Allahabad HC has deprecated filing of multiple non-compulsive litigation for maintenance by wife when she is unable to maintain herself

On the one hand, the petitioner claims that she is unable to maintain herself and she cannot afford to purchase even the basic necessities for survival and on the other hand, she is multiplying non-compulsive litigation against her husband. The petitioner had filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and a complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act claiming maintenance. Although she had a legal right to institute numerous proceedings claiming maintenance under various statutory provisions but when she claims to be unable to maintain herself and afford even the basic necessities for survival, it does not appear to be proper to multiply non-compulsive litigation. Further, non filing of the suit for restitution of conjugal rights or divorce indicates that the petitioner is interested only in claiming maintenance from her husband before various fora and not in settling her disputes either way by restitution of her matrimonial status or by dissolution of her marriage. {Para 9}

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

LUCKNOW

MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 4292 of 2026

Shashi Gupta Vs State Of U.P. 

Coram: HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Citation: 2026 AHC LKO 55690.

Dated: August 11, 2026

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Guidance Note for District Judges and Family Court Judges on Deciding Child Custody Disputes

 

Overview

In child custody disputes, the governing principle is that the welfare and best interest of the child is the paramount consideration, overriding the competing claims and legal rights of the parents. Indian courts have repeatedly held that custody proceedings are not to be treated as ordinary adversarial civil trials and that the court is not bound by strict rules of evidence or procedure in the same manner as in regular civil litigation.

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Protecting the Minor’s Share: A Modern Judicial Guide to Assessing "Evident Advantage" under Section 8 of the HMGA

 

In family law and property jurisprudence, one of the most sensitive responsibilities of the court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction over a minor's property. When dealing with applications under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMGA) to alienate a minor's estate, courts face a complex balancing act. The judiciary must safeguard the minor's future without unnecessarily obstructing economically beneficial family transactions.

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Madras HC: How to decide interim maintenance enhancement application filed by wife even though she is having sufficient income?

Further, the fact that the respondent has received substantial monies for the last three financial years is also not in dispute. The object of Section 24 is only for providing interim maintenance to the wife to enable her to get sufficient income to live a comfortable lifestyle. I do not see that the respondent is not possessed of such sufficient income already, warranting further monies from the petitioner by way of interim maintenance. {Para 16}

18.In Rajnesh's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is no straight jacket formula for fixing maintenance and the Court has to waive the status of parties, reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children, their education qualifications, any independent source of income accruing to the wife and whether such income would be sufficient to enable the wife to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in the matrimonial home, whether the wife was employed before and after marriage, etc.

19.Even applying the ratio laid down in Rajnesh's case, I do not find that the respondent requires any further amounts by way of interim maintenance to lead a comfortable lifestyle. In view of the aforesaid discussions regarding her holding of immovable properties as well as the substantial income by way of substantial dividends of the Company. 

 THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

CRP.No.2590 of 2025

& CMP.No.14720 of 2025

Dr.C.Amarnath Vs  Dr.J.Remabarathi 

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI

Dated : 22.08.2025.

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Whether child welfare committee under Juvenile justice Act can hand over custody of child to mother when the matter is pending before the Family Court?

 5. In a case of identical nature, a Division Bench

of this Court in Shaiju S and others v. Child Welfare

Committee and others [2021 (6) KHC 573] has held as

under:

“11. We must at the outset note that the Committee

committed grave error in ordering custody to the mother

when the matter is pending before the Family Court. The

Committee ought to have restrained from entertaining a

dispute which is a subject matter of lis between the

parties. We must also note that wrangling between the

spouses in regard to custody will not confer any power on

the Committee to interfere in such matters and give

custody to one of them. Going by various provisions,

including Section 2(14)(v) of the Act, the Committee's role

would arise only when none of the parents is in a position

to take care or protect the child or children. The

Committee can step into at a stage to protect a child when

parents are not in a position to protect the child. The role

of the Committee commences from the stage where both

parents are not in a position to take care and protect the

child. The parens patriae principle to intervene is to

protect the child and act as a parent of the child when

parents fail to take care and protect the child. So also is

the matter of dispute between spouses. The Committee

would be justified in interfering with the custody of child

with one of the parent, if that parent is incapacitated or

failed completely to take care of the child.

12. The Committee cannot voluntarily interfere with

the custody of the children except on a circumstance

where it forms an opinion that the child requires care and

protection. Merely because the children are isolated from

the mother by the father, Committee cannot interfere with

the legal custody of the children by the father”.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 35830 OF 2024

SHITHU KS Vs  CHAIRPERSON, CHILD WELFARE COMMITTEE,

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

Dated this the 12th day of December, 2024

Citation: 2024:KER:94086.

Read full Judgment here: Click here. 

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Kerala HC: Shuttling Child Between Two Forums Causes Inconvenience And Is Detrimental To Child's Welfare

 On scrutinizing the averments in

O.P.No.411/2024, it shows that that the 3rd respondent

does not have a case that his child is a child in need of

care and protection so as to attract the provisions of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,

2015. Even otherwise the respondent in the petition is

the biological mother of the child. Furthermore, the

filing of a second petition for an identical relief is

unwarranted because the Family Court is the Court of

competent jurisdiction to decide on the interim and

permanent custody of the child. The Family Court has

concurrent jurisdiction with the 1st respondent in matters

concerning the welfare of children. Since the 3rd

respondent has elected the Family Court, his subsequent

endeavour to approach the 1st respondent for identical

reliefs seems to be with an intention to harass the

petitioner. Unmindful of the above legal question, the 1st

respondent has ordered the 2nd respondent to produce

the child before them, when the matter is sub-judice

before the Family Court. {Para 4}

6.  Shuttling the child between the two

Forums will cause inconvenience to the child and is

detrimental to its paramount welfare.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 35830 OF 2024

SHITHU KS Vs  CHAIRPERSON, CHILD WELFARE COMMITTEE,

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

Dated this the 12th day of December, 2024

Citation: 2024:KER:94086.

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Can a Family Court entertain a trademark infringement suit?

 Interestingly, the impugned order has been issued in

OP No.1509/2021, namely Ext.P1 filed by the petitioner, seeking

permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondent from

entering into the two shop rooms scheduled therein, which are

situated at Changanacherry. The respondent, by filing a

counterclaim, alleging that the said shops are being run under the

name “CALLUNA”, over which, she holds a valid Trade Mark; and

therefore, sought an injunction against the petitioner from using it

in any manner. {Para 2}

3. The learned Family Court initially passed an order,

which was challenged before this Court, culminating in a judgment

remanding the matter; and thereupon the learned Court

reconsidered the matter, which has now led to Ext.P10 order.

4. Pertinently, through Ext.P10, I.A.No.1/2021 filed by the

petitioner seeking permanent prohibitory injunction against the

respondent from entering into the two shop rooms has been

rejected; but the latter's application, namely I.A.No.10/2022, has

been allowed, thus restraining the former from using the

trademark “CALLUNA”, with a consequential direction to him to remove it from the name boards/hoardings and social media,

wherever he has displayed/used in his personal capacity.

 Obviously, an injunction against the petitioner, to remove the name boards, prima facie, can be interpreted to the prejudice of the respondent because, going by the findings of the learned Family Court, she is entitled to be in charge of the shop room, at least equally with the petitioner.

9. That apart, when the specific case of the petitioner

was that a counterclaim seeking a roving order as now asserted by

Sri.Manu G.Nair is not maintainable, it has not been considered by

the learned Court in that perspective, but it appears to have gone

on on the assumption that what has been sought for is confined to

the subject matter. This is indubitable because, nowhere in the

impugned order is there any discussion by the learned Family

Court whether a counterclaim, which runs beyond the original

petition particularly with respect to shops which are not part of

the subject matter, would be maintainable; but it has proceeded on the impression that the injunction has been sought only as against  such subject matter.

11. In the afore circumstances, we allow this original

petition and set aside Ext.P10 to the extent impugned, namely qua

I.A.No.10/2022; with a consequential direction to the learned

Family Court to reconsider the said application after affording

necessary opportunities to both sides, thus culminating in an

appropriate fresh order expeditiously.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (FC) NO. 591 OF 2024

C. K. CHANDRAN Vs  MANJU, 

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN

&  MRS. JUSTICE M.B. SNEHALATHA

Dated: 10.10.2024.

Citation: 2024:KER:77983

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Allah HC: Wife Declining To Cohabit With Husband By Forcing Him To Live In Separate Room Amounts To mental Cruelty to husband

 Cohabitation is an essential part of a matrimonial relationship and if the wife declines to cohabit with the husband by forcing him to live in a separate room, she deprives him of his conjugal rights, which will have an adverse impact on his mental and physical well being and which will amount to both physical and mental cruelty. The plaintiff’s allegation of being wrongfully deprived of his conjugal rights has not been controverted by the defendant-respondent and the same has been admitted by implication. {Para 20}

21. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the considered view that there was sufficient evidence to prove the grounds of cruelty pleaded by the plaintiff-appellant for grant of a decree of divorce the plaintiff has successfully proved by his ex-parte evidence that the defendant was treating him with cruelty.

 ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :-FIRST APPEAL No. - 32 of 2023

Jitendra Kumar Srivastava Vs  Smt. Sweta Srivastava

Coram: Hon’ble Rajan Roy J & Hon’ble Subhash Vidyarthi J.

Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC-LKO:57446-DB.

Date: 22.08.2024.

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Under which circumstances the court must waive the cooling off period in petition for divorce by mutual consent?

 Normally, we come across cases where parties continue to fight, though there is no possibility of reconciliation. In such cases, the parties are encouraged to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement and are even referred for mediation so that they can put an end to the litigation. However, when the parties apply for divorce by mutual consent, they have taken a conscious decision to separate and thus have shown a reasonable approach. Such a decision shows that they have decided to move ahead, and thus, there is every chance of rehabilitation. The newly married couple not being able to reside together, or a couple married for quite some time is unable to continue to stay together for various reasons, itself would be a mental agony. Thus, once the Court is satisfied that the parties have taken a conscious decision to separate and move ahead and that there is no possibility of reconciliation, the Court should adopt a realistic approach and exercise the discretion to waive the waiting period. Hence, it is the duty of the Court to assist the parties by exercising the discretion to waive the cooling off period and free them from the stress of their application for divorce remaining pending. {Para 9}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 9369 of 2024

In Re: Sneha Akshay Garg and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gauri Godse, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4846/2024

Decided On: 25.07.2024.

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Whether mental cruelty remedy has reached its limit or it needs further attention?

 The concept of mental cruelty as a remedy in Indian law has evolved significantly over the years, yet it continues to need further attention and development. Let's delve into the concept of mental cruelty within the context of Indian law, and evaluate whether it has reached its limits or requires further refinement.

Understanding Mental Cruelty in Indian Law

1. Definition and Context:

• Mental cruelty refers to conduct that inflicts mental pain and suffering on the spouse, making it impossible for them to continue living with their partner.
• Unlike physical cruelty, which involves bodily harm, mental cruelty involves emotional and psychological abuse.

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Supreme Court: The Courts ought not to prematurely and without identification of individual instances of ‘alienating behaviour’, label any parent as propagator and/or potential promoter of such behaviour

 Psychologists term it as “The Parental Alienation Syndrome” [The Parental Alienation Syndrome was originally described by Dr. Richard Gardner in “Recent Developments in Child Custody Litigation”, The Academy Forum, Vol. 29, No. 2 : The American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 1985]. It has at least two psychological destructive effects:

(i) First, it puts the child squarely in the middle of a contest of loyalty, a contest which cannot possibly be won. The child is asked to choose who is the preferred parent. No matter whatever is the choice, the child is very likely to end up feeling painfully guilty and confused. This is because in the overwhelming majority of cases, what the child wants and needs is to continue a relationship with each parent, as independent as possible from their own conflicts.

(ii) Second, the child is required to make a shift in assessing reality. One parent is presented as being totally to blame for all problems, and as someone who is devoid of any positive characteristics. Both of these assertions represent one parent's distortions of reality.”

18. The aforesaid submission found favour with the High Court. Pertinently, the High Court in the Impugned Order observed that the possibility of the Minor Children having been influenced against the Respondent, could not be ruled out.

19. We find ourselves unable to agree with the High Court - in our considered opinion, the High Court has failed to appreciate the intricacies and complexities of the relationship between the parties and accordingly, proceeded to entertain allegations of PAS on an unsubstantiated basis.

20. PAS is a thoroughly convoluted and intricate phenomenon that requires serious consideration and deliberation. In our considered opinion, recognising and appreciating the repercussions of PAS certainly shed light on the realities of long-drawn and bitter custody and divorce litigation(s) on a certain identified sect of families, however, it is equally important for us to remember that there can no straitjacket formula to invoke the principle laid down by this Court in Vivek Singh (Supra).

21. The role of a Court vis-à-vis allegation(s) of PAS came to be considered recently by an English Court i.e., the High Court of Justice Family Division in Re C (‘parental alienation’; instruction of expert), [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam). Pertinently, the Court reflected on the changing narrative in relation to PAS - placed before the Court therein, by an expert body i.e., the Association of Clinical Psychologists - UK (“ACP”) and thereafter observed as under:

“103. Before leaving this part of the appeal, one particular paragraph in the ACP skeleton argument deserves to be widely understood and, I would strongly urge, accepted:

‘Much like an allegation of domestic abuse; the decision about whether or not a parent has alienated a child is a question of fact for the Court to resolve and not a diagnosis that can or should be offered by a psychologist. For these purposes, the ACP-UK wishes to emphasise that “parental alienation” is not a syndrome capable of being diagnosed, but a process of manipulation of children perpetrated by one parent against the other through, what are termed as, “alienating behaviours”. It is, fundamentally, a question of fact.’

It is not the purpose of this judgment to go further into the topic of alienation. Most Family judges have, for some time, regarded the label of ‘parental alienation’, and the suggestion that there may be a diagnosable syndrome of that name, as being unhelpful. What is important, as with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard, the identification of ‘alienating behaviour’ should be the court's focus, rather than any quest to determine whether the label ‘parental alienation’ can be applied.”

22. We find ourselves in agreement with the aforesaid position. Courts ought not to prematurely and without identification of individual instances of ‘alienating behaviour’, label any parent as propagator and/or potential promoter of such behaviour. The aforesaid label has far-reaching implications which must not be imputed or attributed to an individual parent routinely.

23. Accordingly, it is our considered opinion that Courts must endeavour to identify individual instances of ‘alienating behaviour’ in order to invoke the principle of parental alienation so as to overcome the preference indicated by the minor children.5

24. In the instant appeal, the Family Court has categorically recorded that there was nothing on record to suggest that the interests and welfare of the Minor Children were in any manner affected during their stay with the Appellant. Additionally, the Learned Single Judge of the High Court interacted with the Minor Children on 24.02.2020 i.e., a period of close to 4.5 (four and a half) years after the alleged incident on 08.08.2015, and categorically recorded that the Minor Children expressed no overt preference amongst their parents - the aforesaid observation by the Learned Single Judge, is crucial as it underscores that while the relationship between the parties may have been strained; the Minor Children could not be said to have exhibited any indication of ‘parental alienation’ i.e., there was no overt preference expressed by the Minor Children between the parents and thus, the foundation for any claim of parental alienation was clearly absent. The aforesaid position is also supported by materials on record to suggest that (i) the Minor Children are cognisant and aware of the blame game being played inter se the parties; and (ii) that the Minor Children did not foster unbridled and prejudiced emotions towards the Respondent. Accordingly, we find that the Appellant could not have been said to have engaged or propagated ‘alienating behaviour’ as alleged by the Respondent.

25. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the High Court failed to appreciate the aforesaid nuance and proceeded on an unsubstantiated assumption i.e., that allegations of parental alienation could not be ruled out, despite the stark absence of any instances of ‘alienating behaviour’ having been identified by any Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the reliance placed on Vivek Singh (Supra) by the Respondent is misdirected and the High Court erred in law and in fact whilst relying on the said decision.

26. Accordingly, on an overall consideration, we are convinced that the High Court was neither correct nor justified in interfering with the well-considered and reasoned order passed by the Family Court granting custody of the Minor Children to the Appellant for the reasons recorded above.

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.)

Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh Vs Sugandhi Aggarwal 

Civil Appeal No(S). of 2024 

Decided on May 8, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 847.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

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Bombay HC: Although Adultery Is Grounds For Divorce, It Can't Be A Ground To Deny Child's Custody

 The submission made on behalf of the petitioner/husband as regards the adulterous behavior of the respondent/wife, according to me, these are the allegations which are made in the marriage petition by Husband before Family Court, filed in the year 2020. The said allegation has to be proved by leading evidence before the Family Court. Therefore, based on the allegations, the doubt as to whether the custody can be given to the wife will have no bearing. There is no doubt as held by the various judgments that not a good wife is not necessarily that she is not a good mother. {Para 45}

46. In the present case as regards, the allegations made by

Husband are still to be proved. In the judgment of Vineet Gupta

Vs. Mukta Aggarwal reported in 2024 SCC Online Del 678, it has

been held that even though the allegations are proved as regards

the wife’s extra martial affair, still as far as the custody of the

minor children is concerned, in a given case, the same can be

granted to the wife.

47. Adultery is in any case a ground for divorce, however

the same can’t be a ground for not granting custody.

48. Hence, this writ petition fails. No costs.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.4060 OF 2024

Petitioner  V/s.  S

CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

Dated:  19 APRIL 2024.

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Whether family court mumbai can entertain divorce petition on the ground that marriage reception took place at mumbai?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION :

13. The question for determination in the present proceedings is whether the Family Court at Mumbai has jurisdiction to try and entertain under section 19 (iii) of Hindu Marriage Act, the Divorce Petition filed by Husband under Section 13 (1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act ?

14. There is no dispute between the parties that all the rituals of the marriage took place on 7 June, 2015 at Jodhpur, Rajasthan. In Mumbai, there was only a wedding reception on 11 June, 2015. In my view, there can't be any doubt that a wedding reception can't be called as a part of marriage ritual.

15. Admittedly, for a period of less than 10 days, the husband and wife stayed in the home of the parents of husband at Mumbai and thereafter the husband left for U.S.A. on 15 June, 2015 and the wife left on 1 August, 2015 to U.S.A. there is no dispute that the husband and the wife started living separately from 15 October, 2019 therefore, approximately around four years they stayed together in U.S.A. and occasionally in these four years, visited India.

16. Admittedly the wife has filed the divorce petition in U.S.A. and the husband has filed a divorce petition in Family Court at Mumbai. The fact that the wife has filed a divorce petition at U.S.A. this itself shows that the wife is not admitting the jurisdiction of Family Court in Mumbai, Maharashtra.

21. In the present proceedings, the husband was in U.S.A. at the time of presentation of Divorce Petition in Mumbai, which was notarized in U.S.A. so therefore, the Divorce Petition could not be filed in Mumbai, as Section 19 (iv) of the Hindu Marriage Act, contemplates that the Divorce Petition can be filed at the place where petitioner is residing, if the wife is residing outside India.

29. In the present proceedings the Husband has notarized his petition in U.S.A. and filed it in Mumbai through Power of Attorney. In my opinion in the present proceedings, the last residing together of the couple would be U.S.A., and it can't be Mumbai, where the couple briefly stayed for less than 10 days immediately after marriage, in the home of parents of Husband, hence the Family Court in Mumbai will have no jurisdiction, under sub-section (iii) of 19 of Hindu Marriage Act, to entertain Divorce Petition in Mumbai.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 8829 of 2023

Decided On: 15.04.2024

Shikha Lodha Vs. Suketu Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajesh S. Patil, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2423/2024.

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What basic principles the court should follow while deciding child custody dispute?

Principles governing custody of minor children

53. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well-settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and complex question as to custody of minor, a Court of law should keep in mind relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a humane problem and is required to be solved with human touch. A Court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict Rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to give due weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the Court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the Court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.

55. We are unable to appreciate the approach of the Courts below. This Court in catena of decisions has held that the controlling consideration governing the custody of children is the welfare of children and not the right of their parents.

[Emphasis supplied]

14. This Court has consistently held that welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and not personal law and statute. In Ashish Ranjan v. Anupam Tandon and Anr. MANU/SC/1013/2010 : 2010:INSC:836 : (2010) 14 SCC 274, this Court held as under:

19. The statutory provisions dealing with the custody of the child under any personal law cannot and must not supersede the paramount consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor. In fact, no statute on the subject, can ignore, eschew or obliterate the vital factor of the welfare of the minor.

16. Another principle of law which is settled with reference to custody of the child is the wish of the child, if she is capable of. Reference can be made to Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka and ors.' case (supra). It was held as under:

13. We have stated earlier that the question 'what is the wish/desire of the child' can be ascertained through interaction, but then, the question as to 'what would be the best interest of the child' is a matter to be decided by the court taking into account all the relevant circumstances.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1345 of 2024.

Decided On: 04.03.2024

Shazia Aman Khan and Ors. Vs. The State of Orissa and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Rajesh Bindal, J.

Citation:- MANU/SC/0160/2024.

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Bombay HC: Magistrate Can't Order Imprisonment For More Than 12 Months' Default In Maintenance In A Single Application

The issue has already been settled by division bench of this Court in the case of Gorakshnath Khandu Bagal (supra) and in one application 12 defaults can be clubbed together and after every 12 defaults a separate application will have to be filed, and as such, the Magistrate may impose imprisonment for term of 12 which is the outer limit. However, it needs to be noted that for the subsequent default, a separate application can be filed for which separate imprisonment can be imposed subject to the limitation prescribed by the proviso that the same is filed within a period of one year from date which it becomes due. {Para 22}

23. Now coming to the facts of the present case, upon query by this

Court, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2 submitted that the issuance of warrant was pursuant to the application dated 27th July, 2023 annexed at Page 57 of the Petition. Perusal of the application indicates that the pleading is that there is default of 59 months and the intermittent payments made by the Petitioner were set out. Considering the proviso to Section 125(3) of CR.P.C, it was incumbent upon the Metropolitan Magistrate to first consider whether the application has been filed in respect of default of monthly maintenance for period of 12 months preceding the application, which was not done. The impugned order does not indicate any finding on the aspect of period of default and it is only observed that there is default of 47 months when the application states that there is default of 59 months. The Petitioner has been sentenced to simple imprisonment for period of 47 months for default of 47 months without noticing the outer limit on power of the Magistrate to impose sentence of imprisonment which is set out in the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 125.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (ST) NO.2435 OF 2024

J Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : SHARMILA U. DESHMUKH, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : FEBRUARY 26, 2024

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Whether the family court should refuse to give maintenance to wife if she is not ready to serve husband’s mother and maternal grandmother?

For disposal of this Criminal Revision following point of

determination are being framed:

(i) Whether the opposite party No.1-wife has refused to live

with her husband without any sufficient cause, if so its

effect? {Para 9}

 21. In view of the above in the case in hand, the issue between the

husband and wife is that the wife is not agree to serve the old aged mother in-law and maternal grandmother-in-law, who are respectively 75 years and 95 years old. She creates pressure upon her husband to live separate from his mother and maternal grandmother. It is the very reason; this ground is not found sufficient that’s why the legislature while enacted under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided one of the grounds for denial the maintenance, if wife refuses to reside with the husband without any reasonable cause.

22. In Constitution of India under Article 51-A of Part IV-A, wherein the fundamental duties of the citizen of India are enumerated in Clause (f), it is provided ‘to value and preserve the reach heritage of our composite culture’. It is the culture in India to serve the old aged mother-in-law or grandmother-in-law as the case may by the wife in order to preserve this culture. It was obligatory on the part of wife to serve her husband’s mother and maternal grandmother and not to insist for unreasonable demand to live separate from his old aged mother-in-law and the maternal grandmother-inlaw. Accordingly, the point of determination No.1 is decided in favourt of the petitioner-husband and against the opposite party No.1-wife.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Criminal Revision No.172 of 2022

Rudra Narayan Ray Vs  Piyali Ray Chatterjee, 

CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHASH CHAND

 Pronounced on:22/01/2024.

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Whether husband can refuse to pay maintenance to wife if she is residing in matrimonial house?

The mere fact that she is residing in the matrimonial home is not a pretext to disentitle her to a reasonable amount of maintenance. She still needs some amount towards food, medicine, clothes and educational expenses for the child. Thus, considering the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and minor son are parameters to be considered while determining the sufficiency and the reasonableness of the quantum of interim maintenance to be adjudged so that the wife is able to maintain herself and the minor son in reasonable comfort.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 11007 OF 2023

Rajkumar Amruthrao Guddadigi, Vs Shilaja Rajkumar Guddadigi,

CORAM : DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 4th January 2024.

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Important highlights of SC Judgment Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India (2023 INSC 920)

 1. No Fundamental Right To Marry.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that there was not fundamental, unequivocal right to marry in India.

2. On Striking Down The Special Marriage Act & Allied Laws

Another point on which the entire bench agreed was to not strike or read the Special Marriage Act (SMA) and its allied laws down.

3. On Rights Of Transgender Persons To Marry

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Whether the court should issue arrest warrant against respondent for recovery of maintenance in proceeding under DV Act without recording reasons?

  The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), considered the various provisions under different acts such as Hindu Marriage Act, Family Courts Act, CPC, Code of Criminal Procedure and D.V. Act in relation to execution of the order granting maintenance to the complainant. The Hon'ble Apex Court also took note of various powers available with the concerned Court for enforcement of the order of maintenance. Considering all the circumstances and the various provisions as contained in different Acts with regard to the enforcement of order of maintenance, the following directions were issued:

“(e). Enforcement/Execution of orders of maintenance

132. For enforcement/execution of orders of maintenance, it is directed that an order or decree of maintenance may be enforced under Section 28-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 20(6) of the DV Act; and Section 128 of CrPC, as may be applicable. The order of maintenance may be enforced as a money decree of a civil court as per the provisions of the CPC, more particularly Sections 51, 55, 58, 60 read with Order 21.”

{Para 17}

18. In terms of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court, any order of maintenance, thus, can be enforced under the provisions of the relevant Actas a money decree of Civil Court as per the provisions of CPC.

19. Under the provisions of the DV Act, Magistrate has power to direct the employer of the debtor to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the Court a portion of the wages or salary for the purpose of satisfaction of the maintenance amount.

20. Further, if any, amount of maintenance is not paid, the concerned Executing Court can follow the procedure under Order 21 of the CPC to ensure the execution. The decree holder in terms of Order 21 Rule 37 is also entitled to file an appropriate application for the execution of a decree, seeking arrest and detention of the judgment debtor and civil imprisonment, in case of non satisfaction of the decretal amount. In terms of the procedure provided, the Court on such application at first instance, issues a notice calling upon the judgment debtor to appear before the Court on the day specified in the notice and to show cause as to why he should not be committed to civil imprisonment. The Court, however, is within its power and may decide not to issue such notice and proceed with passing the order if it is satisfied on an affidavit being filed by the decree holder or otherwise that the judgment debtor with the object of delaying the execution is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court is also empowered to issue warrant of arrest in case the judgment debtor does not appear pursuant to the notice issued under Order 21 Rule 37 of the CPC.

21. From the perusal of the impugned order, it is not clear whether the impugned order directing issuance of warrant of arrest was passed exercising power under Order 21 of the CPC or whether for the reason of non-appearance of the decree holder on the particular date.

22. It is seen from the record that the petitioner had not given any reason whatsoever for his non-appearance before the Court on the said date. It is also not denied by the petitioner that he was aware that the matter was listed before the concerned Court on 24.06.2022 and despite being aware neither did he file any application for exemption nor authorized any counsel to appear on his behalf on the said date.

23. The Courts are within its power to pass appropriate orders in case a party does not appear without any sufficient cause. Such orders can be in the nature of proceeding ex-parte, striking off the defence and if the Court is satisfied that such absence is with the object of delaying the proceedings, it is also empowered to pass an appropriate order issuing a warrant of arrest after recording such satisfaction. However, that depends on the nature of case and the stage of the proceeding.

24. It is not in doubt that any order for issuance of warrant of arrest is not to be passed unless it is absolutely necessary. The warrants, be it bailable or non-bailable has an effect of interference with the personal liberty of a person and unless the Court is satisfied that such order is necessary for the purpose of proceeding further in the case, the same should not be passed.

25. As discussed above, an order of maintenance has to be enforced under the provisions of the relevant Act as a money decree of a Civil Court. The Courts, therefore, are empowered to pass any order within the four corners of the applicable laws.

26. It is clear from the perusal of the impugned order that the Magistrate has failed to record any reason why a recourse to issuance of the warrant of arrest was taken in the present case. From the record of the proceedings as produced before this court, it is also apparent that the petitioner had been appearing before the learned Executing Court regularly. In such circumstances, the learned Executing Court, in my opinion, ought not to have proceeded with the issuance of warrant of arrest without recording any reasons as to why such recourse was taken.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Amit Mahajan, J.)

Karan Arora Vs State (NCT of Delhi).

CRL.M.C. 3054/2022 and CRL.M.A. 12844/2022

Decided on July 3, 2023

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3781.

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Questions and answers on law(Part 58)

Q No. 1 :- How many times preamble of constitution was amended?

Ans:- The Preamble has been amended only once so far, in 1976, by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. The amendment added three new words:

1. Socialist
2. Secular
3. Integrity. It also changed "unity of the nation" to "unity and integrity of the nation

Q No. 2:- Which of the following Amendment of the Constitution deals with reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) in education and public employment?

Ans:- 103rd Constitutional Amendment provides 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) in education and public employment.

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