The scheme of Sections 12, 13, and 14, therefore, is that where
an arbitrator makes a disclosure in writing which is likely to give
justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality, the
appointment of such arbitrator may be challenged under Sections
12(1) to 12(4) read with Section 13. However, where such person
becomes “ineligible” to be appointed as an arbitrator, there is no
question of challenge to such arbitrator, before such arbitrator. In such
a case, i.e., a case which falls under Section 12(5), Section 14(1)(a) of
the Act gets attracted inasmuch as the arbitrator becomes, as a matter
of law (i.e., de jure), unable to perform his functions under Section
12(5), being ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. This being so,
his mandate automatically terminates, and he shall then be substituted
by another arbitrator under Section 14(1) itself. It is only if a
controversy occurs concerning whether he has become de jure unable
to perform his functions as such, that a party has to apply to the Court
to decide on the termination of the mandate, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties. Thus, in all Section 12(5) cases, there is no challenge
procedure to be availed of. If an arbitrator continues as such, being de
jure unable to perform his functions, as he falls within any of the
categories mentioned in Section 12(5), read with the Seventh
Schedule, a party may apply to the Court, which will then decide on
whether his mandate has terminated. Questions which may typically
arise under Section 14 may be as to whether such person falls within
any of the categories mentioned in the Seventh Schedule, or whether
there is a waiver as provided in the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act.
As a matter of law, it is important to note that the proviso to Section
12(5) must be contrasted with Section 4 of the Act. Section 4 deals
with cases of deemed waiver by conduct; whereas the proviso to
Section 12(5) deals with waiver by express agreement in writing
between the parties only if made subsequent to disputes having arisen
between them.
18. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the Managing
Director of the appellant could not have acted as an arbitrator himself,
being rendered ineligible to act as arbitrator under Item 5 of the
Seventh Schedule, which reads as under:
“Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties or counsel
xxx xxx xxx
5. The arbitrator is a manager, director or part of the
management, or has a similar controlling influence, in an
affiliate of one of the parties if the affiliate is directly
involved in the matters in dispute in the arbitration”
Whether such ineligible person could himself appoint another arbitrator
was only made clear by this Court’s judgment in TRF Ltd. (supra) on
03.07.2017, this Court holding that an appointment made by an
ineligible person is itself void ab initio. Thus, it was only on 03.07.2017,
that it became clear beyond doubt that the appointment of Shri Khan
would be void ab initio. Since such appointment goes to “eligibility”,
i.e., to the root of the matter, it is obvious that Shri Khan’s appointment
would be void. There is no doubt in this case that disputes arose only
after the introduction of Section 12(5) into the statute book, and Shri
Khan was appointed long after 23.10.2015. The judgment in TRF Ltd.
(supra) nowhere states that it will apply only prospectively, i.e., the
appointments that have been made of persons such as Shri Khan
would be valid if made before the date of the judgment. Section 26 of
the Amendment Act, 2015 makes it clear that the Amendment Act,
2015 shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or
after 23.10.2015. Indeed, the judgment itself set aside the order
appointing the arbitrator, which was an order dated 27.01.2016, by
which the Managing Director of the respondent nominated a former
Judge of this Court as sole arbitrator in terms of clause 33(d) of the
Purchase Order dated 10.05.2014. It will be noticed that the facts in
the present case are somewhat similar. The APO itself is of the year
2014, whereas the appointment by the Managing Director is after the
Amendment Act, 2015, just as in the case of TRF Ltd. (supra).
Considering that the appointment in the case of TRF Ltd. (supra) of a
retired Judge of this Court was set aside as being non-est in law, the
appointment of Shri Khan in the present case must follow suit.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3972 OF 2019
Bharat Broadband Network Limited Vs United Telecoms Limited
Dated:April 16, 2019.
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
