Smt. Pusalkar has argued before us in-person that she was removed from her matrimonial home through the statutory mechanism contained in Section 95A of the 1976 Act, which bore the threats of penal measure and summary eviction process. But this was during the time the decree of judicial separation remained operative. She traces the root of her ‘dishousing’ to a notice dated 10th July 2000 (bearing no. MBR & RB/FN/GN/2136 of 2000) issued by the Board under the 1976 Act. Her case is that it is composite statutory obligation of MHADA, the builder and her husband to rehouse her in her matrimonial home. It is a fact that the said respondents functioned under a statutory scheme while redeveloping the property, commencing from approval of the development scheme, vacating the old building and re-entry into the allocated portion of the redeveloped premises by her husband’s family. The appellant was also dishoused from the said building under that scheme. But in our opinion, when a builder has discharged his obligation by accommodating the original owners in the redeveloped
portion as per such a scheme, a lady married into that family would not be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce her right to matrimonial home citing the provisions of the said statute, if her husband does not permit her to reside in the allocated portion. She does not have any independent claim on title or interest to that property having its genesis in that statute. Her claim of right to reside in her matrimonial home is sought to be projected by her as collateral to the statutory right of her husband to be rehoused or rehabilitated in the new building. But her right to reside in her matrimonial home stands detached from and is independent of the statutory scheme under the said Act. Neither MHADA, nor the builder can have any further legal obligation to rehouse her. She is staking her claim as a constructive beneficiary of the redevelopment scheme. But our opinion is that the right she is seeking to enforce, though flows from a set of events on the basis of which her husband can claim rehabilitation, is actually anchored to an independent legal principle under the Family Law. We accept that she was an occupier under Section 2 (25) of the 1976 Act, but such occupier status was dependent upon her husband’s independent right as part owner of the property. Her right flowing from her matrimonial status cannot get diffused with her right of rehousing or rehabilitation under the statutory scheme. Her right to reside in her matrimonial home does not flow from the 1976 Act.
Though she was dishoused as an occupier applying the provisions of the 1976 Act, claim of her rehousing is based on her status as wife of the respondent no. 8. In our opinion, such claim has to be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court or the Family Court or any other forum the law may prescribe. Such right of the appellant cannot be diffused with the right of her husband under the 1976 Act, whose family property, part of which he is the owner, has been reconstructed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7231 OF 2012
AISHWARYA ATUL PUSALKAR Vs MAHARASHTRA HOUSING & AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
Dated: 27 April, 2020.
