Showing posts with label MOU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MOU. Show all posts

Friday, 15 April 2022

WHEN DOES A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) MERGE WITH A CONTRACT?

  The very fact that the State admits to having executed the MoU with UHL on 10th February, 1992 and the said MoU has been mentioned as “Appendix A” in the second recital of the Implementation Agreement, as reproduced above, itself demolishes the plea taken by the State that the Arbitral Tribunal and the Appellate Court have erred in returning a finding that the MoU dated 10th February, 1992 did not merge into the Implementation Agreement dated 22nd August, 1997. The aforesaid view is reinforced on a reading of the definition of the word “Agreement” as used in Clause 2.2 of the Implementation Agreement which clearly states that the word “Agreement” wherever used in the Implementation Agreement, shall include all its appendices and annexures. The MoU having been described by the parties as Appendix A to the Implementation Agreement, would have to be treated as having merged with the Implementation Agreement for all effects and purposes. In the light of the aforesaid recitals and clauses of the Implementation Agreement, this Court endorses the findings returned in para 47 of the impugned judgment, wherein it has been held that a plain reading of the second recital read with Clause 2.2 of the Implementation Agreement suggested that the MoU has merged with the Implementation Agreement and, therefore, the disputes that were referable to arbitration under the Implementation Agreement in terms of Clause 20, were to include disputes arising under the MoU, even though the latter document did contain a separate arbitration clause. {Para 10}


12. This Court is in agreement with the Appellate Court that Clause 1 of the Implementation Agreement could not have been read in isolation and when read in conjunction with the second recital and Clause 2.2 of the Implementation Agreement, it is apparent that the MoU was made a part and parcel of the Implementation Agreement. In view of the above, the view taken by the learned Sole Arbitrator that the MoU forms a part of the Implementation Agreement, as has been upheld by the Appellate Court, does not deserve any interference. All the points of dispute between the parties regarding performance of the contractual obligations including claims for damages and expenses incurred by UHL either arising from the MoU dated 10th February, 1992, or under the Implementation Agreement dated 22nd August, 1997, were referable to arbitration in accordance with Clause 20 forming a part of the Implementation Agreement.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before N.V. Ramana, C.J. and A.S. Bopanna and Hima Kohli, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 10341 of 2011

UHL Power Company Ltd. Vs State of Himachal Pradesh 

Decided on January 7, 2022

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 19,

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Tuesday, 10 July 2018

Whether it is necessary to pay stamp duty on MOU by which leasehold rights are agreed to be transferred?

Hence, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the Respondents, Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, being a fiscal statute, imposing financial liability, like all other such statutes, its provisions are required to be construed strictly. In the absence of any provision like 'Explanation' to Article 25, which makes the party liable to pay stamp-duty on the market-value of the plot, even on the MOU/Agreement of Sale, if the possession is transferred thereunder, there is no such corresponding 'Explanation' to Article 36, which deals with Agreement to Lease. If the intention of the legislature was to make such MOU for Agreement to Lease also, subject to payment of stamp-duty on market-value, if the possession was handed over thereunder, the legislature would have made such provision in the Act, as there was no difficulty to do so. Hence, in the absence of such provision, this court cannot, on the basis of some analogy, make the instrument, which is not covered under Section 3 of the Act, liable for stamp-duty.

In the face of the facts, which were appearing before the Trial Court, as the impounding of the MOU was sought and, that too, on the count that, under the said MOU, the possession was delivered and, therefore, the 'Explanation' to Article 25 was invoked and as that analogy cannot be accepted, considering the provisions of Articles 3 and 36 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, in my considered opinion, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court does not call for any interference.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 13502 of 2017

Decided On: 23.01.2018

 Yuvraj Developers and Ors. Vs. Gavtya Dhondu Mhatre and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2018(3) MHLJ 95
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Tuesday, 20 June 2017

Whether arbitrator can be appointed if agree-ment/MoU containing arbitration clause is unstamped?

In view of the dictum of Supreme Court in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. (MANU/SC/0836/2011 : 2011 AIR SCW 4484) (supra), the application under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 for seeking reference to the Arbitrator/appointment of the Arbitrator has to be held to be not maintainable if the agree-ment/MoU containing the arbitration clause is unstamped or not duly stamped. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)
S.B. Civil Misc. Application (Arbitration) No. 54 of 2015
Decided On: 21.10.2016
 Ansal Properties and Infrastructure Limited
Vs.
Jhamru Chandaram and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Mohammad Rafiq, J.
Citation:AIR 2017 Raj 52
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Saturday, 13 August 2016

Whether high court can direct arbitrator to decide question of legality and validity of agreement/(MoU)?

Following the decision in SBP & Co.
(supra) this Court in National Insurance Co.
Ltd.(supra) held as follows: (National
Insurance Co. Ltd. Case (supra), SCC p. 283,
paras 22 & 22.1-22.3)
“22. Where the intervention of
the court is sought for
appointment of an Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 11, the
duty of the Chief Justice or his
designate is defined in SBP & Co.
This Court identified and
segregated the preliminary issues
that may arise for consideration
in an application under Section
11 of the Act into three
categories, that is, (i) issues
which the Chief Justice or his
designate is bound to decide; (ii)
issues which he can also decide,
that is, issues which he may
choose to decide; and (iii) issues
which should be left to the
Arbitral Tribunal to decide.
22.1. The issues (first category)
which the Chief Justice/his
designate will have to decide are:
(a) Whether the party making the
application has approached the
appropriate High Court.

(b) Whether there is an
arbitration agreement and
whether the party who has
applied under Section 11 of the
Act, is a party to such an
agreement.
22.2. The issues (second category)
which the Chief Justice/his
designate may choose to decide
(or leave them to the decision of
the Arbitral Tribunal) are:
(a) Whether the claim is a dead
(long-barred) claim or a live claim.
(b) Whether the parties have
concluded the contract
/transaction by recording
satisfaction of their mutual rights
and obligation or by receiving the
final payment without objection.
22.3. The issues (third category)
which the Chief Justice/his
designate should leave exclusively
to the Arbitral Tribunal are:
(i) Whether a claim made falls
within the arbitration clause (as
for example, a matter which is
reserved for final decision of a
departmental authority and
excepted or excluded from
arbitration).
(ii) Merits or any claim involved
in the arbitration.”
 (emphasis supplied)

13. It is clear from the said two decisions
that the question whether there is an
arbitration agreement has to be decided only
by the Chief Justice or his designate and
should not be left to the decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal. This is because the
question whether there is an arbitration
agreement is a jurisdictional issue and unless
there is a valid arbitration agreement, the
application under Section 11 of the Act will
not be maintainable and the Chief Justice or
his designate will have no jurisdiction to
appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 of the
Act. This Court also made it clear that only
in regard to the issues shown in the second
category, the Chief Justice or his designate
has the choice of either deciding them or
leaving them to the decision of the Arbitral
Tribunal. Even in regard to the issues falling
under the second category, this Court made
it clear that where allegations of forgery or
fabrication are made in regard to the
documents, it would be appropriate for the
Chief Justice or his designate to decide the
issue. In view of this settled position of law,
the issue whether there was an arbitration
agreement ought to have been decided by the
designate of the Chief Justice and only if the
finding was in the affirmative, he could have
proceeded to appoint the arbitrator.”
 (emphasis supplied)
25. Keeping in view the law laid down in the
aforementioned three cases quoted supra which
does not need any more elaboration by us, we have
no hesitation in setting aside the direction which

directs the arbitrator to decide the question of
legality and validity of the agreement/(MoU).
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No. 6198 OF 2016
 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 25473/2015)
Velugubanti Hari Babu …….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Parvathini Narasimha Rao & Anr. ……Respondent(s)
Citation: AIR 2016 SC 3285
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
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Wednesday, 25 November 2015

Whether arbitration clause contained in MOU will stand even though MOU is terminated?

Dealing with the said Clause and the arguments raised on behalf of
the respective parties, the law has been laid down as under in
paragraphs 82 and 83 which are to the following effect:
“82. Further, the arbitration agreement contained in Clauses
18.1 to 18.3 of IPLA is very widely worded and would include
all the disputes, controversies or differences concerning the
legal relationship between the parties. It would include the
disputes arising in respect of the IPLA with regard to its
validity, interpretation, construction, performance,
enforcement or its alleged breach. Whilst interpreting the
arbitration agreement and/or the arbitration clause, the court
 must be conscious of the overarching policy of least
 intervention by courts or judicial authorities in matters
covered by the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996. In view of the
aforesaid, it is not possible for us to accept the submission of
Mr Nariman that the arbitration agreement will perish as the
IPLA has not been finalised. This is also because the
arbitration clause (agreement) is independent of the
underlying contract i.e. the IPLA containing the arbitration
clause. Section 16 provides that the arbitration clause forming
part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement
 independent of such a contract.
 The concept of separability of the arbitration
clause/agreement from the underlying contract is a necessity
to ensure that the intention of the parties to resolve the
disputes by arbitration does not evaporate into thin air with
every challenge to the legality, validity, finality or breach of
the underlying contract. The Indian Arbitration Act, 1996, as
noticed above, under Section 16 accepts the concept that the
main contract and the arbitration agreement form two
independent contracts. Commercial rights and obligations are
contained in the underlying, substantive, or the main contract.
It is followed by a second contract, which expresses the
agreement and the intention of the parties to resolve the
disputes relating to the underlying contract through
arbitration. A remedy is elected by parties outside the normal
civil court remedy. It is true that support of the national courts
would be required to ensure the success of arbitration, but
this would not detract from the legitimacy or independence of
the collateral arbitration agreement, even if it is contained in
a contract, which is claimed to be void or voidable or
unconcluded by one of the parties.”
(Emphasis added)

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3702 OF 2015
(@ SLP (C) NO.1963 of 2014)

Ashapura Mine-Chem Ltd. Vs Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation 

Citation;(2015) 8 SCC 193
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Monday, 9 November 2015

Whether magistrate can go behind MOU in cheque dishonour case when cheques were issued in terms of MOU?

The endeavour of the learned Magistrate to go behind the MOU (Ex. CW-1/4) was not permissible, in view of Sections 91 & 92 of the Evidence Act. When the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document, no evidence could be given in proof of terms of such contract, except the document itself. The two exceptions and three explanations to Section 91 of the Evidence Act do not come into play in the facts of the present case.
Delhi High Court
Suresh Chandra Goyal vs Amit Singhal on 14 May, 2015
Author: Vipin Sanghi
Citation;2015 CRLJ(CRI)Journal 470 Bom
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