of Lords held that even though the contract had become more onerous to perform, it was not fundamentally altered. Where performance is otherwise possible, it is clear that a mere rise in freight price would not allow one of the parties to say that the contract was discharged by impossibility of performance.

38. This view of the law has been echoed in 'Chitty on Contracts', 31st edition. In paragraph 14-151 a rise in cost or expense has been stated not to frustrate a contract. Similarly, in 'Treitel on Frustration and Force Majeure', 3rd edition, the learned author has opined, at paragraph 12-034, that the cases provide many illustrations of the principle that a force majeure Clause will not normally be construed to apply where the contract provides for an alternative mode of performance. It is clear that a more onerous method of performance by itself would not amount to an frustrating event. The same learned author also states that a mere rise in price rendering the contract more expensive to perform does not constitute frustration. (See paragraph 15-158)

39. Indeed, in England, in the celebrated Sea Angel case, 2013 (1) Lloyds Law Report 569, the modern approach to frustration is well put, and the same reads as under:

111. In my judgment, the application of the doctrine of frustration requires a multi-factorial approach. Among the factors which have to be considered are the terms of the contract itself, its matrix or context, the parties' knowledge, expectations, assumptions and contemplations, in particular as to risk, as at the time of the contract, at any rate so far as these can be ascribed mutually and objectively, and then the nature of the supervening event, and the parties' reasonable and objectively ascertainable calculations as to the possibilities of future performance in the new circumstances. Since the subject matter of the doctrine of frustration is contract, and contracts are about the allocation of risk, and since the allocation and assumption of risk is not simply a matter of express or implied provision but may also depend on less easily defined matters such as "the contemplation of the parties", the application of the doctrine can often be a difficult one. In such circumstances, the test of "radically different" is important: it tells us that the doctrine is not to be lightly invoked; that mere incidence of expense or delay or onerousness is not sufficient; and that there has to be as it were a break in identity between the contract as provided for and contemplated and its performance in the new circumstances.

40. It is clear from the above that the doctrine of frustration cannot apply to these cases as the fundamental basis of the PPAs remains unaltered. Nowhere do the PPAs state that coal is to be procured only from Indonesia at a particular price. In fact, it is clear on a reading of the PPA as a whole that the price payable for the supply of coal is entirely for the person who sets up the power plant to bear. The fact that the fuel supply agreement has to be appended to the PPA is only to indicate that the raw material for the working of the plant is there and is in order. It is clear that an unexpected rise in the price of coal will not absolve the generating companies from performing their part of the contract for the very good reason that when they submitted their bids, this was a risk they knowingly took. We are of the view that the mere fact that the bid may be non-escalable does not mean that the Respondents are precluded from raising the plea of frustration, if otherwise it is available in law and can be pleaded by them. But the fact that a non-escalable tariff has been paid for, for example, in the Adani case, is a factor which may be taken into account only to show that the risk of supplying electricity at the tariff indicated was upon the generating company.

41. Coming to the PPAs themselves, we find that the force majeure Clause contained in all of them is in a standard form and is as follows:

12.3 Force Majeure

'Force Majeure' means any event or circumstance or combination of events and circumstances including those stated below that wholly or partly prevents or unavoidably delays an Affected Party in the performance of its obligations under this Agreement, but only if and to the extent that such events or circumstances are not within the reasonable control, directly or indirectly, of the Affected Party and could not have been avoided if the Affected Party had taken reasonable care or complied with Prudent Utility Practices:

45. We are, therefore, of the view that neither was the fundamental basis of the contract dislodged nor was any frustrating event, except for a rise in the price of coal, excluded by Clause 12.4, pointed out. Alternative modes of performance were available, albeit at a higher price. This does not lead to the contract, as a whole, being frustrated. Consequently, we are of the view that neither Clause 12.3 nor 12.7, referable to Section 32 of the Contract Act, will apply so as to enable the grant of compensatory tariff to the Respondents. Dr. Singhvi, however, argued that even if Clause 12 is held inapplicable, the law laid down on frustration Under Section 56 will apply so as to give the Respondents the necessary relief on the ground of force majeure. Having once held that Clause 12.4 applies as a result of which rise in the price of fuel cannot be regarded as a force majeure event contractually, it is difficult to appreciate a submission that in the alternative Section 56 will apply. As has been held in particular, in the Satyabrata Ghose case, when a contract contains a force majeure Clause which on construction by the Court is held attracted to the facts of the case, Section 56 can have no application. On this short ground, this alternative submission stands disposed of.


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 5399-5400, 5347, 5348, 5364, 5346, 5351-5352, 5415, 9635-9642 of 2016 and 9035 of 2014

Decided On: 11.04.2017

 Energy Watchdog  Vs.  Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

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Wednesday, 7 May 2014

Whether doctrine of frustration is applicable to contracts for sale of land in India?



It is true that in England the judicial opinion generally expressed is, that the doctrine of frustration does not operate in the case of contracts for sale of land. The reason is that under English law such a contract creates, an interest in the property, and the rule of frustration can only put an end to purely contractual obligations; but it cannot destroy an estate in land which has already accrued in favour of a contracting party. According to the Indian law, which is embodied in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a contract for sale of land does not of itself create any interest in the property which is the subject-matter of the contract. The obligations of the parties to a contract for sale of land are, therefore, the same as in other ordinary contracts and consequently there is no conceivable reason why the doctrine of frustration should not be applicable to contracts for sale of land in India.

C--Contract Act, 9 of 1872, S. 56- Contract for sale of land-Land requisitioned by Government-Frustration of contract.

Where after a contract for sale of a house-site by development company, the land was requisitioned by the Government under the Defence of India Rules: Held, that the requisition order being of a temporary nature could not be said to have made the performance of the contract impossible and the contract had not been frustrated at all.

Supreme Court of India
Satyabrata Ghose vs Mugneeram Bangur & Co., And ... on 16 November, 1953
Equivalent citations: 1954 AIR 44, 1954 SCR 310
BENCH:

MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.

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