Rejecting Benami Claims at the Threshold: Supreme Court’s 08.05.2026 Order VII Rule 11 Judgment Critically Examined

 

Executive overview

In its judgment MANJULA AND OTHERS Vs    D.A. SRINIVAS 2026 INSC 465  dated 8 May 2026, the Supreme Court has converted Order VII Rule 11 CPC from a largely under‑used procedural filter into a robust jurisdictional gatekeeper, particularly in suits tainted by benami arrangements, unlawful land transactions and disqualifications under succession law. The decision arises from a challenge to a trial court order rejecting a plaint as barred under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 ("Benami Act") and Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which was reversed by the Karnataka High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court restores and fortifies the approach of the trial court, while laying down an exacting standard for pleadings that seek to dress up benami and unlawful claims as innocuous civil disputes.

Print Page

Supreme Court: A plaintiff arraigned as the principal accused in the murder of a testator is prima facie disqualified from claiming succession rights under that testator's Will

 25.5. Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act provides that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which such person committed or abetted the commission of murder. Section 27 further declares that where a person is so disqualified, the property shall devolve as if such person had predeceased the intestate. Section 30 recognises testamentary succession and enables any Hindu to dispose of property by Will or other testamentary disposition in accordance with the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or any other applicable law. Thus, the Hindu Succession Act contemplates both intestate and testamentary succession. Consequently, the bar under Section 25 applies equally to a person who seeks to inherit the estate of the deceased through testamentary succession.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7370 OF 2026

[Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 7924 of 2024]

MANJULA AND OTHERS Vs    D.A. SRINIVAS 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Dated: MAY 8, 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 465.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Husband Convicted For Causing Dowry Death Cannot Inherit Deceased Wife's Property Under Hindu Succession Act

 The position in law which thus emerges is that, the disqualification incorporated in section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is based on public policy that a person who causes death of the person whose property he seeks to inherit, cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own felonious act. The disqualification of the murderer to inherit the property of the person he murdered, even before statutory recognition, was

premised on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

The avowed object to disqualify such a person was to disallow a

person to accelerate his inheritance by causing death of the person whose property he seeks to inherit. {Para 19}

20. Secondly, the expression, “a person who commits the murder

or abets the commission of murder,” is required to be so construed as to advance the aforesaid object. The term, “murder” has not been defined in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The definition of the offence of murder under section 300 of the Penal Code which is a technical definition for imposing punishment prescribed under section 302 of the Penal Code cannot be readily imported to construe the term, “murder” under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is not the correct approach to interpret the term used in one enactment dealing with inheritance and succession by importing the definition of a similar term used in a Penal Statute. Plainly Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Penal Code, 1860 do not operate in the same field. Therefore, the term, “murder” ought to receive its ordinary and common parlance connotation. If so construed, it implies causing the death of the person or abetting the causing of death of the person, whose property is sought to be inherited, by the person who is alleged to have incurred the disqualification.

21. Thirdly, the particular section of the Penal Code under which the person accused of causing death is convicted, is not of decisive significance. Nor the factum of conviction, as such, is peremptory. Conversely, even if a person is convicted for an offence punishable under sec.302 of the Penal Code that, by itself, may not sustain the disqualification by a Civil Court under sec.25 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The factum of the person, who has allegedly incurred disqualification, having committed the murder of the deceased has to be decided independently on evidence before the Civil Court.

22. In the light of the aforesaid principles, reverting to the

controversy at hand, in my considered view, the Department is not justified in questioning the competence of the petitioner on the sole ground that the husband of the deceased has been convicted for the offence punishable under section 304-B and not 302 of the Penal Code. In the context of the disqualification under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there does not appear much qualitative difference in the offences punishable under section 302 and 304-B.

28. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that a person who has caused the dowry death of a woman, falls within the dragnet of disqualification prescribed under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if the said factum is proved to the satisfaction of the Civil Court. Therefore, the Department was not justified in questioning the competence of the petitioner on the count that the husband of the deceased has not been convicted for the offence punishable under section 302 but under section 304-B of the Penal Code. The Department’s requisition thus stands dispensed with.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION

TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO.807 of 2020

Pawan Jain Vs Sejal Anurag Jain ...Deceased

CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : JULY 02, 2024

Print Page

Whether family of son will inherit property of father if son murders his father?

 Therefore, once it is held that a person who has murdered his father or a person from whom he wants to inherit, stands totally disqualified. Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act makes it further clear that if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall be deemed as if such person had died before the intestate. That shows that a person who has murdered a person through whom he wants to inherit the property stands disqualified on that account. That means he will be deemed to have predeceased him. The effect of Section 25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally disqualified to succeed to the estate of deceased. The framers of the Act in the objects and reasons have made a reference to the decision of the Privy Council that the murderer is not to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded as non-existent. That means that a person who is guilty of committing the murder cannot be treated to have any relationship whatsoever with deceased's estate.

24. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the effect of Sections 25 and 27 is that the respondent No.1 cannot inherit any property of his father as he has murdered him on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in that case. Once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or son. The defendant-respondent No.1 son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4838 of 1999

Decided On: 06.05.2005

 Vellikannu Vs.  R. Singaperumal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhan and A.K. Mathur, JJ.

Print Page