Whether eviction decree can be passed on ground of bonafide need even if landlord is not qualified to run particular business?

As regards the question as to whether the daughter-in-law of the petitioner-landlord was qualified to run a beauty parlour or not and that she had failed to produce any licence in that regard, it is on record that the daughter-in-law of the petitioner-landlord was indeed running the business of beauty parlour from the very building in question and this was not disputed by placing on record any material on behalf of the respondents/tenants. Therefore, it could not be said that for the said reason, the petitioner-landlord could be deprived of decree of eviction in his favour.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition Nos. 4827 and 4828 of 2016

Decided On: 22.01.2019

Nilkanthrao Raghunathji Chute  Vs.  Dattatraya Narayanrao Balakhe and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 874

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Whether it is mandatory for court to make enquiry regarding comparative hardship faced by landlord or tenant prior to passing to eviction decree?

 So far as the question of comparative hardship is concerned, as pointed out earlier the Trial Court has recorded almost all findings in favour of the tenant but the ultimate decision in favour of the landlord. The Appellate Court has negatived the plea of tenant, regarding the comparative hardship on the ground that if the tenant is given reasonable time to vacate the premises, such eventuality can be cured or met with. In my opinion, no such finding can be recorded without any inquiry by the Court. As pointed out earlier, the requirement of second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 regarding the assessment of extent of requirement of the landlord, is aimed at striking of balance between the reasonable and bonafide requirement of the landlord and comparative hardship likely to be caused to the tenant. This provision is held to be mandatory. The exercise contemplated by second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 is required to be carried out by the Court itself, to arrive at satisfaction contemplated by Section 16(2); both the parts. There is absolutely no evidence on record and no discussion in the judgments delivered by both the Courts below, on this aspect. The Appellate Court could not have recorded the finding against the tenant on the aspect of comparative hardship to the tenant, without carrying out exercise as contemplated by both the parts of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the said Act. In view of this, the decree passed by the Trial Court, as maintained by the Appellate Court, will have to be quashed and set aside and the matter will have to be remanded back to the Trial Court, for enquiry into the extent of need of the landlord and the comparative hardship, likely to be caused to the tenant, because of complete eviction from the suit premises.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 244 of 2007

Decided On: 14.12.2009

 Bismilla Bee  Vs. Anwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Deshpande, J.

Citation: 2010(2) MHLJ 829,2010(1) ALLMR 889

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How to appreciate evidence in case of eviction of tenant on ground of bonafide need of landlord?

 In the present case, the applicants brought on record material to show that there were at least three properties owned by the respondents, which were not disclosed by them while seeking eviction of the applicants from the suit property. One such property was plot No. 6 at Kadbi Chowk, Nagpur, (erroneously written as 'Talvi chowk' in the impugned judgment and order) the others being ancestral property at Sibabuldi and agriculture lands owned by the respondents. On this aspect, the witness appearing on behalf of the respondents was extensively cross examined. The material that came on record demonstrated that the aforesaid property situated on plot No. 6 at Kadbi Chowk was purchased by the respondents on 30-07-1992 and that a tenant was in occupation of the same. At the time of filing of suit for eviction in the present case, the said property was occupied by a tenant. It also came on record in a proceeding initiated by the respondents and as per the compromise that was entered into between the parties before this Court, in the year 2007, the tenant vacated the aforesaid property situated on plot No. 6 at Kadbi Chowk. The ancestral property at Sitabuldi, Nagpur was a house property and remaining properties were agricultural lands.

21. The question that needs to be considered is, whether the respondents had other properties which were available at the time when the suit for eviction was filed in the present case and more particularly whether such properties were suitable for the need that was projected by the respondents in the suit for eviction filed by them. In the material that has come on record it is found by the Courts below that even when the tenant vacated the aforesaid property situated on plot No. 6 at Kadbi Chowk in 2007, it was still not available to the respondents because the lease of the suit properties was not renewed by the Nazul Department. Apart from this, the respondents had specifically pleaded and placed evidence and material on record regarding the extent of land required for satisfying the bona fide need for which the suit for eviction was filed against the applicants. There is nothing to show that such need would have been satisfied by the aforesaid property situated on plot No. 6 at Kadbi Chowk, quite apart from the fact that it was not available with the respondents when the suit for eviction was filed. The other property being ancestral house property at Sitabuldi, Nagpur would not be of any use to the respondents for the specific need that they had projected while filing the application for eviction. The remaining properties being the agricultural properties could not have been considered by the Courts below for the aforesaid case of bona fide need for which the respondents had filed the suit for eviction.

22. The Court below has dealt with this aspect of alleged suppression by the respondents and the claim by the applicants that adverse inference ought to be drawn against the respondents. It is found by the Courts below that in view of the material that had come on record, there was nothing to show that even if those properties were to be taken into consideration it could be said that they were available and suitable for the requirement of the respondents. Thus, it cannot be said that such finding rendered by the Court below was either illegal, perverse or suffered from material irregularity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 27 of 2017

Decided On: 22.03.2018

Chandrashekhar S. Gadgil Vs.  Rameshprasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 918 Bom

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Whether eviction suit can be dismissed if landlord fails to give notice to tenant prior to filing of suit?

 Insofar as the second ground is concerned, perusal of Section 16 would show that when eviction of tenant is sought on any of the grounds mentioned under Section 16(1) of the said Act, no notice is required. It is clear from the perusal of Section 16(1) that if the landlord satisfies the conditions mentioned in the grounds available under Section 16(1) of the said Act, he can directly file a suit for possession. In the facts of the present case, though the learned appellate Court has concurred with the findings of fact arrived at by the learned trial Court that the petitioner has proved his case for bona fide need and that it was also proved that the petitioner does not have any alternate premises for starting his business, has reversed the order solely on the ground that the suit was premature. I find that the said findings are totally in ignorance of the provisions of Section 16(1) of the said Act.

14. I have perused the judgment of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court. The learned trial Court, elaborately discussing the evidence on record, has come to a finding of fact that the suit premises were required by the petitioner for his bona fide occupation for running business of jewellery. It has also come in the evidence that there is a partition in the family and that the petitioner is residing separately and as such requires the premises to start his business separately. The said finding of fact is rightly confirmed by the learned appellate Court. The learned appellate Court, in unequivocal terms, concurred with the said finding and held that the petitioner needs the premises for bona fide occupation and also held that the petitioner wants to start his business there. Only on the ground that the suit was premature, the decree for possession on the ground under Section 16(1)(g) of the said Act has been reversed. As I have already held hereinabove that for filing a suit for eviction under Section 16(1)(g), it is not necessary to issue a notice of 90 days as contemplated under Section 15 of the said Act, I find that the findings of the learned appellate Court are totally unsustainable in law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

W.P. No. 147 of 2005

Decided On: 27.07.2005

Madhukar S/o Laxman Umalkar Vs. Keshao S/o Laxman Shilawant

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation: 2005(3) MHLJ947,2005 BOM RC440

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