Supreme Court: Whether executing court can examine validity of award of Lok Adalat and declare it as null and void?

 Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; Sections 21 and 22E — Challenge to Lok Adalat Award — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Held, the statutory finality attached to a Lok Adalat award leaves no room for an appellate or plenary civil remedy - The validity of such an award cannot be reopened through an ordinary civil suit or by treating execution proceedings as a vehicle for setting it aside - The only recognized avenue of challenge is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, which is supervisory and exceptional in nature - This applies equally to a party to the award and a third party affected by it. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660; Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy, (2018) 13 SCC 480; Paras 8-14]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXI Rules 97, 99, and 101 — Powers of Executing Court regarding Lok Adalat Awards — Held, while these provisions enable an Executing Court to address incidental questions during execution (such as the extent of enforceability against a person in possession), they do not authorize the court to examine the validity of the award itself or declare the decree based upon it void - The Executing Court has no authority to annul or set aside a decree that embodies a Lok Adalat award, nor can it sit in judgment over the validity of the compromise. Filing objections in execution cannot be treated as an "efficacious alternative remedy" that bars writ relief. [Paras 15-19]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

SLP (C) No. 27806 of 2023; 

DILIP MEHTA Vs RAKESH GUPTA & ORS.

Coram: VIKRAM NATH; J., SANDEEP MEHTA; J. 

Dated: NOVEMBER 18, 2025 

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Supreme Court: Plaintiff in Maharashtra will get refund of entire court fees if case is settled in any one of the modes of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of CPC after court fees amendment Act 2018

 As extracted supra, the High Court in the impugned judgment had made a suggestion to the State legislature that the differences in the court fees in Lok Adalat, vis-à-vis, the forms of ADR should be done away with the view to promote the adaptation of such methods of dispute resolution among the public. It has been brought to our attention that the State legislature has indeed carried out such an amendment to the MCFA, 1959 and Section 16A has been introduced therein by way of Maharashtra Act No. X of 2018, the relevant extract of which reads under:

MAHARASHTRA ACT No. X OF 2018.

(First published, after having received the assent of the Governor in the "Maharashtra Government Gazette", on the 16th January 2018.)

An Act further to amend the Maharashtra Court-fees Act.

WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Maharashtra Court-fees Act, for the purposes hereinafter appearing; it is hereby enacted in the Sixty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:

2. After Section 16 of the Maharashtra Court-fees Act (hereinafter referred to as "principal Act"), the following Section shall be inserted, namely:

16A. Where the court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the modes of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and suit is disposed of by the court by adaptation of any of the modes prescribed under the said section, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to a certificate from the court authorising him to receive back from the collector, the full amount of the fee paid in respect of such plaint.''. {Para 22}

23. The effect of the above being that for the time when the amendment to the MCFA, 1959 granting partial or complete refund, as the case may be, in accordance with Section 43 as amended, the persons whose matters were settled by way of ADR would not be entitled to 100% refund. Any matter settled under the processes mentioned in Section 89 Code of Civil Procedure after the coming into force of the above-extracted amendment, such parties shall receive refund of court fees in its entirety.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 14742 of 2024.

Decided On: 19.12.2024

Sanjeevkumar Harakchand Kankariya Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1377/2024.

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Lokadalat: An Effective Alternative Dispute Resolution Remedy in Indian Law

 The concept of Lokadalat, or "People's Court," is a significant component of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system in India. It serves as an informal mechanism for resolving disputes quickly and affordably, embodying the principles of Gandhian justice. This article explores the structure, functioning, and effectiveness of Lokadalats as an alternative remedy for dispute resolution under Indian law.

Historical Background and Legal Framework

Lokadalats have their roots in traditional village councils, known as Gram Panchayats, which historically resolved conflicts through informal methods. The modern Lokadalat system was formally introduced in 1982 in Gujarat, evolving into a statutory framework with the enactment of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. This Act established Lokadalats as a permanent feature of the Indian legal system, granting them legal authority to resolve disputes amicably.

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Whether award of Lok Adalat must have all the characters of a decree to make it executable?

The minimum details of the property agreed to be conveyed ought to have been reflected in the award, so as to make the award executable. The respondent would raise a contention that the agreement to convey half share of the property owned by him is on a condition that the appellant would stay with him in a rented house.

4. To execute an award, it must have all the characters of a decree to enforce it. If the award is blank and only refers to the obligation without referring to the nature of the obligation to be performed, it become in-executable. The award passed by the Lok Adalat is based on the agreement between the parties. The officers, presiding over such Lok Adalat must apply their mind while passing the award to ensure that such award is executable. They must refer to Order 20 Rules 6 (1) and (9) of the Civil Procedure Code which refers to the contents of decree. Absolutely, no details are reflected in the award passed to execute the decree. In the absence of any details as referable above, the decree is in-executable. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

M.A. (Exe.) No. 7 of 2013

Decided On: 13.06.2023

Vijaya K. Vs.  Muraleedharan K.G.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A. Muhamed Mustaque and Sophy Thomas, JJ.

Author: A. Muhamed Mustaque, J.

Citation:  MANU/KE/1856/2023.

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Whether Advocate can be held guilty for cheating before Lok adalat through Whatsapp Video Call?

 The applicant is thus alleged of being a part of the entire episode of impersonating Mrs.Gidwani in the consent terms which were filed in S.C. Suit No. 3032/2019.Tilak Prima facie, it can be seen that the applicant filed his vakalatnama and represented the so-called Ms.Pushpa Gidwani for the first time on 9/3/2020, and he was having her mobile number and as per the direction of the Panel Members of the Lok Adalat on 12/12/2020 he made a phone call on the said number and one lady appeared at the other end, who had introduced herself as Pushpa Gidwani and she was known to the applicant as the defendant in the Suit. The applicant claim innocence by stating that as a lawyer, he was not expected to go into the detail Identification as once the client approached and introduced herself to be so and so, there is no reason to disbelieve and even the vakalatnama which was signed by her was given to him which he filed in the Court. {Para 6}

7 There is no reason to disbelieve the applicant, as a lawyer was satisfied that the vakalatnama given to him and chose to represent the defendant in the Suit and even signed the consent terms. However, the learned APP state that the applicant has refused to divert the phone number of Gidwani to whom he had made a video call. Mr.Nikam state that the applicant shall render his co-operation to the Investigating Officer.In the above circumstances, the custodial interrogation of the applicant is not necessary and he deserve protection by way of interim order.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 2174 of 2022

Date of Order: 18.08.2022

Rakesh Shrinath Dubey  Vs. The State Of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MHOR/121450/2022,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 16.

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Can the High Court set aside the award of a Lok Adalat on the ground of fraud unless the objector proves the allegation of fraud?

  It is a settled position of law that where an allegation of fraud is made against a party to an agreement, the said allegation would have to be proved strictly, in order to avoid the agreement on the ground that fraud was practiced on a party in order to induce such party to enter into the agreement. Similarly, the terms of a compromise decree, cannot be avoided, unless the allegation of fraud has been proved. In the absence of any conclusive proof as to fraud on the part of the objectors, the High Court could not have set aside the compromise decree in the instant case. {Para 35}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3486-3488 OF 2022

K. SRINIVASAPPA & ORS. VS. M. MALLAMMA & ORS. 

Author: NAGARATHNA J.

Dated: 18th MAY, 2022.

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Whether the court can redetermine compensation U/Sec 28A Land Acquisition Act, 1894 based on award of Lok Adalat?

 An Award passed under Section 19 of the 1987 Act is a product of compromise. Sans compromise, the Lok Adalat loses jurisdiction. The matter goes back to the Court for adjudication. Pursuant to the compromise and the terms being reduced to writing with the approval of the parties it assumes the garb of an Award which in turn is again deemed to be a decree without anything more. We would think that it may not be legislative intention to treat such an award passed under Section 19 of the 1987 Act to be equivalent to an award of the Court which is defined in the Act as already noted by us and made under Part III of the Act. An award of the Court in Section 28A is also treated as a decree. Such an Award becomes executable. It is also appealable. Part III of the Act contains a definite scheme which necessarily involves adjudication by the Court and arriving at the compensation. It is this which can form the basis for any others pressing claim under the same notification by invoking Section 28A. We cannot be entirely oblivious to the prospect of an ‘unholy’ compromise in a matter of this nature forming the basis for redetermination as a matter of right given under Section 28A. {Para 48}

49. We would, therefore, approve the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure (supra) and the learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Vasudave (supra) and hold that an Award passed under Section (20) of the 1987 Act by the Lok Adalat cannot be the basis for invoking Section 28A.

50. As far as the argument of the respondents that the award dated 12.3.2016 can be treated as the order of the Court within the meaning of Section 18 of the Act read with Section 28A of the Act, we are of the view such an argument cannot be accepted.

                                   Supreme Court

JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA

NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NOIDA) Vs. YUNUS & ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.901 OF 2022

3rd February 2022

Author: K. M. JOSEPH, J.

Citation: 2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 121

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Under which circumstances Magistrate can stop proceeding in summons case U/S 258 of CRPC(Old S 249 of CRPC)?

 That order was challenged in the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and it was held that: -

"Where the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that no case, not even a prima facie case, under Section 447, I.P.C., was made out, he is perfectly justified in stopping the proceedings under Section 249, Criminal P.C. without first following the procedure under Sections 242 to 244, Criminal P.C. The words of Section 251-A (2), Criminal P.C., cannot be read into Section 249, Criminal P.C., and the Magistrate before releasing the accused under Section 249, need not hear the accused and the complainant".

It was also held that the use of the word "discharge" by the Magistrate in his order under Section 249, merely amounts to a release of the accused and stopping of the proceedings without a conviction or an acquittal. This appears to be quite a contrary view to the one taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of 1962 (1) Cri LJ 817 (MP), referred to hereabove and relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge. To say that in every such case where the summons procedure is to be followed contemplated under Chapter XX, the case must necessarily proceed and must end in acquittal or conviction of the accused, can make Section 249 nugatory. It will be of no consequence if no such power existed in the Magistrate. There may arise cases in which on the face of it taking all the averments made in the accusation contained in the complaint may not constitute any offence at all or where any such complaint would become invalid for want of any particular formality to be gone into. There may arise cases where on account of certain technical defects in any such prosecution there would not arise any purpose for proceeding with the matter till the end. At the same time there may arise some cases in which after the evidence of the complainant is over, and which does not help his case, it may not require to call upon the accused to meet the accusation as was found in the Bombay Case and in those circumstances which can be characterised as Special or unusual which make it difficult or impossible to proceed in the normal way or that by reason of such circumstances the Court considers highly necessary to proceed further in the matter in which event it will be open to the Magistrate to exercise such powers and stop the proceedings without pronouncing any judgment either of acquittal or conviction and would be justified in releasing the accused. With respect, therefore, while I amendment unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the decision referred to hereabove, I agree with the view taken by the High Court of Bombay in the decision referred to above and at the same time observe that such powers have to be sparingly used and that too particularly in the exceptional or unusual circumstances attending the case. The order of releasing the accused, therefore, under Section 249 cannot be said to be in any way so illegal or wrong on a consideration of the effect of Section 249 of the Code.

Gujarat High Court

The State Of Gujarat vs Sanghar Ibrahim Ladha on 9 March, 1970

Equivalent citations: AIR 1971 Guj 148, 1971 CriLJ 949, (1971) 0 GLR 503

Bench: N Shelat

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Maharashtra govt Notification on compounding fees for Motor vehicle offences- Useful for LokAdalat

 https://drive.google.com/file/d/18NmI_93dtqQbuavFkwl-aMlE72xBmgD0/view?usp=sharing

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Under which circumstances the high court should set aside the order of disposal of Lok Adalat's case?

The Lok Adalat miserably failed to appreciate contents of the compromise and statement of Sh. Sukhpreet Singh Chauhan while ordering the suit to be dismissed as withdrawn merely because of the statement of Sh. Robin Gupta, appears to

be the result of wrong legal advice or actuated by his anxiety to have refund of Court fee but without realizing that he would be entitle to refund of Court fee even if the Lok Adalat passes an award on the basis of settlement.

The question that arises for consideration is, whether the respondent who had back-tracked from his commitment recorded in the compromise and statement made before the Lok Adalat should be allowed to perpetuate his mischief of enjoying the property and huge sum of Rs.3.5 crores by ordering the petitioner to avail alternative remedy for enforcement of agreement because of mistake committed by the Lok Adalat or the order passed by the Lok Adalat should be set aside in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227.

As per the settled position in law, no one can be allowed to

misuse and abuse the process of law. The petitioner is involved in

litigation despite having agreed to relinquish his rights in respect of ground

and first floor of the property and parting with a huge amount of Rs.3.5

crores in favour of the respondents plus Rs.1 crore in favour of Sh. Dinesh

Singla. In the given circumstances, if the petitioner is directed to initiate

another bout of litigation for enforcement of the compromise/settlement

deed, it would be nothing short of putting premium over mischievous

conduct of the respondents who failed to discharge their unilateral

obligation on the basis of compromise/settlement and statement recorded

before a Court of law. In this view of the matter, in my considered

opinion, the respondents should not be allowed to take undue advantage of

a wrong committed by the Court and improper legal advice to the

petitioner for withdrawal of the suit.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

(Proceedings conducted through video conferencing)

Date of decision: 23.12.2020

 CR No.4701 of 2019(O&M)

Robin Gupta  Vs M/s Stratford Educational Management Pvt. Ltd. and others

CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE REKHA MITTAL

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THE NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (LOK ADALAT) REGULATIONS, 2009 as amended by notification dated 28.08.2019

 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HTGKNJK1VuzyQ21vxWUSEN-HOdU2tVC_/view?usp=sharing

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Supreme Court guidelines for the online trial of cheque dishonour case

 Banks, being an important stakeholders in cases of this nature, it is their responsibility to provide requisite details and facilitate an expeditious trial mandated by law. An information sharing mechanism may be developed where the banks share all the requisite details available of the accused, who is the account holder, with the complainant and the police for the purpose of execution of process. This may include a requirement to print relevant information, viz the email id, registered mobile number and permanent address of the account holder, on the cheque or dishonour memo informing the holder about the dishonour. The Reserve Bank of India, being the regulatory body may also evolve guidelines for banks to facilitate requisite information for the trial of these cases and such other matters as may be required. A separate software-based mechanism may be developed to track and ensure the service of process on the accused in cases relating to an offence Under Section 138 of N.I. Act.

12. With ensuring the credibility of cheques, it is equally important that cheques are not allowed to be misused giving cause to frivolous litigation. The Reserve Bank of India may consider developing a new proforma of cheques so as to include the purpose of payment, along with other informations mentioned above to facilitate adjudication of real issues.

13. Further, a mechanism may be developed to ensure the presence of the accused even by way of coercive measure, if required, taking effect from Section 83 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which allows attachment of property, including movable property. A similar coordinated effort may be evolved to recover interim compensation Under Section 143A of the N.I. Act as well as fine or compensation to be recovered as per Section 421 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 The Bank may facilitate mechanism for transferring requisite funds from the bank account of the accused to the account of the holder in due course, as may be directed by the Court.

14. With ever growing institution of N.I. cases, there is a need of developing a mechanism for pre-litigation settlement in these cases. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 provides for a statutory mechanism for disposal of case by Lok Adalat at pre-litigation stage Under Sections 19 and 20 of the Act. Further, Section 21 of the Act, recognises an award passed by Lok Adalats as a decree of a civil court and gives it a finality. This Court in K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji MANU/SC/1412/2011 : 2012 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 102 : (2012) 2 SCC 51 has held that:

Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court.

15. The effect of above legal proposition is that an Award passed at the pre-litigation stage or pre-cognizance stage shall have an effect of a civil decree. The National Legal Services Authority, being the responsible Authority in this regard, may evolve a scheme for settlement of dispute relating to cheque bounce at pre-litigation i.e. before filing of the private complaint. This measure of pre-litigation ADR process can go a long way in settling the cases before they come to Court, thereby reducing docket burden.

16. The High Courts, in addition to the above, may also consider setting up of exclusive courts to deal with matters relating to Section 138, especially in establishments where the pendency is above a standard figure. Special norms for assessment of the work of exclusive courts may also be formulated giving additional weightage to disposal of case within the time-frame as per legal requirement.

17. This Court in the case of Meters and Instruments Private Limited (supra), observed the following:

Use of modern technology needs to be considered not only for paperless courts but also to reduce overcrowding of courts. There appears to be need to consider categories of cases which can be partly or entirely concluded "online" without physical presence of the parties by simplifying procedures where seriously disputed questions are not required to be adjudicated. Traffic challans may perhaps be one such category. At least some number of Section 138 cases can be decided online. If complaint with affidavits and documents can be filed online, process issued online and accused pays the specified amount online, it may obviate the need for personal appearance of the complainant or the accused. Only if the accused contests, need for appearance of parties may arise which may be through Counsel and wherever viable, video conferencing can be used. Personal appearances can be dispensed with on suitable self operating conditions. This is a matter to be considered by the High Courts and wherever viable, appropriate directions can be issued.

(emphasis supplied)

In view of the above, the status of directions issued or measures adopted by the High Courts may be assessed and a best suited mechanism in this direction may be considered.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 5464 of 2016

Decided On: 05.03.2020

 Makwana Mangaldas Tulsidas Vs.  State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde, CJI and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 4 SCC 695,MANU/SC/0517/2020

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Whether a husband can enforce consent decree passed by Lok Adalat in which wife has waived her right to claim maintenance?

The consent decrees made by the courts are in effect of nothing but contracts with the seal of the court super-added to them. Accordingly, if the term of the contract is itself opposed to public policy then, such term, is void and unenforceable. If the term is severable then, only the term can be declared as void. If the term is not severable, then, perhaps, the entire contract may fall.

13. There are several rulings, which take the view that an agreement, in which the wife gives up or relinquishes her right to claim maintenance at any time in the future, is opposed to public policy and, therefore, such an agreement, even if voluntarily entered, is not enforceable. The two courts in the present case have basically relied upon such rulings and held that even if it is assumed that the parties had voluntarily agreed to give up their time to claim maintenance from each other, such agreement is opposed to public policy and, therefore, the same is not enforceable, or the same does not bar the maintainability of an application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. There is no jurisdictional error in the view taken by these two courts so as to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3439 of 2016

Decided On: 21.12.2018

Ramchandra Laxman Kamble  Vs.  Shobha Ramchandra Kamble and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

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Karnataka HC: Award passed in Lok Adalat in cheque dishonour case can be enforced through Criminal court

 During criminal proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act, if the accused were to dishonestly state that he was agreeable for reference to Lok-Adalat, in furtherance of which the matter is referred to Lok-Adalat and a compromise being arrived at on certain terms in a dishonest manner in that the accused even at the time knowing fully well that he would not adhere to the terms of the compromise and thereafter the accused not performing his obligation would take up the contention that only methodology available to the complaint is execution of compromise as a civil decree, thereby the accused would have successfully avoided a criminal prosecution, frustrated the complaint and left the complainant with no possibility or lesser possibility of recovering the monies due to him as he would had under Section 138 of N.I. Act.

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Supreme Court: Complaint for dishonour of cheque is maintainable if cheque was issued pursuant to award of Lok Adalat

In the instant case, the respondent clearly had a liability.

As observed above, there was an earlier adjudication which led to

the conviction of the respondent accused. Thus there was

adjudication of liability of the respondent accused. While the

appeal was pending, the matter was settled in the Lok Adalat in

acknowledgment of liability of the accused respondent to the

appellant complainant.

The cheque issued pursuant to the order of the Lok Adalat, was

also dishonoured. This clearly gave rise to afresh cause of action

under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1580 OF 2019

ARUN KUMAR Vs ANITA MISHRA 

Dated:October 18, 2019.

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Whether executing court can correct award of Lok Adalat?

 In Bhavan Vaja and others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is the duty of the Executing Court to find out the true effect of a decree as passed though it cannot go behind such decree in the execution proceedings. For construing a decree, the Executing Court can take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading up to the decree. That is the plain duty of the Executing Court. In Darshan Singh (supra) it has been observed that the corrections contemplated under Section 152 of the Code are only accidental omissions or mistakes. A clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing and the same can be duly corrected in exercise of that power. As noted above in the present case the compromise memo has been correctly prepared and it is only the award which contains an erroneous reproduction of Clause 2 of the compromise memo. The mistake is therefore accidental as well as clerical in nature. The observations in Tulashiram Nivarutthi Shendge (supra) that even in the matters of the present type, the Executing Court can exercise powers under Section 152 of the Code for correcting an award support the case of the respondent No. 1.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 02 of 2019

Decided On: 14.03.2019

Dhanraj Dnyaneshwar Koche  Vs. Rajiv Ramdattaji Batra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 664

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Whether FIR Can Be Filed In Respect Of Disputes Fully Settled In Lok Adalat?

 The dispute between the parties, therefore,
came to an end for all purposes consequent upon
passing of an award except to the extent of recovery
of the awarded amount of Rs.83,120/.
It is not in
dispute that the appellant paid the awarded amount
to the BSES in terms of the award dated 27.02.2015
and the same was also accepted by the BSES
without any protest. The award thus stood fully
satisfied.
18. We also find that the award did not contain
any condition granting liberty to the BSES to file an
FIR against the appellant under the Electricity Act
notwithstanding settlement of the dispute and
passing of an award in relation to demand in
question. On the other hand, the conditions set out
in the award, in clear terms, record that the dispute
has been settled in full and final satisfaction of the
demand in question. It is not in dispute that

Section 152 of the Electricity Act empowers the
officer concerned to compound the offences
punishable under the Electricity Act.
19. In our view, if the BSES was so keen to file FIR
against the appellant under the Electricity Act then
either they should not have settled the matter
through Lok Adalat or while settling should have
put a condition in the award reserving therein their
right to file FIR notwithstanding settlement of the
dispute in question. This was, however, not done.
20. We are, therefore, of the considered view that
the filing of FIR after passing of the award by the
Lok Adalat was wholly unjust and illegal and the
same was not permissible being against the terms of
the award and also for want of any subsisting cause
of action arising out of demand. It is, therefore, not
legally sustainable.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1244 OF 2019

Saleem Ahmed Vs State & Anr.

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
Dated:August 19, 2019

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 3918

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Whether proceeding before Lok adalat is judicial proceeding?

The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

22. Powers of 1 [Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat.]—(1) The 1 [Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat] shall, for the purposes of holding any determination under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:—

---

(a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath;

---

(b) the discovery and production of any document;

---

(c) the reception of evidence on affidavits;

---

(d) the requisitioning of any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any court or office; and

---

(e) such other matters as may be prescribed.

---

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained in sub-section (1), every 1 [Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat] shall have the requisite powers to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it.

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(3) All proceedings before a 1 [Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat] shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and every 1 [Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat] shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of section195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

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How to interpret award of Lok Adalat?

As noticed from the representation submitted by the Appellant to the Gram Panchayath, the core grievance was with regard to the unauthorised structure erected on the plot occupied by the Respondent and which was being used as a Plant for making Rubber Sheets on a commercial basis. The grievance essentially was that the structure was in complete violation of the provisions and conditions of the Kerala Panchayath Building Rules, 2011 and also contributed to severe health hazards to those living in the vicinity. However, the Panchayath was essentially concerned with the unauthorised structure erected on the subject plot by Respondent No. 1. That grievance stood redressed by the award passed by the Lok Adalat recording the assurance given by Respondent No. 1 that he would demolish the existing structure within a period of three months. The fact that the structure, as it existed on the date of making of the award, was removed by Respondent No. 1 is reinforced from the stand taken by the Panchayath in its affidavit. Furthermore, Respondent No. 1 admittedly, constructed a new building on the same plot after taking prior permission of the competent authority in that regard, which presupposes that the structure as existed thereat in August, 2013 was removed, without which the new building could not have been erected. The fact that permit was granted to Respondent No. 1 to construct the new building is not only supported by the permit dated 9th October, 2013 (Annexure-P8), but also from the affidavit filed on behalf of the Gram Panchayath dated 9th January, 2015 and including the factual position stated in the report of the Advocate Commissioner dated 18th February, 2015.

10. The moot question is the width of the award passed by the Lok Adalat dated 23rd August, 2013. It is, in our opinion, obviously limited to removal of the existing structure on the stated plot occupied by Respondent No. 1 within three months. That structure, as aforesaid, came to be removed, which fact is reinforced from the circumstances discussed hitherto. The Executing Court, however, erroneously opined that the structure, as it existed at the time of making of the award, was still not demolished.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1424 of 2016

Decided On: 24.04.2019

 Cheriyath Jyothi  Vs. Sainudeen and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar and Ajay Rastogi, JJ.

Citation:  (2019) 5 SCC 779

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Whether litigant who settles case in Lok Adalat is entitled to get refund of 100% Court Fees?

 For the reasons which we have recorded, we are of the view that
subSection
(1) of Section 21 is a case of legislation by incorporation.
Therefore, provisions of Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act will
have to be read in into subSection
(1) of Section 21 of the 1987 Act.
To conclude, Section 16 of the Central Court Fees Act stands
incorporated in subSection
(1) of Section 21 of the said Act of 1987
and, therefore, when a civil suit is referred to a Lok Adalat which ends
with an Award of the Lok Adalat, the plaintiff is entitled to 100% refund
of Court fees paid in the said suit. Thus, a defendant who files a
counter claim in the suit is entitled to 100% refund of the Court fees
paid on a counter claim which is settled before a Lok Adalat.

Therefore, in the three cases in hand, the learned Trial Judge was not
justified in calling upon the petitioner to deposit 75% of the amount of
Court fees out of the refund amount paid to the petitioner. Hence, we
dispose of the petitions by passing the following order :ORDER
(i) We hold and declare that petitioners being plaintiffs in the
suits settled before the Lok Adalat held under the Legal Service
Authority Act, 1987 are entitled to 100% refund of Court fees.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 9864 OF 2017

Maharishi Shankarrao MohitePatil Sahakar Sakhar Karkhana Ltd,  v/s. The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : A.S. OKA &
M.S. SANKLECHA, J.J.
DATED : 2nd APRIL, 2019
 (Per A.S. Oka, J.)
Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 175,AIR 2019(NOC) 821 Bom

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