Rajasthan HC: Deceased's Ability To Pay Heavy EMIs Relevant Factor When Determining His Income In Motor Accident Compensation Claim

Having regard to the totality of circumstances, this Court is

of the considered and unambiguous opinion that the deceased’s

monthly income must be assessed by synthesising several

streams of his livelihood. The record demonstrates that the

deceased had obtained consent letters from the statutory

authority for carrying out mining activities; that he was the

registered owner of a Hydra Mob Crane for which he was

punctually discharging monthly instalment of Rs.35,170/-; and

that he simultaneously held agricultural land capable of yielding

regular income. This Court, on taking all these factors

cumulatively, concludes that the deceased was earning no less

than an amount of Rs.45,000/- per month from his mining and

agricultural ventures. This conclusion stands reinforced by the

evidence of consistent payment of licence fees for the mines as

well as repayment of the EMI for the crane loan. Accordingly, this

Court deems it proper to assess the monthly income of the

deceased at Rs.45,000/- for the purposes of computation of just

compensation. {Para 18}

Reportable

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT

JODHPUR

S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3011/2018

 Smt. Imrati Devi  Vs  Nattha Ram 

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA

Dated: 23/09/2025.

Citation: 2025:RJ-JD:42439.

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Rajasthan HC: Section 65B Certificate Valid Only from Original Recording Device Owner

The Rajasthan High Court recently delivered an important ruling regarding the issuance of certificates under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, which is crucial for the admissibility of electronic records as evidence in court. The Court emphasized that a Section 65B certificate must be issued by the person who owned or operated the original device on which the electronic record was first created. It cannot be validly issued by someone whose device merely contains a transferred copy of that record.

Background of the Case

The case arose from a challenge to a Rent Tribunal order where the respondents submitted electronic evidence stored in a pen drive and compact disc. The petitioner argued that the original recording was made on a third party’s device — specifically, Rajat Sancheti’s device — but the Section 65B certificate was issued by respondent no. 2, whose device only held a later transferred copy of the recording. The petitioner submitted that under the law, only the original device owner could issue the certificate to authenticate the evidence.

Legal Precedents Cited

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, presiding over the matter, relied on authoritative Supreme Court rulings in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal. These rulings firmly establish that the certificate under Section 65B must originate from the person in control of the device on which the electronic record was originally created, which ensures the authenticity and reliability of digital evidence.

Court’s Holding and Impact

The Court held that the certificate issued by respondent no. 2 concerning the transferred copy was invalid and could not render the electronic evidence admissible. However, the Court left a procedural opportunity for the respondents to file a proper and valid certificate issued by the actual owner of the original recording device, thereby allowing the evidence to potentially remain admissible if corrected.

This judgment underscores the critical importance of complying strictly with Section 65B requirements as laid down by the Supreme Court, especially regarding the chain of custody and certification of electronic evidence. Practitioners must ensure that certificates authenticating electronic records emanate from the original device’s controlling person to withstand scrutiny in judicial proceedings.

Conclusion

In the digital era where electronic evidence is increasingly common, the Rajasthan High Court’s clarification provides much-needed guidance and robustness to the procedural requirements under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. This decision serves as a reminder that the integrity of electronic evidence hinges on proper certification from the original source, maintaining the evidentiary standards crucial for justice.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12210/2025

Shwetabh Singhal,  Vs M/s J.k And Sons, 

JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

Order: 09/09/2025.

Citation: [2025:RJ-JP:36375]

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Rajasthan HC: S.193(9) of BNSS Bars Further Investigation After Filing Of Police Report Without Permission Of Trial Court

 Before parting, I may also hasten to add here that, in any case, where a report under section 193(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) has already been filed against the prime accused, no further investigation can be carried out without the permission of the learned trial court, in view of Section 193(9) of BNSS. For ready reference, the relevant part of the Section 193 of the BNSS, with emphasis on sub-clause 9 thereof, is reproduced herein below: {Para 7}

"SECTION 193: Report of police officer on completion of investigation

(9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub- section (3) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form as the State Government may, by rules, provide; and the provisions of sub-sections (3) to (8) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (3): Provided that further investigation during the trial may be conducted with the permission of the Court trying the case and the same shall be completed within a period of ninety days which may be extended with the permission of the Court."

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

S.B. Criminal Misc. Pet. No. 1375/2023

Decided On: 25.09.2024

Gajendra Singh Shekhawat Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun Monga, J.

Citation: 2024:RJ-JD:39977,MANU/RH/1468/2024.

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Rajasthan HC: High Court Affirms Accused’s Right to Seek Call and Location Details of Prosecution Witnesses During Prosecution Evidence

 The petitioner herein is under-trial being accused serious offence under Section 302 of IPC. If he is held guilty, the consequence thereof may result into death penalty and/or conviction for life imprisonment. Any negligence or dereliction in adducing of the evidence, needless to say, will result in miscarriage of justice and severely jeopardize the defence of the accused. {Para 12}

13. On a Court query, it transpires that currently prosecution testimony is being recorded by the trial court. Given the work load, it may so happen that at the stage of defence evidence, owing to the delay, the call details and location details, which the accused have been advised to adduce in their evidence, may be deleted from the data bank of the service provider of the mobile network of which the accused as well as other witnesses are subscribers.

15. Section 95, supra, thus allows the court to direct postal authorities to produce documents or records that are relevant to a pending trial. The section explicitly grants courts the authority to order the preservation and production of such records, irrespective of whether the documents are in the custody of the accused or not. As per Section 95, the court can direct service providers to produce and retain the required records even before the defense stage, ensuring that these documents are available when needed. This provision thus supports the petitioners' plea to secure the records to avoid their deletion later on by sheer passage of time.

15.1. I am of the view that in the modern day context, postal authority is to be read in a way so as to mean and include even the telecom authority which is a similar service provider qua the electronic data it preserves on behalf of and, delivers, to its consumers. Accordingly, any document or electronic data or a thing, which is not in custody of the accused but with the third party, i.e. postal authority or the telegraph/telecom authority/service provider, but, at the same time, it is relevant for the purpose of the pending trial can be directed by the trial court to be produced in the court as a piece of evidence.

16. If by the time the stage of defense evidence is reached, the call details and location details, which the accused have been advised to adduce in their evidence, have already been deleted from the data bank of the service provider of the mobile network, then the petitioner would be deprived of valuable opportunity of producing their evidence and would thus be seriously prejudiced in his defence.

17. Trite it may sound, but procedure being the handmaid of justice, should not be allowed to thwart justice. Procedural rules exist to facilitate justice, not to hinder it. If strict adherence to procedural rules leads to the destruction of evidence and deprives the accused of a fair chance to defend themselves, the court should exercise its discretion to deviate from the norm. The court should use its powers to ensure that procedural delays do not result in an injustice. Allowing the preservation of electronic records before they are lost is essential for procedural fairness and the integrity of the judicial process.

18. Moreover, the right to a fair trial is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Personal liberty includes the right to defend oneself in a criminal prosecution. Any deprivation of the accused's ability to present crucial evidence, such as call details and location records, would constitute a violation of this fundamental right. The prosecution is expected to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, the accused must be given every reasonable opportunity to contest the evidence and present their defense. Failure to preserve critical evidence like call and location details severely hampers the accused's ability to mount a defense, undermining the concept of a fair trial. Courts are duty-bound to avoid miscarriage of justice. Allowing key evidence to be lost due to procedural delays would also result in an unfair trial, which could lead to a wrongful conviction or harsher punishment (including life imprisonment or even the death penalty in this case). By not securing crucial evidence for the defense (which is in the possession of a third party), the court would inadvertently tip the balance in favor of the prosecution, thus creating a disparity which must be obviated.

Ratio: The court at the stage of prosecution evidence, on the application of accused can direct telecom authority/service provider to produce call details and location details of prosecution witnesses.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 5372/2024

Mala Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun Monga, J.

Decided On: 04.09.2024

Citation: 2024:RJ-JD:36831, MANU/RH/1477/2024.

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Rajasthan HC: The govt can not deny medical reimbursement of its employee if he has taken treatment in Unrecognized Private Hospital in emergent situation

 Illustratively, reference may be had to the judgment

rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Kanhaiya Lal

Dave Versus State of Rajasthan & Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ

Petition No. 420/2009, which in turn relies on another division

bench precedent, wherein it is held as below:

“8.This Court considered the issue of emergent situation in the case

of Gyanendra Kumar Pareek Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. Reported

in 2009(4) WLC(Raj.)-95 and held that when a family member

suffers from cardiac ailment, the prime objective of the other family member would be to save his/her life. At that time, services of whichever hospital is suited could be utilized because emergency knows no law and no procedure and when human life is at stake, in such situation, ultimate responsibility of the State cannot be washed off. This Court relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Anil Kumar Surolia Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2005(3) WLC(Raj.)- 396 wherein the Division Bench observed as under:-

“Government cannot insist upon an employee

to get himself treated at recognized government

institution. All that the Government in these

circumstances can do is to reimburse the concerned

employee at the rates that may be applicable in the

recognized government institution. Reference in this

connection may be made to the judgment of the

Honble Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Vs. State of

Punjab reported in AIR 1996 SC-1388 and State of

Punjab & Ors. Vs. Mohan Lal Jindal reported in

(2001) 9 SCC-217. Consequently, the reimbursement

of the medical expenses borne by the State

Government employees and pensioners has to be done

even if the treatment is undertaken at unrecognized

hospital outside the State even though reference may

not have been taken prior to treatment.”

x-x-x-x-x-x-x

10.Thus, as per scheme of medical concession applicable to the retired employees, the only hurdle against the petitioner for being granted reimbursement of the medical bills is that his wife was subjected to treatment at an unrecognised hospital outside the State and that too without a reference being made. However, as has been noted above, the Division Bench of this Court has already laid the issue to rest by observing that even if the treatment is taken at an unrecognized hospital and without any reference, the reimbursement thereof has to be done at the rates prescribed in the Concession Scheme. x-x-x-x-x-x”

11. On a specific query being put to the learned counsel for the respondents, as to whether the aforesaid judgment is applicable to the case of the petitioner herein; the answer given is in the affirmative. Not only that, it transpires that the aforesaid Single Bench Judgment has attained finality as no intra-Court appeal was filed against the same.

12. In the premise, I see no reason why the benefit thereof is

not also accorded to the petitioner, who is similarly situated.

Question framed in Para 5 of the preceding para of the instant

order is thus answered in affirmative.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT

JODHPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5714/2011

Sohan Lal Sharma Vs  State Finance And Ors

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA

Dated: 04/12/2024.

Citation: [2024:RJ-JD:49546]

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Rajasthan HC: [S.152 BNS] Sedition Law Is A Shield For National Security, Not A Sword Against Political Dissent

12.4. To sum up, laws restricting speech must be narrowly tailored. There must be a direct and imminent connection between the speech and the likelihood of rebellion or secession to invoke such provisions. Legitimate dissent or criticism cannot be equated with sedition or antinational acts. For instance, in cases involving Section 124A (sedition) of the repealed IPC, casual or rhetorical statements did not amount to sedition, unless, of course, they incite violence or public disorder. To my mind, a similar approach would apply to Section 152. Its broad phrasing necessitates careful application to prevent misuse or overreach. The provision must be interpreted in conjunction with the constitutional rights to free speech and expression to ensure it does not infringe on democratic freedoms. One must stay mindful that the provision is used as a shield for national security and not a sword against legitimate dissent.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 5005/2024

Tejender Pal Singh @ Timma  Vs State Of Rajasthan,

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA

Pronounced on : 16/12/2024.

Citation:  [2024:RJ-JD:34845]

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Rajasthan HC: Complainant in Case Under S 138 of NI Act is victim as per s 2(y) of BNSS, he can file appeal against acquittal before Sessions Court

This application for grant of leave to file appeal has been filed by complainant-Vikram Manshani against the judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Case No.3108/2016, where-underthe sole respondent has been acquitted of the charge under

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

It is not disputed that the cheque was issued in favour of the

applicant. Therefore, the applicant was victim of the crime as

defined under Section 2(y) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which reads as follows :

Section 2(y) “Victim” means a person who has

suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of

the act or omission of the accused person and

includes the guardian or legal heir of such

victim.”

If such complainant, is not a victim as defined above then,

he would be required to prefer leave application before the High

Court for preferring appeal against acquittal. However, if the

complainant is a victim of the crime, he/she shall have right

under Proviso to Section 413 BNSS to prefer appeal against

acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate

compensation.

The appellant would be at liberty to present an appeal against acquittal before concerned Sessions Judge within a period of 15 days from the date of this order.

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

JODHPUR

S.B. Crml Leave To Appeal No. 384/2024

Vikram Manshani Vs Praveen Sharma

Coram:  MR. JUSTICE BIRENDRA KUMAR

Dated: 06/08/2024.

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How to decide quantum to compensation for death of unborn child in motor accident?

This Court is in respectful agreement with the judgments of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) and Kerala High Court in the case of Manikuttan (supra), and holds that an unborn child aged five months onwards in mother's womb till its birth is treated as equal to a child in existence. The unborn child to whom the live birth never comes is held to be a 'person' who can be the subject of an action for damages for his death. The foetus is another life in woman and loss of foetus is actually a loss of child in the offing. The appellants are, therefore, entitled to compensation for the loss of foetus.

35. In Prakash and others vs. Arun Kumar Saini (supra), Delhi High Court further held as under:

(19) The judgment of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Farzana (supra) relates to the death of 7 year old child whereas the present case relates to the death of a seven months old foetus. The seven months old foetus cannot be compared with seven years old child and, therefore, this Court is not inclined to award ` 3,75,000/- to the appellants. A foetus shall be treated as a child does not mean that the compensation in respect of a foetus shall be equal to a seven year old school going child. The love and affection of the parents for seven year old child cannot be equated with that of a foetus which has yet to take birth. The love and affection develops after the birth of the child and it keeps on growing and goes deep in the memory. The death of a seven year old child would leave deep memories and, therefore, deeper hurt. In case of death of a child, the photographs of the child and other articles belonging to him/her keep on reminding the parents of the child and make them sad. Memories are also refreshed when parents see other children of same age and it takes a very long time for pain and suffering to dissolve, whereas there are no such memories in case of a foetus and, therefore, lesser hurt. The compensation awarded to a seven year old child, therefore, needs appropriate correction. Considering that ` 2,50,000/- was awarded by Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Shraddha (supra), ` 2,00,000/- by Madras High Court in the case of Krishnaveni (supra) and ` 1,50,000/- by Karnataka High Court in the case of Bhawaribai (supra), ` 2,50,000/- is awarded to the appellants in the present case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)

S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 4767 of 2009

Decided On: 26.09.2011

Hemraj and Ors. Vs. Ramdhan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.C. Sharma, J.

Citation:  MANU/RH/1420/2011.

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Under which circumstances it can be said that Insurance Company has failed to prove that insurance policy produced by claimant in motor accident claim petition is fake?

 It is evident from the facts and undisputed that the accident occurred on 09.06.2012, as a result of which Jepu Khan succumbed to injuries whereas, for insurance of the vehicle in question. However, the case set up by the appellant company is that the insurance policy (Ex. 11) produced by the owner is fake and correct copy of insurance policy was tendered in evidence on behalf of appellant company as Ex. A/1 being Policy No. 2313200275427800000 according to which the vehicle was insured for the period 12.06.2012 to 11.06.2013 whereas, the accident took place on 09.06.2012. Thus, the burden of proving the fact that the insurance policy produced by the owner is forged and fabricated and the vehicle in question was in fact insured for the period 12.06.2012 to 11.06.2013 was upon the appellant insurance company. The appellant insurance company in support of contention produced NAW/1 Pankaj Sharma in evidence who stated that the policy produced by the owner is forged and in this regard a complaint was lodged before the Superintendent of Police, Jaisalmer. However, the said witness has categorically stated that complaint in this regard was not filed for four years from 15.09.2012 to 12.04.2016. Further the said witness has also denied having any knowledge with regard to the agent who issued the said policy. The said witness has also denied having any knowledge with regard to the fact whether the amount against the premium was received in cheque or cash and also failed to produce any record with regard to the receipt of premium by the company. {Para 11}

12. It is pertinent to note that in the matter in hand, the insurance company has admitted coverage of vehicle through insurance policy Ex. A/1 but denied the period of coverage with regard to which claim petition was filed under insurance policy Ex. A/11 filed by the owner/claimant.

13. The accident was caused on 09.06.2012 and the claim petition was pending before the Tribunal from year 2012 but the insurance company did not initiate any proceedings against the owner for producing forged and fabricated policy and it is only in the year 2016 that a complaint was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Jaisaler. The appellant insurance company could have produced the record containing the receipt of premium, proposal form, name of agent and code etc to prove that the policy produced by the company as Exhibit A/1 is the genuine one and was issued for the period 12.06.2012 to 11.06.2013. However, as rightly noticed by the learned Judge, MACT Cases, the appellant insurance company has failed to prove the same.

14. As far as the case of Sobina Iakai (Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant insurance company, the same relates to the date and time from which the policy would be effective. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case has held that when the specific time and date is mentioned, then the insurance policy becomes effective from that point of time and not from an earlier point of time. Herein this case, the respondent had produced the policy issued by the appellant insurance company which was very much effective on the date of accident and the appellant insurance company has failed to prove that the said insurance policy was forged or fabricated and therefore, the case relied upon by the counsel for the appellant is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2623/2016

Decided On: 03.02.2017

HDFC ERGO General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Nimaji and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Goverdhan Bardhar, J.

Citation: MANU/RH/0086/2017,2017 ACJ 2830 Raj

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Under which circumstances the revisional court should not discharge accused?

Thus, this Court is of the firm opinion that if a strong suspicion exists in the mind of the court at the stage concerned, then the same is sufficient for the court to proceed with the framing of the charge against the accused person(s). And if a prayer for discharge has been made before a revisional court, then the same may only be allowed if the court finds that the materials on record are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial. {Para 13}

 14. In view of the aforementioned precedential backdrop and the observations made hereinabove this Court does not find any legal infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned court below so as to warrant any interference, at this stage.

 In the High Court of Rajasthan

(Before Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J.)

Sudhir Bordiya Vs State

S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 27 of 2021

Decided on April 20, 2022

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 765 : (2022) 3 RLW 2010 : 2023 Cri LJ 96.

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Death of a dog in vehicular accident – whether claim petition for the death of a dog is maintainable?­

From a perusal of the aforesaid two provisions, it is established that the word person has been used and a claim petition can be filed on account of death or injury of any person or damage of the property. However, in the instant case, the claim petition is found to have been filed on account of death of dog, which does not fall either under the definition of "person" or "property". In this view of the matter, the claim petition filed by the claimant was not at all maintainable under Sec. 140 and 166 of MV Act. {Para 7}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)

S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1282 of 2009

Decided On: 29.04.2015

Kundan Singh Vs. Gokul and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.C. Sharma, J.

Citation: 2016 ACJ 665 (Raj) ,MANU/RH/2267/2015.

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What are basic principles the court should follow while deciding an application seeking permission to file replication or rejoinder?

The principles deducible from the above discussions may be summarised thus -

a) The plaintiff cannot be allowed to introduce new pleas by way of filing rejoinder, so as to alter the basis of his plaint.

b) In rejoinder, the plaintiff can be permitted to explain the additional facts which have been incorporated in the written statement.

c) The plaintiff cannot be allowed to come forward with an entirely new case in his rejoinder.

d) The plaintiff cannot be permitted to raise inconsistent pleas so as to alter his original cause of action.

e) Application under Order 8, Rule 9, CPC cannot be treated as one under Order 6, Rule 17, CPC as both are contextually different. {Para 9}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN

Civil Revn. No. 1151 of 1997

Decided On: 04.03.1998

State of Rajasthan and Ors.  Vs. Mohammed Ikbal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Shiv Kumar Sharma, J.

Citation: MANU/RH/0223/1999

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Whether an order rejecting an application for condonation of delay and dismissal of an appeal as time barred is a decree?

 In view of above discussions, it is clear that order rejecting an application for condonation of delay is not a decree. Consequently, dismissal of an appeal as time barred is also not a decree. Since second appeal is maintainable against a decree and not against an order, therefore, both the second appeals, which are directed against orders dismissing the appeals as time barred, are not maintainable, the same are liable to be dismissed as not maintainable and are hereby dismissed as not maintainable with no order as to costs. {Para 13}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)

S.B. Civil Second Appeal Nos. 472 of 2009 and 54 of 2010

Decided On: 22.02.2011

State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs.  Rajpal Singh Chauhan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.K. Jain, J.

Citation : AIR 2011 Raj 101, MANU/RH/0446/2011

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Precaution to be taken by Juvenile justice board while dealing with preliminary assessment of Juvenile

31. In view of the above discussion made hereinabove, we conclude as below:

(i) that the entire investigation is vitiated for the reason that no female police officer was associated in the investigation against female child offender. Furthermore, the investigation was not conducted by the Special Juvenile Police Unit as warranted by Section 107(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act;

(ii) that the appellant did not murder her husband in furtherance of any pre-conceived design or in a cold calculated manner, and thus there was no justification for her trial as an adult by a Sessions Court by virtue of Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act;

(iii) that the Principal Magistrate failed to adhere to the mandatory requirements of Section 15 of the Act while holding the enquiry and making the assessment;

(iv) that no legal assistance/effective opportunity of hearing was provided to the appellant child during the preliminary assessment made by the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 15 of the Act and thus also, these proceedings are vitiated;

(v) that the preliminary assessment order is also vitiated for the reason that the appellant was unjustly kept confined in the psychiatry ward of the Hospital and because no psychologist or psycho-social worker having experience of working with children in difficult circumstances (as mandated by Section 15(3) of the Juvenile Justice Act), was associated during the enquiry conducted under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act;

(vi) While holding the inquiry, the Juvenile Justice Board, failed to adhere to the principle that the child shall be presumed to be innocent unless proved otherwise as mandated by Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice Act read with Rule 10A(3) of the Model Rules, 2016. No consideration of this principle is reflected in the order and thus, the illegality is incurable and goes to the root of the matter;

(vii) copy of the order passed under Section 15 of the Act was not provided to the juvenile of thus breaching the mandate of Rule 10-A of the Model Rules of 2016;

(viii) that the under-trial child was sent to the District Jail, Pratapgarh vide order dated 19.08.2017 and thus, was treated in gross contravention of the mandate of Section 19(3) read with Section 46 of the Act of 2015 thereby vitiating the entire proceedings before the Sessions Court.

(ix) The child suffered incarceration from 16.05.2016 to 11.02.2019 on which date this Court suspended the sentences awarded to her and thus, she has undergone a custodial period of nearly two years and seven months in a prison which course of action is totally prohibited by law.

32. Henceforth, the above observations shall be considered to be guidelines in considering cases of juveniles and shall be followed in the letter and spirit.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN

D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 2019

Decided On: 15.04.2019

 Durga Bherulal Meena  Vs. State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep Mehta and Vinit Kumar Mathur, JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

Citation: Citation : 2019 CriLJ 2720, MANU/RH/0529/2019

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Can the court quash FIR if there is a delay of twelve years in the investigation of the case considering the right to speedy trial of the accused?

 It is pertinent to note that the FIR was lodged in the year

2009 and has remained pending for investigation for now more

than 12 years. In the list submitted with the FIR, the properties

which belong to his father and mother are also shown as his

assets. Certain properties in which the purchaser’s name is

mentioned are also shown as assets of the present petitioner.

11. The Apex Court in catena of judgments have held that

accused has a right to speedy trial and right to speedy

investigation. Present is a case wherein, investigation is pending

for last 12 years and conclusion of the Investigating Officer so far till date is that the assets of the petitioner are less than his

income. In view of the judgments referred to hereinabove, also

taking note of the facts and circumstances of the present case,

where the Investigating Officers have come to the conclusion that

the assets of the petitioner are not more than his income and the

petitioner has shown his assets and his income in the income tax

returns right from the beginning, petitioner has retired. There is

no explanation by the Investigating Officer for the delay in

investigation and the delay is not attributable to the petitioner.

The delay in investigation clearly violates the Constitutional

guarantee of speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The proceedings pending against the present

petitioner, therefore, deserves to be and accordingly, quashed. 

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT

JODHPUR

S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 4462/2021

Anil Kumar Vyas Vs State Of Rajasthan,

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Gajendra Singh Butati

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ BHANDARI

Dated; 27/09/2021

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How to appreciate evidence of bone ossification test and margin of error principle?

 It is an admitted position that the Medical Board did not examine the prosecutrix personally for ascertaining her age and Board has based its finding on the report, Ex.P.3 prepared by Dr. Sheetal Jain and the X-ray plates dated 9.12.99 and 28.12.99. It is also an admitteds fact that the prosecution has failed to examine the person who took the X-rays on 8.12.99 and 28.12.999. Even the X-ray report dated 8.12.99 has not been exhibited. It is also not established from the record as to on whose nequisition the X-ray was again done on 28.12.99. Neither the said requisition nor the report have been produced on record. On the other hand, the prosecutrix has stated that she was X-rayed only once. PW.13 Prahlad Singh, Investigating Officer has also admitted that he got the prosecutrix medically examined only once on 8.12.99 for determining her age and to find out whether rape was committed on her. In this unconstroverted fact situation, it would not be safe to place reliance on the X-ray plates dated 28.12.99 and the opinion of the medical board, which is based on such X-ray plates. Be that as it may, assuming it to be true that according to the ossification test, the age of the prosecutrix was between 14 to 16 years, still it is well settled that margin of error of 2-3 years in age on either side is permissible. {Para 17}

18. On the question of margin of error of 2-3 years on either side is permissible, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu & Kashmir (1), Mangal Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2), Gurinder Singh v. State of Punjab (3), Narendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (4), Sheela Bai and Anr. v. State of M.P. (5) and Sribatcha Khamari v. State of Orissa (6).

19. I have gone through the case laws cited above and the ratio of all the cases referred to above is that margin of error in age by 2-3 years is permissible on either side.

21. I have gone through the case laws cited by the counsel for the complainant. Having carefully gone through the case laws, I am of the considered view that law laid down in the aforesaid cases are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as the facts involved in those cases and that of involved in the present case are entirely distinguishable, inasmuch as, the oral as well as documentary evidence viz., the school leaving certificate have been considered and found highly untrustworthy and unreliable.

22. Thus, as stated above, there is no direct documentary or oral reliable evidence about the age of the prosecutrix, except the medical evidence, according to which her age, as per the ossification test was between 14 to 16 years when the offence as alleged was committed. However, keeping in view the margin of error in age ascertained by ossification test may be 2-3 years as propounded in the case laws cited by the counsel for the appellant, the question that emerges is as to whom the benefit of margin should be given. Considering the fact that it is a case of criminal liability, the benefit of margin should go in favour of the accused appellant unless such margin is explained by some piece of evidence. In the instant case, as discussed above, there is no explanation by any substantial piece of evidence. Therefore, I am inclined to give marginal benefit to the accused appellant. Keeping in mind the permissible variance of 2-3 years in the age, it is held that the age of the prosecution, at the time of incident, was 18-19 years. 

Rajasthan High Court

Nand Kishore vs State Of Rajasthan on 22 May, 2002

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On what terms Appellate court can grant stay to eviction decree?

As held by this Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. , once a decree for eviction has been passed, in the event of execution of decree for eviction being stayed, the appellants can be put on such reasonable terms, as would in the opinion of the appellate Court reasonably compensate the decree holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of the decree by the grant of stay in the event of appeal being dismissed. It has also been held that with effect from the date of decree of eviction, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises on being vacated by the tenant. While determining the quantum of the amount so receivable by the landlord, the landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of rent which was prevalent prior to the date of decree.

Rajasthan High Court

Amrit Kumar Garg vs Addl. Distt. Judge No. 3 And Anr. on 11 December, 2007

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Whether court can direct the party to serve a bailable warrant to the witness personally?

 It has next been contended by Mr. Lodra that the trial court had committed material irregularity in directing the plaintiff to get the warrants served 'dasti' and in default the remaining evidence of the plaintiff shall be closed. This order is also wholly erroneous and is not in consonance with the well established procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. A Party cannot be called upon to serve warrant upon the witnesses. The service of the warrant should be through the agency of the court itself and it cannot be left to a private party. Such a direction therefore, being wholly erroneous is quashed.{6}

7. The further direction for directing the plaintiff to attend on 17.10.77 in the court for collecting the warrants is equally erroneous and unsustainable in law. It is for the Court's bailiff to collect the warrants and effect service on the persons. It is none of the duty of the party to effect the service of the warrants.

Rajasthan High Court

Pukh Raj vs Gram Panchayat Sanchore on 12 March, 1978

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Whether the court can direct concurrent running of default sentences in cheque dishonour case?

Having considered the facts and circumstances of the present case, offence involved, sentences awarded, period of detention of the petitioner as on date and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Madan Lal, V.K.Bansal vs. State of Haryana & Ors., Shyam Pal vs. Dayawati Besoya & Anr. and Ammavasai & Anr. vs. Inspector of Police & Ors. (supra), I am of the considered view that it would not be inconsistent with the administration of criminal justice if the petitioner is allowed the benefit of discretion contained in section 427 of the Code to meet the ends of justice. However, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.K.Bansal vs. State of Haryana & Ors. and Shyam Pal vs. Dayawati Besoya & Anr. (supra), the direction for concurrent running of sentences would be limited only to the substantive sentences alone.

In such circumstances, the present misc. petition is allowed and it is ordered that the substantive sentences awarded to the petitioner in the above referred 32 cases would run concurrently, however, the petitioner will have to serve default sentences as the provisions of section 427 of the CrPC do not permit a direction for concurrent running of substantive sentences with the sentences awarded in default of payment of fine/compensation. The sentences, which the petitioner has been directed to undergo in default of payment of fine/compensation shall not be effected by this direction and if the petitioner has not paid the fine/compensation as directed by the trial courts, the said sentences would run consecutively.

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT

JODHPUR

S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 947/2020

Lakshmi Narayan Songara Vs  State,

HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

Order : 21/01/2021

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In the Digital Era Employees Working In Different States can Be Treated as working in One Work Place under Sexual Harassment law.

In the present digital world, work place for employees

working in the Bank and who have earlier worked in the same

Branch and later on shifted to different branches which may be

situated in different States has to be treated completely as one

work place on a digital platform. Thus, if a person may be posted

in Jaipur and acts on a digital platform harassing another lady who may be posted in a different State, it would come within the ambit of being harassed in a common work place. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner, thus on the aforesaid count is rejected.

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.150/2021

Sanjeev Mishra Vs  The Disciplinary Authority And General Manager, Zonal Head, Bank Of Baroda, 

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

Order: 11/01/2021

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