Showing posts with label inheritance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inheritance. Show all posts

Tuesday, 3 June 2025

Legal Consequences of Adoption of child : Inheritance Rights in the Natural and Adoptive Families


Under Indian law, an adopted child
cannot claim a share in the property of their natural (biological) parents after adoption. The adoption legally severs all ties with the biological family regarding inheritance rights. Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA) clearly states that "all ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family".

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Thursday, 1 August 2024

Bombay HC: Motor accident claim tribunal should not grant compensation as per apportionment provided by personal law of the parties but must grant compensation as per their dependency

Shri Kazi, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that as per the principles of Mohammedan law, appellant No. 1 father Abdul Raheman being the heir of deceased Mohammed Shafi is entitled to half of the total compensation and mother and widow to the extent of 1/4th each. We gave anxious consideration on this aspect. However, the compensation is being paid taking into consideration the dependency of the claimants. We are of the opinion that we are not guided by the apportionment as provided under the Mohammedan law. 

{Para 5}

6. Appellant No. I father Abdul Raheman is aged 61 whereas mother of deceased is aged about 43. At the time of incident, appellant No. 3 Shahnazbanu was hardly aged about 28. Her dependency is comparatively more than appellants Nos. 1 and 2, taking into consideration her age. We, therefore, feel that it would be just and reasonable to pay half of the amount of compensation to appellant No. 3 and rest of the amount in equal share i.e. 1/4th to each appellant No. 1 and 2.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Decided On: 30.11.1988

Abdul Rahman and Ors. Vs. Dayaram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Qazi and Ashok A. Desai, JJ.

Author: Ashok A. Desai, J.

Citation: 1989 (2) T.A.C. 423, 1(1989)ACC226,  MANU/MH/0742/1988.

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Wednesday, 20 December 2023

What is the basic concept of 'Uniform Civil Code' and its implications on personal laws?

 

From marriage to adoption, how Uniform Civil Code could subsume personal laws across religions

The Uniform Civil Code is back in the news again after Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a strong push for it. If it comes into force, separate personal laws governing marriages, divorce, and inheritance of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Parsis, and other communities will be subsumed. 

The UCC is the proposal to have one law for the entire country, which will apply to all religious communities in personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession, custody and adoption. The implementation of the UCC is likely to subsume personal laws in the country.

WHAT IS LIKELY TO BE COVERED UNDER UCC?

Marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship, adoption, inheritance, and succession are all issues that come within the definition of a 'civil code'. Currently, under Indian law, all these issues are governed by separate provisions under religious customary laws or codified laws pertaining to each religion in India.

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Sunday, 12 September 2021

Whether Hindu widow can inherit husband's property if she has not remarried on the day succession opens?

 It is very well true that if we have to deal with rights of a

particular party, we have to consider the provisions of relevant law in

its entirety. Section 14 of the Act of 1956 makes the female Hindu

being absolute owner if she possessed the property. Whereas Section 24 of the said Act disinherits the widow if she re-marries. Here this Court wants to note the difference in between the wordings of Section 2 of the Act of 1856 on one hand and the wordings of Section 24 of the Act of 1956. There is emphasis ‘on the date when succession opens’ as per Section 24 of the Act of 1956. The status of the widow being remarried continuing to be widow must be on the date when succession opens. The wordings “if on the date the succession opens” does not find place in Section 2 of the Act of 1856. So, we have to respect the intention of the legislators while incorporating these provisions in

Section 24 of the Act of 1956. {Para 14}

15] In other words, if the widow has not re-married when the

succession opens, the disqualification under Section 24 of the Act of

1956 will not be applicable. Admittedly, defendant-Sunanda re-married

in May, 1991 (i.e. after opening of succession on 19th April, 1991). For

the above discussion, contention of the appellant so as to disqualify the

defendant-Sunanda cannot be accepted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

SECOND APPEAL NO.144 OF 2007

Smt. Jaiwantabai Shenuji Wankhade Vs  Sunanda w/o Ganesh Dode,

CORAM : S.M. MODAK, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 23 rd AUGUST, 2021

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Tuesday, 4 May 2021

Whether on the death of Muslim his legal heirs will inherit his property as joint tenant or tenants in common?

 The cause of action for partition of properties is said to be a perpetually recurring one" See Monsharam Chak-ravarty & Ors. v. Gonesh Chandra Chakravarty & Ors. (2). In Mohammedan Law the doctrine of partial partition is not applicable because the heirs are tenants-in-common and the heirs of the deceased Muslim succeed to the definite fraction of every part of his estate. The share,,, of heirs under Mohamedan Law are definite and known before actual partition. Therefore on partition of properties belonging to a deceased Muslim there is division by metes and bounds in accordance with the specific share of each heir being already determined by the law.

Supreme Court of India
Syed Shah Ghulam Ghouse Mohiuddin ... vs Syed Shah Ahmed Moriuddin Kamisul ... on 17 February, 1971
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Tuesday, 15 September 2020

Bombay HC: Wife can claim maintenance from her father in law after the death of her husband from estate inherited by him

 At the outset, it is required to be submitted that the plain
reading of Section 19 of the Act contemplates that the respondents
have every right to claim the maintenance after the death of husband
from the estate inherited by her father-in-law i.e. the present petitioner.
That proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 19 contemplates that the
respondent has to demonstrate that she on her is unable to maintain
herself. It is in this eventuality she can claim maintenance from the
estate of her husband, still fact remains that the said burden can be
discharged by respondent no.1 at an appropriate stage. The object with
which the provision is made in the statute book for grant of interim
maintenance cannot be ignored.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO.4054 OF 2020

Sardool Singh Sucha Singh Matharoo Vs.  Harneet Kaur widow of Bhupinder Singh Matharoo & Anr. 

Coram : NITIN W. SAMBRE, J.
Date : 7th September, 2020
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Wednesday, 8 April 2020

What are principles for inheritance of property of female hindu acquired by her under compromise decree?

In the present case, it is not disputed that Rajathiammal died intestate without leaving any son or daughter or children of pre-deceased son or daughter. Hence, the property would devolve on the heirs of her father. It is contended that she got the property because of the compromise decree and, therefore, the property is not inherited by her from her father or mother. This submission in our view, is without any substance. She was daughter of Sivabagyammal and, therefore, she was entitled to inherit the property of her maternal grandmother as her mother had expired. As some dispute was raised by the other heirs, a suit was filed. In that suit, rights of Rajathiammal were recognized and compromise decree was passed in her favour. Result is - she got the property as daughter of her mother. That means, she got the property not from the husband or father-in-law, but from her mother side. In that state of affairs, the heirs of her father, that is, heirs of S.V. Venugopala Chettiar would be entitled to inherit her property in view of Section 15(2)(a) of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6626 of 1995

Decided On: 08.08.2003

V. Dandapani Chettiar Vs. Balasubramanian Chettiar (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.B. Shah and AR. Lakshmanan, JJ.


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What are principles for inheritance of self acquired property of female hindu dying intestate?

 The law is silent with regard to self- acquired property of a woman. Sub-section (1) of Section 15, however, apart from the exceptions specified in Sub-section (2) thereof does not make any distinction between a self-acquired property and the property which she had inherited. It refers to a property which has vested in the deceased absolutely or which is her own. The self-acquired property of a female would be her absolute property and not the property which she had inherited from her parents.

10. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act would apply and not the Sub-section (2) thereof.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3241 of 2009 

Decided On: 05.05.2009

 Omprakash  Vs. Radhacharan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.B. Sinha and Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.

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Friday, 7 February 2020

Whether children born to adoptee father prior to his adoption can inherit his property in Adoptive family?

 Since the succession has opened after the death of Laxman on 10th
January, 1987, therefore, succession has to be in accordance with
the Act and not as per Hindu law as all text, rule or interpretation
of Hindu law prior to commencement of the Act have ceased to
have any effect unless expressly provided for in the said Act. This
Court in a Judgment reported as Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo v.
Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo(1981) 4 SCC 613 held that a bare perusal of
Section 4 would indicate that any custom or usage as part of Hindu
law in force will cease to have effect after the enforcement of
Hindu Succession Act with respect to any matter for which
provision is made in the Act.
14. The principle that the Act will be applicable on the date succession
opens is well settled. Reference may be made to a judgment reported
as Bhanwar Singh v. Puran & Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 87, wherein this Court
held that the Act brought about a sea of change in the matter of
inheritance and succession amongst Hindus. Section 4 of the Act
contains a non- obstante provision in terms whereof any text, rule
or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of
that law in force immediately before the commencement of the
Act, ceased to have effect with respect to any matter for which
provision is made therein save as otherwise expressly provided.

15. Since there is no provision of denying the rights of succession to
the natural born son of an adoptee father, therefore, the succession
will be in terms of the provisions of the Act alone.

In my opinion, the fictional severance of ties with the
natural family would not mean that her children would
cease to be her children or can be considered to be not
her children by means of a legal fiction. If by virtue of
the definition in Section 3(j) even the illegitimate
children of a Hindu female have been given a right to
inherit her property, then it would not be permissible to
say that her legitimate children should be excluded
because they were born to her prior to the date of her
husband’s adoption. If, however, the Legislature had
specifically provided for this, then effect must be given
to such a provision and the wishes of the Legislature
respected. Where, however, there is no such clear
provision, such exclusion would appear to be against

the plain language of the enactment and it would not
be proper to come to any such conclusion.”



21. In view of the provisions of the Act which do not make any
distinction between the son born to a father prior or after adoption
of his father and that there is no provision which bars the natural
born son to inherit the property of his natural father, therefore, the
High Court has rightly upheld the rights of the sons of Laxman. In
fact, in the Full Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in Martand
Jiwajee Patil, it has been held that the natural father retains the
right to give in adoption his son born before his own adoption.
Therefore, if he has a right to give his son in adoption, such son has
a right to inherit property by virtue of being an agnate. There was
a full blood relationship between the three sons and the daughter
who was born after adoption. All the children of Laxman are
entitled to inherit the property of their natural father and mother in
accordance with the provisions of the Act as succession has opened
after the death of Laxman in 1987 and subsequently the mother in
the year 1992.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6642-6643 OF 2010

KALINDI DAMODAR GARDE  Vs MANOHAR LAXMAN KULKARNI 

HEMANT GUPTA, J.
Dated:FEBRUARY 07, 2020.
Citation: (2020) 4 SCC 335
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Sunday, 8 December 2019

Whether Hindu is entitled to inherit property of christian relative as per Indian Succession Act?

 There is authority in this Court in favour of the view that a Hindu relation, if he is otherwise entitled to inherit the estate of a Christian deceased under the Indian Succession Act, which would admittedly govern cases of Christian succession, would not be disentitled to such inheritance merely because he is a Hindu (vide -- 'Neepen Bala Debi v. Siti Kanta Banerjee' 15 Cal WN 158 (A)). 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

A.F.O.D. No. 173 of 1954

Decided On: 12.01.1956

Benoy Kumar Mondal  Vs.  Panchanon Majumdar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.N. Mookerjee and Renupada Mukherjee, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1956 Calcutta 177

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Saturday, 13 July 2019

Whether widow of deceased tenant is entitled to inherit commercial tenancy even if she was not using said premises along with deceased tenant?

After the 1978 Amendment, it is only in the absence of member of the tenant's family residing with the tenant at the time of the death of the original tenant, that any heir of the deceased tenant acquires tenancy rights under the Rent Act. From this, it follows that under the unamended 1947 Act, the Division Bench of this Court had recognised that the provisions of 1947 Act were not made to supersede the rights to inheritance of tenancy vesting in the heirs on the death of the original tenant. Further, after the amendment, such rights shall accrue to the legal heirs of the deceased tenant, only in the absence of member of the tenant's family residing with the tenant at the time of his demise. In both situations, therefore, devolution of the tenancy upon the heirs was contemplated, except that after the 1978 amendment, the devolution upon the heirs in accordance with law of inheritance was made subject to absence of any member of the tenant's family using the tenanted premises for the purposes for which they were let out along with the original tenant, at the time of the demise of such original tenant.

11. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the impugned judgment and decree made by the Appeal Court is either in excess of jurisdiction or the same is vitiated by any illegality or material irregularity. In this case, there is no serious dispute that the suit, which has now been decreed, was instituted by the wife of the original tenant and consequently a legal heir of the original tenant. Assuming, therefore, that the wife was not using the suit premises for commercial purposes, at the time of death of her husband, the wife can always claim tenancy on the basis of heir-ship in view of peculiar provisions contained in Section 7(15)(d) of the Rent Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 471 of 2015

Decided On: 25.08.2015

Romeo Pascol Kinny Vs. Savitri

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Sonak, J.

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Tuesday, 2 July 2019

Whether family of son will inherit property of father if son murders his father?

 Therefore, once it is held that a person who has murdered his father or a person from whom he wants to inherit, stands totally disqualified. Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act makes it further clear that if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall be deemed as if such person had died before the intestate. That shows that a person who has murdered a person through whom he wants to inherit the property stands disqualified on that account. That means he will be deemed to have predeceased him. The effect of Section 25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally disqualified to succeed to the estate of deceased. The framers of the Act in the objects and reasons have made a reference to the decision of the Privy Council that the murderer is not to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded as non-existent. That means that a person who is guilty of committing the murder cannot be treated to have any relationship whatsoever with deceased's estate.

24. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the effect of Sections 25 and 27 is that the respondent No.1 cannot inherit any property of his father as he has murdered him on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in that case. Once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or son. The defendant-respondent No.1 son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4838 of 1999

Decided On: 06.05.2005

 Vellikannu Vs.  R. Singaperumal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Ashok Bhan and A.K. Mathur, JJ.

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Sunday, 28 April 2019

Whether legal representatives of deceased licensee will inherit right in licensed premises?

 A mere license does not create any estate or interest in the property to which it relates. It only confers legality for an act which would otherwise become unlawful. A license may be purely personal, gratuitous or contractual. The first two classes of mere licenses are revocable, the third class is revocable or not revocable according to the express or implied terms of the contract between the parties. A license coupled with grant of an interest in nature of property is not revocable. Such a license is a right to enter on land and enjoy a profit a prendre or other fv incorporeal hereditament.

19. The learned Advocate for the appellant invited my attention to Section 56 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 to contend that the license cannot be transferred by the licensee in view of Section 56 of the Easement Act. Original defendant Andrew died during the pendency of these proceedings on 4-5-1996 and is represented by LRs respondents No. 1 to 7 on record.

Admittedly, the first Appellate Court also recorded that the construction was carried out with muds and bricks. If that is so, it cannot be said that those three rooms were constructed of permanent character, as such the construction is purely temporary.

20. Therefore, the finding as to irrevocable license in para 14 of the impugned judgment appears perverse and is not at all sustainable. Considering the legal position that mere license does not create any estate or interest in the property; but only confers legality on acts which would otherwise be unlawful. A license may be purely personal, gratuitous or contractual. In the instant case, it appears that it was gratuitous at the instance of mother as one brother, who is owner of the suit plot, allowed his another brother to occupy a portion of the suit plot such license or permission being of gratuitous nature such license is revocable and not transferable in favour of the legal representatives, as it is purely personal right to enter on the land and enjoy the occupation, till the license is revoked.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

S.A. No. 372 of 1993

Decided On: 01.07.2008

 Francis  Vs.  Andrew and Ors.
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Saturday, 27 April 2019

Whether legal representatives who are impleaded alone are entitled to inherit entire subject matter of litigation?

 I am also of the view that if in a suit a few persons are impleaded as legal representatives, it does not mean that they alone are entitled to inherit the entire subject-matter of the litigation. The legal representatives are brought on record to represent the estate of the deceased. The question of inheritance is not decided and it is only a question of representation of estate which is decided under Order 22 of the CPC. Therefore, a person who represents the estate acts on behalf of the entire body of people who inherit the estate. As such, when after the death of Smt. Rajeshwari Rani Pathak, Dr. S.K. Sharma was impleaded as her legal representative, he represented the estate of the deceased late Smt. Rajeshwari Rani Pathak and it was not decided that he was the sole heir.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Decided On: 17.05.2007

State of H.P. Vs. Smt. Annapurna Pathak and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Deepak Gupta, J.

Citation: AIR 2007 HP 88
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Saturday, 6 April 2019

Whether daughter is entitled to get share in ancestral property which was inherited by her mother?

 Thus, under Subsection
(2) of Section 3 of Hindu
Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 when a Hindu governed by any
school of Hindu law other than Dayabhaga dies having at the time of
his death interest in Hindu joint family property, his widow shall
have the same right, widow shall have in the property the same
interest as the deceased had. However, such interest shall be limited
interest known as Hindu woman's estate.

11 Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as
under:
"14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired
before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her
as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.—In
this subsection,
“property” includes both movable and immovable
property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at
a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or
by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or
after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase
or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also
any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the
commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in subsection
(1) shall apply to any
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other
instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an
award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the
decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such
property.”
12 Thus, in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Appellate Court has held that
the mother of the plaintiff and the defendant became absolute
owner of her share in the suit property which was the limited
interest or Hindu woman's estate. In view of the provisions of
Section 3 of the Hindu Women Right to Property Act, 1937.
Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads that

any property possessed by female Hindu whether acquired
before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by
her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation appended to the said Section embraces all the
modes of acquisition, which includes acquisition of the
property by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a
partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance ,or by gift from any person, whether a relative or
not.
. Thus, the limited interest or Hindu woman's estate
shall be held by the widow as full owner in terms of provisions
of Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
13 Therefore, on bare perusal of Section 14, it
appears that the property or interest in the property acquired
by a female Hindu member of the family before
commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, becomes
an absolute owner.

14 In the case in hand, it is not in dispute that mother
of the plaintiff and the defendant had died after 1956 and,
therefore, her interest in the property would devolve as per
the scheme in terms of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956. Thus, her property will devolve upon her sons,
daughters and husband.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.126 OF 2018
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1511 OF 2017

Shri Jagannath Waman Undre  Vs Smt. Yamunabai Sitaram Kadam

CORAM : SANDEEP K. SHINDE J.
DATE : 1 s t APRIL, 2019
Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 415

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Friday, 11 May 2018

Whether foreign nationals are barred from inheriting property in India?

Dr. S.L. Singh died on 20.3.1976 without leaving any issue. It is not
disputed that Ida Utarid is the real sister of Dr. S.L. Singh. According to the
admitted pedigree, M. Utarid had two sons, namely, Dr. M.B. Utarid and Nazir
Utarid. Nazir Utarid had two daughters, namely, Dr. S.L. Singh (wife of the
original plaintiff) and Ida Utarid. J.M. Utarid (defendant No.1) is the son of E.
Udarid and grandson of Dr. M.B. Utarid. Dr. S.L. Singh is admittedly an Indian
Christian. Therefore, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short ‘the Act’) would
be applicable to the succession of the property left by her. This Act does not bar
the succession of property of any Indian Christian by a person who is not an Indian
national. There is no prohibition for succession of the property in India by a
foreign national by inheritance.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6935 OF 2011

B.C. SINGH (D) BY LRS.  V J.M. UTARID 
Dated:May 8, 2018.
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Thursday, 29 March 2018

Whether S 7(15)(d) of Maharashtra rent control Act is contrary to Hindu succession Act?


1. By this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner seeks a declaration that section 7(15)(d) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short "the MRC Act") is inconsistent with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short "the HS Act) as amended from time to time. The argument is that to the extent section 7(15)(d) of the MRC Act provides protection to the family member, who was residing with the deceased tenant, at the time of his death, even though such family member is not a heir of the deceased tenant, deprives the heir of the deceased tenant of his right and status under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
 We are of the view that the area and field covered by the MRC Act is entirely different. The provision such as definition of the term 'tenant' appearing in section 7(15) must be read in the backdrop of the object and purpose sought to be achieved by the MRC Act. It is not to create a separate class or to carve out a distinct rule of succession but to merely enable somebody to step in place of the deceased tenant until the rights under the general law are determined that such a provision has been inserted and for protection of the interests of both, the landlord and tenant.
Therefore, there appears to be no conflict in the two provisions. The HS Act amends and codifies the law relating to succession amongst Hindus and therefore the overriding effect given to it by section 4(1)(b) over other law in force immediately before commencement of the HS Act relating to intestate succession amongst Hindus, that law ceased to apply insofar as it is inconsistent with any other provisions contained in the HS Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1853 of 2014

Decided On: 11.08.2015

 Urmi Deepak Kadia Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.C. Dharmadhikari and G.S. Kulkarni, JJ.
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Sunday, 11 February 2018

Whether Stepson Of A Hindu Dying Intestate Can Claim Inheritance Under Hindu Succession Act?

The claim is clearly preposterous. In the first place, the Applicant must show that he is entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased either as a relative specified in class-I and if there be no such relative, then as a relative specified in class-II, of the schedule under Hindu Succession Act read with Section 8 of that Act. It is important to note that the controversy involves a claim to the property of a male Hindu dying intestate. The schedule to the Hindu Succession Act refers to heirs in class-I and class-II within the meaning of Section 8 of that Act. A son is included in class-I of the schedule. The Applicant, as son of the wife of the deceased from her first marriage, cannot claim as a son of the deceased. The expression "son" appearing in the Hindu Succession Act does not include a step-son. The expression "son" not having been defined under the Hindu Succession Act, the definition of "son" under the General Clauses Act may be appropriately referred to. In clause (57) of Section 2 of the General Clauses Act, the expression "son" includes only an adopted son and not a step-son. Even otherwise "son" as understood in common parlance means a natural son born to a person after marriage. It is the direct blood relationship, which is the essence of the term "son" as normally understood.
Hindu Law permits adoption, the expression "son" for the proposes of the Hindu Succession Act would include even an adopted son. The word "son" appearing in class-I of the schedule to that Act would thus include an adopted son but there is clearly no warrant for including a step-son within the meaning of the expression "son" used in class-I of the schedule. The context in which the term "son" is used in the schedule does not admit of a step-son being included within it.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Chamber Summons No. 495 of 2017 in Suit No. 2219 of 2000, Suit No. 2219 of 2000 and Notice of Motion No. 381 of 2015 in Suit No. 2219 of 2000

Decided On: 12.01.2018

 Dudhnath Kallu Yadav Vs. Ramashankar Ramadhar Yadav and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.C. Gupte, J.
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Saturday, 30 September 2017

Whether Hindu Daughter After Converting To Islam is entitled to Inherit Property of her parents?

The change of religion and loss of caste have long ceased
to be the grounds of forfeiture of property and the only
disqualification to inheritance on the ground that the person
has ceased to be a Hindu is confined to the heirs of such
convert (Section 26). The disqualification does not affect the
convert himself or herself. This being the position, I have no
hesitation to hold that the applicant who is admittedly a sister
of the private respondents, i.e. the daughter of late Bhikhabhai
Patel, is entitled to succeed in getting her name mutated in the
record of rights as one of the legal heirs. The provisions
contained in Section 26 of the Hindu Succession Act is the only
provision dealing with the right of succession of children born
to a convert after the conversion. However, this provision does
not disqualify the convert himself from succeeding to the
property of the Hindu father.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15825 of 2017

NAYANABEN FIROZKHAN PATHAN @ NASIMBANU FIROZKHAN PATHAN.
V 
PATEL SHANTABEN BHIKHABHAI & 4.

CORAM:  MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 26/09/2017
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Sunday, 20 August 2017

Whether daughters born out of void marriage are entitled to inherit property of their father?

It is an admitted position that respondents 2 and 3 were born out of the wedlock of late Suryanarayana and Pydamma during the subsistence of the marriage between Suryanarayana and Chilakamma. Even assuming, the marriage between late Suryanarayana and Pydamma cannot be treated as a valid marriage because of the subsistence of the marriage between late Suryanarayana and Chilakamma, considering the fact that respondents 2 and 3 were born out of the marriage between Suryanarayana and Pydamma, they would be entitled to succeed to the properties on the death of Suryanarayana and Chilakamma. In this connection, we may consider certain provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short 'the Act').

Section 5 of the Act clearly states the grounds when the marriage cannot be solemnized. Clause (i) of Section 5 is one such condition, which clearly provides that no marriage can be performed if there is a living spouse. Therefore, in view of Section 5, the marriage between Suryanarayana and Pydamma cannot be considered to be legal as at the time of such marriage, Chilakamma was very much alive. Section 11 of the Act, which deals with a void marriage says that any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void if it contravenes any of the conditions specified in Clause (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 of the Act. Therefore, in view of Sections 5 and 11 of the Act, it must be held that the marriage between Suryanarayana and Pydamma is a void marriage as the said marriage was admittedly solemnized after the commencement of the Act. Therefore, considering that the marriage between Suryanarayana and Pydamma was a void marriage, the question that would now arise is whether their daughters, namely, respondents 2 and 3 were entitled to inherit the properties in question, with the first wife, Chilakamma, on the death of Suryanarayana. In this connection, we may refer to Section 16 of the Act. Section 16 of the Act deals with legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act clearly says that notwithstanding that the marriage is null and void under Section 11, any child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, in view of Section 16, it is clear that the daughters, namely, respondents 2 and 3 inherited the properties in question, along with Chilakamma, on Suryanarayana's death. Accordingly, the High Court was justified in holding that on the death of Suryanarayana, the properties in question were inherited by his daughters, namely, respondents 2 and 3, along with Chilakamma and therefore were entitled to evict the appellants from the properties in question along with Pydamma. Accordingly, the findings of the High Court on the question whether respondents 2 and 3 were entitled to inherit the properties in question of late Suryanarayana jointly with Chilakkama cannot be interfered with. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 149 of 2004

Decided On: 12.05.2006

Bhogadi Kannababu  Vs. Vuggina Pydamma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Arijit Pasayat and Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.

Citation:(2006) 5 SCC 532
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