Showing posts with label disclosure statment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label disclosure statment. Show all posts

Friday, 27 December 2019

Whether accused can build his defence on basis of stray statements in disclosure statement U/S 27 of Evidence Act?

 Our attention is invited to disclosure statement under section 27 of the Evidence Act made by accused No. 1 to show that he has pointed out what transpired in the night of 1/10/2008. He has pointed out that on 1/10/2010 in the night deceased Baban gave abuses to his sister Guddu and hence he and accused No. 2 tried to pacify him and asked him not to indulge in such abuses. He was not in mood to listen and altercation ensued. Therefore he with wooden stick and accused No. 2 with iron rod bet Baban on legs, hands and head.

 Our attention is drawn to judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at Murli @ Denny vs. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0136/1994 : 1995 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 39 to submit that such disclosure under section 27 of the Evidence Act can be pressed into service by accused in defence. Similar view is taken by Division Bench of the Court in the case of Madhavgir s/o Gururatangir, MANU/MH/1601/2003 : 2005(1) Mh. L. J. 161 is also relied upon.
In this backdrop when cross examination of PW-1-Nanda is seen, there is no attempt to bring on record any such abuses. Perusal of questions put to accused No. 1 is question Nos. 3, 4 and to accused No. 2 is question Nos. 3 and 4 in section 313 examination shows that they are denying the entire incident. While answering question No. 27 they could have taken defence of abuses to sister by deceased, but there is no such effort. Both of them have stated that they are falsely involved in the matter. Thus, as a matter of fact, defence of abuse in name of sister of accused No. 1 by deceased Baban was never raised and has not been established.

23. Stray sentences appearing in disclosure memorandum Exhibit 17 therefore cannot be allowed to be utilized to build such defence in present facts.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 656 of 2012, 

Decided On: 02.12.2019

Atikul Habibul Rehman Shaikh  Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.P. Dharmadhikari and Sandeep K. Shinde, JJ.

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Saturday, 18 May 2019

Supreme Court Judgment on impartiality and independence of Arbitrator


The scheme of Sections 12, 13, and 14, therefore, is that where
an arbitrator makes a disclosure in writing which is likely to give
justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality, the
appointment of such arbitrator may be challenged under Sections
12(1) to 12(4) read with Section 13. However, where such person
becomes “ineligible” to be appointed as an arbitrator, there is no
question of challenge to such arbitrator, before such arbitrator. In such
a case, i.e., a case which falls under Section 12(5), Section 14(1)(a) of
the Act gets attracted inasmuch as the arbitrator becomes, as a matter
of law (i.e., de jure), unable to perform his functions under Section
12(5), being ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. This being so,
his mandate automatically terminates, and he shall then be substituted
by another arbitrator under Section 14(1) itself. It is only if a
controversy occurs concerning whether he has become de jure unable
to perform his functions as such, that a party has to apply to the Court
to decide on the termination of the mandate, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties. Thus, in all Section 12(5) cases, there is no challenge
procedure to be availed of. If an arbitrator continues as such, being de
jure unable to perform his functions, as he falls within any of the

categories mentioned in Section 12(5), read with the Seventh
Schedule, a party may apply to the Court, which will then decide on
whether his mandate has terminated. Questions which may typically
arise under Section 14 may be as to whether such person falls within
any of the categories mentioned in the Seventh Schedule, or whether
there is a waiver as provided in the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act.
As a matter of law, it is important to note that the proviso to Section
12(5) must be contrasted with Section 4 of the Act. Section 4 deals
with cases of deemed waiver by conduct; whereas the proviso to
Section 12(5) deals with waiver by express agreement in writing
between the parties only if made subsequent to disputes having arisen
between them.
18. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the Managing
Director of the appellant could not have acted as an arbitrator himself,
being rendered ineligible to act as arbitrator under Item 5 of the
Seventh Schedule, which reads as under:
“Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties or counsel
xxx xxx xxx
5. The arbitrator is a manager, director or part of the
management, or has a similar controlling influence, in an
affiliate of one of the parties if the affiliate is directly
involved in the matters in dispute in the arbitration”

Whether such ineligible person could himself appoint another arbitrator
was only made clear by this Court’s judgment in TRF Ltd. (supra) on
03.07.2017, this Court holding that an appointment made by an
ineligible person is itself void ab initio. Thus, it was only on 03.07.2017,
that it became clear beyond doubt that the appointment of Shri Khan
would be void ab initio. Since such appointment goes to “eligibility”,
i.e., to the root of the matter, it is obvious that Shri Khan’s appointment
would be void. There is no doubt in this case that disputes arose only
after the introduction of Section 12(5) into the statute book, and Shri
Khan was appointed long after 23.10.2015. The judgment in TRF Ltd.
(supra) nowhere states that it will apply only prospectively, i.e., the
appointments that have been made of persons such as Shri Khan
would be valid if made before the date of the judgment. Section 26 of
the Amendment Act, 2015 makes it clear that the Amendment Act,
2015 shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or
after 23.10.2015. Indeed, the judgment itself set aside the order
appointing the arbitrator, which was an order dated 27.01.2016, by
which the Managing Director of the respondent nominated a former
Judge of this Court as sole arbitrator in terms of clause 33(d) of the
Purchase Order dated 10.05.2014. It will be noticed that the facts in
the present case are somewhat similar. The APO itself is of the year

2014, whereas the appointment by the Managing Director is after the
Amendment Act, 2015, just as in the case of TRF Ltd. (supra).
Considering that the appointment in the case of TRF Ltd. (supra) of a
retired Judge of this Court was set aside as being non-est in law, the
appointment of Shri Khan in the present case must follow suit.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3972 OF 2019


Bharat Broadband Network Limited  Vs United Telecoms Limited 

Dated:April 16, 2019.
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
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Saturday, 13 April 2019

What amounts improper disclosure by Arbitrator as per Sixth Schedule of Arbitration Act ?

 The petitioner vide its email dated 05.10.2018 sought a disclosure in
terms of the Sixth Schedule of the Act from the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator,
however, sent an email dated 06.10.2018 stating as under:
“The requirement of disclosure under the law in terms of
Schedule VI would only arise, in the event, the Arbitral
Tribunal had any kind of relationship either with the
Counsels or the parties. However, as has been mentioned in
the proceedings of 04.10.2018 that the Arbitral Tribunal has
no disability as enumerated under Schedule V and VII of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hence it is explicit
and it is reiterated that the Arbitral Tribunal has/had no
relationship with either of the parties or their Counsels as
envisaged under Schedules V and VII of the Act.
Hence, the disclosure as requested by you under Schedule VI
is not required.”
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the mandate of the
Arbitrator is liable to be terminated as he has not given a disclosure in terms
of the Sixth Schedule of the Act and also because his appointment was in
violation of the section 12(5) of the Act. 
7. As far as the non disclosure of the Arbitrator in terms of the Sixth
Schedule is concerned, as the Arbitrator has disclosed the major requirement
of the said Schedule and it seems that the Arbitrator was under the
misconception that he need not disclose the other relevant aspects of the
Sixth Schedule to the Act, I grant one further opportunity to the Arbitrator to
give disclosure in terms of the Sixth Schedule of the Act. Such disclosure
should be given by the Arbitrator within one week of communication of this
order.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 120/2018 & I.A. No.15421/2018

GOEL CONSTRUCTION CO. PVT. LTD. Vs THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA (ICAI) .
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

Dated: 13.11.2018
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Sunday, 15 February 2015

Whether disclosure statement made by four accused separately is admissible against them all?


66. From paragraph No. 64 onwards the Trial Court has looked into the circumstantial evidence, like discovery of 4 swords under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Accused persons, particularly accused Nos. 1 to 4 have attacked this discovery only on the ground that all of them were not taken to the well and it is only accused No. 2 Vinod who pointed out that Well. It is also stated that in statement made, these accused persons no where state that they can show the Well or take out the swords from the said Well. Statement at Exh. 215 shows that it is signed by accused No. 1 Vijay. He has stated that 4 swords were used to attack Makrand and then the same were thrown in the Well of Prabhakar i.e. in a well in field of Prabhakar Gawande. Exh. 216 is same statement by accused No. 3 Devanand. Exh. 217 is similar statement by accused No. 4 Shankar. Accused No. 2 Vinod at Exh. 218 has, however, in addition stated that he would show said Well if police force and witness accompanied him. All these statements are signed by the accused persons and it is not their defence that their signatures were obtained by force upon it. Contention that they did not agree to show the Well or to take out swords form that Well is, not very material. Trial Court has considered this aspect in the light of various precedents and noted ingredients of Section 27in paragraph No. 72. It held that Section 27 of Evidence Act does not require that the accused person should show eagerness to point out a place where the evidence was kept hidden. Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at MANU/SC/0465/2005 : 2005 Cr.L.J. 3950 (SC) : (2005 ALL MR (Cri) 2805 (S.C.)) (State (NCT) Delhi vrs. Navjot Sandhu) pressed into service by Shri Mundra, learned counsel shows that on the basis of information furnished by such accused, the investigating officer may go to the place in the company of other witness and recover such object. By doing so, the investigating officer discovers a fact. In present matter, though the investigating officer states that all four accused were carried to the Well, the memorandum of seizure at Exh. 219 shows that it was only accused No. 2 who was taken to that Well. 4 swords were then taken out and seized from it. This seizure memo is again signed by accused No. 2 Vinod. There is no signature of other accused persons on it. It is not the case of the prosecution that though other accused were carried to that place, they refused to sign upon the seizure panchnama. However, material on record establishes that accused persons gave knowledge to the investigating officer about the availability of murder weapons in the said Well below water. They stated that all 4 swords were thrown by them in one and the same Well. Accused No. 2 has actually taken the witness and police to that Well and 4 swords were then seized. Thus this discovery is in consequence of information received from all the accused. We therefore, find the objection being raised by the accused persons unsustainable. Fact that handle of a sword found at spot of crime fits with the blade of sword i.e. one of the weapons recovered from Well is not in dispute.
MANU/PR/0049/1946AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 67 (Pulukuri Kottaya and others vrs. Emperor) relied upon by Shri Mardikar has been considered in Harivadan Babubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0623/2013 : (2013) 7 SCC 45 : (2013 ALL SCR 2524), where at page 53, the Hon'ble Apex Court states that:-
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