Showing posts with label comparative hardship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label comparative hardship. Show all posts

Monday, 14 December 2020

Whether eviction decree will be vitiated if the court takes into consideration comparative hardship if tenanted premises was vacant land?

 Here, in the case before us, the leased property is vacant land. But the Courts below have spoken about comparative hardship. So the Corporation and Firm maintain that the adjudication was under Section 13 (1) (g) rather than Section 13 (1) (i). According to them, as wrong standards have been applied, the decree stands vitiated. This plea was raised for the first time--in the revision. But, I reckon, it is a question of law. Let us consider it.


73. First, both Sections 13 (1) (g) and (i) are substantive provisions; they are not procedural provisions. Second, Sections 13 (2) and (3) have fixed the adjudicatory parameters: what aspects should be considered when the leased property is with structures or is vacant. The Appellate Court as well as the trial Court have considered the Owner's reasonable, bona fide need elaborately. They have concluded that the Owners needed the whole extent for their personal use--to cater to the increasing needs of their growing family. In addition, the Courts have also considered the relative hardship. Perhaps, that consideration of relative hardship may be extraneous or unnecessary. But it does not vitiate the outcome. It proves fatal if something essential has not been considered; it only proves redundant if something extraneous is considered, besides the essential having already been considered. As rightly contended by the Owners, the Courts put heavier onus on them; they were asked to meet an extra criterion--the comparative hardship--which is not required under Section 13 (1) (i). If at all anyone has been prejudiced, it must be the Owners not the Corporation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 561 of 2018 and 562 of 2016 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2005 in Regular Civil Suit No. 149 of 1998

Decided On: 27.04.2020

 K.B. Lahoti and Company and Ors. Vs. Champalal Vithuram Jajoo and Ors.

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Saturday, 5 September 2020

Whether the tenant can deny that he was a tenant of the plaintiff after accepting his tenancy?

The main emphasis of learned counsel for the petitioner is upon the maintainability of the writ petition. To proceed with to decide this issue, it is necessary to record here that it is undisputed that the petitioner has accepted his tenancy before the prescribed authority as well as appellate authority. It is also undisputed that in capacity of tenant, he has also filed Misc. Case No. 672/70/2014 (Prakash Chandra Gupta Vs. Ritesh Bhargav) under Section 30 of the Act, 1972, which is still pending.

42. It is not the case that petitioner has raised a pure legal issue before the Court. In fact, he had taken a plea accepting the tenancy and contested the case, but after loosing the same before the Prescribed Authority and Appellate Authority taking U-turn, he has taken entirely different plea which was earlier never raised. Apart from that, undisputedly, he is enjoying privilege of tenant by filing Misc. Case No. 672/70/2014 (Prakash Chandra Gupta Vs. Ritesh Bhargav) under Section 30 of the Act, 1972, which is still pending. Therefore, in light of such facts, conduct of the petitioner cannot be appreciated and he can not be permitted to take benefit of his own wrong.

44. In the matter of S.U. Ashram (supra), the Court was also of the same view and held that the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable only for the reason that he has admitted landlord-tenant relationship in his written statement. The Apex Court in the case of Heeralal (supra) has stated that amendment sought in the written statement was of such nature as to displace the plaintiff's case could not be allowed. In the matter of Nagindas Ramdas (supra), the Apex Court has again taken very same view and held that admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleading or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872 made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The Court again in the matter of Thimmappa Rai (supra) has taken the same view relying upon the Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and held that any admissions made by the party to the suit in earlier proceeding are also admissible against him.

46. After going through the facts of the case and law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court, it is very much clear that the petitioner tenant has never disputed tenancy and also filed Misc. Case No. 672/70/2014 (Prakash Chandra Gupta Vs. Ritesh Bhargav), under Section 30 of the Act, 1972 in the capacity of tenant, therefore, he cannot be permitted to take new plea in light of law discussed above and further no denial of tenancy is required by the landlord-respondent in light of Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

47. Considering the judgments of Apex Court as well as this Court, it is very much clear that petitioner has never raised this issue before the Prescribed Authority or Appellate Authority, where it could be proved by placing evidence whether he is tenant or not, therefore, he cannot be permitted to raise this issue before the High Court in the writ petition. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also not acceptable that he has raised the issue in the written statement that tenancy is continued from 1960, which was not denied by landlord-respondent in light of Section 58 of Evidence Act. Once the tenancy is accepted, there was no need to landlord to deny the same as the facts admitted need not be proved.

48. Alternative argument of learned counsel for the landlord-respondent is also having force where he has stated that in case petitioner is not the tenant, then he has no authority to maintain this writ petition as he is not the aggrieved person. There is no doubt that once the petitioner is accepting that he is not tenant and his father is tenant then, he has no right to file this writ petition, only his father could invoke this remedy or any other remedy available under the law. Therefore, in that case, this writ petition would not be maintainable in light of law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court and the Court cannot grant any relief in favour of petitioner.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Writ A. No. 20793 of 2019

Decided On: 20.08.2020

Prakash Chandra  Vs.  Ritesh Bhargawa

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Neeraj Tiwari, J.
Citation: MANU/UP/1404/2020
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Monday, 27 April 2020

Whether court can refuse to order production of document by applying test of comparative hardship between parties?

The Court, therefore, is clearly empowered and it shall be lawful for it to order the production, by any party to the suit, such documents in his possession or power relate to any matter in question in the suit provided the Court shall think right that the production of the documents are necessary to decide the matter in question. The Court also has been given power to deal with the documents when produced in such manner as shall appear just. Therefore, the power to order production of documents is coupled with discretion to examine the expediency, justness and the relevancy of the documents to the matter in question. These are relevant considerations which the Court shall have to advert to and weigh before deciding to summoning the documents in possession of the party to the election petition.
8. Without applying any of these tests, the court below allowed the respondent's application holding that refusal of application would otherwise cause a very valuable piece of evidence in favour of the respondent to be shut out. The objection of the petitioner that passport is in his current use and parting of it would result in putting an end to his stay in Abu Dhabi was not accepted by the court below as if it did not merit any consideration under law. It is a common knowledge that a resident will not be permitted to stay in a foreign country unless he holds original passport in his possession since its production could be insisted by the authorities whenever necessary. Therefore the order of the court for production of the original for comparison by a handwriting expert would only deprive petitioner's right to stay abroad. However, the position would have been different had the direction of the court been limited to production of the passport solely for the inspection of the respondent.

9. The court below while taking care of the respondent's concern and interest in the suit, however, failed to consider the hardship exposed to the petitioner while ordering production of original passport. The extent or degree of comparative hardship likely to be suffered by the petitioner in this respect did not engage the attention of the court below. The test of comparative hardship between parties is also one of the tests to be applied by the courts in deserving cases of this nature when parties to suit apply for production of document invoking Order XI Rule 14 of the Code.

10. Order XI Rule 14 of the Code does not attach to a party an absolute right to insist for production of a document in the possession of the adverse party in support of proof of his case. The right of the applicant is liable to be determined by the court in the light of the test of expediency, justness and relevancy as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. Any direction to produce the original passport of the petitioner in court affecting his right to stay abroad will only place him comparably in great hardship than the respondent who relies on the document and seeks to prove his case. Applying the test in Sasanagouda's case, I am satisfied that the impugned order dated 5.10.2017 does not accord with the interest of expediency or justness and therefore it is liable to be set aside as being illegal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (C) No. 492 of 2018

Decided On: 05.02.2019

Thundiyil Abdurahiman  Vs.  Asharaf Kalapeedikayil

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.V. Anilkumar, J.


Citation: AIR 2020 (NOC) 208 Kerala
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Wednesday, 18 March 2020

Whether the appellate court should interfere with the decision of the trial court on the question of balance of hardship under rent law?

It is well settled that an Appeal Court will be ordinarily slow to interfere with the decision of the trial Judge on questions like the balance of hardship, for this is primarily a question of fact. To succeed, the appellant must how that the trial Judge misdirected himself on a question of law or that he based his judgment on some finding of fact on which there was no evidence. If in drawing up the statutory balance sheet of hardship under Section 13(2), there is some evidence of hardship on each side the decision of the trial Judge must be normally final. The appellate Court can interfere in certain circumstance, for instance, if there is no evidence of hardship on one side or if the trial Judge has held to be relevant some matter which in law is not relevant such as the absence of a view of a neighbouring hill, river, tree or something pleasant of that kind.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Special Civil Appln. Nos. 2185, 2187 and 2194 of 1969

Decided On: 14.03.1972

 Kishinchand Murjimal Vs. Bal Kalavati 
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Whether construction of marriage hall or charitable hospital would amount to putting premises to non-residential use?

Mr.Chitale, the learned counsel for the respondents sought to support the decree passed by the Appellate Court by arguing firstly that the requirement of the trustees for constructing marriage hall, clinic and hospital etc. is not requirement for residential purposes and hence, any decree that would be passed on that ground evicting the tenant would be contrary to Section 25(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 which prohibits conversion of residential purpose to non-residential purpose. The trial Court has rightly negatived this contention on the ground that the requirement, cannot be considered to be for non-residential purpose because a large portion of the construction will be used by the doctors, nurses and patients who would be residing therein although for different times and sometime temporarily and the present use of the building itself if not wholly for residential purposes.

19. Moreover, the word "residence" must be understood in the context of the Act as used in Section 6. The words "residential use" as opposed to "non-residential use" must, therefore, be used not for education, business trade or storage within the meaning of S. 5 (1). It cannot be said that the construction of a marriage hall or a charitable hospital by a charitable trust would be putting the premises to use for education business, trade or storage within the meaning of Section 6.

20. "Residence" has no doubt, a variety of meanings according to the Statute or document in which it is used. It is an "ambiguous word" and may receive a different meaning according to the position in which it is found. The word may receive a larger or more restricted meaning according to what the Court believes the intention of the Legislature to have been, in framing the particular provision in which the word occurs. Having regard to these various meanings of the word 'residence' and the scheme of the Rent Act as indicated in the Section 6, it must be held that the legislature in used the words "non-residential purpose" in Section 25 did not intend to prohibit use of a building like the suit building containing a residential flat like the suit flat and the land on which such a building stands for purposes of construction of Marriage Halls. Charitable Hospital and quarters and garages for Doctors and Nurses as in the present case. The said Marriage Halls, Hospitals etc. are like to be used for sleeping, eating, drinking etc. temporarily if not permanently from day-day particularly in a crowded city like Bombay. The use of the same cannot be described, the facts and circumstances established in the case, as "non-residential" use within the meaning of even Section 25.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Special Civil Appln. Nos. 2185, 2187 and 2194 of 1969

Decided On: 14.03.1972

 Kishinchand Murjimal Vs. Bal Kalavati and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Vaidya, J.

Citation: 1972 MHLJ 822, AIR 1973 Bom 46
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Sunday, 17 November 2019

Whether landlord can get eviction decree on ground of bonafide need if there is non user of tenanted premises?

Dr. Bhal­Chandra Balwant Marathe and ors. Vs.
Narayan Vaman Sumant [1986(1) RCI 302 (Bom.)],
wherein the Hon'ble Bombay High Court observed that,
premises in occupation of the tenant almost in a state of

non ­user by him. No hardship will cause to tenant. Even a
minor requirement of the landlord will be sufficient to give
landlord decree for eviction sought by him.
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Thursday, 26 September 2019

Questions and answers on rent law

1) What is difference between S 15(2) and S 15 (3) of Maharashtra rent control act?
Ans -1) As per S 15(2) No eviction suit is to be filed against tenant unless Demand notice is issued to him prior to filing of eviction suit  demanding arrears of rent. As per S 15 (3) no eviction decree should be passed by court if tenant deposits arrears of rent, interest,permitted increase and costs of suit within 90 days from date of receipt of summons and thereafter continue to deposit rent and permitted increases till disposal of suit.
2) S 15(2) is applicable at pre trial stage and S 15(3) is applicable after filing of eviction suit.

Read important judgments on rent law: 
Click here

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Tuesday, 17 September 2019

Whether court should consider issue of comparative hardship if unlawful occupant is residing in tenanted premises/

Reverting to the issue of the comparative hardship, the courts below were right in observing that the issue of comparative hardship will be relevant only, in the context of the requirement of the tenant and not in relation to some other occupant of the suit premises and when that occupant has no right to continue in the premises.
Bombay High Court

Balwant P. Doshi vs Shantaben Dhirajlal Shah And Anr. on 4 July, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003 (2) BomCR 190, 2002 (4) MhLj 473

Bench: A Khanwilkar
Read full judgment here: Click here
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Sunday, 28 July 2019

How to decide issue of comparative hardship in eviction suit against tenant?

 To say that the Trustees of the petitioners are also members of the Jamaat and that Jamaat had several other properties, is certainly an irrelevant consideration. As long as, there is no material produced on record, this Trust itself owns any suitable property from where it could start the school, the issue of comparative hardship certainly cannot be decided in favour of the respondents. Besides, in the present case, considering the number of business activities which the respondents carry out through various premises located in Mahabaleshwar itself, the issue of comparative hardship will have to be decided against the respondents. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1997 of 1995, Civil Application Nos. 2274 and 1351 of 2017

Decided On: 21.12.2018

Ranjanwadi Shikshan Trust Vs.  Govind N. Naidu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 38,2019(1) RCR 552
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Thursday, 9 May 2019

Whether it is mandatory for court to frame issue regarding comparative hardship?

These are all the judgments which are cited before us. Having considered the arguments in depth, we are of the view that there is no statutory obligation to frame a particular issue covering the provisions of the second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Rent Act. On the contrary when the total circumstances of a case are being considered by the Court in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence led, it is enough if the Court is aware that while passing a decree for eviction against a tenant a division of the premises is] permissible and under certain circumstances it can bring about a situation where the needs of both the landlord and tenant are satisfied without there being any hardship on either of them. If the Court disposes of the case with the awareness of these provisions either by express discussion or by implication where the facts speak for themselves, the Rent Court had done its duty properly and there is no infirmity! of any kind either in the procedure or in the substantive disposal of the dispute.

25. In the case of P.A. Machiah 1975 BomLR 99 Deshpande, J. observed on pages 100 and 101 as follows:

"But whether findings on one or both parts of this Section is necessary or not, must necessarily depend on how the case is prosecuted on either side. Each one may seek to acquire or retain possession of the entire premises by establishing greater hardships to himself or seek to acquire or retain only part of the premises by proving no hardship to either. Each one may even try to bring his case under both the parts and seek relief's alternately taking no chance. This must, in turn, depend in no small measure, on the urgency and extent of the needs of both, availability of alternate accommodation, the extent of the accommodation in dispute, degree of adaptability of the parties and suitability of the portion of the premises and variety of other factors. Suffice it to note that it is not difficult to conceive of cases where mere part of the premises may not suit the requirements of the either under any circumstances, and of his own deliberate choice, each one of them may rather choose to concentrate on first part and try to acquire or retain the entire premises for proving his greater hardship than even think of pressing for any portion of the premises. It would be unrealistic to such a situation to require the Court to record any finding on the second part even when parties themselves have deliberately, due to the sheer disinterestedness, not pressed for it at any stage of the trial. There is nothing in Section 13(2) to require the Court mandatorily to record a finding on both the parts even without any plea, evidence and need. It would indeed be an idle formality."
We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge and we think that the above observations correctly lay down the law in regard to the provisions of Section 13(1)(g) read with Section 13(2). Needless to add that we neither agree with nor approve of the view taken by Savant, J. in Bhaskar Digambar v. Bhagwan Vishwanath MANU/MH/0262/1976 : (1976)78BOMLR454 .

26. We may additionally point out that the provisions of Section 13(2) in the form in which they appear have always been there ever since the present Act of 1947 became effective from 13-2-1948. The entire litigation in this State has been conducted on the footing that there is no statutory obligation of framing any such issue. Rent litigation forms a bulk of litigation in many places. If we were now to observe that an issue, as proposed by the learned Single Judge, is a statutory necessity it may result in remanding literally hundreds and thousands of suits to the trial court without any appreciable benefit to the parties whose needs are genuine. It may give a distinct advantage to the unscrupulous tenants who have really no defence in an action of eviction against them under Section 13(1)(g) read with Section 13(2). If any instance is needed, the present litigation is gross instance of that type.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Spl. Civil Appln. No. 2618 of 1977

Decided On: 28.03.1978

 Kisanrao Madhavrao Bartakke Vs. Narayan Dhondi Shete

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Balkrishna Narhar Deshmukh and M.L. Pendse, JJ.

Citation: 1978 MHLJ 859,AIR 1979 Bom 74
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Wednesday, 8 May 2019

Whether it is mandatory for court to make enquiry regarding comparative hardship faced by landlord or tenant prior to passing to eviction decree?

 So far as the question of comparative hardship is concerned, as pointed out earlier the Trial Court has recorded almost all findings in favour of the tenant but the ultimate decision in favour of the landlord. The Appellate Court has negatived the plea of tenant, regarding the comparative hardship on the ground that if the tenant is given reasonable time to vacate the premises, such eventuality can be cured or met with. In my opinion, no such finding can be recorded without any inquiry by the Court. As pointed out earlier, the requirement of second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 regarding the assessment of extent of requirement of the landlord, is aimed at striking of balance between the reasonable and bonafide requirement of the landlord and comparative hardship likely to be caused to the tenant. This provision is held to be mandatory. The exercise contemplated by second part of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 is required to be carried out by the Court itself, to arrive at satisfaction contemplated by Section 16(2); both the parts. There is absolutely no evidence on record and no discussion in the judgments delivered by both the Courts below, on this aspect. The Appellate Court could not have recorded the finding against the tenant on the aspect of comparative hardship to the tenant, without carrying out exercise as contemplated by both the parts of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the said Act. In view of this, the decree passed by the Trial Court, as maintained by the Appellate Court, will have to be quashed and set aside and the matter will have to be remanded back to the Trial Court, for enquiry into the extent of need of the landlord and the comparative hardship, likely to be caused to the tenant, because of complete eviction from the suit premises.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 244 of 2007

Decided On: 14.12.2009

 Bismilla Bee  Vs. Anwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Deshpande, J.

Citation: 2010(2) MHLJ 829,2010(1) ALLMR 889
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Whether court is supposed to decide issue of comparative hardship if tenant fails to raise plea of comparative hardship?

The learned Counsel has further urged that the Trial Court has failed to make any enquiry into the aspect of comparative hardship. He has relied upon the decision of this Court reported in Bismilla Bee Sk. Chand and Anr. v. Mohd. Anwar Mohd. Akhtar 2010 (2) BCR 63. In the said judgment it has been held that the burden of proof as to comparative hardship is upon the tenant. In view of this, it is obligatory on the part of the tenant to first of all raise a plea of comparative hardship. It is only upon such plea being raised in the written statement that the Trial Court is obliged to make an enquiry irrespective of the fact whether there is any such demand or not. The judgment cited supra, does not lay down a law that even if such plea is not raised in written statement the Trial Court is obliged to make an enquiry. Hence, it is of no assistance. In the present case, after going through the written statement, I do not find such a plea of comparative hardship has been raised by the tenant. In view of this the judgment is of no help to the petition

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 4332 of 2010

Decided On: 21.06.2011

 Vilaschand Vs. Bhimchand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Deshpande, J.

Citation: 2011(4) MHLJ 864,2011(6) ALLMR 248,2011(6) Bom CR 81
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Burden of proof is on whom to prove issue of comparative hardship in eviction suit?

 In Mst. Bega Begum and Others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by Lrs. and others, MANU/SC/0313/1978 : (1979) 1 SCC 273 pari materia provision contained in J & K Rent Act came up for the consideration of this Court. It was observed that it is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and merely because the tenant will be ousted from the premises where he was running his activity cannot, by itself, be considered to be a hardship and be a valid ground for refusing the landlord a decree for eviction. In deciding the extent of the hardship, each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable. The owner of the property cannot be denied eviction and compelled to live poorly merely to enable the tenants to carry on their flourishing business activity at the cost of the landlord. The fact that there is no other means for the landlord to augment his income except by getting the tenancy premises vacated compared against the conduct of the tenant who having obtained the premises for a fixed number of years has overstayed and enjoyed the premises for a long period of time are relevant factors not to deprive the landlord from the possession over the tenancy premises and recording a finding of no equity in favour of the tenants continuing in possession any further. If the tenants prove that they will not be able to get any accommodation anywhere in the city that may be a relevant consideration. However, the tenant cannot insist on getting an alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality because that will be asking for the impossible. What are to be weighed as relevant factors are the comparative inconvenience, loss, trouble and prejudice.

35. A perusal of these paragraphs would go to show that nowhere the Supreme Court held that there is no requirement to raise pleadings. What the Supreme Court held in paragraph 10 is that it is expected of the parties to raise necessary pleadings and the Court to frame necessary issues based on the pleadings so as to enable the parties to adduce evidence and bring on record such relevant material as would enable the Court forming an opinion on the issue of comparative hardship and consistently with such finding whether a partial eviction would meet the ends of justice. Even if no issue has been framed, the Court may discharge its duty by taking into consideration such material as may be available on record.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 257 of 2007

Decided On: 22.02.2013

Chetan Anand Shetty  Vs.  Indrajeet Chandrasen Shirole and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.
Citation: 2013(3) MHLJ 310,2013(3) ALLMR 33,2013(4) AIR BOM R 530.
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Sunday, 27 January 2019

How to ascertain comparative hardship in suit for eviction of tenant?

While considering the comparative hardships, the case of the petitioners cannot be equated with the case of any tenant whose business or profession is dependent upon the business activities that are being carried out in the rented premises. The place of practicing a profession, the clientele built by such a tenant etc. are some of the factors which need to be considered while dealing with comparative hardships in between the litigating sides.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 4178 of 2001, Civil Application Nos. 2848 of 2002 and 1222/2016

Decided On: 02.08.2018

 Kamgar Kalyan Kendra Vs. Kashinath Brindavan Bundelkhandi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 411
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Wednesday, 8 August 2018

Whether court should consider issue of comparative hardship if landlord has failed to prove his bonafide need?

The lower Appellate Court, in its exhaustive judgment held that the requirement of the landlords was not established and the requirement made out was the same as that in the case of Marathe. In view of the fact that the landlords lost on the issue of requirement, the lower Appellate Court held that the issue of comparative hardship does not survive. Mr. Karlekar reiterated his submissions about the requirement of landlords as urged in the case filed against tenant Marathe and for the reasons recorded herein above, these submissions are required to be rejected. Mr. Karlekar submitted with reference to an affidavit sworn on April 12, 1985 by plaintiff No. 2 that Vimalabai had retired on attaining age of superannuation in September 1982 and that she had property at village Dharangaon in Erandol Taluka where she can easily shift and, therefore, decree of eviction should be passed against her. It is impossible to accede to the suggestion because the question of comparative hardship arises only after the landlord establishes that his requirement is bonafide and reasonable. The landlords have failed to establish that the requirement is bonafide and reasonable and, therefore, the question of comparative hardship is of no consequence. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2431 of 1979 with Writ Petition Nos. 1655 of 1985, 430 of 1980, 2781 of 1980

Decided On: 13.07.1989

Shriram Vishram Marathe Vs. Pitambar Govinda Patil

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.L. Pendse, J.

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Whether it is permissible for court to decide issue of bonafide need and comparative hardship in composite manner?

The Trial Court, in the present case has considered the issue of bona fide requirement and comparative hardship in a composite manner rather than consider the two aspects separately. The Trial Court, failed to appreciate that to begin with, it has to be determined whether the landlords have made out a case that the suit premises are required by them reasonably and bona fide. Upon record of satisfaction in this regard, the Trial Court should have then adverted to the predicates of Section 16(2) of the Rent Act, which mandate that no decree of eviction shall be passed on the grounds specified in Section 16(1)(g) of the Rent Act, if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the question whether reasonable accommodation is acquired by landlord, greater hardship would be caused by passing a decree than by refusing to pass it. There is accordingly, clear failure to exercise jurisdiction under Section 16(2) of the Rent Act, by confusing and mixing of two issues of reasonable and bona fide requirement and comparative hardship into one. The entire reasoning of two Courts is that the landlords are the best judges and the final arbiters in matters of reasonable and bona fide requirement and further that since the tenant Gujar has two rooms in Namdev Cooperative Housing Society, the respondent-landlords will suffer greater hardship. The landlords are hoteliers having Hotels like Blue Star and Lucky Restaurant at Mahabaleshwar itself. The landlords and their family members are engaged in several businesses like STD Booth, sale of handicrafts etc.. One of the landlords has been the President of Municipal Council of Mahabaleshwar. The record indicates that the family members of one of the landlords have served in Municipal Council in some capacities or the other. In contrast, the tenant Gujar, who resides in suit premises No. 1, is engaged in sale of 'Panipuri' and other road side snacks. The tenant Panhalkar is engaged in sale of handicraft items through suit premises No. 2 which admeasure around 40 sq.ft. Both the tenants have deposed that despite best efforts, it is not possible for them to acquire other premises. There are several premises in the occupation of the landlords which the landlords did not even bother to disclose in the plaints. In these circumstances, even if the issue of comparative hardship was required to be decided, the same would have to be answered in favour of the tenants. In any case, by ignoring of such relevant and vital material on record, the Courts could not have answered such issue in favour of the landlords.
 This Court in case of BismilL Bee w/o. SK. Chand and Khajamiyan S/o. Sk. Chand v. anwar S.o. Mohd. Akhtar MANU/MH/1536/2009 : 2010(1) ALL MR 889, has held that the provisions of Section 16(2) of the Rent Act, cast a statutory duty upon the Court to make an enquiry to the extent of need of the landlord, even if such need is found to be reasonable and bona fide. The right of the landlord to seek eviction on one hand and the protection granted to the tenant on the ground of comparative hardship on the other hand, can be balanced by the Court by making enquiry into the extent of need of landlord and even passing a decree for partial eviction from the suit premises, to meet the ends of justice. Such an exercise is required to be carried out by the Court irrespective of the fact whether party demands it or not. If such exercise is not carried out by the Court, then certainly it would result not only in failure to jurisdiction, but also failure to perform statutory and mandatory duty, resulting in failure of justice. Further, Section 16(2) of the Rent Act mandates that the Court is to have 'regard to all circumstance of the case'. It further proceeds to state that this would include the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant. In this context, it is necessary, for the Court to be alive to the financial status of both the landlord as well as the tenant. The Court is also expected to be alive to the situation regards scarcity of accommodation at a particular place. In the present case, the two Courts have failed to undertake any such exercise and the impugned orders consequently are unsustainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 770 of 2013, 

Decided On: 04.08.2015

 Vasant Mahadeo Gujar and Ors. Vs.  Baitulla Ismail Shaikh and Ors.

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Thursday, 17 May 2018

Whether eviction decree is to be passed against tenant if hardship is equal to landlord and tenant?

The Courts also held that petitioner/landlord requires the suit premises bona fide for his business as he is running the said business. The appellate Court has held that the place where the business is carried out is more suitable for transportation business and the said business is flourishing in that area and the plaintiff carries his ancestral business of silk cloth. Whether the business can be flourished or not is not the requirement under the statute. The requirement under the statute is bona fide need of the landlord and the same has been established. It is settled law that the landlord is the best judge of the premises he requires for the business and the tenant cannot dictate the terms. The only question that would remain is of the hardship. The tenant has not stepped into the witness box to prove the aspect of hardship. If the hardship is equal to the landlord and the tenant then the rule is a decree of eviction. In the present case in absence of any evidence or proof on the part of the tenant about the hardship being caused the landlord would be entitled for decree of eviction.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

W.P. No. 4722 of 2011

Decided On: 20.09.2011

Rafiq Ahmed Qureshi S/o Bashir Ahmed Vs.  Iqbal Khan S/o Hashmat Ali Khan and Others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.V. Gangapurwala, J.

Citation:  2012(1) MHLJ 337: 2012(4) ALLMR 647
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Tenant not taking efforts to search alternative accommodation, whether liable to be evicted?

In the context, the consistent view of the Bombay High Court is that once the landlord proceeds to initiate a suit on the ground of bona fide requirement, the tenant is expected to start looking for alternative premises and to explain as to why he was unsuccessful in securing such accommodation. In case of Suhasini Atmaram Parab and others vs. B. H. Khatu and others, 2003 Bom.R.C. 313 a Single Bench of this Court has reiterated the same view by taking survey of the case law on the point. The tenant did not elaborate his efforts regarding steps taken to search for alternative accommodation. He failed to discharge the burden to prove that comparatively he will be put to greater hardship in case of passing the eviction decree. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

W. P. No. 802 of 1990

Decided On: 07.12.2006

Parashram Tuljaram Belhekar  Vs. Tejmal @ Kankamal Mulchand Jain 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.R. Kingaonkar, J.

Citation: 2007(2) MHLJ 610: 2007(3) ALLMR 657
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Whether eviction decree can be passed against tenant if he fails to take efforts to find alternative accommodation?

The Appellate Court rightly adverted to the fact that there is nothing on record to show that the petitioners have made efforts to find out alternative accommodation for their residence and could not get one. Reliance was placed on paragraph No. 14 of the defendants evidence which reads thus:

"14. It is true that the plaintiff has offered me an alternative accommodation of one room admeasuring 10 x 12 with balcony, with bathroom W.C. combined, in the same suit premises having separate entrance. I am not prepared to accept the offer of the plaintiff regarding the above said alternate accommodation. I tried to find out the alternative accommodation for my residence from June, 1980 near Pratap Talkies, S.T. Workshop, Near Highway at Murphy Company. It is not true to say that I did not search an alternate accommodation for my residence after receiving the notice from the plaintiff."
From the evidence it is obvious that no positive evidence has been adduced by the defendants that getting alternative premises in the same locality or the same city was impossible. If that be so, then applying the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in MANU/SC/0313/1978 : [1979]2SCR1 in the case of Ms. Bega Begum & others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others, the Court will have to answer the issue of comparative hardship against the petitioners-tenants and in favour of the respondent-plaintiff landlady.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4457 of 1991

Decided On: 28.08.2002

 Gaur Chandra Basu and Anr. Vs. Ruchira Ashok Sonde and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2002(1) ALLMR 312
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Whether it is necessary for court to frame issue of comparative hardship?

At the outset, I have no hesitation in observing that the manner in which the appeal has been disposed of is wholly unsatisfactory and unacceptable by any standards. On reading the impugned judgment, the impression gathered is that the learned Judge has summed up the entire controversy in a cryptic way. What is interesting to note is that in para No. 13, the Appellate Court has adverted to all the 23 decisions cited across the bar on both sides without even briefly indicating the relevance of those decisions or that he was guided by the principle in any particular decision; and, concluded that the issue of reasonable and bona fide requirement will have to be answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents. Be that as it may, what is still surprising to note is that the Appellate Court has not even thought it appropriate to frame much less decide the issue of comparative hardship which it was obliged to do in view of the mandate of section 13(2) of the Act as it was inclined to grant decree for possession of the suit premises in favour of the respondents on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. Suffice it to mention that the decision of the Appellate Court which is subject matter of challenge before this Court cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 6005 of 2002 with C.A.S.T. No. 39237 of 2002

Decided On: 22.10.2002

 Suresh D. Zamakade Vs. Narayandas V. Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2002(1) ALLMR 312: 2003(2) BomCR 830
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