Unquestionably, the dispute in this case revolves around Clause (d) of explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act. A mere glance at the provision indicates that it has been worded in careful and cautious terms. It states that a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship would lie exclusively before the Family Court.
{Para 21}
22. What has to be seen is whether the circumstances in which the order or injunction is sought in the present case arise out of a marital relationship. The test is not whether the cause of action, forming the the basis of the prayer for injunction, arises out of a marital relationship or whether the marital relationship is the reason for the grievance ventilated by the plaintiff. All that has to been seen are the circumstances in which the injunction is sought. Once the Court identifies the circumstances, if those circumstances arise out of a marital relationship, Clause (d) of the Explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act would ipso facto be attracted.
23. Explanation (d) in Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, require the parties to the lis to be husband and wife. Clearly, in so opining, the learned SCJ has effectively re-written the statutory provision. There is nothing in Clause (d) of the explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act in which indicates that the clause would apply only where the litigation is between husband and wife. For the clause to apply, all that is required is that (i) there is a marital relationship, (ii) the martial relationship has resulted in a certain set of circumstances and (iii) the order or injunction which is sought in the suit is sought in those circumstances.
24. Applying these tests to the case at hand, if one examines the plaint, and the case set up by the respondents in the plaint, it is clear that the circumstances in which injunction has been sought by them have arisen out of the marital relationship between the petitioner and Pardip. Had the petitioner not married Pardip, she would never had been the daughter-in-law of the respondents, she would never had come to stay in the residence of the respondents, the respondents would never had given her any permissive licence to reside therein, and the entire chiaroscuro of events, which have been emphasised in the plaint by the plaintiffs, to highlight the alleged ignominy and persecution to which petitioner allegedly subjected the respondents, would not be in existence. The fact that the petitioner married the respondents’ son was the foundation of the relationship that emerged between the petitioner and the respondents, and it was in the circumstances which arouse out of that relationship that the entire dispute between the respondents and the petitioner, as per the allegations contained in the plaint, filed by the respondents, arose.
28. That being so, in my view, the case squarely falls within Clause (d) of the explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act.
29. I am unable, therefore, to subscribe to the view expressed by the learned SCJ in the impugned order 30th October, 2019 in Suit 12114/2016 that the suit was not required to be transferred to the Family Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
CM(M) 69/2020 & CM APPL. 2707/2020
AVNEET KAUR Vs SADHU SINGH & ANR .
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
Dated: 01.06.2022
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