Supreme Court: The Appellate Court can always frame an issue to determine any question of fact based on subsequent event

Yet another factor that impelled the High Court to interfere was the direction of the Appellate Bench in remanding the issue of bonafide requirement and hardship to the Trial Court for recording evidence and returning a finding in that regard. According to the High Court, the Trial Court had neither omitted to frame such issue nor had failed to try the same when it decided the suit. Hence, exercise of power by the Appellate Bench under provisions of Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083 was uncalled for. While it is true that the Trial Court did not omit to frame or try the issue with regard to bonafide requirement of the landlord, the Appellate Court could always exercise power Under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code and frame an issue so as to "determine any question of fact which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits." Such power can be exercised by the Appellate Court if it appears to it essential to the right decision of the suit on merits. It has to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of the case when found necessary by the Appellate Court for arriving at a right decision in the suit. {Para 18} 

In the facts of the present case, we do not find that the Appellate Bench committed an error when it exercised its jurisdiction Under Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code and referred the issue of bonafide requirement to the Trial Court pursuant to the plaint being amended. Liberty had been granted to the Defendants to amend the written statement and thereafter to both parties to lead evidence. Hence, even on this count the order of the Appellate Bench was not liable to be interfered with.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6677 of 2026

Decided On: 24.04.2026

Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh Vs. Natwarlal Shamji Gada and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 416,MANU/SC/0405/2026

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Supreme Court: Whether an appellate court can dismiss an appeal solely on the basis of an unrebutted affidavit of the respondent without considering the entire material on record, including the trial court record?

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the documentary material on record, we are of the view

that the writ petition did not warrant dismissal solely on the

ground that the original plaintiffs failed to file any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023. In our view, all relevant material that was brought on record by both the parties ought to have been examined while deciding the writ petition. The affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 could have been considered as additional material in opposing the claim for eviction on theground of bonafide need. Dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of non-traverse has, in our view, vitiated the impugned judgment. {Para 6}.

18. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001)

2 SCC 604], this Court held that the landlord should not be

penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial

date for deciding the facts of the requirement of the landlord is

the date of his application for eviction. It is also observed that

the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying

the landlord relief unless the litigation at least reaches the final

stages. However, it is further added that subsequent events

may, in some situations, be considered to have overshadowed

the genuineness of the landlords’ needs but only if they are of

such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need

and make it lose the significance altogether.”

In the light of above discussion, the High Court failed to consider whether the subsequent event as urged by the defendants had material bearing on the right claimed by the plaintiffs. It has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court had passed a decree for eviction on the basis of the evidence on record which was reversed by the Appellate Court. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to have taken into consideration the entire material available on record including the affidavit dated 12th April 2023. Thus, by failing to do so, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it while deciding the challenge to the reversal of the decree for eviction. We, therefore, find that the order passed by the High Court deserves interference.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

MARIA MARTINS  Vs NOEL ZUZARTE AND OTHERS 

Author: ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 376

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Supreme Court: Application For Compensation by Landlord at belated stage Can't Be Entertained When Appeal Is Ready For Final Hearing

 In my opinion if Interim Application as per the ratio laid down by the judgment of Atma Ram Properties (supra) is preferred in a short span of time after the Appeal is admitted and stay is granted to the execution of eviction decree, the same can be decided by Appellate Court on its own merits, by putting the tenant on reasonable terms.

But certainly such an application preferred much later for fixing market rent/compensation, after the Appeal is ready for final hearing, would not be entertainable when both the parties were heard at the time of Admission of Appeal and the execution of judgment and decree of eviction was stayed.{Para 7}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 15729 OF 2023

IN

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION 646 OF 2012

Brijbhushan Chandrabali Shukla Vs Shri. Mahendra Yadav, S/o

Lavjari S. Yadav 

CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

DATED : 12 JANUARY 2024.

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Whether married daughters of landlord are his dependents for the purpose of claiming eviction of tenant?

 The court is of the view that the status of financial well-being of a landlord or his family members-wife and children, who were dependent upon him, is not the test of bonafide requirement. All that was to be seen was whether there was a suitable alternate accommodation available with the landlord, for him to use or for providing the same to his daughters. No such suitable alternate accommodation has been shown. The impugned judgment has misdirected itself in an inquiry about the landlord's, his wife's and of the business of the husband's of the dependent daughters' or their economic well-being or in concluding that simply because the daughters of the petitioner were married, "happy with their matrimonial life" and alternate accommodation was available with their respective husbands, therefore, there was no need for them to start their business or to ask their father to provide them an accommodation for business. {Para 20} 

Ordinarily, for a daughter, irrespective of her matrimonial status, her paternal/maternal home is always a psychological, physical and emotional sanctuary, a place to which she can relate and return to freely, irrespective of how far she is geographically located from her parents. The law provides for eviction of a tenant on the need of dependants. Married daughters are included among dependents of their parents, for commercial/residential space.5 The test in law is about the dependency of the children upon the landlord/landlady when the property of the parent is in question.

22. In the present case, the married daughters are dependent upon their father for space to start their business in Delhi. The dependency was not pleaded on the husbands. The petition is maintainable. The daughters' need continues, so does the need of the petitioner. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Should the court refuse an eviction decree to the landlord if the husbands of his married daughters have accommodation?

 The landlord wanted his property not only for his daughters but for himself also. Assuming that accommodation was available with the respective husbands of the two daughters, surely it was not expected of the father-in-law to take assistance of his daughters and request them to make available such space through their respective husbands, for him to start a business enterprise. And why should he? The law does not require him to do so. Would it not compromise his self-respect and affect delicate family relations? Furthermore, the nature of the proposed business could be discussed/re-assessed/altered at any stage when the accommodation was made available, the landlord was not required to indicate the nature of business he intended to initiate. {Para 16}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Should a landlord have all information about the income and assets of his wife and disclose it before the court to seek eviction of a tenant?

 

 The impugned judgment then delves into the examination of nature of business being carried out by the landlord i.e. whether the hotel business was being run from 19 rooms to 13 rooms and how it was being run. It also doubted the credibility of the landlord on the ground that, since his family comprised only his wife and two daughters, he should have known the received income of his wife from her business of running a hotel. It further records that the hotel business was being run from the first and second floor of a building which was rented by the same Wakf-ul-aulad, to a partnership firm in which his brothers, sisters and sister-in-law were partners. The learned ARC inferred dishonesty and concealment on the part of the petitioner because he did not disclose these aspects and of his wife's business. {Para 11}

12. The court is of the view that the aforesaid inquiry was neither relevant nor necessary because for the purposes of a petition under section 141(1)(e) read with section 25B of the DRC Act, only the availability of suitable alternate accommodation is to be seen. It also presupposes that a husband has a right to know all details of his wife's business and financial affairs, as if the wife had no right to financial and business confidentiality or personal independence or privacy. There cannot be an assumption that the wife is subservient to her husband and is obliged to disclose to or share with her husband details of all her financials. In the present case, it was only to be seen: Whether a suitable alternate accommodation was available on the ground floor for the petitioner and/or his daughters for starting the business.

21. A wife is neither an appendage of nor an adjunct to her husband. Her identity does not merge with or get subsumed in her husband's identity. In law, she retains her individual entity. She retains her natural right to pursue her dreams, aspirations and the desire and need to be financially independent or otherwise do some meaningful social work. Idle luxuriation may not be the life-goal of many a woman or to be simply known as a rich man's wife. There is a certain self-worth which a person acquires by running her or his own business/commercial enterprise, vocation and professional activity. This aspiration cannot be questioned in proceedings for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Should a landlord disclose his entire financial transactions and file details of his income tax returns to prove his bona fide need for eviction of a tenant?

 

 The court is of the view that disclosure of his entire financial affairs by a tenant is neither essential in an eviction petition nor is it mandatory for the landlord to disclose all properties owned by her/him. Receipt of rentals from leased properties is a legitimate exercise. A plea of bonafide requirement has to be pivoted on the fact that the landlord had no other suitable alternative accommodation and there was a need for the same, not a mere wish. The landlord was not required to file details of his income tax returns and not filing the same along with the eviction petition would neither whittle away nor cast a doubt on the bonafide need, which is otherwise made out in the eviction petition.1 The "sufficiency" of income of a landlord or that he was well-off cannot be an issue for examination in eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act.2 For who can sit in judgment as to what is sufficient finance for a person or his/her family. There can be no check, hindrance or curtailment to aspirations of an individual.{Para 10}.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Whether the rent control Court has jurisdiction to decide eviction of tenant proceeding instituted before amendment Act 2013 of S 83 of wakf Act?

 At the outset, the respondent has questioned the maintainability of the eviction petition before the learned ARC on the ground that under section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 only the Wakf Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to eviction of a tenant of a Wakf property, section 85 of the said Act bars jurisdiction of other courts in respect of the matters which the Wakf Tribunal is empowered to decide, therefore, the eviction petition could not have been decided or entertained by the learned ARC. Reliance is placed by the respondent upon the following judgments: Rashid Wali Beg vs Farid Pindari MANU/SC/1001/2021 : (2022) 4 SCC 414; Syed Amir Ali vs Anjuman-e-Maidan [CM(M) 521/2021 decided on 02.12.2021 by High Court of Delhi; and Mehnish Adil vs Delhi Wakf Board 2002 (286) DLT 654.

6. Refuting the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Gobindram vs Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf MANU/SC/0659/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 726, which while dealing with an eviction petition prior to the amendment of section 83 of the Wakf Act in November, 2013 held that an eviction petition against a Wakf property would also be maintainable before a Civil Court. In Rashid Wali (supra) the Supreme Court held as under:

"....45. Interestingly, the basis of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram was removed through an amendment under Act 27 of 2013. As we have stated elsewhere, Ramesh Gobindram sought to address the question whether a Waqf Tribunal was competent to entertain and adjudicate upon disputes regarding eviction of persons in occupation of what are admittedly waqf properties. Since this Court answered the question in the negative, Section 83(1) was amended by Act 27 of 2013 to include the words, "eviction of tenant or determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and lessee of such property"."

7. However, the 2013 Amendment does not make section 83 of the Wakf Act applicable retrospectively. The eviction petition relates to 24.12.2009, i.e. more than over four years before the amendment came into effect. No notification was issued regarding transfer to the Wakf Tribunal of all cases relating to wakfs pending before the ARC under the DRC Act. Interestingly, this issue was never raised before by the tenant. On 11.02.2015, this court had remanded the matter to the learned ARC for decision on the issue of leave to defend. The said remand and direction received affirmation of the Supreme Court on 07.05.2015.

8. In view of the above, the eviction petition was maintainable before the learned ARC. The tenant's contentions to the contrary are untenable and are rejected. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023

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Is every claim for a license fee for the remainder of a lock-in period in a leave and license agreement considered a claim for damages?

 (e) Every claim for license fee for the remainder of a lock-in period in a leave and license agreement is not per se a claim for damages, liquidated or unliquidated. In a given case, it may be in the nature of either, or in the nature of a penalty, or it may simply be a component of the contractual consideration and therefore a debt properly so-called when the contingency in contemplation comes to pass. This will depend on an interpretation of the contract in question and an assessment of the conduct of the parties.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Company Petition No. 496 of 2013

Decided On: 28.02.2014

 Indiabulls Properties Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. Treasure World Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Patel, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0249/2014,2014 SCCOnLine Bom 4768.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Is a contractual provision for a lock-in period in a leave and license agreement illegal?

The result of this discussion, in summary, is that for the purposes of Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956:

(a) The liability of the respondent-company must be certain. Where the liability is to be adjudged, i.e., where it remains to be decided by a court whether or not the respondent-company is liable in the first place, there can be no 'debt' within the meaning of the section. The liability of a company is its obligation to pay. The debt is the amount that it is liable to pay.

(b) The debt must an ascertained, or definitely ascertainable, amount, not one that requires adjudication. 13 A claim in damages is no debt. 14

(c) The debt must be a debt now due at the time of presentation of the petition. Any contingency contemplated must be one that has come to pass; it cannot be one yet to occur. 15 It is on the happening of a contingency that a company can be said to be 'indebted'. Should the contingency never happen, there can be no debt .24

(d) A contractual provision in a leave and license agreement for a lock-in period is not per se illegal, unlawful, void or even voidable.

(e) Every claim for license fee for the remainder of a lock-in period in a leave and license agreement is not per se a claim for damages, liquidated or unliquidated. In a given case, it may be in the nature of either, or in the nature of a penalty, or it may simply be a component of the contractual consideration and therefore a debt properly so-called when the contingency in contemplation comes to pass. This will depend on an interpretation of the contract in question and an assessment of the conduct of the parties. {Para 64}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Company Petition No. 496 of 2013

Decided On: 28.02.2014

 Indiabulls Properties Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. Treasure World Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Patel, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0249/2014,2014 SCCOnLine Bom 4768.

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Whether the court can direct tenant to pay enhanced rent during pendency of eviction proceeding as per O 15-A of CPC?

 There is no gainsaying that an order under Order 39 Rule 10 CPC and/or Order XV-A CPC is rendered as an interim measure to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff/owner. This ‘order as an interim measure’ is to be carefully passed and the provisions loosely interpreted to safeguard the interest of a party that claims ownership over a property and assails unauthorized occupation of the same. In light of the very nature of relief contemplated under the above provisions, there is no reason to deprive a plaintiff of fair protection of his interest during pendency of the trial just because the trial is near its end or because there is dispute as to whether the property was tenanted as one or three/four. {Para 11}

12. In the present case, the appellant has placed on record certain registered lease deeds, to show that rentals upto Rs.145/- are being charged from tenants in the vicinity of the property in question. In the application filed, though the appellant had sought use/occupation charges @ Rs.12 lacs per month, during the course of submissions before the Trial Court, the demand was statedly restricted to Rs.8 lacs per month. Despite considering the scope of Order XV-A CPC, the Trial Court restricted its decision to direct payment only to ‘admitted’ rate of rent. The same does not find favour with this Court.

14. Considering the aforesaid and the material on record, this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the respondent/defendant is directed to deposit before the Trial Court arrears @ Rs.2 lacs per month since the date of filing of the suit till its pendency.

 Neutral Citation Number : 2023:DHC:1893

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ FAO 7/2023 & CM APPL. 1225/2023

SMT. SWARAN MAKKAR Vs M/S DAYAL CHAND KISHORI LAL

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

Pronounced on : 16.03.2023

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Can the tenant refuse to pay rent in the absence of a specific clause in that regard in the sale agreement?

It is settled position of law that an agreement holder who is the tenant of the property should continue to pay the rent, unless there is a specific clause in the sale agreement that the tenant need not pay the rent from the date of sale agreement. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the jural relationship of the landlord and tenant had got terminated due to the sale agreement is not legally sustainable. {Para 8}

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

C.R.P.(MD).No.323 of 2023 and CMP(MD).No.1537 of 2023

K.Jeyakumar  Vs L.Arunachalam 

CORAM

 MR.JUSTICE R.VIJAYAKUMAR

DELIVERED ON: 13 .02.2023

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Can the court grant interim relief U/S 9 of the Arbitration Act relating to possession of property given on leave and license?

As held by the Full Bench in Central Warehousing Corporation, Mumbai (supra) in the arbitration agreement in such cases is held to be invalid and inoperative on the principle that it would be against public policy to allow the parties, by a contract to oust the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court by virtue of Section 41 of the PSCC Act.

41. Thus, in my opinion, the respondents are correct in their

contention that this Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the Section 9 petition considering the nature of the reliefs, which in fact pertain to or are incidental to the possession of the licenced premises as asserted by the petitioners, subject matter of the leave and licence agreements. Hence, as held by the Court in the decisions as discussed above, jurisdiction to entertain any such proceedings would lie with the Small Causes Court under the provisions of Section 41 of the PSCC Act.

In view of such conclusion, it may not be possible for the Court to pass any orders on the present petition permitting the respondent to deposit in this Court liquidated damages which Mr. Shah had agreed to deposit even in the present proceedings. In view of the fact that the present proceedings are held as not maintainable and having reached such conclusion, it may not be permissible for the Court to bifurcate causes of action, the principles of law in that regard being well settled. Needless

to observe that it would be open to the petitioner to seek prayers in that regard in appropriate proceedings in the event the claims are pure monetary disputes falling within the realm of arbitrability of such disputes. All contentions of the parties in that regard are expressly kept open.

42. Resultantly, these petitions filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, cannot be entertained. The petitions are accordingly dismissed. The petitioners are at liberty to take recourse to other appropriate proceedings as may be available to the petitioners in law including to assert pure monetary claims in arbitral proceedings as discussed in paragraph 37 of this judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITION (L.) NO. 22526 OF 2022

BXIN Office Parks India Pvt. Ltd. Vs  Kailasa Urja Pvt. Ltd. 

CORAM : G.S. KULKARNI, J.

Pronounced on : AUGUST 20, 2022.

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Can the court refuse to grant an eviction decree to the landlord on the grounds of bonafide need if one landlord claims a rent increase?

 The learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have passed an order of eviction finding bonafide requirement of the landlord. The demand of increase of rent is wholly irrelevant to determine the bonafide requirement of the premises by the appellant.

We find that even if a notice is served upon by a landlord to increase the rent, that notice has nothing to do with the bonafide requirement as the landlord is statutorily prohibited from increasing the rent in respect of the tenanted premises in terms of Section 6 of the Act. The demand of rent beyond the agreed rent is not permissible in terms of Section 6 of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5539-5540 OF 2022 

 SURINDER SINGH DHILLON & ORS. Vs VIMAL JINDAL

Coram: HEMANT GUPTA; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J. 

Dated: AUGUST 22, 2022

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Can the Electricity board refuse to give electric supply to the tenant if the landlord fails to issue a no-objection certificate?

It is now well settled proposition of law that electricity is

a basic amenity of which a person cannot be deprived. Electricity

cannot be declined to a tenant on the ground of failure/refusal of

the landlord to issue no objection certificate. All that the

electricity supply authority is required to examine is whether the

applicant for electricity connection is in occupation of the

premises in question.

 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 810 OF 2022

DILIP(DEAD) Vs  SATISH & OTHERS 

Author: INDIRA BANERJEE J.

Dated: MAY 13, 2022

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How to ascertain mesne profits or compensation while staying execution of eviction decree?

 Now, reverting on the issue of determination of the amount of

mesne profits @ Rs.2,50,000/per month is concerned, the guidance may be taken from the judgment of Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Another – (1999) 2 SCC 325, in which this Court held that once a decree for possession has been passed and the execution is delayed depriving the decree holder to reap the fruits, it is necessary for the Appellate Court to pass appropriate orders fixing reasonable mesne profits which may be equivalent to the market rent required to be paid by a person who is holding over the property. In the case of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. – (2005) 1 SCC 705, this Court held that Appellate Court does have jurisdiction to put reasonable terms and conditions as would in its opinion reasonable to compensate the decree holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of the decree while granting the stay. The Court relying upon the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, observed that on passing the decree for eviction by a competent Court, thetenant is liable to pay mesne profit or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have able to let out the premises in present and earn the profit if the tenant would have vacated the premises. The Court has explained that because of pendency of the appeal, which may be in continuation of suit, the doctrine of merger does not have effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy merely because the decree of eviction stands merged in the decree passed by the superior forum at a later date. {Para 10}

11. Thus, after passing the decree of eviction the tenancy

terminates and from the said date the landlord is entitled for mesne profits or compensation depriving him from the use of the premises. The view taken in the case of Atma Ram (supra) has been reaffirmed in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. and others (2009) 9 SCC 772 by threeJudges Bench of this Court. 

12. The basis of determination of the amount of mesne profit, in

our view, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case

considering place where the property is situated i.e. village or city or metropolitan city, location, nature of premises i.e. commercial or residential are and the rate of rent precedent on which premises can be let out are the guiding factor in the facts of individual case.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 464647 OF 2022

M/s. Martin & Harris Private Limited & Anr. Vs Rajendra Mehta & Ors. 

Author: J.K. Maheshwari, J.

Dated: July 06, 2022

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Whether landlord is deemed to have waived the termination of lease if he accepts rent from tenant after expiry of period of lease?

  In view of the evidence thus obtained and taking

into account the decision in Shanti Prasad Devi’s case

(supra) the High Court held that mere acceptance of the

rent by the landlord after the expiry of the period of

lease would not amount to waiver of the termination of

lease.

12. In view of the above conclusion this Special Leave

Petition must fail as it is devoid of merits.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO.10700 OF 2022

SRI K.M. MANJUNATH Vs SRI ERAPPA. G DEAD THROUGH LRS. 

Dated: June 24, 2022.

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Whether Judgment debtor can claim relief expressly denied to him in the suit in the execution of the decree?

 It is trite law that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree that is to be executed and give relief to the judgment debtor that was expressly denied to him [refer: Bhawarlal Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Shifting Enterprise, (1999) 1 SCC 558]. After this issue pertaining to whether the Petitioner is the owner of the property in question or not has been crystallized, the Petitioner is now once again raking up the same issue which has attained finality. The argument of the Petitioner that he and his father were the owners of the property in question has attained finality in the Eviction Petition and the same has been confirmed by this Court in the Revision petition filed by the Petitioner. Furthermore, and the SLP filed against that order has failed. The Petitioner wants to contend that the sale deed did not convey any right, title or interest to the Respondents as the erstwhile owners were not in possession of the area in occupation of the Respondents. This amounts to re-agitating the case once-again. The Petitioner cannot now agitate the very same issue in the Execution Petition. {Para 8}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

IN THE MATTER OF:

RC.REV. 76/2022

RAMESH KUMAR BANGA Vs KAILASH MAKKAR AND ANR 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

Date of decision: 21st APRIL, 2022

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Should competent authority under rent law accept an application for leave to defend if it is not on the affidavit?

 Though the learned advocate for the petitioner, at first blush, would appear to be right in placing reliance upon Section 4 of the Limitation Act, the issues that need to be considered are, (a) whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the case of the petitioner and, (b) whether application, Exh.-8, seeking leave to defend, could be termed to be an application, in the eyes of law, in the absence of an affidavit or even a verification not affirmed before an oath administering authority. {Para 10}

11. In Prakash H. Jain v. Ms. Marie Fernandes1, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the competent authority cannot be mistaken to be a ‘court’. The authority has a limited scope and a specific purpose under the Act and it cannot be deemed to be a ‘court’ for invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. A similar view was taken in Sunda Associates v. Ajit Kisanlal Agarwal2, wherein it was held that the authority cannot be deemed to be a ‘court’ and the delay of even one day, cannot be condoned. 

13. In Amitabh s/o. Ramsharan Nigam v. Amit Raghunandan Saran Sharma4, it has been held that the requirement under Section 43(4)(a) of the Rent Act is mandatory in nature. An application filed by the counsel, bearing his signature, seeking leave to defend, does not satisfy the strict requirement of the said provision. No affidavit was filed by the petitioner. Hence, refusing to grant leave to defend was proper, as the petitioner did not satisfy the strict requirement of Section 43(4)(a) of the Rent Act.

14. In view of the above, it is obvious that Exh.-8, without the mandatory affidavit, would not be an application, which is within the strict prescription of law. In fact, the language used in Section 43(4)(a) requires an affidavit to be filed and not a mere application. As such, though Section 4 of the Limitation Act may have rescued the petitioner, the absence of an affidavit, which is mandatory, would render the said application non-existent in the eyes of law.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Ravindra V. Ghuge, J.)

Laxman Dadasaheb Jagtap  Vs Additional Commissioner and Another 

Writ Petition No. 579 of 2022

Decided on January 19, 2022

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 155

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Whether civil court or rent court will have jurisdiction to try a suit if tenant is government undertaking?

 A perusal of the scheme of the Act 1976 would show that from the appointed day, right, title and interest of Burmah Shell with effect to Section 5(1) stood transferred and vested with the Central Government and by virtue of Section 7(2), the vesting of tenancy rights with the Central Government stood further transposed and vested in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and that became a statutory tenant by virtue of Section 7(3) of the Act. To that extent, Section 11 of the Act has an overriding effect to the provisions of other laws. That being so, the jurisdiction indeed of a civil Court is impliedly barred from the field covered specifically by the provisions of the Act 1973 and that being the complete code determining the rights of a tenant/landlord to the exclusion of the other laws, we find no error in the view expressed by the High Court in the impugned judgment holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is held to be barred and remedial mechanism for ejectment could be possible only under the provisions of the Act 1973. {Para 21}

Supreme Court

JUSTICE AJAY RASTOGI JUSTICE ABHAY S. OKA

SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS. Vs. M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 7517 OF 2012

28th January 2022

Author: Rastogi, J.

Citation:  2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 95

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